{ "id": 1365186, "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. Kenneth Andrew SULLIVAN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sullivan", "decision_date": "2000-02-10", "docket_number": "CR 99-1140", "first_page": "315", "last_page": "318-G", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "340 Ark. 315" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "11 S.W.3d 526" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "285 U.S. 452", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1175385 ], "year": 1932, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/285/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. App. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/44/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 S.W.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1896959 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703833 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902455 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604789 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "569 N.W.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11909373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/569/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "927 P. 2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 806859 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/187/0116-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 Misc. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 32546 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/180/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.W.2d 886", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11714612 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/582/0886-01" ] }, { "cite": "979 P.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715586 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/414/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6190962 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50255 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 567", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922688 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0567-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298605 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604789 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 806", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746960 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "813" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0806-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 929, "char_count": 22786, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2300264656993516e-07, "percentile": 0.605419659601776 }, "sha256": "7c78c9a7da42b461e1b43e819d889edf6007c8f75ed01bb125404bfc48d99cde", "simhash": "1:a95cb5002f6fda46", "word_count": 3806 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:52:11.293742+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin, Brown, and Thornton, JJ., join.", "GLAZE, Imber, and Smith, JJ., would grant rehearing.", "IMBER and SMITH, JJ., join this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE of Arkansas v. Kenneth Andrew SULLIVAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThe State brings this interlocutory appeal from the trial court\u2019s granting of appellee\u2019s motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle after an officer observed him speeding. Appellee was approached by a Conway police officer, Joe Taylor, for allegedly traveling forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone on Highway 65 in Conway. Although Officer Taylor did not use his \u201cblue lights\u201d to require appellee to stop, appellee pulled into a service station and was then informed by Officer Taylor of the reason for the contact.\nAppellee was requested by Officer Taylor to produce registration and proof of insurance. When appellee, a now-disabled, previously self-employed roofer, opened his vehicle door to locate the documents requested, Officer Taylor noticed a rusted roofing hatchet that was corroding into the carpet of the vehicle. Appellee was unable to locate his vehicle registration and proof of insurance. He was then arrested for speeding, having no vehicle registration and no proof of insurance, and carrying a weapon (the roofing hatchet), as well as having an improper tint on his windshield. Officer Taylor further deemed appellee\u2019s vehicle to be unsafe because his speedometer was not working properly.\nAftpr another officer arrived and placed appellee in the back of his police unit, Officer Taylor began an inventory search of appellee\u2019s automobile. Officer Taylor testified that under the armrest, he found a black bag with what appeared to be methamphetamine inside it. The bag, he claims, contained a Ziploc-type bag with ten individually-wrapped bags of the substance, twenty-seven corners of plastic bags, a small plastic container with suspected marijuana, another Ziploc-type bag with bag corners inside of it, and a plastic container with two bags of suspected methamphetamine. Officer Taylor also stated that a zippered pocket of the same black tote bag contained two bags of suspected methamphetamine, a plastic tube with white powdery residue in it, a wood-handled knife with white powdery residue on the ends, and a red metal plate and a purple plastic straw. Appellee was then charged with the following offenses: possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver; attempt to manufacture methamphetamine; possession of drug paraphernalia; unlawful possession of a weapon, the roofing hatchet; and speeding. He was not charged with having no proof of insurance or vehicle registration.\nAppellee moved to suppress evidence seized from his vehicle on the basis that the stop was a pretext to conduct a search. Upon the testimony of the sole witness at the suppression hearing, who was Officer Joe Taylor, as well as arguments of counsel, tbe trial court deliberated overnight and then granted appellee\u2019s motion to suppress, from which the State now brings this appeal. For its only point on appeal, the State asserts that the trial court erred in granting appellee\u2019s motion to suppress evidence found in his vehicle. We disagree with the State and affirm the trial court.\nThis Court, upon review of a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, makes an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances and reverses only if the trial court\u2019s ruling is against the preponderance ' of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 333 Ark. 92, 966 S.W.2d 901 (1998). The issue before this Court is whether the search of appellee\u2019s vehicle was justified, either as an inventory search or as a search incident to arrest. We hold that it was not.\nIn the instant case, Officer Taylor was the sole witness who testified at the hearing on appellee\u2019s motion to suppress. Although he testified on direct examination that what he conducted was merely an inventory search as dictated by policy and not a search conducted after a traffic stop predicated on suspicions he had of the appellee\u2019s involvement in drug activity, he did admit on cross-examination that he had been assigned to the narcotics section and that said section had intelligence on the appellee of which Officer Taylor was aware. Appellee contends that the very facts and circumstances surrounding the arrest itself proves that it was pretextual in nature, in that it was made solely for the purpose of searching the appellee\u2019s vehicle for controlled substances, and that, as a result, he is entitled to an order suppressing any and all evidence seized from his vehicle. Appellee asserts that the arresting officer had no reasonable basis to believe that the roofing hatchet was to be used as a weapon.\nWe have held that \u201cpretext\u201d is a matter of the arresting officer\u2019s intent, which must be determined by the circumstances of the arrest. Brenk v State, 311 Ark. 570, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). We held in Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986), and the Court of Appeals followed in Miller v. State, 44 Ark. App. 112, 114, 868 S.W.2d 510 (1993):\nThe Supreme Court has specifically held that \u201can arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence.\u201d United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932). ...\nClaims of pretextual arrest raise a unique problem in law \u2014 deciding whether an ulterior motive prompted an arrest which otherwise would not have occurred. Confusion can be avoided by applying a \u201cbut for\u201d approach, that is, would the arrest not have occurred but for the other, typically, the more serious crime. Where the police have a dual motive in making an arrest, what might be termed the covert motive may be dominant, so long as the arrest would have been carried out had the covert motive been absent. ...\nThe question then becomes whether appellee would have been arrested simply for traveling forty miles per hour in a thirty-five mile-per-hour zone and possessing a roofing hatchet that had clearly been in his vehicle for quite a long time, given that it was corroding into the carpet. We find that to be doubtful. His vehicle may have been impounded due to his failure to provide proof of insurance and registration. However, appellee was never charged with having no proof of insurance or vehicle registration. Further, the trial court, when assessing the credibility of Officer Taylor (the sole witness at the hearing), the totality of the circumstances, and the applicable law, agreed with appellee that the search and seizure was pretextual and should be suppressed. Clearly, a review of the applicable law illustrates that thfe issue of pretext necessarily turns on the facts in a given case, and given our standard of review in these cases, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s ruling was against the preponderance of the evidence:\nAffirmed.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by; Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nNo response.", "type": "majority", "author": "WH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING MAY 18, 2000\nWH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThe State has petifor rehearing in this case, contending that this court\u2019s opinion delivered on February 10, 2000, State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (200Q), contained a significant error of law. The State argues that this court\u2019s analysis of the present case using the concept of \u201cpretext\u201d is contrary to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). The State presents us with the Whren case for the first time on rehearing and argues that under Whren, a police officer may arrest someone for a minor traffic violation, knowing full well that the real reason for the arrest is to enable a search of the vehicle for a suspected crime.\nWe do not read Whren as going as far as the State would have it. In Whren, the police officers observed youthful occupants at night in a vehicle with temporary license plates. The youths were acting suspiciously in a high crime area. When the vehicle did a U-turn and sped off at an unreasonable speed, the police officers gave chase and stopped the vehicle. One of the police officers approached the vehicle and saw two bags of crack cocaine in the driver\u2019s hands.\nThese facts are very different from those in the case before us. Here, the police officer stopped Sullivan for speeding, arrested him primarily because he had a roofing hatchet on the floor of his vehicle which had rusted into the carpet, and then conducted an inventory search following the arrest. As the trial court found in its ruling:\n[F]ollowing our hearing yesterday, I have gone over the testimony and looked at what I believe to be the law in that case, and it\u2019s going to be my decision in this particular instance that based on the testimony, specifically that the officer testified that he stopped the car based on a charge of suspicion of speeding \u2014 which I have no problem with the stop. I think that was ... there was radar. I don\u2019t have any problem with that.\nHe testified that once he got him stopped, he recognized him as someone that he had seen intelligence on regarding narcotics, and he \u2014 rather than write citations, he physically arrested him. And the weapons charge, I think, was added to that. And I don\u2019t believe that in this particular instance that the \u2014 that that was appropriate, and I\u2019m going to grant the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that search.\nThe State argues that under Whren, the Supreme Court has determined that the ulterior motives of police officers are irrelevant so long as there is probable cause for the traffic stop. Admittedly, the decision in Whren is broadly written, but much of it is dicta. Nevertheless, we do not interpret Whren as blanket authority for pretextual arrests for purposes of a search in all cases. Rather, the reasonableness of the arrest and search must be governed by the facts of each case. For example, we do not believe that Whren goes so far as to sanction conduct where a police officer can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity.\nSeveral jurisdictions, after the Whren decision, have refused to give total authority to law enforcement for pretextual arrests and the resulting searches, either because of state constitutions or because the search and seizure was unreasonable. See, e.g., State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999); State v. Varnado , 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998); People v. Dickson , 690 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2d 390, 180 Misc. 2d 113 (1998); State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 927 P. 2d 776 (Ariz. 1996). Further, one jurisdiction has questioned the ultimate absurdity of whether Whren was meant to sanction arrests and searches incident to a parking violation. See State v. Holmes, 569 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 1997).\nThis court has cited Whren in two cases. See Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998); Burris v. State 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). Neither case dealt with the issue of pretextual arrests but rather cited Whren for the proposition that probable cause of a traffic violation is all that is required for a police officer to make a stop. In fact, in Travis, we specifically noted that the argument of a pretextual arrest had not been made. \u00bf\nHere, the trial court found that the arrest was pretextual and made for the purpose of searching Sullivan\u2019s vehicle for evidence of a crime. Again, we do not believe that Whren disallows this. Moreover, even if we were to interpret Whren to give full rein to law enforcement to effect pretextual arrests for traffic violations, there is nothing that prevents this court from interpreting the U.S. Constitution more broadly than the United States Supreme Court, which has the effect of providing more rights. We arguably have done so with our Criminal Rules that provide more stringent requirements for nighttime searches than Court decisions. See Ark.. R. Crim. P. 13.2(c); Garner v. State, 307 Ark. 353, 820 S.W.2d 446 (1991).\nIn sum, we will not give carte blanche approval for all pretextual arrests for traffic violations, as the State would have us do. We draw a clear distinction between arresting a person with crack cocaine in his hands as was the case in Whren and effecting a pretextual arrest for purposes of a search, such as we have in the instant case. Surely that flies in the face of reasonableness, which is the essence of the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Holmes, supra. We will decide the reasonableness of the arrest and search on a case-by-case basis, as the Whren decision makes clear. For these reasons, we deny the State\u2019s petition for rehearing.\nDenied.\nCorbin, Brown, and Thornton, JJ., join.\nGLAZE, Imber, and Smith, JJ., would grant rehearing.", "type": "rehearing", "author": "WH. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting.\nThe State petitioned for rehearing in this case, arguing that our decision rendered on February 10, 2000, State v. Sullivan, 340 Ark. 315, 11 S.W.3d 526 (2000), contained a significant error of law in failing to mention Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). It is true that our opinion did not discuss Whren, but only because that case was neither cited nor argued to this court. I agree with the majority court that the Whren decision is significant to our reaching a correct holding in the present case; thus, our court considers it now.\nAs our court set out in its original opinion, the evidence was indisputable that police officer Joe Taylor made a proper stop of Kenneth Sullivan\u2019s car because Sullivan was speeding. Sullivan also had no insurance, vehicle registration, or functional speedometer, and his car windows were improperly tinted. The officer additionally observed a hatchet on the driver\u2019s floorboard. The officer advised Sullivan that he was being placed under arrest for these infractions and for driving an unsafe car. He put Sullivan in the back of another officer\u2019s car and began inventorying Sullivan\u2019s vehicle. In the search, the officer found methamphetamine and marijuana. In making the inventory search, Taylor testified that he followed his department\u2019s policy and procedural manual. In these circumstances, Officer Taylor had probable cause to believe Sullivan committed a traffic offense at the time of the stop. That valid stop resulted in the discovery of other violations of the law that permitted Taylor to arrest Sullivan and .inventory his car, where the officer found illegal drugs.\nRecently, in Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998), our court upheld the stop of a defendant\u2019s truck for committing a traffic offense \u2014 failing to display expiration-date stickers. After the stop, the officer discovered that the driver of the truck had a suspended driver\u2019s license, and the passenger, defendant, was a felon who also had no valid license. The officer had the truck towed. When the officer later opened the door of the truck, he found a rifle which led to the defendant\u2019s arrest for being a felon in possession of a firearm. At trial, the defendant argued that no probable cause existed for the officer to stop his truck because the officer wrongly believed the Texas license plate was required to display an expiration sticker. Citing Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997), and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), the Travis court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument and upheld the search of defendant\u2019s truck, holding that it is wefl settled that an officer may stop and detain a motorist where the officer has probable cause to befieve a traffic violation had occurred. Furthermore, in reaching its decision, the Travis court repeated the rule in Brunson v. State, 327 Ark. 567, 940 S.W.2d 440 (1997), that, in assessing the existence of probable cause, our review is liberal rather than strict. To the same effect, see Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). In the present case, once the officer made a valid stop and arrested Sullivan for the numerous traffic violations, including driving an unsafe vehicle, the officer had the authority to perform an inventory of Sullivan\u2019s vehicle.\nIt has been suggested that the State\u2019s argument on rehearing is that a poEce officer may arrest someone for a minor traffic violation, knowing fuE weE that the real reason for the arrest is to enable a search of the vehicle for a suspected crime. To the contrary, the State set out its contention as foEows:\nThe relevant inquiry, thus, is 'not whether the officer* had an ulterior motive for stopping the vehicle, but whether the officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was committing a traffic offense at the time of the initial stop. Travis, supra; Burris, supra. Based on his radar detection of [Sullivan\u2019s] speed, the officer here unquestionably had probable cause to stop [Sullivan], This Court, thus, applied the wrong standard when it decided this case based on its view that the officer stopped appellee based on an ulterior motive. Even if the officer had an ulterior motive, which the State does not admit, it is not to be taken into account by this Court, according to Whren, because the stop was unquestionably proper. The Court should grant rehearing to consider this case in the light of Whren, Travis, and Burris.\nIt has been further suggested that Officer Taylor had arrested SuEivan primarily because he had a roofing hatchet in the floor of his vehicle; however, even if the trial court believed this to be true, Taylor stiE had probable cause to detain and arrest SuEivan for the numerous traffic offenses he had committed. It appears that the judge got off track by injecting his personal view as to whether a hatchet could be a weapon for which he could be arrested for possession. The judge mused, \u201cI\u2019ve got a hammer under the seat of my car today. Am I subject to being arrested and taken physically into custody because I have a hammer?\u201d With all due respect to the trial judge, the issue, as stated above, is not whether the hatchet, alone, was cause for an arrest after the stop, but whether Sullivan had committed traffic violations in Officer Taylor\u2019s presence. Unquestionably, such violations occurred.\nIn sum, because Sullivan was speeding, had no insurance or vehicle registration, a non-working speedometer, illegally tinted windows, and an unsafe vehicle, the officer had the right to place (and did place) Sullivan under arrest. Sullivan\u2019s arrest was valid under Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.1 (a)(iii) (1999), which states that \u201ca law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed . . . any violation of the law in the officer\u2019s presence.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this rule, a law enforcement officer is authorized to arrest a person for minor traffic violations witnessed by the officer, such as speeding. See State v. Earl, 333 Ark. 489, 970 S.W.2d 789 (1998); Hazelwood v. State, 328 Ark. 602, 945 S.W.2d 365 (1997). The officer\u2019s arrest of Sullivan was, therefore, valid. These violations being found also allowed Taylor to make an inventory search that quickly led to the discovery of illegal drugs. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 12.6(b) (1999) (a vehicle impounded in consequence of any arrest, or retained in official custody for other cause, may be searched at such times and to such extent as is reasonably necessary for safekeeping of the vehicle and its contents). The trial court did not find, nor did Sullivan prove, that the inventory search was conducted in bad faith for the sole purpose of collecting evidence.\nThe majority opinion on rehearing hypothecates that the Supreme Court\u2019s Whren case does not go so far as to sanction conduct where a police can trail a targeted vehicle with a driver merely suspected of criminal activity, wait for the driver to exceed the speed limit by one mile per hour, arrest the driver for speeding, and conduct a full-blown inventory search of the vehicle with impunity. Of course, I agree Whren does not allow such a stop and search, but those are not the facts before this court. It is uncontroverted that, at the time of the stop, Officer Taylor did not know the driver was Sullivan. Once again, even the trial court found no pretextual stop, and ruled the stop valid. Under the circumstances of this case, Sullivan\u2019s criminal record simply cannot be utilized to his advantage at the time of his stop and arrest.\nThe majority court validates the stop in this case, but finds Sullivan\u2019s arrest pretextual. Again, Sullivan\u2019s violation of numerous traffic offenses justified his arrest, and I am unaware of any rule or law that requires an officer merely to issue citations in a traffic stop where numerous violations occurred. Furthermore, I find nothing in the record that the officer could not arrest the violator. While it is true that Officer Taylor, after the stop, recognized Sullivan as a person who had been involved in illegal drugs, surely this fact should not be employed by our court to hold Sullivan\u2019s arrest invalid. Labeling Sullivan\u2019s arrest illegal when so many other violations justified it fads to comport with the law.\nIn fact, Supreme Court jurisprudence dictates a contrary result. In United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), the court dismissed the argument that an ulterior motive might strip law enforcement officers of their legal justification to undertake a search. The Court likewise held that a traffic-violation arrest would not be rendered invalid by the fact that it was \u201ca mere pretext for a narcotics search.\u201d United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Summarizing these and other cases in Whren, Justice Scalia wrote, \u201c[w]e think these cases foreclose any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved.\u201d Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.\nFor the above reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred and would overturn its ruling. The majority court\u2019s failure to do so will generate considerable confusion among the rank and file of law enforcement, the bench, and the bar alike. Its decision is unquestionably a departure from search and seizure law as the Supreme Court has heretofore defined it.\nIMBER and SMITH, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.\nThe State also failed to cite or argue Arkansas cases Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998), or Burris v. State, 330 Ark. 66, 954 S.W.2d 209 (1997). However, the Travis, Burris, and Whren cases are relevant to the search, seizure, and arrest issues raised at trial and on appeal and require this court to consider them", "type": "dissent", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.", "P.N \u201cBuddy\u201d Troxell, for appellee.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by; Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. Kenneth Andrew SULLIVAN\nCR 99-1140\n11 S.W.3d 526\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 10, 2000\n[Supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing issued May 18, 2000 ]\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nP.N \u201cBuddy\u201d Troxell, for appellee.\nGlaze, Imber, and Smith, JJ., would grant." }, "file_name": "0315-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 353 }