{ "id": 130662, "name": "John Lee HUDDLESTON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Huddleston v. State", "decision_date": "1999-12-02", "docket_number": "CR 99-682", "first_page": "266", "last_page": "274", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "339 Ark. 266" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "5 S.W.3d 46" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "111 S.W.2d 844", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 147", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886909 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ark. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1885468 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/301/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "932 S.W.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862779 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" }, { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904370 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ark. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1885538 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/301/0513-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878646 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1755042 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 379", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895803 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0379-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902421 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453672 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "992 S.W.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 243602 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 1532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 S. Ct. 246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445669 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715515 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "61-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703799 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299" }, { "page": "221" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0294-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 714, "char_count": 13491, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.9015587946212273e-07, "percentile": 0.8451114331376076 }, "sha256": "1ecdd1c5ca01b8f7646866ca2c59f1276fcc96cccba205d570d3e619d87de417", "simhash": "1:4b6748a476a819e2", "word_count": 2167 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:54:09.164159+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "John Lee HUDDLESTON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nOn September 17, stjury ice. appellant, John Lee Huddleston, as a habitual offender and found him guilty of possession of amphetamine with intent to debver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court fined him $10,000.00 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to a ten-year term in the Arkansas Department of Correction. In light of appellant\u2019s sentence, our jurisdiction is warranted pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(2) (1999). On appeal, Huddleston contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds, (2) granting the State\u2019s motions in limine to exclude the testimony of three defense witnesses and the affidavit of a fourth witness, and (3) denying his motion for a new trial based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no merit in appellant\u2019s arguments, and we affirm the trial court. \u25a0\nFollowing his arrest on May 16, 1996, Huddleston was charged by information on May 20, 1996, with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. The arrest stemmed from an incident at the Englander Motel. While executing an arrest warrant for Kelly Mendoza, police officers entered Mendoza\u2019s motel room, also occupied by Mendoza\u2019s daughter and appellant. Appellant told the police to leave if they did not have a warrant and, after being informed that they did, appellant continued to interfere with Mendoza\u2019s arrest. Subsequently, Huddleston was arrested for interfering, and during a search of his clothing, police discovered two ounces of methamphetamine and saw other drug paraphernalia within plain view.\nI. Speedy trial\nHuddleston\u2019s first point on appeal submits that the State failed to timely prosecute him in violation of his right to a speedy trial. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1 and 28.2(a) require the State to try appellant within twelve months of the date of arrest or the filing of the information, whichever occurs first, here, May 16, 1996, excluding any periods of delay authorized by Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3. Although Huddleston\u2019s trial was ultimately held on September 17, 1998, on the date the trial court denied his motion, the trial was set for September 15, 1998, 852 days after his arrest. Therefore, the State has the burden of showing that the delay was the result of appellant\u2019s conduct or was otherwise justified. See Morgan u State, 333 Ark. 294, 299, 971 S.W.2d 219, 221 (1998). In this case, the State must show that at least 487 days were properly excludable to meet this burden.\nThe State contends that at least 569 days, resulting from appellant\u2019s or his counsel\u2019s requests for continuances, are excludable for speedy-trial purposes. Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3(c) permits the exclusion of the delay period resulting from a continuance granted at a defendant\u2019s or his counsel\u2019s request. See Smith v. State, 313 Ark. 93, 852 S.W.2d 109 (1993). Specifically, the State points to four periods of time chargeable to the appellant. First, pursuant to appellant\u2019s or his counsel\u2019s request, the trial court continued the case from August 30, 1996 to November 12, 1996, for a total of seventy-four days. Second, the trial court continued the case from December 9, 1996 to February 10, 1997, for sixty-three days. Third, the case was continued from May 12, 1997 to May 11, 1998, for 364 days, and, fourth, from July 8, 1998 to September 14, 1998, for 68 days. These four periods total 569 days, well in excess of the 487 days necessary to affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling. We agree that the State met its burden by demonstrating that the periods were properly excludable due to the requested continuances.\nEssentially, appellant argues that the trial court erred in charging certain periods to him because he demanded a speedy trial, in his lawyer\u2019s presence, and that his attorney requested a sixty-day continuance without consulting him, over his implied objection. However, Rule 28.3(c) permits the exclusion of periods resulting from a continuance granted at either the defendant\u2019s or his counsel\u2019s request. In fact, we have held that continuances granted at a defendant\u2019s attorney\u2019s request are excludable from the speedy-trial time, even if the defendant does not approve or is not consulted. Matthews v. State, 268 Ark. 484, 490, 598 S.W.2d 58, 61-62 (1980). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that Huddleston\u2019s right to a speedy trial was not violated, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s decision denying his motion to dismiss.\nII. Exclusion of defense testimony and affidavit\nAppellant\u2019s second point on appeal challenges the trial court\u2019s grant of the State\u2019s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of three defense witnesses, Gary Lee, Jimmy Cureton, and Lisa Didway, and the affidavit of a fourth witness, Ruth Cloud. On appeal, we will not reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion nor will we reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 915 S.W.2d 702 (1996), cert, denied, 117 S. Ct. 246 (1996).\nAppellant suggests that defense witnesses Cureton and Lee would have testified that they had personal knowledge that the police involved in Huddleston\u2019s arrest may have planted drugs in other instances. Additionally, Lisa Didway, appellant\u2019s former girlfriend, would have testified that Wayne Barnett, one of the police officers who arrested Huddleston and discovered the drugs and drug paraphernalia, contacted her in August, several months after appellant\u2019s arrest, and urged her to plant a weapon or drugs on appellant. Although Huddleston claims that the three witnesses would also testify that Kelly Mendoza, present during his arrest, planted the drugs on appellant, the record does not support appellant\u2019s claims. Significantly, appellant failed to proffer Lee\u2019s and Cureton\u2019s testimony. Without proffering this testimony to the trial court, appellant cannot claim now that the trial court erred by excluding it. See McGehee v. State, 338 Ark. 1532, 175, 992 S.W.2d 110, 124 (1999). Moreover, the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude the testimony is supported by considerations of relevance and hearsay. See Ark. R. Evid. 801(c), 802 (1999).\nHuddleston also offered the affidavit of Ruth Cloud to support his theory that the police were involved in \u201csetting him up.\u201d According to Cloud\u2019s affidavit, her sister, Lisa Marts, cooperated with Officer Wayne Barnett to plant drugs on Marts\u2019s husband. Again, although Barnett was involved in appellant\u2019s arrest, Cloud\u2019s affidavit was also properly excludable on grounds of relevance and hearsay. In any event, appellant never demonstrated that Cloud was unavailable to testify at trial.\nAppellant\u2019s final argument, that the trial court\u2019s exclusion of the testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, is equally misplaced. The Confrontation Clause is intended to permit a defendant to confront witnesses and to provide him with the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses. As the State correctly points out, neither of those interests is implicated here. In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of Lee, Cureton, and Didway, and the affidavit of Cloud.\nIII. Ineffective assistance of counsel\nHuddleston\u2019s third point on appeal argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The proper method for relief to challenge the adequacy of counsel\u2019s representation is a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.1. Carrier v. State, 278 Ark. 542, 647 S.W.2d 449 (1983). Postconviction relief may be granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel if the petitioner proves that (i) counsel\u2019s performance was deficient, and (ii) counsel\u2019s deficient performance prejudiced the actual outcome of the proceeding. Strickland v. Wash ington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Noble v. State, 319 Ark. 407, 892 S.W.2d 477 (1995).\nThe petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668; Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992). Moreover, the counsel\u2019s acts and omissions are viewed from the counsel\u2019s perspective at the time of trial. Wainwright, 307 Ark. 569; Dumond v. State, 294 Ark. 379, 743 S.W.2d 779 (1988). The petitioner must overcome the strong presumption of competency by clear and convincing evidence showing that he was prejudiced and that the prejudice effectively denied him a fair trial. Blackmon v. State, 274 Ark. 202, 623 S.W.2d 184 (1981). The proper standard for judging attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668. Notably, each allegation of counsel\u2019s incompetence must be evaluated separately. This court does not recognize cumulative error in allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Isom v. State, 284 Ark. 426, 682 S.W.2d 755 (1985). See Parks v. State, 301 Ark. 513, 785 S.W.2d 213 (1990); Jones v. State, 308 Ark. 555, 826 S.W.2d 233 (1992). Accordingly, Huddleston\u2019s ineffective-assistance arguments are discussed independently.\nFirst, appellant argues that his appointed counsel, John Joplin, was ineffective by his failure to pursue a speedy-trial claim. Specifically, Huddleston contends that when appointed, Joplin knew that appellant wanted a speedy trial and that he requested a continuance beyond the speedy-trial time. We agree with the State that this argument is not properly preserved for review because Huddleston failed to argue in his motions for new trial that counsel was ineffective because he failed to preserve speedy-trial arguments. Further, the trial court made no ruling on this issue, and we decline to consider the merits of his challenge at this time. See Alexander v. State, 335 Ark. 131, 133, 983 S.W.2d 110, 111 (1998).\nNext, Huddleston claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because Joplin failed to adequately investigate his case and to obtain evidence in support of his defense. Specifically, appellant points to Joplin\u2019s failure to investigate his theory that the police and Mendoza, as their agent, \u201cplanted the dope\u201d and \u201cset up\u201d appellant. Additionally, appellant claims that Joplin was ineffective because he met with Huddleston only twice, for about twenty minutes each time. In response, the State argues that these points are not preserved for appeal. We agree. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(6) (1999) requires the appellant to abstract material parts of the record that are necessary to \u201can understanding of all questions presented to the Court for decision.\u201d The record on appeal is confined to what appellant has abstracted or has included in his addendum. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(8) (1999); see also Allen v. State, 326 Ark. 541, 542, 932 S.W.2d 764, 765 (1996). Here, appellant failed to abstract the guilt phase of his trial. Similarly, appellant failed to argue that Mendoza was an agent for the State, and the trial court made no ruling on this claim. Accordingly, Huddleston\u2019s claims on these points are procedurally barred.\nAlso, appellant objected to Joplin\u2019s failure to present the testimony of Gary Lee because of an alleged conflict of interest created by the Public Defender\u2019s Office representing Lee on an unrelated charge. However, the record reveals that even if Lee had testified at trial, his new counsel acknowledged that he would be invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself. Consequently, appellant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by Lee\u2019s failure to testify. Moreover, as Joplin noted at the hearing, he could not call a witness knowing that he would invoke the Fifth Amendment. See Hamm v. State, 301 Ark. 154, 159, 782 S.W2d 577, 580 (1990). Again, the trial court did not rule on appellant\u2019s claim that counsel failed to disclose an alleged conflict of interest, and this point is not preserved for appellate review.\nFinally, appellant contends that he was denied effective assistance because his attorney failed to object to the introduction of an exhibit showing a prior forgery and uttering conviction. Appellant argues that the exhibit was inadmissible because it did not demonstrate that he was represented by- counsel or that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. However, Huddleston failed to preserve this point for appeal because he did not raise it in the trial court. In any event, the exhibit provides sufficient evidence to establish that he was represented because it identifies Martin L. Green of Fort Smith as Huddleston\u2019s attorney. See Stewart v. State, 300 Ark. 147, 150, 111 S.W.2d 844, 845 (1989). In conclusion, we hold that the trial court did not err in finding that Huddleston received effective assistance of counsel at trial.\nIV. Rule 4-3(h)\nIn accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h) (1998), the record has been reviewed for adverse rulings objected to by the appellant but not argued on appeal, and no reversible errors were found. We affirm the trial court on all points, and we affirm appellant\u2019s judgment of conviction.", "type": "majority", "author": "WH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Shannon L. Blatt and Robert S. Blatt, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "John Lee HUDDLESTON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 99-682\n5 S.W.3d 46\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 2, 1999\nShannon L. Blatt and Robert S. Blatt, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Asst. Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0266-01", "first_page_order": 288, "last_page_order": 296 }