{ "id": 1257807, "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry Dean HOWARD", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Howard", "decision_date": "2000-06-15", "docket_number": "CR 99-989", "first_page": "640", "last_page": "649", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ark. 640" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "19 S.W.3d 4" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "c" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935027 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Edwards, 310 Ark. 516, 838 S.W.2d 356 (1992)" }, { "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Edwards, 310 Ark. 516, 838 S.W.2d 356 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236209 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.W. 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ark. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1556250 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/123/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "868 S.W.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1910564, 1910471 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0595-01", "/ark/315/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 595", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910564 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "345" }, { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298612 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12021902 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298651 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880998 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377611 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240981 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243580 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ark. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1616732 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/260/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ark. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1715507 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/268/0427-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 787, "char_count": 18315, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2720099260533582e-07, "percentile": 0.7838632677040245 }, "sha256": "d2a15b4727852015d2a3622c25b582a2c869a6e1fedf633922d45eabde48f037", "simhash": "1:2329f062b0f8bff4", "word_count": 3028 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:19.609022+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Alan David Epley, Judge;", "Glaze, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry Dean HOWARD" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAVENSKI R. SMITH, Justice.\nThe State filed this interlocutory appeal ice. Carroll County Circuit Court\u2019s pretrial order suppressing evidence of drug activity seized from Appellee Jerry Dean Howard\u2019s residence and property in rural Carroll County. The trial court found the search warrant invalid due to its inaccurate property description. The State contends the trial court erred as a matter of law due to the rural nature of the property. It contends that naming the owner of rural property is sufficiently particular under Arkansas law. The State appealed this case to the court of appeals, which certified it to this court pursuant to Arkansas Supreme Court Rule l-2(d).\nFacts\nOn the morning of May 31, 1998, Carroll County Sheriff Deputy Greg Lester prepared a search warrant with a supporting affidavit. Lester also signed the affidavit for the search warrant. Deputy Lester then presented them to Municipal Court Judge Kent Coxsey, who signed the search warrant based on the representations made under oath by Lester and in the affidavit. The affidavit and warrant both described the property to be searched as follows:\nThe residence located at Route #2 on County Road #517, Berryville, AR, a one story, off-white single family dwelling located on the northeast side of County Road #517, outbuildings located on this same property, the pond and surrounding area (suspected to be commonly owned by Jimmy and Jerry Howard), and vehicles located on this same property, currently occupied by Jerry Howard, Venus Howard, Sue Howard, and Cody Howard.\nThereafter, Lester, Officer Marr, and other officers from the Carroll County Sheriff\u2019s Department executed the warrant on Jerry\u2019s residence and property and on his brothers residence and property in Carroll County, with the search turning up evidence of methamphetamine manufacturing and other drug activity. Police arrested and the prosecutor charged Jerry, his brother Jimmy, who also lived in a house on the same county road, Brenda Kay Proctor, Susan Greer Howard, Steve Orion Howard, and Cody Howard with several drug-related crimes in an information filed on July 31, 1998.\nJerry\u2019s attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search, and the trial court held hearings April 19, 1999, and May 10, 1999. During the hearings, the State presented testimony from Officers Lester and Marr and Judge Coxsey regarding the collection of evidence for and issuance of the affidavit and search warrant. The defense then presented testimony by Jerry and Steve Howard, and presented a videotape depicting the county road and property owned by Jerry.\nAccording to the testimony of Officer Lester, the Carroll County Sheriff\u2019s Department first received a phone call from an informant approximately one year before this search was conducted regarding possible drug activity taking place at Jimmy\u2019s residence. Then, about three weeks before the search of the property, the department began receiving \u201cmany\u201d calls, approximately ten to fifteen calls, from informants telling the officers that the Howards, specifically Jimmy Howard, were manufacturing methamphetamine at their houses.\nOfficer Lester testified that a few days before the search was conducted, he questioned a confidential informant, informant #175, who had just been arrested. The informant indicated that she had just been to Jimmy\u2019s residence and that Jimmy was manufacturing methamphetamine. In order to test the veracity of this informant\u2019s information, Officer Lester questioned the informant about the location and layout of Jimmy\u2019s residence. Officer Lester testified that he had knowledge of the details of this residence because he had served an eviction notice, or notice of detainer, on Jimmy at his residence. Officer Lester testified that the details the informant provided indicated to him that she had, in fact, been at Jimmy\u2019s residence and that she had witnessed illegal activity taking place.\nWith regard to the warrant for Jerry\u2019s residence, Officer Lester testified that he supported the affidavit for the search warrant by references to the anonymous phone calls to the sheriff\u2019s department and by \u201cinadvertent confidential informants\u201d who had been to the residences. These \u201cinadvertent\u201d informants were people Officer Lester heard speaking on an audio tape regarding another drug suspect, and these informants spoke of the Howard residences \u201con the mountain.\u201d After an objection by the defense that this information was not in the affidavit for the warrant, Officer Lester then testified that he based the affidavit for the search of Jerry\u2019s residence on the information provide by confidential informant #175.\nOn cross-examination, Officer Lester indicated that he did not include a house number or residence address on the warrant for the search of Jerry\u2019s house because he did not think that there were any other houses on the county road besides Jerry\u2019s house and Jimmy\u2019s house. He indicated that another house, Sue Howard\u2019s sister\u2019s house, was close to the Howards\u2019 houses but was on a different county road. Officer Lester also indicated that he described Jerry\u2019s house as a one-story, off-white, single-family dwelling located on the northeast side of County Road #517. He also indicated that the pond was described as being part of Jimmy\u2019s property and Jerry\u2019s property, and that a large metal shed was actually across the county road although that was not indicated in the affidavit. Officer Lester indicated that he included all of the outbuildings, in general, in both of the affidavits for warrants, and that the confidential informant who gave him his information did not indicate that there were any drugs or drug activity in the metal shed or building across the county road from the property.\nRegarding the residents of the two houses searched, Officer Lester indicated that he knew that Jerry and his wife Susan, and their son Steve lived in Jerry\u2019s house, and that possibly Venus, Jerry\u2019s and Susan\u2019s daughter, did too. Officer Lester also indicated that he knew that Jimmy, Brenda, and Cody Howard lived in Jimmy\u2019s house, despite the fact that the affidavit and warrant indicated that Jerry, Venus, Susan, and Cody Howard lived in Jerry\u2019s house. Officer Lester testified that he did not look at any deeds to determine who actually owned the property, nor was he aware that these tracts of land were part of a subdivision. He indicated that the department believed that both Jimmy and Jerry jointly owned the property, but he also indicated that the wooden shed allegedly containing the methamphetamine lab was on Jimmy\u2019s property. Officer Lester testified that he was part of the team that searched Jimmy\u2019s house, not Jerry\u2019s house.\nJudge Coxsey testified that he signed the search warrant based on the fact that he believed that there was probable cause to search the named premises. Officer Marr next testified, and he indicated that he was part of the team that searched Jerry\u2019s house and property. According to Officer Marr, the confidential informant told him and Officer Lester that she had seen the production of methamphetamines in a shed behind Jerry\u2019s house, as well as sales being made at both residences, and paraphernalia at both residences and in some outbuildings on the property approximately one week before she spoke to the officers. Officer Marr also testified concerning the information received from the confidential informant, and he stated that the informant indicated that the Howards were working back and forth between Jimmy\u2019s and Jerry\u2019s houses and property. Officer Marr indicated that the informant told him that a methamphetamine \u201ccook\u201d took place in the shed behind Jerry\u2019s house, and he acknowledged that that would have been a different story than the one the informant told Officer Lester that the \u201ccook\u201d had taken place in the shed behind Jimmy\u2019s house down by the pond. Officer Marr testified that they did not know who owned the shed or pump house by the pond, and that they took no steps to investigate on whose land that building was located. Officer Marr also indicated that he could not provide a reason why Cody Howard was listed as a resident of both Jimmy\u2019s and Jerry\u2019s houses, and he acknowledged that Cody could not be a resident of both despite the fact that he was listed on both affidavits and warrants as such.\nThe defense presented testimony from Jerry, who noted that he owned both residences at issue in the warrants. He took over the bank loan on Jimmy\u2019s land to avoid foreclosure. Jerry testified about a videotape he made for the hearing which shows the county road from the beginning to his residence. Jerry testified that several houses are located along the road, including his and Jimmy\u2019s, as well as Gail Howard\u2019s house, a house owned by someone named Chris, Brandon Smith\u2019s house, Sam Dada\u2019s house, and James and Kay McNutt\u2019s house. Jerry also testified regarding the location of several outbuildings on his and Jimmy\u2019s property. Finally, Steve Howard testified regarding his presence at the search of Jerry\u2019s house.\nAfter the hearing, the circuit judge issued his four-page decision filed June 21, 1998, finding that the search warrant did not sufficiently describe the property to be searched. As such, the court suppressed the evidence seized in the search of Jerry\u2019s and Jimmy\u2019s property. The State appealed this ruling on June 24, 1999, to the court of appeals, which certified it to this court for review.\nStandard of Review\nIn reviewing a case involving the suppression of evidence, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances and reverse only if the ruling is clearly erroneous or against the preponderance of the evidence. State v. Rufus, 338 Ark. 305, 993 S.W.2d 490 (1999); Fouse v. State, 337 Ark. 13, 989 S.W.2d 146 (1999); Langford v. State, 332 Ark. 54, 962 S.W.2d 358 (1998). In making this determination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee. Fouse, supra; Langford, supra. The State urges this court to use a de novo standard of review, arguing that the trial judge applied the incorrect law when ruling that the search warrant was defective in its description of the property. The State cites State v. Blevins, 304 Ark. 388, 802 S.W.2d 465 (1991), for the proposition that where the matter to be decided is principally one of law, the Court may conduct a de novo review. The State argues that because the court did not find that the defendant\u2019s name alone on the search warrant for a rural piece of property was sufficient to identify the property, the court did not apply the law correctly, and this court must now review the case de novo. We decline the State\u2019s invitation. The Blevins court noted and applied the general standard of review in suppression cases recited above.\nThe only issue on appeal is whether the warrant sufficiently described the property to be searched. The trial court, in suppressing the search, held that the warrant was defective \u201cfor failure to particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized as required by ARCrP 13.2 (b) (iii).\u201d Specifically, the court noted that the deviation by the officers in this case was so great that there was substantial risk of the wrong property being searched. The court also found that the violation was \u201cwillful\u201d because the officers could have easily obtained the correct description and location of the property.\nIn this interlocutory appeal, the State argues that the search warrant in this case was sufficient under constitutional requirements and under the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State contends that merely naming the owner of rural property is sufficiently particular to describe the property to be searched, and any descriptive errors in the warrant do not make the warrant invalid. The State avers that the attack on the warrant by Howard was a technical attack, and that this court disfavors those. Furthermore, the State argues that even if the totality-of-circumstances standard of review was appropriate, suppression was unwarranted. The State notes the police had no doubt about which property was to be searched because two of the officers conducting the search had been to this property previously, these officers had personally met with the drug informant before the warrant was issued, and Howard admitted that the property was his. Overall, the State argues that despite the fact that there were other houses on the same road as Howard\u2019s house and despite the fact that the warrant described Howard\u2019s house color incorrectly, as well as incorrectly described an outbuilding\u2019s location, the warrant was still valid because the possibility of misidentification was small.\nAlthough not addressed by the parties, we are compelled to address the application of Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Crim. 3 to the instant appeal. Under this rule of appellate procedure, when the State files an interlocutory appeal from the trial court\u2019s grant of a defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence under Rule 16.2, an initial inquiry of this court must be whether the appeal involves the correct and uniform administration of justice and of the criminal law. State v. Jones, 321 Ark. 451, 903 S.W.2d 170 (1995); State v. Gray, 330 Ark. 364, 955 S.W.2d 502 (1997). Section (a) of the rule outlines the permissive grounds for State interlocutory appeals in criminal cases. We have many time stated that the State\u2019s ability to appeal is not a matter of right but limited to those cases described under Rule 3. Bowden v. State, 326 Ark. 266, 931 S.W.2d 104 (1996); State v. Stephenson, 330 Ark. 594, 955 S.W.2d 518 (1997).\nAs we stated in Stephenson, supra:\nWe accept appeals by the State when our holding would be important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law. Rule 3(c). As a matter of practice, this court has only taken appeals \u201cwhich are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law.\u201d State v. Banks, 322 Ark. 344, 345, 909 S.W.2d 634, 635 (1995). Where an appeal does not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal does not involve the correct and uniform administration of the law. State v. Harris, 315 Ark. 595, 868 S.W.2d 488 (1994). Appeals are not allowed merely to demonstrate the fact that the trial court erred. State v. Spear and Boyce, 123 Ark. 449, 185 S.W. 788 (1916).\nStephenson, 330 Ark. at 595. Therefore, where the resolution of the State\u2019s attempted appeal turns on the facts of the case and would not require \u201cinterpretation of our criminal rules with widespread ramifications,\u201d acceptance of the State\u2019s appeal is not allowed under Rule 3. Gray, 330 Ark. at 368-B (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing). An appeal that raises the issues of application, not interpretation, of a statutory provision does not involve the \u201ccorrect and uniform administration\u201d of justice or the criminal law. Jones, supra. The court in State v. Hart, 329 Ark. 582, 952 S.W.2d 138 (1997), explained this by noting that\n[w]here the trial court acts within its discretion after making an evidentiary decision based on the facts on hand or even a mixed question of law and fact, this court will not accept an appeal under Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.10 (now Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Crim. 3(c).\nHart, 329 Ark. at 585-586 (citing Harris, 315 Ark. at 597; State v. Mazur, 312 Ark. 121, 123, 847 S.W.2d 715 (1993) (quoting State v. Edwards, 310 Ark. 516, 838 S.W.2d 356 (1992)).\nWe hold that in the instant case that the State has not demonstrated that the appeal of this matter involves the correct and uniform administration of the law and is, therefore, dismissed.\nDismissed.\nGlaze, J., dissents.\nRule 3(a) states in pertinent part:\n(a) An interlocutory appeal on behalf of the state may be taken only from a pretrial order in a felony prosecution which (1) grants a motion under Ark. R. Crim. P 16.2 to suppress seized evidence, (2) suppresses a defendant\u2019s confession, or (3) grants a motion under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-42-101 (c) to allow evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual conduct. The prosecuting attorney shall file, within ten (10) days after the entering of the order, a notice of appeal together with a certificate that the appeal is not taken for the purposes of delay and that the order substantially prejudices the prosecution of the case. Further proceedings in the trial court shall be stayed pending determination of the appeal.\n(c) When a notice of appeal is filed pursuant to either subsection (a) or (b) of this rule, the clerk of the court in which the prosecution sought to be appealed took place shall immediately cause a transcript of the trial record to be made and transmitted to the attorney general, or delivered to the prosecuting attorney, to be by him delivered to the attorney general. If the attorney general, on inspecting the trial record, is satisfied that error has been committed to the prejudice of the state, and that the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law requires review by the Supreme Court, he may take the appeal by filing the transcript of the trial record with the clerk of the Supreme Court within sixty (60) days after the filing of the notice of appeal. (Emphasis added.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAVENSKI R. SMITH, Justice." }, { "text": "TOM GLAZE, Justice,\ndissenting. We should review this case tice, App. P. \u2014 Crim. 3(a)(1). It is the type of case this court has reviewed in the past. See State v. Tucker, 268 Ark. 427, 597 S.W.2d 584 (1980); State v. Cashion, 260 Ark. 148, 539 S.W.2d 423 (1976). A significant issue in this appeal requires the interpretation of seven circumstances listed in Rule 16.2(e) as applied to rural property made the subject to a search warrant which contains descriptive errors. That rule provides that a motion to suppress evidence shall be granted only if the court finds that the violation upon which it is based was substantial. Because this court does not appear to have considered Rule 16(2)(e) in these circumstances involving a search of rural property, I would reach and decide the merits of this case.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TOM GLAZE, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Stevan E. Vowell, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry Dean HOWARD\nCR 99-989\n19 S.W.3d 4\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 15, 2000\nAlan David Epley, Judge;\nStevan E. Vowell, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0640-01", "first_page_order": 666, "last_page_order": 675 }