{ "id": 1342361, "name": "Joshua RAGER, by His Next Friend Marjorie Rager; Matthew Rager, Jr.; Yolanda Rager; and Marjorie Rager v. Chandra Rager TURLEY, Administratrix", "name_abbreviation": "Rager ex rel. Rager v. Turley", "decision_date": "2000-10-05", "docket_number": "99-1465", "first_page": "223", "last_page": "231", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "342 Ark. 223" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "27 S.W.3d 729" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "335 Ark. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862744 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "apportionment hearing ordered to be held in which all statutory beneficiaries would participate and present evidence of their respective rights to the wrongful-death proceeds" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443824 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862755 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1880856 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-13-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655444 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ark. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138890 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "on the issue of Joshua's intervention, two judges of the court of appeals agreed with the lead opinion, two judges concurred with the result, and two judges dissented" }, { "parenthetical": "on the issue of Joshua's intervention, two judges of the court of appeals agreed with the lead opinion, two judges concurred with the result, and two judges dissented" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/68/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895716 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "d" }, { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(g)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(g) and (h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 677, "char_count": 15488, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.138363859351185e-08, "percentile": 0.4700942024033061 }, "sha256": "9cef764d940d508b42ffa0b6c2e3928beea678b7083db461a40513f020f80665", "simhash": "1:716b69e88d0c461c", "word_count": 2510 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:01:02.266586+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Joshua RAGER, by His Next Friend Marjorie Rager; Matthew Rager, Jr.; Yolanda Rager; and Marjorie Rager v. Chandra Rager TURLEY, Administratrix" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nAt issue in this case is the approval and distribution of a wrongful-death settlement in probate court pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(g) (Supp. 1999). The appellants are certain heirs and beneficiaries of the decedent, Thomas H. Rager, and an alleged illegitimate son of the decedent. The appealing beneficiaries and their relationship to the decedent are Cory Rager, a minor child; Matthew Rager, Jr., a brother; Yolanda Rager (now Pigeon), a sister; and Marjorie Rager, the mother. These appellant-beneficiaries appeal the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement. Joshua Rager, by his adoptive parent who is also the decedents mother, Marjorie Rager, appeals the decision of the probate judge to deny his participation in the wrongful-death settlement. The appellee is Chandra Rager (now Turley), who is the administratrix of the decedent\u2019s estate.\nAt issue in this appeal are three points: (1) the fairness and reasonableness of the wrongful-death settlement, which includes the question of the exclusion of Joshua Rager from participation; (2) the propriety of paying a $3,000 executor\u2019s fee from the settlement proceeds; and (3) the necessity for an evidentiary hearing regarding distribution of the settlement proceeds. We reverse and remand the probate court\u2019s decision with regard to Joshua, with directions that his claim that he is the illegitimate son of the decedent be transferred to the Pope County Chancery Court for a determination of paternity. We also reverse payment of the executor\u2019s fee from settlement proceeds. Because the reasonableness and fairness as well as distribution of the settlement hinges on Joshua\u2019s status as a child, we do not reach those issues at this time.\nOn August 15, 1994, Thomas H. Rager died intestate from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident, while driving an eighteen-wheeler truck for his employer, Tyson Foods, Inc. On August 18, 1994, his daughter Chandra Rager (now Turley), who was age nineteen, was appointed administratrix of his estate. His surviving beneficiaries allegedly included, in addition to the appellants, a second brother, Eugene Rager, and two children by his first marriage, Chandra Rager Turley (the administratrix) and Tommy Joe Rager. On August 19, 1994, Matthew Rager, Jr., objected to Turley\u2019s appointment as administratrix and petitioned for his own appointment. The probate court denied the petition.\nIn 1996, Joshua\u2019s natural mother died, and Marjorie Rager adopted him.\nOn August 29, 1997, Turley, as administratrix, filed an amended complaint in Pope County Circuit Court pursuant to the Arkansas Wrongful Death Act, on behalf of herself and all statutory beneficiaries in which she alleged that Razorback Disposal, Inc. and Thomas Gregory Hill wrongfully caused the death of the decedent by their gross negligence and recklessness. The action did not name Joshua as a beneficiary.\nWith the assistance of legal counsel, Turley, as administratrix, negotiated a settlement in the wrongful-death action. On January 6, 1998, she petitioned the probate court for approval of the settlement, as required by \u00a7 16-62-102(g), and for distribution of the settlement amount in fixed amounts to the beneficiaries. On January 8, 1998, appellants Marjorie Rager, Matthew M. Rager, Jr., Yolanda Pigeon, and Deborah Rager (now Matheson) as guardian of Cory C. Rager, filed their objection to the proposed settlement and distribution. On January 14, 1998, Turley filed a second petition for approval of the settlement, which would be funded by the purchase of life insurance annuity contracts.\nOn March 11, 1998, Joshua filed a motion to intervene in the petition for probate court approval of the settlement as a wrongful-death beneficiary and filed a claim to participate in the distribution. He was permitted by the probate court to intervene on March 12, 1998. On March 17, 1998, Turley, as administratrix, filed an objection to Joshua\u2019s intervention.\nOn April 3, 1998, the probate court held a hearing to decide whether Joshua had the right to participate in the negotiated settlement and whether the settlement itself was reasonable. The probate court began by considering the reasonableness of the settlement and said that it would decide collateral issues later. Turley testified in favor of the settlement and distribution while Deborah Rager, Matthew Rager, and Marjorie Rager testified against it. At one point, Joshua\u2019s attorney objected to questions relating to Joshua\u2019s paternity which had been posed by Turley\u2019s attorney. The probate court gave this response:\nI think that\u2019s \u2014 I think that\u2019s right. I think just based on the fact that we are not going into that at this time, I\u2019ll sustain the objection. We will take that up at a later time.\nThe probate court did not receive or consider testimony regarding specific distribution to beneficiaries and said, \u201cWell, I think that\u2019s going to hinge on what my decision is today.\u201d\nOn April 7, 1998, Joshua filed a brief regarding whether Arkansas law prohibited his participation in the division of the proceeds of any wrongful-death claim related to the decedent\u2019s death. He claimed that Arkansas statutes and caselaw did not foreclose his participation. For purposes of his brief, he assumed the following to be true:\n\u2022 Joshua is the biological child of the decedent.\n\u2022 Joshua\u2019s mother was never married to the decedent.\n\u2022 The decedent never legitimized Joshua by paternity action or otherwise.\n\u2022 Joshua filed no claim against this estate within one hundred and eighty days (180 days) of the death of the decedent.\n\u2022 Joshua\u2019s date of birth is February 1, 1988.\n\u2022 No notice was given to Joshua of the administration of the estate of the decedent.\nOn June 18, 1998, the probate court sent a letter opinion to counsel for the parties in which it concluded that because Joshua had filed no claim against the estate within 180 days of the decedent\u2019s death, as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209 (d) (1987), he was not entitled to share in the settlement proceeds. As a result, the court dismissed Joshua\u2019s petition to intervene. The court further concluded that the setdement was reasonable and approved it. On August 5, 1998, the probate court memorialized its letter opinion in a final order and cited Boatman v. Dawkins, 294 Ark. 421, 743 S.W.2d 800 (1988), as additional support for its decision. In that order, the court also approved distribution of the settlement to the beneficiaries but stayed the order pending appeal.\nThe appellants appealed the final order to the court of appeals, and in a plurality decision that court, for varying reasons, affirmed the probate court\u2019s decision to deny Joshua the right to intervene in the wrongful-death settlement. See Rager v. Turley, 68 Ark. App. 187, 6 S.W.3d 113 (1999) (on the issue of Joshua\u2019s intervention, two judges of the court of appeals agreed with the lead opinion, two judges concurred with the result, and two judges dissented). This court granted appellants\u2019 petition to review on January 27, 2000.\nWhen this court grants a petition for review of a case decided by the court of appeals, we review the case as if the appeal was originally filed in this court. Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998). We first address whether \u00a7 28-9-209 (d) of the Probate Code controls the issue of Joshua\u2019s intervention in the approval of the wrongful-death settlement. That subsection fixes a limitations period and reads:\n(d) An illegitimate child or his descendants may inherit real or personal property in the same manner as a legitimate child from the child\u2019s mother or her blood kindred. The child may inherit real or personal property from his father or from his father\u2019s blood kindred provided that at least one (1) of the following conditions is satisfied and an action is commenced or claim asserted against the estate of the father in a court of competent jurisdiction within one hundred eighty (180) days of the death of the fatherf.]\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209(d) (1987).\nIt is clear to this court, as it was to the court of appeals, that \u00a7 28-9-209(d) does not apply to claims to share in a wrongful-death settlement. By its terms, this subsection applies to a \u201cclaim asserted against the estate of the father\u201d and not to claims to participate in wrongful-death settlement. Nor does the case of Boatman v. Dawkins, supra, which was relied on by the probate court, persuade us otherwise. In Dawkins, we affirmed the application of the 180-day limitations period to an illegitimate child\u2019s claim against her father\u2019s estate. Again, that is what \u00a7 28-9-209 (d) contemplates \u2014 claims against a father\u2019s estate as opposed to claims against a wrong-fol-death settlement where a petition to approve the settlement may occur more than three years after the father\u2019s death. We hold that the probate court erred in applying \u00a7 28-9-209 (d) to Joshua\u2019s motion to intervene and in denying his request.\nWe turn then to the Wrongful Death Act and specifically to subsection (d) of that Act. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(d) (Supp. 1999). Subsection (d) reads:\nThe beneficiaries of the action created in this section are the surviving spouse, children, father and mother, brothers and sisters of the deceased person, persons standing in loco parentis to the deceased person, and persons to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis.\nThus, to qualify as a statutory beneficiary under this Act, Joshua must be a child of the decedent. Without that status, he has no standing to intervene in probate court regarding the wrongful-death settlement.\nOur reading of the record in this case convinces us that the probate court held the issue of paternity relating to Joshua in abeyance until it first resolved the limitations issue. Having decided that the 180-day cutoff period did apply, the probate court apparently concluded that it was unnecessary to determine the paternity issue. The probate court, however, could not have resolved the paternity question in any event because it lacked the subject-matter jurisdiction to do. Our recent pronouncement on this matter is clear:\nThe probate court has jurisdiction over the administration, settlement, and distribution of estates of decedents and the determination of heirship. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-1-104 (1987). Chancery court, however, has concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile division of chancery court in cases and matters relating to paternity. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-101 (Repl. 1993); Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-13-304(b) (Repl. 1994); Ark. Const, amend. 67. In the instant case, the sole purpose of the action is to establish paternity. Consequently, the probate court was without jurisdiction to hear the matter.\nIn Re Estate of F.C., Deceased, 321 Ark. 191, 193, 900 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1995).\nJoshua argues that we held contrary to this principle in Standridge v. Standridge, 304 Ark. 364, 803 S.W.2d 496 (1991). That, however, is incorrect. The Standridge case did involve the determination of beneficiary status for a child in connection with the approval of a wrongful-death settlement in probate court. But that decision did not require a decision relating to paternity. Rather, the decision of the probate court in Standridge in deciding whether the minor son (Johnny Thacker) was a beneficiary centered on whether the deceased husband of Johnny\u2019s mother (Standridge) stood in loco parentis to Johnny. We stated that there was no evidence in the record which indicated that Standridge intended to assume the duties and benefits associated with becoming Johnny\u2019s father and held that Johnny was not entitled to beneficiary status in the wrongful-death settlement.\nDetermining whether a decedent stood in loco parentis to a minor child is a far cry from deciding paternity. We hold that the probate court is without subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the paternity issue relating to Joshua.\nThat leaves us then with the issue of whether Joshua\u2019s claim as a child for purposes of the wrongful-death settlement is barred for some reason other than the 180-day limitations period. Stated differently, has Joshua\u2019s delay in asserting his rights as a child or having the issue of paternity decided foreclosed him from participating in this settlement? We think not.\nJoshua was born on February 1, 1988, which means he was six at the time of the decedent\u2019s death and eight when his natural mother died and he was adopted by his alleged grandmother, Marjorie Rager, in 1996. He was ten when he moved to intervene to share in the settlement proceeds on March 11, 1998. It is true that no one on Joshua\u2019s behalf has assumed the burden of resolving the paternity issue. But it is also true that no steps were taken by Turley, as administratrix, to resolve the issue, though she became aware of Joshua\u2019s claim to be a beneficiary as early as March 11, 1998, if not before. There is also the point that the probate court apparently reserved a decision on paternity until it could decide the limitations issue, thus leading Joshua to believe that the paternity issue could be decided in probate court after the limitations hurdle was jumped. As already held in this opinion, the probate court had no subject-matter jurisdiction to decide paternity.\nBecause of these facts, we conclude that Joshua is entitled to have the paternity issue decided and that he may share in the settlement proceeds if that decision is favorable to him. We, therefore, reverse the probate court\u2019s final order of approval and distribution and remand the case to that court. We further direct the probate court to transfer the matter of the decedent\u2019s paternity relating to Joshua to the Pope County Chancery Court for resolution. See O\u2019Fallon v. O\u2019Fallon, 335 Ark. 229, 980 S.W.2d 246 (1998); Walker v. First Commercial Bank, N.A., 317 Ark. 617, 880 S.W.2d 316 (1994). Further, it is clear that the probate court erred in awarding executor fees from the wrongful-death settlement proceeds. The Wrongful Death Act provides that no debts of a decedent\u2019s estate shall be paid from a wrongful-death recovery. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(e) (Supp. 1999); see also Douglas v. Holbert, 335 Ark. 305, 983 S.W.2d 392 (1998). We reverse the probate court on that point.\nBecause the status of Joshua is as yet undetermined, we do not know whether he will share in the wrongful-death settlement. When Joshua\u2019s status is resolved, we direct that the shares of the beneficiaries be fixed by the probate court, taking into consideration the best interests of all beneficiaries, as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(g) and (h) (Supp. 1999). See also Douglas v. Holbert, supra (apportionment hearing ordered to be held in which all statutory beneficiaries would participate and present evidence of their respective rights to the wrongful-death proceeds).\nReversed and remanded.\nCory Rager is referred to at various times throughout the record as Corey Rager, Cory C. Rager, Cory Channing, and Cory Channing Rager.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "James Dunham, for appellant Joshua Rager.", "John Van Cleef, for appellants Cory Rager, Matthew Rager, Jr., Yolanda Rager, and Marjorie Rager.", "Mobley Law Firm, by: Jfff Mobley and Skelton & Steuber, P.A., by: Kristin Steuber, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joshua RAGER, by His Next Friend Marjorie Rager; Matthew Rager, Jr.; Yolanda Rager; and Marjorie Rager v. Chandra Rager TURLEY, Administratrix\n99-1465\n27 S.W.3d 729\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 5, 2000\n[Petition for rehearing denied November 9, 2000.]\nJames Dunham, for appellant Joshua Rager.\nJohn Van Cleef, for appellants Cory Rager, Matthew Rager, Jr., Yolanda Rager, and Marjorie Rager.\nMobley Law Firm, by: Jfff Mobley and Skelton & Steuber, P.A., by: Kristin Steuber, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0223-01", "first_page_order": 247, "last_page_order": 255 }