{ "id": 1257702, "name": "Rodney PRICE, Kenneth Price, and Randy Price v. Virginia Sue PRICE", "name_abbreviation": "Price v. Price", "decision_date": "2000-05-18", "docket_number": "99-470", "first_page": "311", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ark. 311" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "16 S.W.3d 248" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "49 Ark. App. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137189 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/49/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 255", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740701 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753620 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where the General Assembly's statute required a shorter appeal time than the court's procedural rule, the court held the statute controlling because it was based on the strong public policy that local option election matters should be advanced" }, { "parenthetical": "where the General Assembly's statute required a shorter appeal time than the court's procedural rule, the court held the statute controlling because it was based on the strong public policy that local option election matters should be advanced" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 5", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 Ark. App. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/28/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Ark. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137085 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/48/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ark. App. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/64/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898841 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 S.W.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455886 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 217", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655513 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ark. 494", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1889858 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/298/0494-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-67-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241038 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-65-121", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 613, "char_count": 10591, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.7434461606000336e-07, "percentile": 0.8948847983029127 }, "sha256": "890b1ef3abddf3e18f69243d3ea6ddbd31af493e22e9858b492e52010c4864cf", "simhash": "1:e36cac8a630bd8a0", "word_count": 1775 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:19.609022+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Jim Gunter, Probate Judge;" ], "parties": [ "Rodney PRICE, Kenneth Price, and Randy Price v. Virginia Sue PRICE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TOM Glaze, Justice.\nThis court accepted jurisdiction of the appeal tice. presents a significant issue needing clarification or development of the law and also requires our interpretation of an act of the General Assembly. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (b)(5), (6) (2000). Specifically, we are asked whether Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-65-121 (Supp. 1999) or Ark. R. Civ. P. 58 controls the facts in this case.\nThe facts are undisputed. Charles and Sue Price were married and had three sons. In 1977, they divorced and remarried; they later filed again for divorce in 1997. The second divorce proceeding is in issue here. On July 23, 1997, the chancellor announced from the bench that Sue Price be awarded the divorce, and at the same proceeding, the parties\u2019 stipulated agreement concerning property, debts, fees, and costs, was read into the record and acknowledged by both of them. On August 8, 1997, Charles was killed in a car accident before the parties\u2019 divorce decree was entered. In fact, the parties\u2019 decree was not filed of record until June 19, 1998. See Price v. Price, 337 Ark. 372, 990 S.W.2d 514 (1999) (per curiam). On August 8, 1998, Sue Price filed a petition in the Miller County Probate Court, seeking to be appointed administratrix of Charles\u2019s estate and asserting she was entitled to the appointment because she was Charles\u2019s surviving spouse. The Prices\u2019 adult sons contested Sue\u2019s appointment, stating she was not married to Charles at the time of his death. They claimed that Sue had been awarded a final divorce on July 23, 1997, and therefore was not Charles\u2019s surviving spouse when he was killed on August 8, 1997. The probate judge ruled that, for the purpose of this proceeding, the Prices\u2019 divorce was not final and in effect because Charles died before the Prices\u2019 decree had been entered. As a consequence, the judge determined the Prices were still married when Charles was killed. Even so, the judge denied Sue\u2019s request to be administratrix, and instead appointed one of the sons, Kenneth Price, as administrator. The Prices\u2019 sons, Rodney, Kenneth, and Randy (\u201cthe sons\u201d), appeal the judge\u2019s ruling finding Sue to be Charles\u2019s surviving spouse. They further claim that because she is not Charles\u2019s surviving spouse, she is not entitled to share in his estate. Sue does not challenge or appeal Kenneth\u2019s appointment as administrator.\nIn their appeal, the sons rely on Act 98, \u00a7 1 of 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-65-121 (Supp. 1999), which, in relevant part, provides, \u201cAll judgments, orders, and decrees . . . are effective as to all parties of record from the date rendered and not from the date of entry of record.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Act 98, \u00a7 2 of 1989 (3rd Ex. Sess.), codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-67-101 (Supp. 1999), provides that the \u201ctime for filing a notice of appeal shall commence upon the filing and entry of record of the judgment, order, or decree pursuant to Rule 4 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure.\u201d The sons reason that, under these 1989 statutory provisions, the chancellor\u2019s oral pronouncement rendering Sue a divorce on July 23, 1997, was effective on that date.\nSue, on the other hand, relies on Ark. R. Civ. P. 58, which in pertinent part reads as follows: \u201cEvery judgment or decree shall be set forth on a separate document. A judgment or decree is effective only when so set forth and entered as provided in Administrative Order No. 2.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Administrative Order No. 2 provides that a judgment, decree, or order is entered when so stamped or marked by the clerk. Sue argues that, under Rule 58 and Administrative Order No. 2, the chancellor\u2019s pronouncement awarding her a divorce on July 23, 1997, was not effective on that date, since no separate decree or order had been filed and entered before Charles\u2019s death. Thus, Sue asserts she is entitled to share in Charles\u2019s estate as his surviving spouse.\nAlthough our court has never had the occasion to consider \u00a7 16-65-121, we have interpreted this court\u2019s Rule 58 and Administrative Order No. 2 in a situation much like the one now before us. In Standridge v. Standridge, 298 Ark. 494, 769 S.W.2d 12 (1989), the chancellor heard a divorce proceeding on October 5, 1984, between Terry and Annie Thacker, and at the end of the hearing, the chancellor wrote in his docket book, \u201cdecree \u2014 a little unusual but it may work.\u201d The chancellor\u2019s concern apparently was that the father, Terry, was to have custody of the couple\u2019s daughter and Annie was to have custody of their son. Two days later, and before the Thackers\u2019s divorce decree was finally filed with the court clerk, Annie and Carroll Standridge married. After their marriage, Carroll was killed in a motorcycle accident. Annie, as Carroll\u2019s surviving spouse, was appointed administratrix of Carroll\u2019s estate. However, Carroll\u2019s former wife, Sharon, contested Annie\u2019s appointment, contending Annie\u2019s marriage to Carroll was invalid because, at the time of the marriage, Annie\u2019s divorce from Terry was not final, since a separate divorce decree had not been filed as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 58. In a 4-3 decision, this court held in Sharon\u2019s favor. The Standridge court held that a judgment or decree is not effective until it is entered as provided in Rule 58 and Administrative Order No. 2 and further concluded that an announcement of the divorce from the bench is insufficient to effect the divorce. The court explained that the purpose of Rule 58 was to provide a definite point at which a judgment, be it a decree of divorce or other final judicial act, becomes effective. This court\u2019s interpretation of Rule 58 in Standridge has been followed repeatedly by our court and the court of appeals. Shackelford v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 334 Ark. 634, 976 S.W.2d 950 (1998); Blaylock v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 330 Ark. 620, 954 S.W.2d 939 (1997); Clayton v. State, 321 Ark. 217, 900 S.W.2d 537 (1995); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Eubanks, 318 Ark. 640, 887 S.W.2d 292 (1994); Nance v. State, 318 Ark. 758, 318 S.W.2d 758 (1994); Kelly v. Kelly, 310 Ark. 244, 835 S.W.2d 869 (1992); A-1 Bonding v. State, 64 Ark. App. 135, 984 S.W.2d 29 (1998); Morrell v. Morrell, 48 Ark. App. 54, 889 S.W.2d 772 (1994); Brown v. Imboden, 28 Ark. App. 127, 771 S.W.2d 312 (1989).\nThe sons are well aware of the Standridge decision and its progeny, and while they do not ask us to overturn those decisions, they submit the General Assembly essentially did so seven months after Standridge when it enacted \u00a7 16-65-121. Quoting richly from the dissenting opinion in Standridge, the sons submit that \u00a7 16-65-121 merely reaffirmed the original meaning of Rule 58 so as to assure any citizen that a decision made in open court by a judge would finally decide the merits of his claim without waiting for the filing and entering of a separate decree, judgment, or order. Unquestionably, this argument presents us with the conflict between this court\u2019s Rule 58, as it was interpreted in Standridge, and the General Assembly\u2019s enactment of \u00a7 16-65-121.\nIn State v. Sypult, 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990), the court was confronted with a situation where a conflict arose between rules established by this court and legislation enacted by the General Assembly. The court set out the following analysis and approach as to how it would deal with such conflicts: \u201cTo protect what we hold inviolate we now declare that we will defer to the General Assembly, when conflicts arise, only to the extent that the conflicting court rule\u2019s primary purpose and effectiveness are not compromised; otherwise, our rules remain supreme.\u201d\nAn exception to the foregoing rule exists when the statutory rule is based upon a fixed public policy which has been legislatively or constitutionally adopted and has as its basis something other than court administration. See Citizens for a Safer Carroll County v. Epley, 338 Ark. 61, 991 S.W.2d 562 (1999) (where the General Assembly\u2019s statute required a shorter appeal time than the court\u2019s procedural rule, the court held the statute controlling because it was based on the strong public policy that local option election matters should be advanced).\nAs generally discussed above, this court has recognized that Rule 58 is a matter pertaining to court administration whereby it provides a definite point at which a judgment becomes effective. Establishing that point to be the moment at which the court\u2019s written precedent is filed can eliminate or at least reduce disputes between litigants over what a trial court\u2019s oral decision in open court entailed. Such disputes inevitably delay the filing of appeals, which is at odds with this court\u2019s procedural objective of moving appeals expeditiously. Cf. Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982).\nIn conclusion, we hold that Rule 58, not \u00a7 16-65-121, controls the facts in this case and that the rule effectively supersedes that statute. Therefore, we affirm the lower court\u2019s decision.\nSue Price untimely filed an appeal from the divorce proceeding, but when she filed a motion for rule on the clerk, the court denied her request. Citing Childress v. McManus, 282 Ark. 255, 668 S.W.2d 9 (1984), Sue posited that the death of a party nullifies the validity of a subsequent divorce decree. While we agreed, we further recognized that it is not necessary to appeal from a void order because it never became effective, and a void order is subject to collateral attack. This probate proceeding, of course, does collaterally attack the Prices\u2019 July 23, 1997, divorce proceeding.\nCharles\u2019s estate was established to pursue a wrongful death lawsuit and to administer his assets, debts, and financial affairs\nThe record reflects \u201cthe son\u201d was the appropriate person to be administrator, and since Kenneth Price was the only son to apply for appointment, we assume he was appointed administrator even though Rodney is the only Arkansas resident. No real issue is raised regarding the appointment of the administrator, and we assume the probate judge will clarify this point at some stage of the proceeding\nAn apparent conflict between \u00a7 16-65-121 and Rule 58 was footnoted in McCarther v. Green, 49 Ark. App. 42, 895 S.W.2d 562 (1995), but the court of appeals did not address the issue because, while the trial court\u2019s ruling was on-the record, it was not rendered in open court.", "type": "majority", "author": "TOM Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Davis, for appellants.", "Clarke D. Arnold, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Rodney PRICE, Kenneth Price, and Randy Price v. Virginia Sue PRICE\n99-470\n16 S.W.3d 248\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 18, 2000\nJim Gunter, Probate Judge;\nJames E. Davis, for appellants.\nClarke D. Arnold, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0311-01", "first_page_order": 337, "last_page_order": 342 }