{ "id": 51200, "name": "Millard James RUSSEY v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Russey v. State", "decision_date": "1999-02-18", "docket_number": "CR 98-383", "first_page": "401", "last_page": "406", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "336 Ark. 401" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "985 S.W.2d 316" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "331 Ark. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604784 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(9)" }, { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51338 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715390 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" }, { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447563 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "660" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0647-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 489, "char_count": 8007, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.607797957359516e-07, "percentile": 0.6850607892583699 }, "sha256": "64a36397e6525c5502934f50cebc213da4e40b8f9523cab1e476af46db8045e1", "simhash": "1:fa6f9ff9634fcb1e", "word_count": 1364 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:29:35.905877+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Millard James RUSSEY v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Millard James Russey was charged as a habitual offender charged as a habitual offender with the rape of a female victim who was fifteen years old at the time of the crime. A jury found Russey guilty and sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, Russey raises two points for reversal, but neither point has merit.\nRussey first argues the trial court erred in fading to grant his motion to suppress a blood sample taken from him soon after the police picked up Russey as the rape suspect. He points out that the State had the burden to show he had freely and voluntarily consented to the drawing of his blood and no actual or implied duress or coercion was exercised by the officers.\nThe law is settled that the taking of blood by a law enforcement officer does amount to a Fourth Amendment search and seizure, but a consensual search does not run afoul of the amendment. Mills v. State, 322 Ark. 647, 660, 910 S.W.2d 682, 689 (1995). We also have said that a consensual taking of blood does not require a court order when the drawing is voluntary. Id.; cf. Ark. R. Crim. P. 18.1(a)(vii). Here, then, the question is whether Russey voluntarily agreed to the taking of his blood. In resolving this issue, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and considers the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the State proved that consent to search was freely and voluntarily given without actual or implied duress or coercion. Mills, 322 Ark. at 660, 910 S.W.2d at 689; Scroggins v. State, 268 Ark. 261, 263, 595 S.W.2d 219, 220 (1980). We will affirm a finding of voluntariness unless that finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.\nRussey claims that any consent that he gave to draw blood resulted from Gurdon City Marshall David Childres\u2019s threat to take action against Russey on some \u201chot checks\u201d he was previously alleged to have \u201cforged\u201d at the local Jiffy Mart. Russey said that Childres was armed with a gun when he picked up Russey as a rape suspect and took him to the Gurdon police station, where he met Wes Sossamon, a criminal investigator with the Clark County Sheriff\u2019s Office. Russey claims Sossamon immediately transported him to an Arkadelphia hospital where his blood was drawn. He further asserts he did not sign any consent form for any blood samples until after Sossamon returned him to the police station. Russey emphasized that Officer Childres had been actively involved in working with Russey regarding the \u201chot check\u201d problems and would give Russey a receipt for payments he made to pay off his bad checks. Russey testified that he only cooperated and consented to giving a blood sample because Childres had told him there was a new hot check and that Childers would turn the checks over to the prosecutor if he did not cooperate with Sossamon. He added, \u201cI lied when I said on the tape that I voluntarily consented to the blood sample because Mr. Childres was standing in the door and had threatened me with this here and held this over my head and I did not want to go to jail.\u201d\nOfficers Childres and Sossamon largely denied Russey\u2019s version of what led to his signing the consent form to allow his blood to be drawn. Childres said that he did assist Russey in making his payments to pay off the Jiffy Mart checks, but related Russey had paid all but twenty dollars owed on them. Childres argued that, with Russey\u2019s permission, he took Russey to the police station where Officer Sossamon, alone, interviewed him. Childres testified that he could not say what Sossamon and Russey \u201ctalked about.\u201d Childres denied having told Russey that Childres would turn Russey\u2019s checks over to the prosecutor if Russey did not cooperate with Sossamon.\nSossamon testified that when he interviewed Russey, he told Russey that he was free to go and was not required to cooperate with the investigation. He said that, at the time of the interview, he was aware of Russey\u2019s bad checks. After telling Russey that he was a suspect, Sossamon said that Russey signed a consent form waiving his rights and authorizing his blood to be drawn. Sossamon related that Russey had a lengthy criminal record and was well acquainted with his legal rights in these circumstances. Sossamon also contradicted Russey\u2019s version of when the blood was drawn, stating that Russey\u2019s blood was drawn at the hospital after he had signed the consent form. Sossoman further related that Russey signed a Miranda waiver after the blood was drawn.\nFaced with the different versions of what led to when and why Russey consented to his giving a blood sample to Officer Sossamon, the trial court was not required to believe Russey\u2019s version of events. Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 404, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses in this instance was for the trial court to weigh and assess. Mills, 322 Ark. at 661, 910 S.W.2d at 689, and in doing so here, the trial court obviously resolved the conflicts in testimony against Russey\u2019s explanation of what had occurred, holding his consent had been given voluntarily and without duress or coercion. We cannot say the trial court was clearly erroneous.\nIn his second point for reversal, Russey argues the trial court erred in faffing to grant his motions for directed verdict. As we have often stated, motions for directed verdict are treated as challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Marta v. State, 336 Ark. 67, 983 S.W.2d 924 (1999). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, this court does not weigh the evidence, but simply determines whether the evidence in support of the verdict is substantial, which is defined as direct or circumstantial evidence that is forceful enough to compel a conclusion and which goes beyond mere speculation or conjecture. Id. In determining whether there is substantial evidence, this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id.\nIn this case, Russey was charged with engaging in sexual intercourse with a female by forcible compulsion in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103 (Repl. 1993). Sexual intercourse is defined as the \u201cpenetration, however slight, of the labia by a penis,\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-101(9) (Supp. 1995), and forcible compulsion is defined as \u201cphysical force or a threat, express or implied, of death or physical injury to or kidnapping of any person.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-101(2) (Supp. 1995). This court has also held repeatedly that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Freeman v. State, 331 Ark. 130, 959 S.W.2d 400 (1998).\nAt trial, the rape victim identified Russey as the man who attacked and forced her to have sexual intercourse while holding a knife to her throat. The State presented evidence that, after the victim reported that she had been raped, a physical exam was conducted and the medical findings were consistent with her having had a forceful sexual encounter. The examining physician testified that he performed a vaginal swab on the victim, and the semen sample collected was sent for DNA profiling. The forensic expert who performed the DNA testing testified that DNA on the vaginal swab from the victim was consistent with the DNA test performed on the blood sample recovered from Russey. This alone was substantial evidence to show that the victim sustained a rape and that Russey was the perpetrator. Therefore, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling rejecting Russey\u2019s motion for directed verdict.\nPursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), the record has been examined and reviewed for all errors prejudicial to Russey, and none was found.\nChildres made an audiotape during questioning on which Russey answered that he voluntarily gave a sample of his blood.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Alvin Schay, for appellant.", "Winston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mac Golden, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Millard James RUSSEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 98-383\n985 S.W.2d 316\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 18, 1999\nAlvin Schay, for appellant.\nWinston Bryant, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mac Golden, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0401-01", "first_page_order": 427, "last_page_order": 432 }