{ "id": 939025, "name": "Vincent Anthony SANSEVERO v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Sansevero v. State", "decision_date": "2001-06-21", "docket_number": "CR 00-1397", "first_page": "307", "last_page": "313", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ark. 307" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "45 S.W.3d 840" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241019 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912756 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257759 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "910 S.W.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1447562, 1447483 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "jury's observation of defendant at trial was sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was more than sixteen years old" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0561-01", "/ark/322/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 472", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447483 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "jury's observation of defendant at trial was sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was more than sixteen years old" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0472-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ark. 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/246/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 Ark. App. 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6648104 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "148-149" }, { "page": "580-581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/20/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-13-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(4)(C)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 635, "char_count": 10723, "ocr_confidence": 0.771, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.9252270247653882e-07, "percentile": 0.7335221088179272 }, "sha256": "5807ac4666e6afa7f74d4f2976051b178aac4b86a94fc20ae737f07b56866b5e", "simhash": "1:ab27fac4268a0632", "word_count": 1840 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:17.216423+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Vincent Anthony SANSEVERO v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nIn this appeal, appellant Anthony Vincent Sansevero raises the sole issue of whether the evidence presented by the State was insufficient to convict him of battery in the second degree. We agree that it was, and we reverse the judgment of conviction for second-degree battery and remand.\nOn July 22, 1999, the victim, eleven-year-old K.S., was babysitting in Litde Rock for the children of Karen McCammon, who are named Robert and Marie. At the time, Robert was age six and Marie was age four. K.S. stated that it was her first time to babysit in another person\u2019s home, but added that the McCammon\u2019s house was very near to her home. K.S. testified that she was babysitting in the daytime, while Ms. McCammon went to a doctor\u2019s appointment for approximately an hour.\nMs. McCammon left for her doctor\u2019s appointment at about 8:22 a.m., and K.S. and the two children sat down to watch television. The doorbell rang, and K.S. answered the door. It was a man, and he asked for a drink of water from the hose outside. K.S. agreed and closed the door. About five minutes later, a man rang the doorbell again. It was Sansevero. He also asked for water, and this time K.S. went to the kitchen to get him some water. She returned to the door and gave him a plastic cup filled with water. At that time, Sansevero asked if he could use the telephone. K.S. replied, \u201cNo, I\u2019m sorry.\u201d Sansevero then pushed his way past K.S. into the house and locked the door behind him. He grabbed K.S. by the neck and pushed her up the stairs and into a bedroom. K.S. testified that she did not scream or yell, and that the children did not see her being pushed up the stairs.\nOnce in the bedroom, Sansevero closed the door. K.S. stated that she was crying at this point. He ordered her to take off her clothes, and she said, \u201cNo.\u201d He then ordered her again to take off her clothes and tried to do so himself but was not able to get her clothes off. He then hit her across the face. Sansevero next asked, \u201cWhere do your parents keep the money?\u201d, and she responded, \u201cI don\u2019t know. This isn\u2019t my house.\u201d K.S. stated that Sansevero went downstairs at that time, and she followed because she was not sure what he was going to do and the children were downstairs. He forced her a second time up the stairs, and this time, he undressed her and raped her.\nDuring the rape, one of the children, Robert, came to the bedroom door and asked K.S. to play a video tape for the children. K.S. stated that when Robert knocked on the door, Sansevero got off of her and began to put his clothes back on. Sansevero told K.S. to get dressed and to clean up. While she was getting dressed, Sansevero told her, \u201cIf you tell anybody, I\u2019m going to kill you.\u201d K.S. testified that she went downstairs to sit with the children. When Sansevero came down, he repeated the threat and said, \u201cIf you tell anyone, I\u2019ll find you and I\u2019U kill you.\u201d He then left.\nMs. McCammon arrived home approximately five to ten minutes later and took K.S. home. K.S. told her mother what had happened, and her father called the Little Rock Police Department. K.S. subsequently gave the clothes she was wearing to police officers and went to Arkansas Children\u2019s Hospital for a sexual-assault examination. At the crime scene, police officers obtained evidence, including the plastic cup that Sansevero drank from. The police officers were able to lift fingerprints from that cup, which matched the fingerprints of Sansevero. The investigation also revealed other DNA evidence, including semen, finking Sansevero to the crime. He was arrested and charged with rape, residential burglary, terroristic threatening, and second-degree battery. Enhancement of any sentence was requested due to his having been convicted of more than four previous felonies.\nSansevero was tried by a jury and convicted on all counts. Proof of five prior convictions was introduced, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape, forty years for residential burglary, fifteen years for terroristic threatening, and fifteen years for battery in the second degree.\nSansevero only appeals his conviction for second-degree battery. He argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for battery in the second degree because the State failed to prove by substantial evidence that he knew the victim was less than thirteen years of age at the time of the offense. This charge arose from the testimony of K.S. that when she resisted his orders to take off her clothes, he slapped both sides of her face with his hand, causing bruising. Sansevero contends that he was charged with causing physical injury to K.S., who he knew to be twelve years of age or younger. He denies that he knew K.S.\u2019s age.\nSecond-degree battery is defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) (Supp. 1999), and reads in pertinent part:\n(a) A person commits battery in the second degree if:\n(4) He intentionally or knowingly, without legal justification, causes physical injury to one he knows to be:\n(C) An individual sixty (60) years of age or older or twelve (12) years of age or younger[.]\n(Emphasis added.) The jury was instructed on this specific definition of battery and returned a guilty verdict. No evidence was presented by the State that Sansevero knew K.S. was twelve years old or younger.\nSansevero directs this court\u2019s attention to an opinion by the court of appeals in Hubbard v. State, 20 Ark. App. 146, 725 S.W.2d 579 (1987). In Hubbard, the issue presented was whether the defendant knew the victim to be sixty years of age or older under the second-degree battery statute. The court of appeals concluded that the State had to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the victim\u2019s age under the language of the statute. The court said:\nThe plain wording of \u00a7 41-1602(1) (d) (iii) [now \u00a7 5-13-202(a)(4)(C)] imparts that knowledge on the part of the defendant must be personal to him. The statute does not provide a substitute or explanatory equivalent. We believe the test is whether from the circumstances in the case at bar, appellant, not some other person or persons, knew that his victim was sixty years of age or older. A different result by this court could have been reached had the General Assembly defined \u201cknows to be\u201d in the above statute to include one who has information that would lead an ordinary, prudent person faced with similar information to believe that the information is fact.\nHubbard, 20 Ark. App. at 148-149, 725 S.W.2d at 580-581.\nThe State counters this by arguing that K.S.\u2019s physical appearance, standing alone, was circumstantial evidence of her age and constituted substantial evidence that Sansevero knew that K.S. was twelve or younger. The State cites the court to Clark v. State, 246 Ark. 876, 440 S.W.2d 205 (1969), where Justice Fogleman, in a concurring opinion, wrote that age may be proved in many different ways such as by the appearance of the individual to the jury. The State contends that the jury could infer that Sansevero knew of the victim\u2019s age when he battered her based on her appearance and her obvious youth. See also Hadley v. State, 322 Ark. 472, 910 S.W.2d 675 (1995) (jury\u2019s observation of defendant at trial was sufficient circumstantial evidence that he was more than sixteen years old).\nIt falls our lot to interpret the language of \u00a7 5-13-202(a)(4)(C) and specifically what the General Assembly intended by the phrase \u201cknows to be.\u201d We strictly construe criminal statutes and resolve any doubts in favor of the defendant. Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633, 19 S.W.3d 16 (2000); Graham v. State, 314 Ark. 152, 861 S.W.2d 299 (1993). It is also axiomatic that in statutory interpretation matters, we are first and foremost concerned with ascertaining the intent of the General Assembly. State v. Havens, 337 Ark. 161, 987 S.W.2d 686 (1999). In cases of statutory interpretation, we give words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning. Hagar v. State, supra; Bush v. State, 338 Ark. 772, 2 S.W.3d 761 (1999). In the case before us, the General Assembly has expressly provided that in order to commit second-degree battery, it is necessary that Sansevero knew K.S. to be age twelve or younger. The language of the statute is clear and unmistakable and differs significantly from statutes such as the rape statute which merely provide that the victim be a certain age and not that the defendant know what that age is. See, e.g, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-103(a)(4) (Repl. 1997). Moreover, the General Assembly has expressly provided that with respect to sexual offenses involving children beiow the age of fourteen, it is no defense that the defendant did not know the age of the child. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-14-102(b) (Repl. 1997). No comparable language is contained in the second-degree battery statute.\nWe take note of the fact that since the court of appeals handed down Hubbard v. State, supra, in 1987, the General Assembly has amended \u00a7 5-13-202 in three legislative sessions. Despite this focus on the statute, the General Assembly has failed to address the issue of the \u201cknows to be\u201d language which was pointed out to that body in the Hubbard decision. Hence, we can only conclude that the General Assembly has intended to retain the \u201cknows to be\u201d language, as interpreted in Hubbard.\nWe, therefore, hold that the State failed to establish proof of an essential element of the second-degree battery offense, which was Sansevero\u2019s actual knowledge of the age of K.S. We modify the conviction to battery in the third degree, a Class A misdemeanor, which has no knowledge-of-age requirement, and assess the maximum term of one year imprisonment in the county jail. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-401(b)(1), 5-13-203 (Repl. 1997). We credit Sansevero, however, with the time served of 390 days, leaving no time to be served on this judgment of conviction.\nThis appeal did not involve Sansevero\u2019s convictions for rape, residential burglary, and terroristic threatening. Thus, the sentences assessed in connection with those convictions will remain in place. The judgment of conviction for second-degree battery is reversed and modified and this matter is remanded for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.\nThe record in this case has been reviewed for other reversible error pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3 (h), and none has been found.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Sandra Cordi, Deputy Public Defender; by: Deborah R. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Michael C. Angel, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Vincent Anthony SANSEVERO v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 00-1397\n45 S.W.3d 840\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 21, 2001\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, and Sandra Cordi, Deputy Public Defender; by: Deborah R. Sailings, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Michael C. Angel, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0307-01", "first_page_order": 329, "last_page_order": 335 }