{
  "id": 1240940,
  "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. James L. SHEPPARD",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sheppard",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of Arkansas v. James L. SHEPPARD"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "W. H.\u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThis case presents an interlocutory appeal from a trial court\u2019s order suppressing testimony regarding the appellee\u2019s verbal statements to an Arkansas State Police investigator. Our jurisdiction is authorized pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. Rule 1-2(a)(8) (1998) and Ark. R. App. P.\u2014Crim. 3(a). The appellant State of Arkansas contends that the trial court clearly erred by applying an incorrect standard to determine the statements\u2019 admissibility. We agree, and we reverse.\nOn July 23, 1996, Kimberly Warren of the Arkansas State Police interviewed the appellee, James L. Sheppard, and his wife at Arkansas Childrens\u2019 Hospital regarding the possible battery of the Sheppard\u2019s eight-week old baby. Prior to taking appellee\u2019s statement, Warren mirandized Sheppard. Warren testified that her standard procedure for investigating literate adults is to talk with the person, obtain information, write out a summary, and instruct the person to read the statement for accuracy and initial any additions or deletions to the statement. Following her interview with Sheppard, Warren wrote a statement summarizing the interview, and Sheppard read and signed the statement, making one correction. Subsequently, Sheppard was charged by information with first-degree battery.\nDuring a hearing on June 20, 1997, Sheppard argued that the written statement was involuntary and moved for its suppression. He also disputed the truthfulness of the written statement. Ultimately, the trial court determined that the written statement was not admissible as Sheppard\u2019s statement because it was \u201cnot the statement of the defendant at all.\u201d Significandy, the trial court noted that it did not find any involuntariness in the taking of the statement but characterized the statement in the officer\u2019s words as \u201cinherently nontrustworthy.\u201d Additionally, the trial court remarked that it suppressed the statement \u201cnot because what was said that day violates any Miranda or any voluntariness\u201d but because \u201cwhat we have here is suspect to the point that the State can\u2019t meet its burden of proving that this represents a voluntary statement of the defendant.\u201d\nFollowing the suppression of the written statement, the State queried whether Investigator Warren could testify as to her memory of what Sheppard said during the interview. On May 11, 1998, the State filed a proffer of three statements that Investigator Warren would testify to based upon her \u201cindependent recollection\u201d and not upon her \u201cpolice report.\u201d Specifically, the proffer included the following expected testimony:\n1. Mr. Sheppard told me that he was trying to get the baby to sleep and that he was feeling frustrated and tired.\n2. Mr. Sheppard told me that he had slammed the baby down on his leg and he was sitting in front of a coffee table.\n3. I then inquired if the baby could have hit the coffee table, and he stated, \u201cOh my God yes, that\u2019s what happened.\u201d\nOn May 20, 1998, the trial court suppressed Investigator Warren\u2019s proffered testimony. The trial court indicated that the testimony \u201cabsolutely lack[ed] the trustworthiness that statements ought to have to be admitted into evidence.\u201d Further, the trial court found it \u201cabsolutely incredible that [Warren] could remember a statement being made that was much more damning than anything in the statement that she initially presented.\u201d From the trial court\u2019s order suppressing Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony, comes the instant appeal.\nSuppression of testimony regarding appellee\u2019s statement\nThe State\u2019s sole point in this interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court\u2019s suppression of Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony regarding statements made by the appellee to Warren during an interview at Arkansas Childrens\u2019 Hospital. In Gooden v. State, 295 Ark. 385, 393, 749 S.W.2d 657, 662 (1988), we saw no difference in the admissibility of a written summary of a defendant\u2019s statement as opposed to witness testimony regarding that statement. Here, although the trial court ruled that the written statement was inadmissible, the State\u2019s subsequent attempt to introduce evidence regarding that statement, via Warren\u2019s testimony, marks a continuation or revisiting of the prior issue. Accordingly, we apply the same standard for determining the admissibility of Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony as we would apply in evaluating the admissibility of the written statement. See Gooden, 295 Ark. at 392-93, 749 S.W.2d at 661-62.\nNotably, Sheppard moved to suppress Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony based upon a lack of voluntariness, but the trial court excluded the testimony because it believed that the statements were untrustworthy. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that confessions be voluntary in order to be admissible at trial. Due process also requires that a defendant is entitled to \u201ca fair hearing and a rehable determination on the issue of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth or falsity of the corfession.\u201d Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377 (1964) (citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the State suggests that the trial court should have decided only whether Investigator Warren\u2019s conduct \u201cwas such as to overbear [appellee\u2019s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.\u201d See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961). Significantly, that question should be answered \u201cwith complete disregard of whether or not [appellee] in fact spoke the truth.\u201d Id.\nWhen we review the voluntariness of confessions, this court makes an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances and reverses the trial court only if its decision was clearly erroneous. See Hood v. State, 329 Ark. 21, 30, 947 S.W.2d 328, 333 (1997). In reaching its decision, this court may consider the accused\u2019s age, education, and intelligence, whether the accused was advised of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, the use of physical punishment, the statement of the interrogating officers, and the accused\u2019s vulnerability. Hood, 329 Ark. at 30-31, 947 S.W.2d at 333.\nThe State argues that the ultimate issue of the statement\u2019s reliability is a question for the jury as fact-finder and not for the trial court at a suppression hearing on voluntariness. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986). We agree. Here, the trial court acknowledged that it \u201cautomatically suspects any statement that is not recorded or not in the handwriting of the person giving the statement.\u201d However, this reasoning bears upon the statement\u2019s credibility, an issue of fact for the jury, and not upon the statement\u2019s voluntariness, an issue of law for the court.\nAppellee cites Moore v. State, 321 Ark. 249, 253, 903 S.W.2d 154, 156 (1995), in support of its position that \u201c[w]hen conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances of a confession is offered, it is the trial court\u2019s province to weigh the evidence and resolve the credibility of the witnesses.\u201d However, the circumstances of a confession relate to the issue of whether or not the statement was coerced or given voluntarily. None of the issues raised by the appellee concern any threat of coercion or other factor contributing to the statement\u2019s voluntariness. In fact, appellee\u2019s objections to Warren\u2019s competency as a witness and her capacity for truthfulness are matters that may be explored during cross-examination.\nHere, the record indicates that the trial court improperly focused upon Warren\u2019s credibility as a witness and the truthfulness of the statement rather than the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement. Given that the trial court found that appellee\u2019s statements were voluntary, Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony should have been admitted. The trial court was clearly erroneous in excluding Investigator Warren\u2019s testimony because it believed that she lacked credibility and that the statements were untruthful. Accordingly, we reverse.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "W. H.\u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly S. Terry, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.",
      "Theresa S. Nazario, Deputy Public Defender, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. James L. SHEPPARD\nCR 98-891\n987 S.W.2d 677\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 18, 1999\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kelly S. Terry, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nTheresa S. Nazario, Deputy Public Defender, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0001-01",
  "first_page_order": 25,
  "last_page_order": 30
}