{ "id": 1257805, "name": "Randy DAVIS v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-06-29", "docket_number": "00-193", "first_page": "751", "last_page": "759", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "341 Ark. 751" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "20 S.W.3d 326" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "312 Ark. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488229 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ark. App. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/59/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50383 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703836 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "citing Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "932 S.W.2d 764", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50341 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Allen v. State, 326 Ark. 541, 932 S.W.2d 764 (1996)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Allen v. State, 326 Ark. 541, 932 S.W.2d 764 (1996)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ark. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6654921 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "decision under prior act finding that claimant's activity triggering subsequent complication must be \"unreasonable under the circumstances\" to be an independent intervening cause" }, { "parenthetical": "decision under prior act finding that claimant's activity triggering subsequent complication must be \"unreasonable under the circumstances\" to be an independent intervening cause" }, { "page": "223", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "224" }, { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/11/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ark. App. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139058 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that new act has not changed the relevant analysis of independent-intervening-cause cases" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that new act has not changed the relevant analysis of independent-intervening-cause cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/62/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.W.3d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 6137622, 1365215 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0074-01", "/ark/340/0717-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137622 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "11 Ark. App. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6654921 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/11/0219-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 725, "char_count": 15361, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.6289839368958387e-07, "percentile": 0.8220382732738473 }, "sha256": "588908d177a9ba6753a66c9f3b7bd24dddb3a2a377ef2d1bc284299fbd71a093", "simhash": "1:6c8a88dda07c43d4", "word_count": 2375 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:03:19.609022+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze and Smith, JJ., dissenting.", "Smith, J., joins this dissent." ], "parties": [ "Randy DAVIS v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201cDUB\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nAppellant, Randy ustice. challenging a decision of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission denying his claim for medical expenses and additional temporary total-disability benefits. In a published opinion dated January 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the Commission\u2019s decision. See Davis v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 69 Ark. App. 74, 13 S.W.3d 171 (2000). Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-4 (2000), we granted review of the appellate court\u2019s decision. We affirm the Court of Appeals, and we reverse and remand the Commission\u2019s decision because it fails to display a substantial basis for the denial of relief.\nBackground\nThe parties agree that on April 4, 1996, Davis sustained a compensable right-ankle injury while working for appellee, Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. On September 11, 1996, Dr. Jay Lipke performed a surgical repair of a partial dislocation of Davis\u2019s peroneal tendons. Subsequently, Dr. Lipke diagnosed Davis with a blood clot, which required hospitalization and anticoagulant medication. As of November 1, 1996, Dr. Lipke\u2019s notes indicated that Davis\u2019s wound was well-healed, his ankle demonstrated a good range of motion, and there was no evidence of subluxation of the tendon. Dr. Lipke also remarked that he anticipated that Davis would be released to return to work when the blood-clot condition stabilized.\nUnfortunately, on approximately November 13, 1996, Davis aggravated the surgical repair when he stepped awkwardly on his ankle to avoid stepping on his two-year-old niece. At the time of the incident, Davis heard a loud pop. He returned to Dr. Lipke, who treated the new injury as a sprain. However, Dr. Lipke noted on December 2, 1996, and December 9, 1996, that the incident disrupted the prior surgical repair because Davis\u2019s healing process was incomplete.\nAs a result of the November injury, Davis sought additional workers\u2019 compensation benefits. In response, Old Dominion asserted that the November 1996, incident constituted an independent intervening cause, barring an award of additional benefits. Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge agreed with Old Dominion and concluded that Davis had failed to prove entitlement to additional benefits. Davis appealed the ALJ\u2019s decision to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, which affirmed and adopted the ALJ\u2019s findings.\nFollowing the Commission\u2019s decision affirming the ALJ\u2019s denial, Davis appealed to the Arkansas Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, reasoning that the Commission had no substantial basis to deny compensability because it had applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether the November 1996 incident constituted an independent intervening cause. Significantly, the appellate court concluded that although the legislature expressed an intent, via Act 796 of 1993, to overrule \u201call prior opinions or decisions of any administrative law judge, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission, or courts of this state contrary to or in conflict with any provision of this act,\u201d that (1) that declaration was not a blanket repeal of all prior decisions on the subject of independent intervening causes, and (2) preexisting case law regarding independent intervening causes remains in force for new act cases.\nIn support of its decision reversing the Commission, the Court of Appeals cited with approval its prior decisions in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162, 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998) (holding that new act has not changed the relevant analysis of independent-intervening-cause cases), and Guidry v. J. & R Eads Constr. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 669 S.W.2d 483 (1984) (decision under prior act finding that claimant\u2019s activity triggering subsequent complication must be \u201cunreasonable under the circumstances\u201d to be an independent intervening cause).\nFrom the appellate court\u2019s decision reversing and remanding the Commission, comes the instant appeal. In their petition for review from the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision, appellees and the Arkansas Self Insurers Association, as amicus curiae, argue that (1) Act 796 unambiguously declared the legislature\u2019s intent to repeal all prior opinions, decisions, and case law in conflict with the new act, (2) the appellate court\u2019s reliance on Carter and Guidry was misplaced, and (3) Ark. Code Ann. section 11 \u2014 9\u2014102(5)(F) (iii) (Repl. 1996), specifically controls the proper disposition of the instant case and dictates denial of additional benefits. In response, Davis argues that the. legislature merely intended to repeal all prior inconsistent case law.\nI. Substantial evidence\nAppellant\u2019s first point on appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s decision denying him additional benefits on the basis that his November 1996 accident was an independent intervening cause. Notably, when we grant a petition to review a case decided by the Court of Appeals, we review it as if it was filed originally in this court. See Williams v. State, 328 Ark. 487, 944 S.W.2d 822 (1997) (citing Allen v. State, 326 Ark. 541, 932 S.W.2d 764 (1996)). Moreover, on appeal, this court will view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision and affirm when that decision is supported by substantial evidence. Ester v. National Home Ctrs., Inc., 335 Ark. 356, 361, 981 S.W.2d 91 (1998) (citing Golden v. Westark Community College, 333 Ark. 41, 969 S.W.2d 154 (1998); Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997)).\nSubstantial evidence exists if reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion. Id. We will not reverse the Commission\u2019s decision unless fair-minded persons could not have reached the same conclusion when considering the same facts. Id. Where, as here, the Commission denies benefits because it determines that the claimant has failed to meet his burden of proof, the substantial-evidence standard of review requires us to affirm if the Commission\u2019s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of relief. McMillan v. U.S. Motors, 59 Ark. App. 85, 953 S.W.2d 907 (1997).\nHere, the parties agree that Davis sustained a compensable ankle injury in April of 1996. Following his surgery in September of 1996 and treatment for a blood clot in November of 1996, Davis testified that his doctor informed him that once the blood-clot treatment stabilized, he could return to work within approximately two to four weeks from November 1. Consistent with that testimony, Dr. Lipke\u2019s November 1, 1996, report states that Davis\u2019s wound was \u201cwell healed\u201d and that Davis demonstrated \u201cgood range of motion\u201d with \u201cno evidence of subluxation of the tendon.\u201d Dr. Lipke\u2019s report also confirmed that although Davis would remain temporarily totally disabled until his next scheduled appointment in one month, once his blood-clot anticoagulant therapy was well stabilized, Davis could probably return to work, \u201cin the next two to four weeks.\u201d According to Davis, Old Dominion continued to pay him workers\u2019 compensation benefits for four weeks following the November 1 doctor\u2019s appointment, representing the projected healing period as indicated by Dr. Lipke.\nDavis also admitted that he sustained a nonwork-related injury to the same anide a few days before November 13, 1996. Davis then sought treatment from Dr. Lipke. According to his November 13, 1996, report, Dr. Lipke remarked that Davis \u201cwas doing well until the other day when his two-year-old niece snuck behind him and twisted his right ankle. There was a loud pop evident. He\u2019s had significant swelling since that time.\u201d Given that Davis acknowledged that the subsequent injury was nonwork related, we must decide whether the Commission applied the correct legal standard to determine whether that injury constituted an independent intervening cause. Therefore, we address the merits of appellant\u2019s second point on appeal in order to resolve the first.\nII. Section H-9-I02(5)(F)(iii)\nThe heart of the instant appeal concerns the interpretation of the legal standard of review set forth in Ark. Code Ann. section 11 \u2014 9\u2014102(5)(F)(iii) (Repl. 1996), now codified as section 11-9-102(4)(F)(iii) (Supp. 1999). Section U-9-102(5)(F)(iii) states that:\nUnder this subdivision (5)(F), benefits shall not be payable for a condition which results from a nonwork-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment. A nonwork-related independent intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness on the part of a claimant.\n(Emphasis added.) Significantly, when the construction of a statute is at issue, we will presume that the General Assembly, in enacting it, possessed the full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers, full knowledge of prior legislation on the same subject, and full knowledge of judicial decisions under preexisting law. McLeod, Comm\u2019r of Revenues v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 205 Ark. 225, 168 S.W.2d 413 (1943). We must also give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent, making use of common sense and giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993).\nAlthough the parties agree that the November 1996 injury was caused by a nonwork-related event, they disagree as to whether the incident was an independent intervening cause. In support of the Commission\u2019s decision, appellees refer to the history of the independent-intervening-cause doctrine. In 1984, the Court of Appeals adopted the principle that if there is a causal connection between a primary compensable injury and the subsequent disability, there is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability is triggered by activity of the claimant that is \u201cunreasonable under the circumstances.\u201d Guidry v. J. & R. Eads Constr. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 223, 669 S.W.2d 483, 485 (1984) (citations omitted).\nSubsequently, the legislature enacted Act 796 of 1993, with the purpose of annulling pre-1993 Commission and court decisions interpreting and applying the pre-1993 act. Appellees also note that prior to Act 796 of 1993, the workers\u2019 compensation laws did not address the term \u201cindependent intervening cause.\u201d Therefore, according to appellees, Act 796 was an unambiguous rejection of all prior case law, including Guidry. Since Davis\u2019s injuries occurred after the effective date of Act 796, appellees assert that the Commission applied the correct legal standard.\nIn response, Davis argues that this interpretation of section 11-9-102(5)(F)(iii) makes any analysis illusory because all nonworkrelated incidents that prolong disability or need for treatment would automatically be deemed independent intervening causes as a matter oflaw. Further, Davis contends that section 11-9-102(5) (F)(iii) is actually a codification of preexisting case law and, specifically, the Guidry test. We agree. In Guidry, the appellate court held that:\n... \u2014 not only can there be an independent intervening cause without negligence or recklessness on the claimant\u2019s part, but unreasonable conduct on a claimant\u2019s part may create an independent intervening cause which would otherwise not exist.\n(Emphasis added.) Guidry, 11 Ark. App. at 224, 669 S.W.2d at 486. Similarly, the legislature expressed in section 11-9-102(5) (F) (iii) that:\n... a nonwork-related independent intervening cause does not require negligence or recklessness on the part of the claimant.\nThe statutory language at issue tracks the language in Guidry but leaves the standard of unreasonableness intact.\nMoreover, we must assume that the legislature was aware of Guidry when it enacted section 11-9-102(5) (F) (iii), and of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Carter, 62 Ark. App. 162, 969 S.W.2d 677 (1998), when it recently enacted amendments to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act in 1999. The legislature simply elected not to change existing law regarding independent intervening causes. In the absence of a statutory definition of independent intervening cause, we conclude that the legislature adopted the legal standard established and applied in prior Commission decisions and case law.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the Commission\u2019s decision failed to display a substantial basis for the denial of relief because it failed to apply the correct legal standard to determine whether appellant\u2019s November 1996 accident constituted an independent intervening cause. Accordingly, we reverse the Commission\u2019s decision and remand for further action consistent with this opinion.\nGlaze and Smith, JJ., dissenting.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201cDUB\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "TOM GLAZE, Justice,\ndissenting. The majority opinion is seriously tice, holding that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014 102(5) (F) (iii) (Supp. 1999) merely codifies preexisting case law found in Guidry v. J. & R. Eads Constr. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 669 S.W.2d 483 (1984). That statutory provision clearly changed the law announced in Guidry. In Guidry, the court adhered to the following principles:\nWhen the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant\u2019s own negligence or misconduct. (Emphasis added.)\n[T]he question is whether there is a causal connection between the primary injury and the subsequent disability and if there is such a connection, there is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability is triggered by activity on the part of the claimant which is unreasonable under the circumstances. (Emphasis added.)\nThe above principles clearly provide that an independent intervening cause or connection is shown when the claimant\u2019s own negligence, misconduct, or unreasonable activity results in a subsequent or second injury. Section 11 -9-102(5) (F) (iii), on the other hand, provides the claimant\u2019s negligence or recklessness is unnecessary to show a nonwork-related independent intervening cause. Section 11 -9-102 (5) (F) (iii), adopted by Act 796 of 1993 after the Guidry decision, further states that workers\u2019 compensation benefits shall not be payable for a condition which results from a nonwork-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment.\nHere, claimant\u2019s Randy Davis\u2019s second injury to his ankle was clearly nonwork-related, since it occurred at his sister\u2019s house. Randy\u2019s own conduct caused his second injury when, to avoid contact, he stepped over his two-year-old niece and came down awkwardly on the right ankle he had previously injured at work. There is no substantial evidence to show Davis\u2019s second injury was due to his own nonwork-related independent activity. Because the plain language in \u00a7 11 \u2014 9\u2014102(5)(F)(iii) clearly excludes benefits ion these circumstances, I must respectfully dissent.\nSmith, J., joins this dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "TOM GLAZE, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "The James Law Firm, by: William O. \u201cBill\u201d James Jr. and Steven R. McNeely for appellant.", "Kirkpatrick, Aud & Williams, L.L.P., by: Michael E. Aud, for appellees.", "Chisenhall, Nestrud & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Mark W. Hodge, for amicus curiae Arkansas Self-Insurers Association, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Randy DAVIS v. OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC.\n00-193\n20 S.W.3d 326\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 29, 2000\nThe James Law Firm, by: William O. \u201cBill\u201d James Jr. and Steven R. McNeely for appellant.\nKirkpatrick, Aud & Williams, L.L.P., by: Michael E. Aud, for appellees.\nChisenhall, Nestrud & Julian, P.A., by: Jim L. Julian and Mark W. Hodge, for amicus curiae Arkansas Self-Insurers Association, Inc." }, "file_name": "0751-01", "first_page_order": 777, "last_page_order": 785 }