{ "id": 226562, "name": "James D. JACKSON v. ARKANSAS RACING COMMISSION", "name_abbreviation": "Jackson v. Arkansas Racing Commission", "decision_date": "2001-01-11", "docket_number": "00-435", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "316", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ark. 307" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "34 S.W.3d 740" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "232 Ark. 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1694050 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/232/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ark. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1746957 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/279/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675821 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "944 S.W.2d 456", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243546 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-110-204", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(6)" }, { "page": "(a)(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 792, "char_count": 16175, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.130850020915159e-08, "percentile": 0.4684232555643205 }, "sha256": "ea3944fd67b7619057d850e3f937860c7d29ee98fe7fec397dacfbd746af0764", "simhash": "1:b70f8ad56d2e4a9b", "word_count": 2520 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:01.373813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, Imber, Thornton, and Hannah, JJ\u201e not participating.", "Special Justices PAUL GEAN, Lee FERGUS, and W.H. DlL-LAHUNTY concur." ], "parties": [ "James D. JACKSON v. ARKANSAS RACING COMMISSION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nThe Court of Appeals certified this case for us to consider an issue of first impression, constitutional interpretation, and substantial public interest involving the construction of the Rules and Regulations of appellee Arkansas Racing Commission. Our jurisdiction is authorized pursuant to Ark. R. Sup. Ct. l-2(d) and l-2(b)(l), (3), (4), (5), and (6) (2000). Appellant, James D. Jackson, brings the instant appeal from a Pulaski County Circuit Court order affirming appellee\u2019s decision disqualifying appellant\u2019s horse, Valhol, from the Arkansas Derby run on April 10, 1999, at Oaklawn Park, in Hot Springs, Arkansas, and ordering the forfeiture, return, and redistribution of the purse, trophy, and first-place award.\nBilly Patin, a jockey licensed by appellee, rode Valhol in the Derby at the request of appellant and Dallas Keene, the horse\u2019s trainer. Although Valhol won the race by four-and-a-half lengths, Oaklawn Park officials discovered a \u201cbattery\u201d on the track immediately following the race. A battery is a small electrical device that, if used, could alter the outcome of a race by increasing the horse\u2019s speed. Possession of such an electrical device is prohibited by appellee\u2019s Rules 1214 and 2128. While reviewing a videotape of the race, Oaklawn Park officials observed that Valhol\u2019s jockey dropped a dark object on the track after crossing the finishing line.\nSubsequently, track stewards investigated the incident and, following a hearing on May 5, 1999, suspended and fined the jockey, disqualified the winner, Valhol, and redistributed the purse money. Jackson appealed the stewards\u2019 decision to the Arkansas Racing Commission. At a May 24, 1999 hearing, appellee upheld the stewards\u2019 ruling. In particular, the commission found that \u201cBilly C. Patin was in possession of an electrical device during the running of the Arkansas Derby.\u201d Consequently, appellee also disqualified Valhol and ordered the purse money redistributed.\nNext, Jackson appealed the commission\u2019s decision to the Pulaski County Circuit Court. The circuit court affirmed. In the instant appeal, Jackson challenges the circuit court\u2019s order and raises four points urging reversal. First, he claims that appellee\u2019s rules do not authorize it to redistribute purse money. Second, he argues that such punishment is unwarranted because he was unaware that his jockey possessed an unauthorized electrical device, and appellee made no finding that the device was used or that the outcome of the race was altered. Third, appellant contends that the punishment is unconstitutional and a violation of his due-process rights. For his final point on appeal, Jackson submits that appellee and Oaklawn bear some responsibility for failing to protect him, and other horse owners, from the unauthorized actions of their jockeys. We find no merit in appellant\u2019s arguments, and we affirm the circuit court\u2019s decision.\nI. Motion to strike Oaklawn\u2019s brief and oral argument\nAs a preliminary matter, we consider appellant\u2019s motion to strike Oaklawn\u2019s appellate brief. First, we acknowledge that Oak-lawn has participated throughout the course of this litigation, without prior objection and with appellant\u2019s consent. In fact, appellant urged Oaklawn to award the Derby prize money to him. Oaklawn opposed appellant\u2019s position and presented the case against him, his trainer, and his jockey. Second, we note that appellant benefits from Oaklawn\u2019s brief, which contains a supplemental abstract consisting of a condensation of the material rules at issue in this appeal. In this respect, appellant\u2019s brief was insufficient by its failure to abstract all \u201cmatters in the record as are necessary to an understanding of all questions presented to the Court for decision.\u201d See Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 4-2 (2000).\nThird, given appellant\u2019s final point on appeal, urging this court to recognize that Oaklawn had a duty to protect him from his jockey\u2019s actions, we are reluctant to deny Oaklawn the opportunity to respond to appellant\u2019s argument. Accordingly, we deny appellant\u2019s motion to strike Oaklawn\u2019s brief. Similarly, we deny appellant\u2019s untimely oral motion to strike Oaklawn\u2019s oral argument.\nII. Appellee\u2019s authority to redistribute purse\nJackson argues that appellee\u2019s rules and regulations do not authorize disqualification of a horse and redistribution of the purse for mere possession of a prohibited battery because no specific rule expressly creates authority for imposing those sanctions. However, appellant concedes that the rules permit such punishment when a horse tests positive for drugs. Given the rules\u2019 silence on the specific circumstances raised in his case, Jackson reasons that the commission\u2019s decision was erroneous.\nThe circuit court found appellant\u2019s arguments unpersuasive. In a December 14, 1999 letter opinion, the court concluded that the record contained \u201csubstantial, almost overwhelming evidence, that jockey, Pat\u00edn, possessed an electrical, and prohibited, battery powered device, which he discarded after the finish of the race.\u201d In the court\u2019s opinion, possession of the device, alone, was sufficient to sustain the sanction. The court determined that the sanctions against the jockey were justified in light of the commission\u2019s responsibility to protect the public interest in the sport of horse racing. The court explained that racing fans have:\n... a right to trust that the outcome of thoroughbred races will depend on the traditional considerations, including the natural abilities and characteristics of the horses, riders and trainers, and not on the effects of a battery powered device. Violation of that trust merits the sanction.\nAccording to the court, \u201cdisqualification and redistribution are reasonable, even expected sanctions for violation of rules 1214 and/or 2128.\u201d\nThe court also noted that the commission is vested with sole jurisdiction over the business and sport of horse racing in Arkansas and may take what action it deems necessary to supervise, regulate, and control, in the public\u2019s interest, horse racing. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-110-204(a)(6) (Repl. 1999). Moreover, pursuant to rule 2061, the stewards are empowered to interpret the commission\u2019s rules and \u201cto decide all questions not specifically covered by the Rules.\u201d In sum, the court found that by entering Valhol in the Derby, Jackson knew or should have known that it was a violation for his jockey to possess an electrical device and that the stewards were authorized to suspend the jockey and disqualify the horse for such an infraction of the rules.\nWe agree with the circuit court\u2019s findings. As the court observed, the rules contain a number of violations that contain no sanction following the rule. Nevertheless, the stewards are empowered to punish violations of those rules, including disqualification of a horse. Given the paramount interest of protecting the public and the broad authority of the racing stewards and the commission to regulate the sport of horse racing, we decline to conclude that the rules did not permit the instant sanctions.\nIII. Burden of proof\nAppellant also objects to the sanctions imposed upon him because they resulted from an infraction committed by another (i.e., his jockey). For his second point on appeal, Jackson claims that the commission\u2019s rules require proof that he either knew his jockey possessed the prohibited electrical device, that the device was used, or that the outcome of the race was altered. In response, appellee cites the applicable standard of review. An administrative agency\u2019s decision may be overturned if the petitioner\u2019s substantial rights have been prejudiced because the decision was: (1) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the agency\u2019s authority; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) not supported by substantial evidence of record; or (6) arbitrary, capricious, or characterized by an abuse of discretion. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 25-15-212(h) (1997). In light of the appellant\u2019s burden of proof and the deference afforded agency decisions, appellee maintains that the circuit court\u2019s decision should be affirmed.\nIndeed, we must give the evidence its \u201cstrongest probative force in favor of the agency\u2019s riding.\u201d Arkansas State Police Comm\u2019n v. Smith, 338 Ark. 354, 357, 944 S.W.2d 456, 458-59 (1999). We have acknowledged that administrative agencies are better equipped by specialization, insight through experience, and more flexible procedures than courts, to determine and analyze the unique legal issues affecting their agencies. Id. We have also held that between two fairly conflicting views, even if the reviewing court might have made a different choice, the board\u2019s choice must not be displaced. Northwest Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Fayetteville Sav. & Loan Ass\u2019n, 262 Ark. 840, 847, 562 S.W.2d 40, 52 (1978).\nHere, we cannot say that the commission\u2019s decision was unsupported by the evidence or arbitrary and capricious. In fact, as the circuit court pointed out, the racing rules do not require proof of collusion because of the balancing in favor of the public\u2019s interest. See D\u2019Avignon v. Ark. Racing Comm\u2019n, 279 Ark. 355, 651 S.W.2d 87 (1983). Giving appropriate deference to the agency\u2019s interpretation of its own rules, we reject appellant\u2019s argument that the commission failed to meet its burden of proof. We affirm the circuit court\u2019s finding that possession of the device, alone, was sufficient to sustain the sanctions.\nIV Constitutionality of sanctions\nJackson maintains that the sanctions imposed upon him were unconstitutional because appellee violated his due-process rights. Along the same lines as his burden-of-proof argument, Jackson insists that the sanctions are unlawful in the absence of evidence of complicity between Jackson and his jockey. As a result, he claims that the stewards\u2019 and appellee\u2019s actions were arbitrary and capricious. We find no merit in appellant\u2019s argument.\nSignificantly, this court has recognized that liability may be imposed without fault and may be necessary for the protection of the public. See D\u2019Avignon v. Arkansas Racing Comm\u2019n, 279 Ark. 355, 358, 651 S.W.2d 87, 88 (1983). In D\u2019Avignon, the appellant\u2019s dog-trainer\u2019s license was suspended for sixty days after a dog tested positive for drugs. The applicable rules made a trainer an absolute insurer of the condition of a dog\u2019s entry, regardless of acts by third parties. On appeal, D\u2019Avignon argued that the absolute-insurer rule was unconstitutional. We disagreed.\nAlthough the facts in D\u2019Avignon involved an absolute-insurer rule, the reasoning underlying our decision applies equally well in the instant case. We commented that:\nthe enterprises of horse and dog racing are especially susceptible to fraud and deceit because of the parimutuel wagering .... [I] t is imperative that society be afforded as much protection as possible to prevent abuses. For these reasons, we find the absolute insurer rule (Rule 1233) a constitutional and valid exercise of the police power of this state.\nD\u2019Avignon, 279 Ark. at 358, 651 S.W.2d at 88. Here, the commission\u2019s rule 1214 expressly and plainly prohibited possession of an electrical device. Appellant\u2019s jockey violated that rule. In fight of the state\u2019s interest in affording the public \u201cas much protection as possible to prevent abuses,\u201d we cannot say that Jackson\u2019s constitutional rights were violated in the instant case when sanctions were imposed upon him without proof of fault. See id.\nMoreover, the commission was expressly authorized to \u201ctake such other action, not inconsistent with the law, as it may deem necessary or desirable to supervise and regulate, and to effectively control in the public interest, horse racing in the State of Arkansas.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-110-204(a)(6) (Repl. 1999); compare D\u2019Avignon, 279 Ark. at 358, 651 S.W.2d at 88 (quoting Arkansas Racing Comm\u2019n v. Hot Springs Kennel Club, Inc., 232 Ark. 504, 339 S.W.2d 126 (I960)). Possession of the device violated rule 1214, and no other rule required the commission to find that Jackson was aware his jockey possessed the device or that the device actually altered the race\u2019s outcome. Given the rule\u2019s violation, disqualification resulted. In conclusion, we agree with appellee that Jackson has not proven that the commission\u2019s actions were arbitrary or capricious or that his constitutional rights were violated.\nV. Duty to protect\nJackson\u2019s final point on appeal concerns obligations the commission and Oaklawn may owe to horse owners to protect them from the unauthorized actions of their jockeys. Appellant suggests that appellee and Oaklawn should have utilized Rule 2064 to \u201csearch the person, or enter and search the stables, rooms, vehicles, or other places within the track enclosure at which a meeting is held ... of all persons licensed by the Commission, and of all employees and agents of any race track operator . . . .\u201d Appellant argues that the failure to conduct a Rule 2064 search shifts liability to the commission and the track.\nThe Arkansas Racing Commission is the licensing authority for all jockeys in the State of Arkansas. However, as appellee points out, the commission has no duty, arising from any statute or other authority, to protect owners from the fraudulent or negligent acts of their own jockeys. Further, the commission illustrates that appellant was in the superior position to protect himself from his jockey\u2019s fraudulent act. Jackson entered into a contract with Patin to ride Valhol in the Arkansas Derby. Jackson had the opportunity to monitor his jockey, and Valhol\u2019s trainer had a similar opportunity. Apparently, Jackson and Valhol\u2019s trainer were satisfied with Patin because he was permitted to ride in the Derby.\nOaklawn agrees with the arguments advanced by the commission. Oaklawn\u2019s General Manager, Eric Jackson, also claims that protective measures were unnecessary because only two prohibited electrical devices have been discovered at the track in twenty years. In any event, appellant has failed to cite any authority to lend support to his theory that either the commission or Oak-lawn bears liability for a jockey\u2019s corrupt, fraudulent, or prohibited practices- We agree that Jackson was in the best position to observe his jockey and-to make decisions about his suitability to ride Valhol in the Arkansas Derby. In the absence of any statute or rule imposing a duty on appellee or Oaklawn to protect appellant from his jockey\u2019s negligent or fraudulent actions, we reject Jackson\u2019s argument that such a duty was breached.\nAffirmed.\nGlaze, Imber, Thornton, and Hannah, JJ\u201e not participating.\nSpecial Justices PAUL GEAN, Lee FERGUS, and W.H. DlL-LAHUNTY concur.\nRule 1214, contained in the Arkansas Racing Commission\u2019s Rules and Regulations\u2019 section entitled \u201cCorrupt, Fraudulent and Prohibited Practaces,\u201d provides that no elctrical or mechanical device or other expedient designed to increase or decrease the speed of a horse, or that would tend to do so, other than the ordinary whip, shall be possessed by any one or applied by anyone to a horse at any time on the grounds of a franchise holder during a Meeting whether in a race or otherwise.\nLocated under the section entitled \u201cOwners and Trainers,\u201d rule 2128 states that nno person licensed by die Commission shall have in his possession on or aobut any race track any appliance, electrical, mechanical, or otherwise which could affect the racing condition or speed of a horse.\nRule 2068 authorises the stewards to impose fines or supensions, or both, for infractions fo the rules. Rule 2070 permits the stewards to suspend a person or disqualify a horse.", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Laser Law Firm, P.A., by: Sam Laser and Brian A. Brown, for appellant.", "Mitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Byron Freeland, for appellee Arkansas Racing Commission.", "Friday, Eldredge & Clark, by: James M. Simpson, for appellee Oaklawn Jockey Club.", "Dodds, Kidd, Ryan & Moore, by: Donald S. Ryan, for appellees Bush Williams and Jo Williams." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James D. JACKSON v. ARKANSAS RACING COMMISSION\n00-435\n34 S.W.3d 740\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 11, 2001\nLaser Law Firm, P.A., by: Sam Laser and Brian A. Brown, for appellant.\nMitchell, Williams, Selig, Gates & Woodyard, P.L.L.C., by: Byron Freeland, for appellee Arkansas Racing Commission.\nFriday, Eldredge & Clark, by: James M. Simpson, for appellee Oaklawn Jockey Club.\nDodds, Kidd, Ryan & Moore, by: Donald S. Ryan, for appellees Bush Williams and Jo Williams." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 333, "last_page_order": 342 }