{ "id": 226520, "name": "Joe TERRY and David Lee Stocks v. A.D. LOCK, Lock Hospitality, Inc., Greg Entler, John Doe I, John Doe II, and John Doe III", "name_abbreviation": "Terry v. Lock", "decision_date": "2001-01-25", "docket_number": "00-818", "first_page": "452", "last_page": "465", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "343 Ark. 452" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "37 S.W.3d 202" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 18-28-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 N.W.2d 266", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10599127 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/467/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 S.W. 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 Ark. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1374116 ], "year": 1925, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/169/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Ark. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8727182 ], "year": 1861, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/22/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 S.W.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 2250911, 10178959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tex/155/0195-01", "/sw2d/284/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Or. 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or.", "case_ids": [ 2066876 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1948, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or/186/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.W.2d 400", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6104534 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/534/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "900 S.W.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1449578, 1449572 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0291-01", "/ark/321/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449572 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ark. App. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136211 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 Ark. 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1875348 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/289/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "38 Ark. App. 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137411 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/38/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 S.W. 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ark. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1382148 ], "year": 1924, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/164/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451174 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "99 S.W.3d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 593", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365281 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12022369 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0372-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 888, "char_count": 21886, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.465131374761772e-07, "percentile": 0.8059338594643934 }, "sha256": "ea9983229aeffe93f5fe1d50a41ee9c7cfbd7b7dd7243e895bbc8b9685464236", "simhash": "1:3b8c492731ee8c20", "word_count": 3649 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:43:01.373813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Joe TERRY and David Lee Stocks v. A.D. LOCK, Lock Hospitality, Inc., Greg Entler, John Doe I, John Doe II, and John Doe III" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "RAY THORNTON, Justice.\nOn February 1, 1999, appellants, Joe Terry and David Stocks, were preparing the Best Western motel in Conway for renovation. The motel was owned by appellee, Lock Hospitality Inc., a corporation wholly owned by appellee, A.D. Lock and his wife. The appellants were removing the ceiling tiles in room 118, with Mr. Lock also present in the room. As the ceiling tiles were removed, a cardboard box was noticed near the heating and air supply vent where it had been concealed. Appellant Terry climbed a ladder to reach the box, opened it, and handed it to appellant Stocks. The box was filled with old, dry and dusty currency in varying denominations. Mr. Lock took the box and its contents to his office. Later in the day, appellants contacted the Conway Police Department and informed them of the discovery. The investigating officer contacted Mr. Lock, and the money was counted. The face value of the currency was determined to be $38,310.00.\nAppellants filed a complaint in Faulkner County Chancery Court, asserting that the currency \u201cbeing old and fragile is unique and has numismatic or antique value and may have a market value in excess of the totality of its denominations as collector\u2019s funds.\u201d Appellants sought a temporary restraining order and an injunction, directing appellees to refrain from spending or otherwise depositing the found money and to pay all of the money to either appellants or into the registry of the court. Appellants\u2019 complaint also urged that under the \u201cclean-up doctrine,\u201d the chancery court had authority to decide a number of charges sounding in tort. Appellants also sought an order finding that appellees were holding the money in trust for appellants.\nOn the day the complaint was filed, the chancery court entered a temporary restraining order requiring appellees to deposit the found money with the registry of the court. On February 9, 1999, Mr. Lock and Lock Hospitality, Inc., filed their answer. Appellees raised the defenses of estoppel, laches, failure of consideration, and fraud in their answer. Eventually, all of the named appellees other than Mr. Lock and Lock Hospitality, Inc., were dismissed from the case.\nOn appeal, appellants now contend that the chancery court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and resolve the issues that they had asked the chancellor to resolve. We find no merit in this- argument and conclude that the chancery court had jurisdiction under the clean-up doctrine to resolve the merits of the matters relating to ownership of the money.\nThe remaining issue for our review is whether the chancellor was clearly erroneous in characterizing the found money as \u201cmislaid\u201d property and consequently that the interest of Lock Hospitality, Inc., as the owner of the premises, is superior to the interest of appellants as finders of the money. We conclude that the chancellor was not clearly erroneous in finding that the money was mislaid property, and we affirm.\nIn their first point on appeal, appellants argue that the trial court was wholly without subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the issues involved in this case. We have previously stated that parties may not consent to a court\u2019s subject-matter jurisdiction where no such jurisdiction lies, nor may the jurisdiction be waived. Douthitt v. Douthitt, 326 Ark. 372, 930 S.W.2d 371 (1996). A court must determine if it has subject-matter jurisdiction of the case before it. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction is always open, cannot be waived, can be questioned for the first time on appeal, and can even be raised by this court. Hamaker v. Strickland, 340 Ark. 593, 99 S.W.3d 210 (2000). In fact, this court has a duty to determine whether or not we have jurisdiction of the subject matter of an appeal. Id. Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined from the pleadings, the complaint, answer, or cross-complaint. Maroney v. City of Malvern, 320 Ark. 671, 899 S.W.2d 476 (1995). Subject-matter jurisdiction is tested on the pleadings and not the proof. Id.\nA court of chancery or equity may obtain jurisdiction over matters not normally within its purview pursuant to the cleanup doctrine, our long-recognized rule that once a chancery court acquires jurisdiction for one purpose, it may decide all other issues. Douthitt, supra. Generally, the clean-up doctrine allows the chancery court, having acquired jurisdiction for equitable purposes, to retain all claims in an action and grant all the relief, legal or equitable, to which the parties in the lawsuit are entitled. See Fulcher v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 164 Ark. 261, 261 S.W. 645 (1924); see also Bright v. Gass, 38 Ark. App. 71, 831 S.W.2d 149 (1992).\nIn Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986), we noted that:\nunless the chancery court has no tenable nexus whatever to the claim in question we will consider the matter of whether the claim should have been heard there to be one of propriety rather than one of subject-matter jurisdiction.\nId.\nWe have further noted that an error in bringing a suit in equity when there is an adequate remedy at law is waived by failure to move to transfer the cause to the circuit court; where the adequacy of the remedy at law is the only basis for questioning equity jurisdiction the chancellor\u2019s decree is not subject to reversal for failure to transfer the case, unless the chancery court is wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought. Titan Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Shipley, 257 Ark. 278, 517 S.W.2d 210 (1974). Some examples of courts granting relief which they were \u201cwholly without jurisdiction\u201d to grant would be a chancery court trying a criminal case or a chancery court hearing a probate matter. See Dugal Logging. Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., 66 Ark. App. 22, 988 S.W.2d 25 (1999).\nWe have also noted that when the issue is whether the chancery court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks an adequate remedy at law, we will not allow it to be raised for the first time on appeal. Liles, supra. It is only when the court of equity is wholly incompetent to consider the matter before it that we will permit the issue of competency to be raised for the first time on appeal. Finally, we have held that it is a well-settled rule that one who has invoked the assistance of equity cannot later object to equity\u2019s jurisdiction unless the subject matter of the suit is wholly beyond equitable cognizance. Leonards v. E.A. Martin Machinery Co., 321 Ark. 239, 900 S.W.2d 546 (1995).\nKeeping in mind the foregoing applicable principles of law, we turn to the case now on review. In this case, appellants filed their complaint in Faulkner County Chancery Court. Looking at the pleadings filed in this case, we conclude that the chancery court properly had subject-matter jurisdiction to address the matter. The appellants\u2019 complaint sought the following equitable remedies: (1) an injunction; (2) specific performance; and (3) the imposition of a constructive trust. Additionally, appellants asserted in their complaint that they were seeking equitable relief. Specifically, their complaint states: \u201cthe cash money, referred to herein above, being old and fragile is unique and has numismatic or antique value and may have fair market value in excess of the totality of its denominations as collector\u2019s funds and therefore plaintiffs move for specific performance...[.] \u201d\nFrom the pleadings, it appears that appellants sought equitable remedies in the chancery court. As a result, when the chancery court addressed these remedies, that court then acquired jurisdiction over the remaining tort claims pursuant to the \u201cclean-up doctrine.\u201d Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was not wholly without subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.\nThe argument that the court should have transferred the case to circuit court is one of propriety rather than one of subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellants did not request that their case be transferred to circuit court at the trial court level. Because this issue was not raised below we may not consider it now for the first time on appeal. See, Titan Oil & Gas, supra; see also Liles, supra. Accordingly, the trial court is affirmed.\nIn their second point on appeal, appellants contend that the trial court\u2019s finding that the property involved in. this case was \u201cmislaid\u201d property was erroneous. Specifically, the trial court found \u201cthat the money in question was intentionally placed where it was found\u201d and that when \u201cmoney is mislaid, the finders would acquire no rights.\u201d The trial court then concluded that \u201cLock Flospitality, Inc., as the owner of the premises is entitled to possession.\u201d Appellants argue that the found property was not \u201cmislaid property\u201d but instead was \u201clost property,\u201d \u201cabandoned property,\u201d or \u201ctreasure trove\u201d and that the trial court\u2019s finding that the money was \u201cmislaid property\u201d is clearly erroneous. We disagree.\nThe standards governing our review of a chancery court decision are well established. We review chancery cases de novo on the record, and we do not reverse unless we determine that the chancery court\u2019s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. Newberry v. Scruggs, 336 Ark. 570, 986 S.W.2d 853 (1999).\nWe have not previously analyzed the various distinctions between different kinds of found property but those distinctions have been made in the common law, and have been analyzed in decisions from other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of Iowa has explained that \u201cunder the common law, there are four categories of found property: (1) abandoned property, (2) lost property, (3) mislaid property, and (4) treasure trove.\u201d Benjamin v. Linder Aviation, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1995); see also Jackson v. Steinberg, 186 Or. 129, 200 P.2d 376 (1948). \u201cThe rights of a finder of property depend on how the found property is classified.\u201d Benjamin, supra. The character of the property should be determined by evaluating all the facts and circumstances present in the particular case. See Schley v. Couch, 284 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. 1955).\nWe next consider the classification of found property described in Benjamin, supra.\nA. Abandoned property\nProperty is said to be \u201cabandoned\u201d when it is thrown away, or its possession is voluntarily forsaken by the owner, in which case it will become the property of the first occupant; or when it is involuntarily lost or left without the hope and expectation of again acquiring it, and then it becomes the property of the finder, subject to the superior claim of the owner. Eads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861); see also Crosston v. Lion Oil & Refining Co., 169 Ark. 561, 275 S.W. 899 (1925).\nB. Lost property\n\u201cLost property\u201d is property which the owner has involuntarily parted with through neglect, carelessness, or inadvertence, that is, property which the owner has unwittingly suffered to pass out of his possession, and of whose whereabouts he has no knowledge. Property is deemed lost when it is unintentionally separated from the dominion of its owner. Popularly, property is lost when the owner does not know, and cannot ascertain, where it is, the essential test of lost property is whether the owner parted with the possession of the property intentionally, casually or involuntarily; only in the latter contingency may it be lost property. Property is not \u201clost\u201d unless the owner parts with it involuntarily and unintentionally, and does not, at any time thereafter, know where to find it. A loss is always involuntary; there can be no intent to part with the ownership of lost property.\n1 Am. Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 4 (1994); see also Benjamin, supra; Rizt v. Selma United Methodist Church, 467 N.W.2d 266 (Iowa 1991); Jackson, supra.\nThe finder of lost property does not acquire absolute ownership, but acquires such property interest or right as will enable him to keep it against all the world but the rightful owner. This rule is not affected by the place of finding, as the finder of lost property has a right to possession of the article superior to that of the owner or occupant of the premises where it is found.\n1 Am. Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 18 (1994); see also Rizt, supra.\nC. Mislaid property\n\u201cMislaid property\u201d is that which is intentionally put into a certain place and later forgotten. The place where money or property claimed as lost is found is an important factor in the determination of the question of whether it was lost or only mislaid. But where articles are accidentally dropped in any public place, public thoroughfare, or street, they are lost in the legal sense. In short, property will not be considered to have been lost unless the circumstances are such that, considering the place where, and the conditions under which, it is found, there is an inference that it was left there unintentionally.\n1 Am. Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 6 (1994); see also Benjamin, supra; Ritz, supra; Jackson, supra.\nA finder of mislaid property acquires no ownership rights in it, and, where such property is found upon another\u2019s premises, he has no right to its possession, but is required to turn it over to the owner of the premises. This is true whether the finder is an employee or occupier of the premises on which the mislaid article is found or a customer of the owner or occupant.\nThe right of possession, as against all except the true owner, is in the owner or occupant of the premises where the property is discovered, for mislaid property is presumed to have been left in the custody of the owner or occupier of the premises upon which it is found. The result is that the proprietor of the premises is entitled to retain possession of the thing, pending a search by him to discover the owner, or during such time as the owner may be considered to be engaged in trying to recover his property. When the owner of premises takes possession of mislaid personal property left by an invitee he becomes a gratuitous bailee by operation of law, with a duty to use ordinary care to return it to the owner.\nThe finder of mislaid property must turn it over to the owner or occupier of the premises where it is found; it is the latter\u2019s duty to keep mislaid property for the owner, and he must use the care required of a gratuitous bailee for its safekeeping until the true owner calls for it. As against everyone but the true owner, the owner of such premises has the duty to defend his custody and possession of the mislaid property, and he is absolutely liable for a misdelivery.\n1 Am. Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 24 (1994); see also Benjamin, supra; Rizt, supra; Schley, supra.\nD. Treasure trove\nAccording to the common law, treasure trove is any gold or silver in coin, plate, or bullion, whose owner is unknown, found concealed in the earth or in a house or other private place, but not lying on the ground. Where the common-law treasure trove doctrine has been applied to determine the ownership of a find, property considered as treasure trove has included gold or silver coin, and its paper representatives, buried in the earth or hidden in some other private place, including a mattress, a cabinet sink, and a piano. It is not essential to its character as treasure trove that the thing shall have been hidden in the ground; it is sufficient if it is found concealed in other articles, such as bureaus, safes, or machinery. While, strictly speaking, treasure trove is gold or silver, it has been held to include the paper representatives thereof, especially where found hidden with those precious metals.\n1 Am. Jur.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 7 (1994); see also Benjamin, supra; Jackson, supra.\n\u201cTreasure trove carries with it the thought of antiquity; to be classed as treasure trove, the treasure must have been hidden or concealed so long as to indicate that the owner is probably dead or unknown.\u201d 1 Am. JUR.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 8 (1994). 'Tide to treasure trove belongs to the finder, against all the world except the true owner.\u201d 1 Am. JUR.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property \u00a7 26 (1994); see also Ritz, supra.\nRemaining mindful of the various types of found property and the rights to possession of that property, we turn now to the case before us on review. Appellants were stripping motel rooms at the Best Western Motel, which belongs to Lock Hospitality Inc., on February 1, 1999. Their work, as independent contractors, included removing sheet rock or dry wall, ceiling tiles, and other material to prepare the motel for renovations. While working in room 118, appellants removed some ceiling tiles. Appellants found a cardboard box concealed on top of the heating and air vent that became visible as a result of the removal of the ceding tiles. Appellant Terry described the box as \u201ccovered with dust.\u201d Appellant Stocks stated in his affidavit that \u201cthe box and its contents appeared to have been located at the site for a very long time.\u201d Mr. Lock testified that in 1988 a beam was replaced in room 118 and the box was not discovered at that time. Upon opening the box, a large amount of old, dusty currency was discovered. Both appellants and Mr. Lock were in the room when the box was discovered. Neither appellants nor appellees claim to have concealed the property in the ceiling. It is apparent that the box was not lost.- The circumstances suggest that it was either abandoned property, mislaid property, or treasure trove. Considering all of the facts as presented, we cannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding that the property was mislaid property was clearly erroneous. Specifically, we hold that the trial court\u2019s findings that \u201cthe money in controversy was intentionally placed where it was found for its security, in order to shield it from unwelcome eyes...\u201d and that the \u201cmoney was mislaid [property]\u201d were not clearly erroneous.\nWe note that other jurisdictions have addressed similar fact situations and have determined that the property at stake was \u201cmislaid\u201d property. The Iowa Supreme Court addressed this issue in Benjamin, supra. In that case, a bank hired Benjamin to perform a routine service inspection on an airplane which it owned. During the inspection, Benjamin removed a panel from the wing.. Id. The screws to the panel were old and rusted, and Benjamin had to use a drill to' remove them. Upon removal of the panel, Benjamin discovered packets of currency totaling $18,000. Both Benjamin and the bank, as the owner of the plane, claimed ownership of the money. Id. The court reviewed the various types of property and determined that the money was \u201cmislaid\u201d property. The court explained that \u201cthe place where Benjamin found the money and the manner in which it was hidden are also important.\u201d They further noted that:\nthe bills were carefully tied and wrapped and then concealed in a location that was accessible only by removing screws and a panel. These circumstances support an inference that the money was placed there intentionally. This inference supports the conclusion that the money was mislaid.\nBenjamin, supra. After reaching this conclusion, the court held \u201cbecause the money discovered by Benjamin was properly found to be mislaid property, it belongs to the owner of the premises where it was found.\u201d Id. The circumstances in Benjamin are similar to those now before us, and we are persuaded that the reasoning of the Iowa court was sound.\nThe Oregon Supreme Court has also considered a case involving facts similar to the case now on review before this court. In Jackson, supra, Mrs. Jackson, while working as a chamber maid at Arthur Hotel, discovered $800 concealed under the paper lining of a dresser drawer. Id. The court observed that \u201cfrom the manner in which the bills in the instant case were carefully concealed beneath the paper lining of the drawer, it must be presumed that the concealment was effected intentionally and deliberately. The bills, therefore, cannot be regarded as abandoned property. Id. The court then held:\nThe natural assumption is that the person who concealed the bills in the case at bar was a guest of the hotel. Their considerable value, and the manner of their concealment, indicate that the person who concealed them did so for purposes of security, and with the intention of reclaiming them. They were, therefore, to be classified not as lost, but as misplaced or forgotten property, and the defendant, as occupier of the premises where they were found, had the right and duty to take them into his possession and to hold them as a gratuitous bailee for the true owner.\nJackson, supra.\nThe case now before us presents circumstances similar to those upon which Benjamin and Jackson were decided. The trial court found that the original owner of the $38,310.00 acted intentionally in concealing his property. The trial court also recognized that the found property did not have the characteristics of antiquity required for the classification as treasure trove. We cannot say that the trial court\u2019s determination that the box was mislaid property was clearly erroneous. We hold that the trial court did not err when it found that the property in the present case was mislaid property and as such belongs to the owner of the premises in which the money was found. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nAlthough not addressed by the parties on appeal, we note that there is a possibility that pursuant to Arkansas\u2019 \u201cUnclaimed Property Act,\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 18-28-101, et. seq., the State might have asserted an interest in the money in controversy in this case, but did not do so.", "type": "majority", "author": "RAY THORNTON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "McHenry & McHenry Law Firm, by: Donna McHenry, Robert McHenry, & Connie L. Grace, for appellants.", "Grady & Adkisson, P.A., by: William C. Adkisson, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joe TERRY and David Lee Stocks v. A.D. LOCK, Lock Hospitality, Inc., Greg Entler, John Doe I, John Doe II, and John Doe III\n00-818\n37 S.W.3d 202\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 25, 2001\nMcHenry & McHenry Law Firm, by: Donna McHenry, Robert McHenry, & Connie L. Grace, for appellants.\nGrady & Adkisson, P.A., by: William C. Adkisson, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0452-01", "first_page_order": 478, "last_page_order": 491 }