{ "id": 939024, "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. Dean Marion OSBORN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Osborn", "decision_date": "2001-06-07", "docket_number": "CR 01-21", "first_page": "196", "last_page": "203", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ark. 196" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "45 S.W.3d 373" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "522 U.S. 1125", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11628386, 11628133, 11628935, 11628264, 11628041, 11629002, 11628232, 11628493, 11628846, 11628435, 11628319, 11628790, 11628188, 11628605, 11628735 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1125-07", "/us/522/1125-02", "/us/522/1125-14", "/us/522/1125-05", "/us/522/1125-01", "/us/522/1125-15", "/us/522/1125-04", "/us/522/1125-09", "/us/522/1125-13", "/us/522/1125-08", "/us/522/1125-06", "/us/522/1125-12", "/us/522/1125-03", "/us/522/1125-10", "/us/522/1125-11" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236204 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241019 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "106 P.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "40 Cal. App. 2d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6041230 ], "year": 1940, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/40/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "2 N.Y.S.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1938, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 N.Y.S.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 P.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Cal. App. 2d 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4458534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-2d/78/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243568 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675-76" }, { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627361 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "527-28" }, { "page": "634", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "524" }, { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 575", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907758 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-54-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236174 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 971", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11139681, 11139812, 11139845, 11139654, 11139719, 11139623, 11139913, 11139557, 11139751, 11139948, 11139598, 11139535, 11139888, 11139576 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0971-07", "/us/525/0971-10", "/us/525/0971-11", "/us/525/0971-06", "/us/525/0971-08", "/us/525/0971-05", "/us/525/0971-13", "/us/525/0971-02", "/us/525/0971-09", "/us/525/0971-14", "/us/525/0971-04", "/us/525/0971-01", "/us/525/0971-12", "/us/525/0971-03" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 703842 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/333/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 702, "char_count": 14222, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0009743277947885e-07, "percentile": 0.538879872919232 }, "sha256": "a626ab2aa3d70445adacbdb7d7afdcb7b1e8ff9a5df2209340c305c1d11c4731", "simhash": "1:cf4bd8b5351613d9", "word_count": 2350 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:17.216423+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE of Arkansas v. Dean Marion OSBORN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice.\nThe State of Arkansas appeals the order of the Franklin County Circuit Court dismissing the charge of hindering apprehension or prosecution against Appellee Dean Marion Osborn. The State argues that the trial court erred in finding that Franklin County lacked jurisdiction over Osborn\u2019s charge. The State asserts that under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-108(c) (1987), jurisdiction was proper in either Crawford County, where the act was committed, or Franklin County, where the effects of the offense were felt. This court has not heretofore interpreted the \u201ceffects\u201d clause of section 16-88-108(c) as it applies to the charge of hindering apprehension or prosecution. We thus have jurisdiction of the State\u2019s appeal, as our holding will establish important precedent and is necessary for the correct and uniform administration of justice. See Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Crim. 3(c); State v. Earl, 333 Ark. 489, 970 S.W.2d 789, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998); State v. Rice, 329 Ark. 219, 947 S.W.2d 3 (1997). For the reasons set out below, we conclude that the State\u2019s argument has merit, and we reverse.\nThe facts of this case are not in dispute. Don Meador was shot to death in his home in Franklin County on or about January 14, 1998. On February 5, 1998, Investigator Richard Hoffman, of the Arkansas State Police, interviewed Osborn about the homicide at his home in Crawford County. Osborn told Hoffman that he had not seen the victim for a year and a half, and that he was at home in Van Bur\u00e9n on the date in question. About nine months later, in November 1998, Osborn contacted the victim\u2019s son, Steve Meador, and told him that he had information about his father\u2019s murder. Osborn later met with Steve and told him that he had been present in Meador\u2019s home when three individuals, Jeremy Richison, Marshall White, and Gary Harvel, came to the house and attacked Meador at the door leading into the garage. Osborn stated that he fled the house through the back door, but then stopped and watched through the kitchen window, as a struggle ensued between Meador and the three assailants. Osborn then heard five shots and ran toward the front of the house, where he heard one of the assailants call out \u201cJeremy, let\u2019s go!\u201d Osborn stated that one of the assailants had a small-caliber revolver.\nSteve Meador reported Osborn\u2019s story to the police, who, in turn, arrested Osborn for hindering apprehension or prosecution, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-54-105 (Repl. 1997). The charge was based on the State\u2019s theory that Osborn had provided false information to the police in his February interview. Osborn was charged in Franklin County, where the murder occurred and where the investigation was ongoing. Osborn subsequently challenged Franklin County\u2019s authority to charge and try him. He contended that the proper venue for the charge was Crawford County, where he gave the interview. The State countered that Franklin County had jurisdiction because the effects of his actions were felt there. The State relied on section 16-88-108(c).\nThe trial court agreed with Osborn and dismissed the charge. Viewing the issue as one of venue, rather than jurisdiction, the trial court found that venue was in Crawford County. It is evident from the trial court\u2019s bench ruling and the subsequent written order that the trial court focused almost entirely on the situs of Osborn\u2019s allegedly unlawful acts, with little regard for where the effects of his acts occurred. Moreover, the order of dismissal evinces the trial court\u2019s conclusion that Crawford County was the only county in which Osborn could be charged and tried. In other words, the trial court did not interpret section 16-88-108(c) as providing concurrent jurisdiction over Osborn\u2019s offense. We conclude that the trial court\u2019s interpretation of the law was erroneous.\nBefore reaching the merits of this appeal, however, we first address the State\u2019s contention that this issue is one of jurisdiction, not venue. The terms \u201cvenue\u201d and \u201cjurisdiction\u201d are often used interchangeably. See Meny v. Norris, 340 Ark. 418, 13 S.W.3d 143 (2000) (per curiam); Davis v. Reed, 316 Ark. 575, 873 S.W.2d 524 (1994). Ordinarily, venue refers to the geographic area, like a county, where an action is brought to trial. In contrast, jurisdiction is generally thought of as the power of a court to decide cases, and it presupposes control over the subject matter and the parties. Id. One type of jurisdiction is known as local jurisdiction. According to Professor LaFave, local jurisdiction \u201cdeals only with where the offense is to be tried, not with whether the state lacks the basic authority to apply its criminal law to the events in question.\u201d Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 16.1(a), at 461 (2d ed. 1999). In Arkansas, local jurisdiction is statutorily provided for in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-105 (1987). Subsection (b) of that statute provides that the local jurisdiction of circuit courts \u201cshall be of offenses committed within the respective counties in which they are held.\u201d Section 16-88-108(c) provides for local jurisdiction over those offenses that occur in more than one county. In this respect, section 16-88-108(c) is an extension of the local jurisdiction provided for in section 16-88-105. We thus agree with the State that this appeal is properly viewed as presenting an issue of local jurisdiction, not venue. That being said, we turn now to the substance of the State\u2019s appeal.\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in its interpretation of section 16-88-108(c), which provides: \u201cWhere the offense is committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts, or effects thereof, requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two (2) or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This statute is remedial in nature, intended to prevent miscarriages of justice by extending the lines of jurisdiction beyond the limits prescribed by the common law, and is to be liberally construed. Hill v. State, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624 (1972). It is presumed that an offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court where the charge was filed, unless the evidence affirmatively shows otherwise. Id. See also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-88-104 (1987). The State argues that all of the evidence in this case supports jurisdiction in either Crawford County, where Osborn acted, or Franklin County, where the effects of Osborn\u2019s actions manifested themselves and hindered the murder investigation.\nThe State relies on this court\u2019s holdings in Hill and Blackwell v. State, 338 Ark. 671, 1 S.W.3d 399 (1999). In Blackwell, this court held that jurisdiction over a charge of Medicaid fraud was proper in Pulaski County, where the effects of the defendant\u2019s acts were felt. Blackwell argued that there was an insufficient nexus to bring charges against him in Pulaski County. This court disagreed:\nWhile Blackwell\u2019s dental practice was located in Pine Bluff and he treated patients there, his offense was consummated by submitting fraudulent billings to Arkansas\u2019s State Medicaid Agency (Department of Human Services) located in Little Rock. Moreover, it was in Little Rock where the state agency denied or authorized Blackwell\u2019s Medicaid claims. Clearly, Blackwell\u2019s acts took effect in Pulaski County where the Medicaid agency received and processed Blackwell\u2019s fraudulent bills. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling that it had jurisdiction to try the State\u2019s Medicaid charges against Blackwell.\nId. at 675-76, 1 S.W.3d at 401 (emphasis added).\nSimilarly, in Hill, 253 Ark. 512, 487 S.W.2d 624, the appellant was convicted in Howard County of selling cattle that were subject to a Hen. The evidence showed that all negotiations for the sale of the cattle took place in Sevier County, that both the appellant and the buyer were residents of Sevier County, and that the buyer delivered the check for payment of the purchase price in Sevier County. The only connection between Howard County and the transaction was the fact that the cattle were located on a farm in that county. This court concluded, however, that it was not error to charge the appellant in Howard County:\nIn this case, the acts of Hill with reference to the sale may well have taken place in Sevier County, but the intention essential to his conviction must have been to defeat the holder of the \u201clien\u201d in the collection of the debt. If the cattle were in Howard County, the \u201chen\u201d was there and its enforcement could be expected to be conducted or at least initiated in that county. The effect of the sale was to transfer title to the cattle located in Howard County to Powell, who would certainly take them into his possession there. Clearly, acts or their effects requisite to the consummation of the alleged offense would occur in Howard County. The venue was not improperly laid there, even though it might have been properly laid in Sevier County.\nId. at 527-28, 487 S.W.2d at 634 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, this court relied on several cases from foreign jurisdictions and held:\nIf the acts committed by the accused were intended to take effect in a county other than that in which all were actually committed, venue may be laid in the former county, even though all of the acts of the accused were done before the actual effect of the unlawful purpose has materialized there.\nId. at 524, 487 S.W.2d at 632 (emphasis added) (citing People v. Wallace, 78 Cal. App. 2d 726, 178 P.2d 771 (1947); People v. Quill, 149 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Kings County Ct. 1956); People v. Vario, 2 N.Y.S.2d 611 (Queens County Ct. 1938)).\nTwo of the cases relied upon by this court in Hill, Wallace, 78 Cal. App. 2d 726, 178 P.2d 771; and Quill, 149 N.Y.S.2d 566, rely on language from the case of People v. Megladdery, 40 Cal. App. 2d 748, 106 P.2d 84 (1940). In Megladdery, the California court was presented with a question of local jurisdiction over charges stemming from the bribery of a public official. The defendant argued that because the acts that formed the basis of his criminal charges were committed outside of Alameda County, that county had no jurisdiction to try him. The applicable California statute, section 781 of the California Penal Code, is very similar to section 16-88-108(c). Section 781 provided: \u201cWhen a public offense is committed in part in one county and in part in another, or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either county.\u201d Id. at 774, 106 P.2d at 98. The defendant argued that under section 781, a particular county cannot have jurisdiction over an offense unless some act that is a necessary element of the offense is committed in that county, or unless some effect of such an act, which effect is an essential or necessary element of such offense, occurs within the county. The appellate court disagreed:\nThe interpretation contended by respondent would completely disregard the phrase \u201cor the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense\u201d contained in the section. Obviously, the phrase, \u201cor requisite to the consummation of the offense,\u201d means requisite to the completion of the offense \u2014 to the achievement of the unlawful purpose \u2022 \u2014 \u2022 to the ends of the unlawful enterprise. By the use of the word \u201cconsummation\u201d the legislature drew a distinction between an act or an effect thereof which is essential to the commission of an offense, and an act or effect thereof which, although unessential to the commission of the offense, is requisite to the completion of the offense \u2014 that is, to the achievement of the unlawful purpose of the person committing the offense.\nId. at 774-75, 106 P.2d at 98. We believe that this reasoning is applicable to the present case.\nHere, Osborn is charged with hindering apprehension or prosecution, in violation of section 5-54-105. Although this offense may be violated in a number of ways, Osborn was charged pursuant to subsection (a)(6), which prohibits a person from volunteering false information to a law enforcement officer while acting \u201cwith purpose to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense[.]\u201d The unlawful act is volunteering false information to the police. There is no dispute that the act alleged to have been committed by Osborn was committed entirely within the boundaries of Crawford County, where Osborn gave the interview. However, the effects requisite to the consummation of the offense, i.e., the achievement of the unlawful purpose of hindering the apprehension or prosecution of the three murder suspects, occurred in Franklin County, where the murder occurred and the investigation was ongoing. Indeed, were it not for the murder in Franklin County, Osborn would not have been interviewed by police and there would have been no investigation or prosecution for him to hinder. Thus, under section 16-88-108(c), jurisdiction was proper in either county. Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the charge against Osborn in Franklin County.\nWe thus reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand with instructions to reinstate the charge of hindering apprehension or prosecution against Osborn. We agree with the State that no double-jeopardy violation will result from reinstating the charge against Osborn. This court recently stated in State v. Havens, 337 Ark. 161, 987 S.W.2d 686 (1999), that where the charge is dismissed on a pretrial motion made by the defendant\u2019s counsel and is not the result of the State\u2019s failure to prove its case, the State should be permitted to refile the charge. \u201cPermitting retrial in this instance is not the sort of oppression at which the Double Jeopardy Clause is directed[.]\u201d Id. at 168, 987 S.W.2d at 690 (citing State v. Zatvodniak, 329 Ark. 179, 946 S.W.2d 936 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1125 (1998)).\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Donald L. Corbin, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.", "Ernie Witt, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. Dean Marion OSBORN\nCR 01-21\n45 S.W.3d 373\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 7, 2001\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nErnie Witt, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0196-01", "first_page_order": 218, "last_page_order": 225 }