{ "id": 210131, "name": "Leslie G. COTHREN v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Cothren v. State", "decision_date": "2001-05-10", "docket_number": "CR 99-597", "first_page": "697", "last_page": "710", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "344 Ark. 697" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "42 S.W.3d 543" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "996 F. Supp. 110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 202129 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/996/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876546 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ark. 174", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1746962 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/279/0174-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240952 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-71-214", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ark. 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1678861 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(m)" }, { "page": "(m)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-110", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912769 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" }, { "page": "827" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5719289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/284/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 711", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772134 ], "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ark. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1342356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/342/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257725 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ark. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/286/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451158 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243567 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "910" }, { "page": "391" }, { "page": "910" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377601 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298569 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604757 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 932, "char_count": 21606, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.432107301203737e-07, "percentile": 0.8792037682505814 }, "sha256": "9bf5e772c4ba480872d7a5eec74bfb51a9a8923029d4eb3063800a83339f5252", "simhash": "1:092c083531cbf735", "word_count": 3492 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:48:00.616095+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Leslie G. COTHREN v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ANNABELLE Clinton Imber, Justice.\nAppellant, Leslie G. Cothren, appeals the Cleburne County Circuit Court\u2019s denial of his petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Ark. R. Cr. P. 37. Mr. Cothren was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine in an amount of at least 200 grams but less than 400 grams, and possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver in an amount within the same weight range. He argues that one of his convictions was obtained in violation of his rights against double jeopardy and therefore should be vacated. He further argues that he was denied a fair trial by the failure of both trial counsel and the trial court to take appropriate action in response to an improper closing argument by the prosecuting attorney. We affirm the circuit court\u2019s denial of postconviction relief.\nOn September 22, 1996, officers from the Cleburne County Sheriffs Department, the Arkansas State Police, and the Arkansas Drug Enforcement Agency were dispatched to the Ozark Dental Lab in Quitman, Arkansas, where a possible burglary was underway. When the officers arrived, a man inside was threatening to come out shooting. In fact, there was no burglary. Bryan Barber, who had called 911, was under the influence of methamphetamine when he eventually exited the building and surrendered to the police. The officers then searched the building to be certain no one else was inside and discovered several items of paraphernalia commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, as well as instructions copied from a technical manual that detailed how to manufacture the drug. Mr. Barber informed the officers that he had loaned his red Dodge pickup to Mr. Cothren, who operated the dental lab. Mr. Cothren appeared approximately ten minutes later in Mr. Barber\u2019s truck. Officers conducted a pat-down search of Mr. Cothren and found a plastic bag containing 1.4 grams of powdered crystal methamphetamine, an amber, screw-cap bottle containing 0.442 grams of methamphetamine, and $360 in cash in his pockets. Officers were able to look through the windows in the truck\u2019s camper and see a glass jar full of ether and two cake pans containing methamphetamine in an unfinished state. The two cake pans contained a total of 326.9 grams of a gummy substance that was determined to be twenty-five percent methamphetamine.\nMr. Cothren was charged by information in the Cleburne County Circuit Court with one count of manufacturing a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount greater than 200 grams and less than 400 grams and one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to deliver in an amount greater than 200 grams and less than 400 grams, both Class Y felonies proscribed by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401 (Supp. 1999). Following a jury trial, Mr. Cothren was convicted on both counts. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment on each count, to be served consecutively, and imposed a fine of $10,000 on each count.\nMr. Cothren\u2019s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Cothren v. State, CACR97-1230 (Ark. App. May 6, 1998). He then petitioned for postconviction relief pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. The trial court denied the petition and this appeal followed. For reversal, Mr. Cothren argues that his conviction and sentence is in violation of double jeopardy and that he was denied due process and effective assistance of counsel by the failure of trial counsel or the trial court to respond appropriately to an improper closing argument by the prosecuting attorney.\nWe will not reverse the denial of a Rule 37 petition unless the trial court\u2019s decision is clearly erroneous. Catlett v. State, 331 Ark. 270, 962 S.W.2d 313 (1998) (per curiam), citing Thomas v. State, 330 Ark. 442, 954 S.W.2d 255 (1997). The question on appeal is whether, based upon the totality of the evidence, the trial court clearly erred in holding that counsel\u2019s performance was not ineffective under the standard set in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). State v. Slocum, 332 Ark. 207, 964 S.W.2d 388 (1998). We recently reiterated the Strickland standard for assessing the effectiveness of trial counsel:\nAccording to that standard, the petitioner must show first that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u201ccounsel\u201d guaranteed the petitioner by the Sixth Amendment. A court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel\u2019s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, which requires showing that counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that renders the result unreliable. The petitioner must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt, i.e., the decision reached would have been different absent the errors. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.\nSasser v. State, 338 Ark. 375, 385, 993 S.W.2d 901, 907 (1999). Furthermore, we have stated many times that \u201ca lawyer\u2019s choice of trial strategy that proved ineffective is not a basis for meeting the Strickland test.\u201d State v. Slocum, 332 Ark. at 213, 964 S.W.2d at 391, (citing Vickers v. State, 320 Ark. 437, 898 S.W.2d 26 (1995); Monts v. State, 312 Ark. 547, 851 S.W.2d 432 (1993)).\nA petitioner may also qualify for Rule 37 relief, regardless of trial counsel\u2019s performance, if he demonstrates error so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. Sasser v. State, supra. A violation of double jeopardy is just such an error. Travis v. State, 286 Ark. 26, 688 S.W.2d 935 (1985); Martin v. State, 277 Ark. 175, 639 S.W.2d 738 (1982).\nI. Double Jeopardy\nFor his first point on appeal, Mr. Cothren argues that he is entitled to have one of his convictions set aside because his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object on double jeopardy grounds to his conviction and sentencing for both the manufacture of methamphetamine and the possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. The State argues that Mr. Cothren\u2019s double-jeopardy argument is not cognizable in a Rule 37 proceeding based upon the fact that the argument was not raised before the original trial court, and therefore should not be addressed on the merits. We rejected this argument in Rowbottom v. State, 341 Ark. 33, 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000), wherein we reaffirmed that a violation of double jeopardy is an error so fundamental that it renders the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we held that a double-jeopardy claim can be raised for the first time in a Rule 37 petition. Id., 341 Ark. at 37, 13 S.W.3d at 907. We therefore address the merits of Mr. Cothren\u2019s double-jeopardy argument.\nThe Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Arkansas Constitutions protect criminal defendants from: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. Wilcox v. State, 342 Ark. 388, 39 S.W.3d 434 (2000); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969); Zawodniak v. State, 339 Ark. 66, 3 S.W.3d 292 (1999). The third protection is at issue here. Mr. Cothren argues that he has been punished twice for the same offense because possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is a lesser included offense of manufacturing the controlled substance.\nIn Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy bar applies in the multiple punishment context where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished cannot survive the \u201csame-elements\u201d test. The same-elements test, commonly referred to as the \u201c Blockburger\u201d test, is as follows:\n[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not .... [A] single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other.\nBlockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. at 304. The Blockburger test has been applied by this court, Craig v. State, 314 Ark. 585, 863 S.W.2d 825 (1993), and the Arkansas General Assembly has codified this constitutional protection at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-110 (Repl. 1997), which provides in relevant part:\n(a) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than one (1) offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense. He may not, however, be convicted of more than one (1) offense if:\n(1) One offense is included in the other, as defined in subsection (b) of this section;\n* * * * *\n(b) . . . . An offense is so included if:\n(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;\nMr. Cothren was charged and convicted of two counts of violating Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401 (Supp. 1999), which proscribes the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver a controlled substance. The charges and convictions were based upon one manufacturing count and one possession-with-intent-to-deliver count, with both counts being for methamphetamine in an amount within the same weight range \u2014 between 200 and 400 grams. The Arkansas Criminal Code defines the term \u201cmanufacture\u201d as follows:\n\u201cManufacture\u201d means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis, and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container, except that this term does not include the preparation or compounding of a controlled substance by an individual for his own use ....\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-101 (Repl. 1997).\nAs Mr. Cothren has argued, possession of a controlled substance is a lesser-included offense of manufacturing that substance. Craig v. State, 314 Ark. 585, 589, 863 S.W.2d 825, 827 (1993). Consequently, conviction of both crimes, if arising from the same course of conduct, violates double jeopardy. Id. However, Mr. Cothren was not convicted of simple possession. Mr. Cothren was convicted of possession with intent to deliver. Based upon the language of the statute excepting the preparation or compounding \"of a controlled substance for an individual\u2019s own use, Mr. Cothren argues that the intent to deliver is a required element of manufacturing a controlled substance as defined by section 5-64-101(m). \"We disagree. In order to convict Mr. Cothren of the offense of manufacturing a controlled substance, the statute requires the State to prove that he was engaged in the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion, or processing of a controlled substance. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-101(m). There is no requirement that the State prove additionally that Mr. Cothren intended to deliver the controlled substance, although Mr. Cothren was given the opportunity under the statute to assert as a defense to prosecution that he was not guilty of manufacturing a controlled substance because the methamphetamine was for his own use. Id.\nApplying the Blockburger test to the statutes at issue, therefore, it becomes evident that possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver is not a lesser-included offense of manufacturing a controlled substance. A conviction for manufacturing requires proof that the defendant produced, prepared, propagated, compounded, converted, or processed a controlled substance. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-101(m). Possession with intent to deliver requires no such proof. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401. Furthermore, as stated above, a conviction for manufacturing does not require proof of intent to deliver, an element essential to a conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Id. Because the two offenses for which Mr. Cothren was convicted each require the proof of an element not common to the other, possession with intent to deliver is not a lesser-included offense of manufacturing a controlled substance. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-110.\nMr. Cothren argues, additionally, that he cannot be convicted of both manufacturing and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver based upon the evidence presented because both offenses arise out of the same impulse and, therefore, constitute a continuing course of conduct. The trial court held that Mr. Cothren\u2019s conduct was not one continuing course, but two separate courses of conduct. The manufacturing conviction arose out of the manufacturing process that took place inside the dental lab. The possession-with-intent-to-deliver conviction arose out of Mr. Cothren\u2019s possession of the product as it was completing its process of production in the back of the red Dodge pickup. We cannot say the trial court clearly erred in this finding. The testimony of several witnesses at trial established the fact that Mr. Cothren used the dental lab in Quitman for the production of methamphetamine. Mr. Barber testified that Mr. Cothren was in the process of making a batch of methamphetamine when he called to invite Barber to visit. Mr. Barber joined Mr. Cothren at the dental lab for the purpose of observing the manufacturing process at the lab on September 22, 1996. Paraphernalia commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine and detailed instructions for its manufacture were found within Mr. Cothren\u2019s dental lab. The paraphernalia included opened batteries, antihistab packages, and used cans of starting fluid, all of which contain ingredients necessary for manufacturing methamphetamine. The compound substances found in some of the containers tested positive for methamphetamine. A man and a woman came to the lab \u201cto buy and ounce.\u201d Mr. Cothren asked to borrow Mr. Barber\u2019s truck and loaded everything, promising to \u201csplit whatever he made\u201d with Mr. Barber. It was after Mr. Cothren left in Mr. Barber\u2019s truck that Mr. Barber called 911 to report a possible burglary. .When Mr. Cothren returned to the dental lab in Mr. Barber\u2019s truck, police observed the two cake pans of methamphetamine in the back of the pickup and arrested Mr. Cothren.\nAs the court of appeals noted in Mr. Cothren\u2019s direct appeal, \u201ca substance does not have to be in a form to be sold before \u2018manufacturing\u2019 occurs.\u201d Cothren v. State, CACR97-1230, slip op. at 1. Mr. Cothren had committed the offense of manufacturing a controlled substance inside the dental lab before he left the premises. The fact that the methamphetamine was still \u201ccooking\u201d when he was found to be in possession of it with intent to deliver does not cause the two offenses to be merged into one continuing course of conduct.\nA \u201ccontinuing offense\u201d is one that is a \u201ccontinuous act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force.\u201d Britt v. State, 261 Ark. 488, 549 S.W.2d 84 (1977). The test to determine if a situation involves a continuing offense is \u201cwhether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute; if the former, then each act is punishable separately; if the latter, there can be but one penalty.\u201d Id., 261 Ark. at 493, quoting Wharton, Criminal Law, 11th ed. \u00a7 34, n. 3. Put another way, \u201cwhen the impulse is single, but one indictment lies, no matter how long the action may continue. If successive impulses are separately given, even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action, separate indictments lie.\u201d Id. Examples given in Britt and cited in several subsequent cases of continuing offenses include nonsupport [Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401], promoting prostitution [Ark.. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-70-104 - 106], and erecting or maintaining a gate across a public highway [Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-71-214],\nMcLennan v. State, 337 Ark. 83, 88-89, 987 S.W.2d 668, 671 (1999). In the instant case, it is the individual acts of manufacture and possession with intent to deliver that are prohibited, not the continuing course of action. For these reasons, Mr. Cothren\u2019s conviction of both offenses does not violate double-jeopardy principles, and the trial court did not clearly err in denying the petition for post-conviction relief.\nII. Closing Arguments\nFor his second point on appeal, Mr. Cothren argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in fading to object and demand a mistrial in response to improper argument by the prosecuting attorney during closing arguments. Mr. Cothren\u2019s argument relates to the following statement regarding the statutory presumption of intent to deliver that was made by the prosecuting attorney during closing arguments: \u201cThe law says that the amount of methamphetamine gives rise to the possession with the intent to deliver.\u201d Mr. Cothren argues further that the trial court had an affirmative duty to declare a mistrial on its own motion in response to the prosecutor\u2019s argument.\nIn response, the State argues that the prosecuting attorney did not improperly argue the statutory presumption. If the prosecutor\u2019s argument was improper, however, the State argues that Mr. Cothren\u2019s argument concerning the trial court\u2019s duty to act on its own is not preserved for review. Further, the State argues that the failure of Mr. Cothren\u2019s trial counsel to object to the argument was a legitimate trial strategy. Finally, the State asserts that, even if error is shown, Mr. Cothren has failed to demonstrate prejudice.\nWith regard to the trial court\u2019s duty on its own motion to act, Mr. Cothren\u2019s argument is not cognizable in a Rule 37 proceeding. \u201cTo the extent that [Mr. Cothren] argues that the trial court erred when it did not, on its own motion, seek to remedy the alleged prejudice caused by the prosecutor\u2019s remarks, we conclude that he cannot raise that argument for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding. This is an allegation of trial error that should have been raised on direct appeal. As we explained above, such an error can only be raised for the first time under Rule 37 if it is so fundamental as to render the judgment void and subject to collateral attack. In Pitcock v. State, 279 Ark. 174, 649 S.W.2d 393 (1983), we held that a trial error involving a remark made by a prosecutor during closing argument was not \u2018fundamental.\u2019 \u201d Sasser v. State, 338 Ark. at 390, 993 S.W.2d at 910. Accordingly, we may only consider Mr. Cothren\u2019s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor\u2019s comments.\nMr. Cothren\u2019s trial counsel testified at the Rule 37 hearing that he did not find the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments at trial objectionable. Even in hindsight, he was not certain that the arguments were improper. Once again, as we stated in Sasser v. State:\nExperienced advocates might differ about when, or if, objections are called for since, as a matter of trial strategy, further objections from counsel may have succeeded in making the prosecutor\u2019s comments seem more significant to the jury. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985). Because many lawyers refrain from objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the wide range of permissible professional legal conduct. Cohen v. United States, 996 F. Supp. 110 (D. Mass. 1998).\n338 Ark. at 391, 993 S.W.2d at 910. We cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred when it found that Mr. Cothren failed to prove a deficient performance by trial counsel. In any event, Mr. Cothren has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been different if trial counsel had made an objection to the prosecutor\u2019s comment. Sasser v. State, supra. Consequently, Rule 37 relief is not warranted.\nAffirmed.\nMr. Cothren\u2019s name has been misspelled \u201cCothern\u201d in the style of the case as filed with the Supreme Court Clerk. We have corrected the spelling for purposes of this opinion in order to be consistent with the prior appeal filed by Mr. Cothren.\nThe record reflects that Mr. Cothren told the police \u201cthat [the two cake pans] was the stuff that they made,\u201d which evidence supports the conviction of manufacturing methamphetamine in the amount of at least 200 grams but less than 400 grams.\nBecause Mr. Cothren possessed over 200 milligrams of methamphetamine in the truck, there existed a rebuttable presumption that he possessed it with intent to deliver. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401(d) (Repl. 1997). The two cake pans contained an aggregate weight, including adulterants and diluents, of 326.9 grams of methamphetamine. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-64-401 (a).", "type": "majority", "author": "ANNABELLE Clinton Imber, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Stuart Vess, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mac Golden, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Leslie G. COTHREN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 99-597\n42 S.W.3d 543\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 10, 2001\nStuart Vess, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Mac Golden, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0697-01", "first_page_order": 731, "last_page_order": 744 }