{ "id": 243443, "name": "Eric Alan HAMEL v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Hamel v. State", "decision_date": "1999-10-14", "docket_number": "CR 98-23", "first_page": "769", "last_page": "771", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "338 Ark. 769" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "1 S.W.3d 434" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "297 Ark. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1891381 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/297/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369195 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369313 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9159422 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2107", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "487 U.S. 266", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1774898 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/487/0266-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 317, "char_count": 4724, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3792910399125094e-07, "percentile": 0.6401857791709092 }, "sha256": "d14293a7082fe96da8ba38fad7d6a66d5e935a618718a32029d3d09568ff93a3", "simhash": "1:9f4a814cd0527826", "word_count": 810 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:43:54.470477+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Eric Alan HAMEL v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nAppellant Eric Hamel appeals on the basis that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition for postconviction relief under Ark. R. Crim. P. 37, when that petition was received more than ninety days after judgment was entered against him. We discern no error in the trial court\u2019s dismissal and affirm.\nThe facts are not in dispute. Hamel pled guilty to a reduced charge of first-degree murder and was sentenced to forty years in prison with ten years suspended. On June 11, 1996, the judgment of conviction was entered against him in the Benton County Circuit Clerk\u2019s office. On September 5, 1996, which was eighty-six days after entry of judgment, Hamel placed his Rule 37 petition in the inmate mailing system at the Cummins Unit of the Department of Correction. The Legal Mail Log at the Cummins Unit substantiates this fact. On September 11, 1996, Hamel\u2019s petition was stamped filed in the Benton County Circuit Clerk\u2019s office. Because Hamel\u2019s petition was file-marked on the ninety-second day after entry of judgment, the trial court dismissed the petition.\nHamel\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition and urges this court to adopt the \u201cMailbox Rule,\u201d which provides that a pro se inmate files his or her petition at the time the petition is placed in the hands of prison officials for mailing. In support of his argument, Hamel cites us to the reasoning in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988), where the United States Supreme Court concluded that a notice of appeal in a habeas corpus case was filed when the petitioner delivered that notice to prison authorities for mailing. The rationale of the Court was that prison inmates were foreclosed from being able to monitor the progress of their appeals by virtue of their incarceration and were forced \u201cto entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail. . . .\u201d 487 U.S. at 271. The pertinent federal statute involved in Houston provided that appeals from a judgment shall not be brought \u201cunless the notice of appeal is filed within thirty days after the entry of such judgment.\u201d See 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2107. Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 4(a)(1) were even more specific with regard to the filing required. Both specified that the notice of appeal be filed \u201cwith the clerk of the district court.\u201d Be that as it may, the Court concluded that filing by pro se inmates occurred when the notice of appeal was delivered to prison authorities.\nThe State, on the other hand, urges this court to follow the plain language of our rule, which reads in pertinent part:\n(c) If a conviction was obtained on a plea of guilty, or the petitioner was found guilty at trial and did not appeal the judgment of conviction, a petition claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the appropriate drcuit court within ninety (90) days of the date of entry of judgment.\nArk. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c) (emphasis added). The State continues by citing caselaw where this court has held that the time limitations imposed in Rule 37 are jurisdictional in nature, and the circuit court may not grant relief on an untimely petition for postconviction relief. See, e.g., Seaton v. State, 324 Ark. 236, 920 S.W.2d 13 (1996). This court has further held that the date of filing a petition for postconviction relief is determinative of whether the trial court has jurisdiction to reach the merits of the case. See Benton v. State, 325 Ark. 246, 925 S.W.2d 401 (1996). The State, finally, emphasizes the point that this court has held that pro se inmates are required to conform to the rules of appellate procedure. See, e.g., Daffron v. State, 325 Ark. 411, 926 S.W.2d 662 (1996) (per curiam) (abstract deficiency).\nWe view our procedural rule, Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), as controlling in this case. That rule requires in language that is clear and unambiguous that the petition must be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety days of judgment. That, of course, did not occur in this case. Though Hamel argues vigorously that this court should adopt the reasoning of Houston v. Lack, supra, we decline to do so. This court has noted in a prior decision that the Houston case was no more than the Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of federal rules which have no applicability in our jurisdiction. See Key v. State, 297 Ark. 111, 759 S.W.2d 567 (1988) (per curiam).\nThe trial court correctly dismissed Hamel\u2019s petition for lack of jurisdiction.\nAffirmed.\nCorbin, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Craig Lambert, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Eric Alan HAMEL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 98-23\n1 S.W.3d 434\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 14, 1999\nCraig Lambert, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0769-01", "first_page_order": 799, "last_page_order": 801 }