{ "id": 939026, "name": "Stephen CLEMMONS v. OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT", "name_abbreviation": "Clemmons v. Office of Child Support Enforcement", "decision_date": "2001-06-21", "docket_number": "01-258", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "355", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ark. 330" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "47 S.W.3d 227" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "999 S.W.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 243542, 243503 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0591-01", "/ark/338/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243542 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ark. 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1488307 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1943, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/205/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ark. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1754983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/274/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884308 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ark. 4", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1746988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/279/0004-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ark. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1916800 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/305/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ark. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1912798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/314/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369141 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 S.W.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1443778 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240997 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 Ark. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893439 ], "year": 1884, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/44/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 S.W. 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "81 Ark. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1530676 ], "year": 1905, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/81/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.W. 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 Ark. 168", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1546832 ], "year": 1909, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/93/0168-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ark. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 226509 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250-251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/343/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455988 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862749 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ark. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888343 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/299/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "962 S.W.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1604762, 377543 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0386-01", "/ark/332/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604762 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ark. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1449524 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/321/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Cal. Rptr. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4502", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4383", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Cal. Code", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Repealed in 1993" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-17-604", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "236 Ark. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922779 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725-726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0723-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298643 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935046 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655477 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ark. 789", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1447487 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/322/0789-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12024580 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51264 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0310-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 201", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904278 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0201-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ark. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1891441 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/297/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ark. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1668846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/264/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 781", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455967 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243591 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243554 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257774 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-17-101-9", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 454.010", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Mo. Ann. Stat.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51248 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604789 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862799 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240990 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130706 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257741 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ark. App. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142176 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/72/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137775 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ark. 837", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724015 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839-40" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/244/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "870 S.W.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1910507, 1910443 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0688-01", "/ark/315/0677-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ark. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1910507 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/315/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453561 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655512 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340960 ], "year": 1912, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/225/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "876 S.W.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1443778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ark. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888343 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/299/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "962 S.W.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1604762, 377543 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0386-01", "/ark/332/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604762 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ark. App. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/65/0084-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1426, "char_count": 46069, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.890478632763559e-07, "percentile": 0.9012832408375933 }, "sha256": "a6793696f1e6fe4807553449d60c32f1a967e8a10d3d9e341c42706fd2e4a697", "simhash": "1:1bede6a5e58ad7c8", "word_count": 7620 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:17.216423+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Brown and Imber, JJ., concur.", "BROWN, J., joins in this concurrence." ], "parties": [ "Stephen CLEMMONS v. OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Justice.\nAppellant Stephen L. Clemmons petitions for review from a court of appeals decision affirming the chancery court\u2019s order awarding child support to Appellee Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) in the amount of $20,775. Stephen argues on appeal that the chancery court erred in finding that his ex-wife, Sheila, maintained the right to collect child-support arrearages, which she assigned to OCSE, after the couple\u2019s son, Christopher, had reached majority. Stephen also argues that the chancery court applied the wrong statute of limitations to allow OCSE to collect the entire amount of child-support arrearages due from a 1978 support order. We affirm the chancery court and the court of appeals.\nFacts\nThe chronology of this case has been stated previously in the two prior court of appeals decisions in this case. See Office of Child Supp. Enforcem\u2019t v. Clemmons, 65 Ark. App. 84, 984 S.W.2d 837 (1999); Clemmons v. Child Support Enforcement, 72 Ark. App. 443, 37 S.W.3d 687 (2001). These facts are restated here.\nSheila and Stephen Clemmons were married in the state of Missouri on March 4, 1971, and divorced there on October 16, 1974. One child, Christopher Stephen Clemmons, was born of that union on June 5, 1973. The couple divorced in Missouri on October 16, 1974, and Sheila was awarded custody of Christopher, with Stephen ordered to pay seventy-five dollars per month child support until Christopher entered the first grade, at which time support was to increase to one hundred dollars per month. The custody and support provisions of this decree were modified by the Missouri court on May 7, 1976, with Sheila having custody of the minor child for nine months during the regular school term and Stephen having custody for three months during the summer, with each party having reasonable visitation while the child was in the other\u2019s custody. Further, Stephen was ordered to pay seventy-five dollars per month child support, which abated during his three months of custody.\nOn September 7, 1976, the Washington County, Arkansas, juvenile court placed custody of Christopher with Sheila, apparently based on a dependency-neglect petition filed by Sheila. On September 9, 1976, the juvenile court quashed that order and placed physical custody with Stephen. However, Sheila failed to appear at that hearing with Christopher; Stephen would later learn that she had taken him to California. On November 17, 1976, Stephen also obtained an order from the Missouri court awarding him temporary custody of Christopher.\nIn February 1977, Stephen located Sheila and Christopher in California, but Sheila refused to allow him any contact or communication with Christopher. Law enforcement officials declined to assist Stephen in gaining physical custody of Christopher, even though he had the Arkansas and Missouri custody orders.\nA hearing was held in California in December 1977 on the issues of custody, visitation, and support. Both parties were present and represented by counsel. On March 27, 1978, an order was entered in the Superior Court of California in the County of Los Angeles acknowledging the Missouri decree as a valid foreign decree and giving it full faith and credit; finding a child-support arrearage of $525.00 from June 1977 through December 1977; placing custody of Christopher with Sheila, with reasonable visitation awarded to Stephen; and modifying Stephen\u2019s child-support obligation from seventy-five dollars per month to one hundred twenty-five dollars per month as of January 1, 1978. After the California order was entered, Sheila continued to move around California and continued to refuse any contact between Stephen and Christopher. Stephen did not appeal the California order granting custody to Sheila, nor did he ever pursue a contempt citation concerning her denial of his visitation with Christopher, which would have been the proper forum for these issues.\nChristopher turned eighteen on June 5, 1991. In 1993, Sheila assigned her rights to the state of Missouri for assistance in collecting child-support arrearages. After locating Stephen in Arkansas, Missouri initiated an interstate action to enforce Stephen\u2019s child-support obligation under the 1978 California award. On February 6, 1995, the Arkansas OCSE filed a request in Pope County, Arkansas, Chancery Court for registration of the California order and a petition to reduce Stephen\u2019s unpaid child support to judgment. On November 14, 1995, the Pope County Chancery Court entered the California order as a foreign decree and ordered briefing of two issues: the mother\u2019s assignment of rights of her non-minor child, and the proper statute of limitations. On January 22, 1998, the chancellor entered an order estopping OCSE or Sheila from obtaining a judgment and/or attempting to collect any child-support arrearages based upon the fact that Sheila had willfully concealed Christopher from his father.\nOCSE appealed this order, and the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that the chancellor directly contravened the purpose of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (\u201cUIFSA\u201d) when he refused to allow the collection of past-due support based upon a failure to allow visitation, and ordering that the chancellor \u201cdetermine the proper amount of child-support arrearage due pursuant to the March 27, 1978, California order, taking into consideration the applicable statute of limitations and the propriety of the mother\u2019s assignment.\u201d\nUpon remand, without elaborating his reasons, the chancellor made the determination at a hearing on August 26, 1999, that, \u201ctaking into consideration the applic\u00e1ble statute of limitations and the propriety of the mother\u2019s assignment, it is hereby found that the Defendant\u2019s child support delinquency to be [sic] the sum of $20,775 as ofjuly 28, 1999.\u201d Stephen appealed that ruling, arguing that the chancellor erred (1) in not considering the propriety of Sheila\u2019s assignment of child support to OCSE pursuant to the instructions of this court on remand, and (2) in calculating the child-support arrearage. Despite the court of appeals\u2019 determination that the chancellor\u2019s opinion was \u201cconclusory\u201d and failed to address the issues put before it on remand, and despite the court of appeals recognition that this was an issue of first impression, the court of appeals affirmed the chancellor\u2019s ruling, and Stephen petitioned for review to this court arguing the same points on appeal. This court accepted review.\nStandard of Review\nUpon a petition for review, we consider the case as though it were originally filed in this court. Davis v. Child Support Enforcement, 341 Ark. 349, 20 S.W.3d 273 (2000); Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 2 S.W.3d 60 (1999); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999); ERC Contractor Yard & Sales v. Robertson, 335 Ark. 63, 977 S.W.2d 212 (1998); Frette v. City of Springdale, 331 Ark. 103, 959 S.W.2d 734 (1998); Travis v. State, 331 Ark. 7, 959 S.W.2d 32 (1998). We have held many times that although we review chancery cases de novo on the record, we will not reverse a finding of fact by the chancellor unless it is clearly erroneous. Slaton v. Slaton, 336 Ark. 211, 983 S.W.2d 951 (1999).\nI. Propriety of Sheila\u2019s Assignment to Missouri\nThe first issue before this court is whether Sheila\u2019s assignment of her collection rights to Missouri, which then assigned or transferred those rights to Arkansas, was proper. Within this issue is also the question of whether a custodial parent can attempt to collect child-support arrearages for a child who has since reached the age of majority.\nA. Validity of Shelia\u2019s Assignment to Missouri and Arkansas\nAs an initial issue, it should be noted that Sheila\u2019s assignment of her collection rights to Missouri was a valid assignment under Missouri law pursuant to Mo. Ann. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 454.010 et seq. In turn, Arkansas recognizes collection orders for other states pursuant to Arkansas\u2019s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act found at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 9-17-101-9-17-902 (Repl. 1998). As such, there is no issue regarding the legitimacy of Sheila\u2019s assignment to collect arrearages and the transfer of that collection right to OCSE pursuant to Missouri and Arkansas law.\nB. Sheila\u2019s Ability to Assign Collection Rights to the State\nWhile there is no issue as to the mechanics of Sheila\u2019s assignment of her purported rights, the real issue here is whether Sheila actually had rights to assign. Stephen argues that She\u00f1a no longer had the right to pursue support arrearages from him after Christopher turned eighteen in 1991, prior to Sheila\u2019s filing for collection. OCSE argues that the right belongs to anyone listed in the applicable statute.\nStephen argues that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-105 (Repl. 1998) \u201cPetition for Support\u201d controls and dictates that only Christopher could initiate the action to collect child support from him. This statute states:\n(a) The chancery courts in the several counties in this state shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil cases and matters relating to the support of a minor child or support owed to a person eighteen (18) or older which accrued during that person\u2019s minority.\n(b) The following may file a petition to require the noncustodial parent or parents of a minor child to provide support for the minor child:\n(1) Any parent having physical custody of a minor child;\n(2) Any other person or agency to whom physical custody of a minor child has been given or relinquished;\n(3) A minor, child by and through his guardian or next friend; or\n(4) The Office of Child Support Enforcement when the parent or person to whom physical custody has been relinquished or awarded is receiving assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Medicaid, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act \u2014\u2022 Foster Care, or has contracted with the department for the collection of support.\n\u2022 (c) Any person age eighteen (18) or above to whom support was owed during his minority may file a petition for a judgment against the nonsupporting parent or parents. Upon hearing, a judgment may be entered upon proof by a preponderance of the evidence for the amount of support owed and unpaid. (Emphasis added.)\nThis statute seems to indicate that the people named in section (b) may initiate an action to collect support for a minor child, while section (c) indicates that a child who has reached majority may initiate an action on his or her own behalf.\nStephen also argues that Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236 (Repl. 1998) \u201cArrearages \u2014 Child support limited \u2014 Limitations period\u201d requires that a child who has reached majority, rather than the custodial parent or guardian, must pursue collection of arrearages. This statute states:\n\u2022 (a) As used in this section:\n(1) \u201cAction\u201d means any complaint, petition, motion, or other pleading seeking recovery of accrued child support arrearages;\n(2) \u201cMoving party\u201d means any of the following:\n(A) The custodial parent;\n(B) Any person or agency to whom custody of a minor child has been given or relinquished;\n(C) The minor child through his guardian or next friend;\n(D) A person for whose benefit the support was ordered, within five (5) years of obtaining his majority; or\n(E) The Office of Child Support Enforcement when the custodial parent or person to whom custody has been relinquished or awarded is or has been receiving assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children or has contracted with the Office of Child Support Enforcement for the collection of support;\n(3) \u201cAccrued child support arrearages\u201d means a delinquency owed under a court order or an order of an administrative process established under state law for support of any child or children which is past due and unpaid; and\n(4) \u201cInitial support order\u201d means the earliest order, judgment, or decree entered in the case by the court or by administrative process which contains a provision for the payment of money for the support and care of any child or children.\n(b) In any action involving the support of any minor child or children, the moving party shall be entitled to recover the full amount of accrued child support arrearages from the date of the initial support order until the filing of the action.\n(c) Any action filed pursuant to subsection (b) of this section may be brought at any time up to and including five (5) years beyond the date the child for whose benefit the initial support order was entered reaches the age of eighteen (18) years.\nThis statute is the applicable statute in this case because OCSE is pursuing collection of support arrearages for support ordered in a prior judgment. Had OCSE sought an initial petition for support against Stephen, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-105 would have applied. This statute, which specifically applies to the collection of child-support arrearages, indicates that the \u201cmoving party\u201d can be the custodial parent, any person or agency to whom custody of a minor child has been given or relinquished, a minor child\u2019s guardian or next friend, OCSE when rights have been assigned, or the child himself or herself once he or she reaches the age of majority. However, this statute does not indicate whether anyone is the exclusive party to pursue an action.\nWhile Stephen argues that both of these statutes specifically allow only the child, upon majority, to pursue the collection action, Stephen\u2019s proposition would require this court to interpret and add language to the statute that is not there. This court reviews issues of statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Stephens v. Arkansas School for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939, 20 S.W.3d 397 (2000); Hodges v. Huckabee, 338 Ark. 454, 995 S.W.2d 341 (1999). In this respect, we are not bound by the trial court\u2019s decision; however, in the absence of a showing that the trial court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Id. The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999). In determining the meaning of a statute, the first rule is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. The statute must be construed so that no word is left void or superfluous and in such a way that meaning and effect is given to every word therein, if possible. Id. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation. Id. Where the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Id. (citing State v. McLeod, 318 Ark. 781, 888 S.W.2d 639 (1994)). Statutes relating to the same subject are said to be in pari materia and should be read in a harmonious manner, if possible. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).\nFirst and foremost, taking into consideration our rules for interpreting statutes, this statute does not place a limitation on who can pursue an action for collection of child-support arrearages from the hst of possible parties. In Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236, the list of potential moving parties is set off by the word \u201cor\u201d to indicate who the alternative moving parties may be. Had the General Assembly meant to limit child-support arrearage actions brought after the child reaches majority to those brought by the child, we believe that it would have specifically made such a statement in the statute rather than including the child of majority in a Hst of alternative moving parties.\nIn addition, our case law supports such a conclusion. In most of our cases, the custodial parent of a minor child sought child-support arrearages. See, e.g., Sharum v. Dodson, 264 Ark. 57, 568 S.W.2d 503 (1978); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 297 Ark. 377, 761 S.W.2d 941 (1988); Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992); State Office of Child Sup. Enforcem\u2019t v. Terry, 336 Ark. 310, 985 S.W.2d 711 (1999); Branch v. Carter, 326 Ark. 748, 933 S.W.2d 806 (1996); Durham v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Services, 322 Ark. 789, 912 S.W.2d 412 (1995). In some cases, the adult child pursued the arrearages. See, e.g., Fonken v. Fonken, 334 Ark. 637, 976 S.W.2d 952 (1998); Chunn v. D\u2019Agostino, 312 Ark. 141, 847 S.W.2d 699 (1993). In others, the parent has pursued the arrearages even after a child reaches majority. See Sanderson v. Harris, 330 Ark. 741, 957 S.W.2d 685 (1997); Cole v. Harris, 330 Ark. 420, 953 S.W.2d 586 (1997). In no case has this court held that only the adult child has the right to pursue the arrearage.\nThe strongest support for the proposition that the right to pursue child-support arrearages belongs either to a custodial parent or to the child, whether of majority or not, is Dan v. Bankston, 327 Ark. 723, 940 S.W.2d 481 (1997), in which this court allowed the deceased custodial parent\u2019s estate to pursue and recover past-due child support from her ex-husband who had custody of the children after the mother\u2019s death. The court recognized \u201cthe custodial parent\u2019s right to unpaid installments of child support,\u201d and the estate was entitled to take possession of all of the mother\u2019s personal property, which included back child support. Dan, 327 Ark. at 725-726. While Dan obviously dealt with the recovery of child-support arrearages where the children were still minors, the case indicates that the right to the payments equally belongs to the \u201ccustodial parent,\u201d the parent who had custody of the children when the support was ordered. Based on Dan, \u201ccustodial parent\u201d as listed in the statute necessarily must be a designation of the parent who maintains the right to collect the ordered support rather than the parent in whose custody a minor child currendy resides. For example, the term \u201ccustodial parent\u201d is merely the alternate to \u201cnon-custodial parent\u201d for purposes of party recognition in support and custody proceedings. In this case, the 1978 California Order required child support to be paid to Shelia just as in Dan. This court in Sharum, supra, stated, \u201c[E]ntitlement to payment of child support installments vested in appellant as they accrued, and she was entided to judgment as a matter of right....\u201d This proposition is further supported in Chunn, in which the children upon majority pursued the support arrearages. This court stated, \u201cAs we read the statute it contemplates one support obligation which may be pursued by different persons at different times.\u201d Chunn, 312 Ark. at 145. These cases indicate that once a child reaches majority, whoever files the collection action first is allowed the right and ability to collect. Finally, the differences between Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-105 and \u00a7 9-14-236 provide further support for this determination. In Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-105(b), the petitioning party may be \u201cany parent having physical custody of a minor child,\u201d while in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236(a), the \u201cmoving party\u201d may be the \u201ccustodial parent.\u201d Again, had the General Assembly meant to confer the right to collect arrearages only upon the \u201cparent having physical custody of a minor child\u201d until the child reached majority, and then only upon the adult child, it clearly would have so stated rather than using the term \u201ccustodial parent.\u201d Therefore, we determine that Sheila retained the right to pursue child-support arrearages even after Christopher reached age eighteen.\nII. Calculation of Child-support Arrearages\nIn the second issue on appeal, Stephen argues that the chancery court erred in awarding $20,775.00 in child-support arrearages from the California order establishing support. Fie argues that the $525.00 awarded in the California order cannot be collected because the ten-year statute of hmitations has run since it was reduced to judgment and not collected, and the rest of the pending monthly support can only be collected to ten years prior to February 6, 1995, when OCSE filed the action in Arkansas for collection of past-due support. Actually, the Arkansas statute of limitation bars ah claims for child-support arrearages that have accrued prior to March 29, 1986. See Johnson v. Lilly, 308 Ark. 201, 823 S.W.2d 883 (1992); Branch v. Carter, 236 Ark. 748, 933 S.W.2d 806 (1996). In this case, if the Arkansas statute of hmitations governs, then OCSE is entided to recover all arrearages that accrued between March 29, 1986, and June 5, 1991, Christopher\u2019s eighteenth birthday.\nOCSE argues in response that California's statute of hmitations, and not Arkansas\u2019s, applies in this UIFSA litigation because California\u2019s statute of hmitations is longer and is, therefore, the applicable statute. OCSE argues that because California does not have a statute of hmitations for the collection of support arrearages, the entire amount can be cohected from the issuance of the original order in June 1977.\nIn UIFSA arrearage proceedings, the applicable statute of limitations is the longer of the statute of limitations under Arkansas law or the state issuing the support order. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-17-604(b) (Repl. 1998). Such a determination requires a two-step analysis. First, the court must consider whether there are differing limitations on the time that a custodial parent or child of majority may initiate a proceeding to collect support arrearages. Second, the court must look at the longer of the two statutes allowing how far back collection of support arrearages is allowed.\nOn the first issue, both Arkansas and California law allow a child of majority or custodial parent to bring an action for support arrearages at least up to five years after the child turns eighteen, or up through age twenty-three. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-14-236(c); Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4383 (Repealed in 1993); Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4502 (1993). Under California law, prior to 1993, a judgment for child support could be enforced by writ of execution without prior court approval until five years after the child reached majority and thereafter only as to amounts that were not more than ten years overdue. Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4383; In re Marriage of Garcia, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 242 (Ct. App. 1998). Beyond these time frames, the court had discretion to determine whether to allow enforcement of the judgment and could take into account such considerations as laches or lack of diligence. Id. After 1993 in California, upon the repeal of \u00a7 4383 by the enactment of \u00a7 4502, support judgments did not have to be renewed, and they became \u201cenforceable until paid in full.\u201d Id. Based on this, because Sheila filed the action here within five years of Christopher\u2019s eighteenth birthday, under either Arkansas or California law she timely filed her action to collect arrearages.\nThe analysis does not end there, however. Of more importance here is how far back the court can go in determining the amount of support due. California does not consider its pre-1993 or post-1993 statutes for enforcement of child-support orders as \u201cstatutes of limitation,\u201d but instead as statutes providing a procedure for enforcement. Garcia; In re Marriage of Wight, 264 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1989). Whether the pre- or post-1993 statutes should apply is the first consideration. Certainly, under the post-1993 statute, there is no question that Sheila can collect the entire amount of support because the statute allows collection of the entire amount until paid in full. Cal. Fam. Code \u00a7 4502. However, based on the reasoning in Garcia that applying a post-1993 statute to a pre-1993 judgment would be impermissibly retroactive, we believe the pre-1993 statute applies.\nAs noted, \u00a7 4383, the pre-1993 statute, allows collection in the five years between majority and age twenty-three by way of a writ of execution without court approval. After age twenty-three, collection can only be had for the ten years prior. Here, obviously, the claim was made within the five years, but Sheila did not have a writ of execution. However, according to the reasoning in Wight and Garcia, the trial court still retained discretion to determine whether to allow enforcement of the judgment. As such, the chancellor\u2019s determination to allow collection of the entire support amount is lawful. Under California law, the entire amount of child support until Christopher\u2019s eighteenth birthday was due. Because California allows for collection of the entire child-support arrearage, the law of California is applicable in this UIFSA action. Therefore, we do not find that the chancellor was clearly erroneous in granting the entire amount of child-support arrearage of $20,775.\nThe concurring opinion argues that the trial court should be affirmed by applying the law-of-the-case doctrine because the trial court in its first order seemingly ruled on the issues of the assignment and statute of limitations. However, the doctrine cannot apply in this case. The law-of-the-case doctrine provides that on second appeal the decision of the first appeal becomes the' law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former appeal, and also of those which might have been, but were not, presented. Slaton v. Slaton, 336 Ark. 211, 983 S.W.2d 951 (1999); Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 321 Ark. 197, 900 S.W.2d 539 (1995); Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark. 386, 962 S.W.2d 349 (1998); see also, Alexander v. Chapman, 299 Ark. 126, 771 S.W.2d 744 (1989). The doctrine of law of the case prevents an issue raised in a prior appeal from being raised in a subsequent appeal. Vandiver, supra. The doctrine provides that a decision of an appellate court establishes the law of the case for the trial upon remand and for the appellate court itself upon subsequent review. Kemp v. State, 335 Ark. 139, 983 S.W.2d 383 (1998). On the second appeal, the decision of the first appeal becomes the law of the case, and is conclusive of every question of law or fact decided in the former appeal, and also of those which might have been, but were not, presented. Griffin v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 318 Ark. 848, 888 S.W.2d 306 (1994). The doctrine extends to issues of constitutional law. Id.\nWhile the history of this case may seem to trigger this doctrine given the language in the chancery court\u2019s 1998 original order, there is a reason why the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot apply in this case. The statements in the chancery court\u2019s 1998 order regarding the assignment to OCSE and the statute of limitations are obiter dictum and cannot satisfy the requirements of law-of-the-case doctrine.\nThe chancellor\u2019s 1998 order only decided OCSE\u2019s inability to collect arrearages due to estoppel, and the statements in the order regarding the assignment and statute-of-hmitations issues were obiter dictum. As such, those statements do not qualify for recognition under the law-of-the-case doctrine. In Green v. State, 343 Ark. 244, 33 S.W.3d 485 (2000), this court discussed the interplay between the law-of-the-case doctrine and obiter dictum. The court stated:\nThe law-of-the-case doctrine does dictate that a decision made in a prior appeal may not be revisited in a subsequent appeal. Mode v. State, 234 Ark. 46, 350 S.W.2d 675 (1961). We have long held that a decision in a prior appeal becomes the law of the case. Bowman v. State, 93 Ark. 168, 129 S.W. 80 (1909). This is true even if the decision was wrongly decided. Rankin v. Schofield, 81 Ark. 440, 98 S.W. 674 (1905). The conclusion of the court in one opinion becomes the law of the case on subsequent proceedings on the same cause and the matter is res judicata. Perry v. Little Rock & Fort Smith Railway Cp., 44 Ark. 383, 395 (1884). The doctrine requires that matters decided in the first appeal be considered concluded. The doctrine is not inflexible and does not absolutely preclude correction of error, but it prevents an issue already decided from being raised in a subsequent appeal unless the evidence materially varies between the two appeals. Carmargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 680 (1999).\nCourts developed the doctrine to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark.166, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994). The doctrine requires that matters decided in a prior appeal be considered concluded. Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 680 (1999); Davis v. State, 325 Ark. 96, 925 S.W.2d 768 (1996); Mauppin v. State, 314 Ark. 566, 865 S.W.2d 270 (1993). While a decision of the court will not be disturbed because it is law of the case under res judicata, the court is not bound by a conclusion stated as obiter dictum, even if couched in terms that infer the court reached a conclusion on a matter. This is so because obiter dictum is mere comment and not a decision of the court, and therefore not binding as the law of the case under res judicata. In an opinion, the court may sustain by comment an argument presented by obiter dictum. Peeples v. State, 305 Ark. 338, 808 S.W.2d 331 (1991). However, a comment on the evidence does not rise to a decision or holding by the court. Smith v. City of Little Rock, 279 Ark. 4, 648 S.W.2d 454 (1983).\nWhere discussion or comment in an opinion is not necessary to the decision reached therein, the discussion or comment is an obiter dictum. Nashville Livestock Common v. Cox, 302 Ark. 69, 787 S.W.2d 664 (1990). In Couch v. State, 274 Ark. 29, 621 S.W.2d 694 (1981), the court noted that even though the opinion stated, as obiter dictum, that upon retrial an instruction on first-degree murder ought to be given, that was not a point in issue and thus not binding. Dicta consists of statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand, and they lack the force of an adjudication. Garrett v. Andrews, 294 Ark. 160, 741 S.W.2d 257 (1987). \u201cWe point this out so that the dicta in one decision will not be seized on as the ratio decidendi in the next decision. . . .\u201d McLeod, Comm. Of Revenues v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 205 Ark. 780, 171 S.W.2d 62 (1943).\nGreen, 343 Ark. at 250-251. Based on this directive, it is obvious that the findings by the chancery court in the 1998 order regarding the assignment and the statute-of-fimitations issue were dicta because they had nothing to do with the court\u2019s actual order \u2014 that is, that OCSE was estopped from collecting the arrearages due to Sheila\u2019s bad acts of concealing Christopher from his father for so many years. In other words, whether the chancery court decided the assignment and statute-of-limitations issues had nothing to do with the court\u2019s actual order barring collection of the arrearages. As such, there is no initial order from which Stephen is barred from arguing the issues due to the law-of-the-case doctrine.\nThe concurring opinion argues that the trial court on remand refused to reopen the issue of assignment, one of the issues placed before it by the court of appeals, and because Stephen failed to cross-appeal initially, he should now be barred from raising the issues here. However, the flaw in this reasoning is highlighted by the fact that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies not to what the trial court decided in its 1998 order, but instead to the court of appeals\u2019s first decision.\nThe concurring opinion also argues that in the first appeal, the court of appeals issued a limited remand order instructing the trial court to award arrearages and did not reopen the issues of assignment and limitation in its remand order. The concurring opinion is mistaken. The court of appeals\u2019s first decision only included reversal on the estoppel issue with a specific directive to \u201cdetermine the proper amount of child-support arrearage due pursuant to the March 27, 1978, California order, taking into consideration the applicable statute of limitations and the propriety of the mother\u2019s assignment.\u201d Office of Child Supp. Enforcement v. Clemmons, 65 Ark. App. 84, 984 S.W.2d 837 (1999). That is plain language. The court of appeals directed the trial court to determine the proper amount of child-support arrearage. Because estoppel is not applicable, the trial court had to decide the propriety of the assignment first, and then had to decide the applicable statute of limitations before it could determine the proper amount of child-support arrearages. Those two issues were to be decided by the trial court on remand. Clearly, this directive indicates that the court of appeals did not find that these two issues, which were not necessary to the trial court\u2019s finding on estoppel, had been conclusively decided by the trial court to trigger the law-of-the-case doctrine. Otherwise, the court of appeals would have merely directed the trial court on remand to enter the judgment for arrears.\nThe concurring opinion is also mistaken in arguing that the trial court on remand refused to reopen the issue of assignment. The court of appeals did not direct the trial court to take further evidence. The trial court on remand did exactly what the court of appeals instructed it to do. The trial court decided the propriety of the assignment, the applicable statute of limitations, and the amount of child-support arrearages. Those issues were before the trial court, and the trial court decided them. In its second decision from which this petition for review arises, the court of appeals, after setting out the remand directive from the first appeal, stated:\nUpon remand, without elaborating his reasons, the chancellor made the conclusory determination that \u201ctaking into consideration the applicable statute of limitations and the propriety of the mother\u2019s assignment, it is hereby found that the Defendant\u2019s child support delinquency to be the sum of $20,775 as of July 28, 1999.\u201d\nThis statement clearly indicates that the court of appeals recognized that it instructed the trial court to consider these issues anew, and then recognized that the trial court had done so. Because the law-of-the-case doctrine only applies to the court of appeals\u2019s first decision rather than the trial court\u2019s 1998 order, law of the \u201ccase does not bar our consideration of these issues on the merits in this appeal.\nWe affirm the chancery court and the court of appeals.\nBrown and Imber, JJ., concur.\nIt should be noted that while Slaton indicates that law of the case extends to issues that were or could have been decided in the first appeal, in criminal cases we have held that the issue actually must have been decided explicitly or implicitly before the doctrine can apply. See} e.g., King v. State, 338 Ark. 591, 999 S.W.2d 183 (1999), and Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 680 (1999).", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Justice." }, { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice,\nconcurring. I agree with the result reached by the majority; however, I would affirm the trial court by applying the doctrine of the law of the case. That doctrine bars consideration in a second appeal of issues that were or should have been decided in the first appeal, where there has been a decision on the merits in the first appeal. Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark. 386, 962 S.W.2d 349 (1998). According to Justice Holmes, the law of the case merely expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912). The application of the law-of-the-case doctrine is not limited to issues actually raised in prior appeals, because it was developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. Miller County v. Opportunities, Inc., 334 Ark. 88, 971 S.W.2d 781 (1998). For that reason, even those issues that might have been but were not actually presented in the first appeal are barred from reconsideration in the second appeal. Vandiver v. Banks, 331 Ark. at 394.\nOn January 22, 1998, the Pope County Chancery Court entered an Order finding that:\n1. the assignment by Mrs. Shelia Clemmons to the Office of Child Support Enforcement was proper;\n2. the statute of limitations is ten years unless the action was filed prior to the child becoming 24 years of age, then all arrearages would be collectible; and,\n3. regardless of the preceding findings, both Mrs. Clemmons and OCSE were estopped from obtaining a judgment for arrearage in child support because of Mrs. Clemmons\u2019 concealment of the minor child from its biological father, Stephen Clemmons.\nOCSE appealed the trial court\u2019s finding of estoppel. Mr. Stephens filed no cross-appeal from the trial court\u2019s findings of proper assignment and statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in refusing to enforce an order for child support and determine the amount owed in arrearage based upon a theory of estoppel. The appellate court reversed and remanded the case with instructions to the trial court \u201cto determine the proper amount of child-support arrearage due pursuant to the March 27, 1978, California order, taking into consideration the applicable statute of limitations and the propriety of the mother\u2019s assignment.\u201d Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Clemmons, 65 Ark. App. 84, 88, 984 S.W.2d 837, 839 (1999).\nUpon remand, the trial court determined that Mr. Stephens owed child support in the amount of $20,757.00 and refused to reopen the issue of assignment. Mr. Clemmons then filed the appeal that is before us today, arguing that the trial court erred in not considering the propriety of Mrs. Clemmons\u2019 assignment of child support to OCSE.\nAn argument that could have been raised in the first appeal and is not made until a subsequent appeal is barred by the law of the case. Alexander v. Chapman, 299 Ark. 126, 771 S.W.2d 744 (1989); McDonald\u2019s Corp. v. Hawkins, 319 Ark. 1, 888 S.W.2d. 649 (1994). When there is no cross-appeal, the order from which cross-appeal is not taken becomes the law of the case. Van Houten v. Pritchard, 315 Ark. 688, 870 S.W.2d 377 (1994); Moore v. Robertson, 244 Ark. 837, 427 S.W.2d 796 (1968). In Moore v. Robertson, supra, Robertson alleged on cross-appeal that the decision of the trial court in favor of his co-defendants should have enured to his benefit despite his failure to file an answer in the case. The failure to answer ultimately resulted in a default judgment against him. We refused to address the issue because it should have been raised by cross-appeal in the first appeal of the case. In declining to address the merits of Robertson\u2019s argument, we stated:\nThe case at bar confirms the wisdom of the [law-of-the-case] rale. If the appellee\u2019s contention has merit \u2014 a point which we do not decide \u2014\u25a0 its assertion on the first appeal would have done away with the necessity for a second trial and a second appeal, with their attendant expenditure of time and money. Such waste can be effectively prevented only by a strict adherence to the principle that points not urged upon the first appeal are not available later on.\nMoore v. Robertson, 244 Ark. at 839-40. As in Robertson, the case at bar demonstrates the wisdom of the law-ofi-the-case doctrine. Had Mr. Clemmons cross-appealed the trial court\u2019s adverse assignment and limitations rulings, those issues could have been addressed in the first appeal and, if successful, would have done away with the necessity for a remand and second appeal. Because Mr. Clemmons failed to cross-appeal the first time around, the trial court\u2019s findings with regard to the propriety of the assignment and applicable statute of limitations became the law of the case.\nUpon remand, the trial court noted that it had already determined that Mrs. Clemmons\u2019 assignment to OCSE was proper and that the action was brought within the applicable statute of limitations. Despite these findings, the trial court denied relief in the first trial based upon the affirmative defense of estoppel. The majority concludes that the finding of estoppel rendered the first two findings unnecessary dicta not subject to the law-of-the-case doctrine. That conclusion ignores the defensive nature of an estoppel claim.\n\u201cEquitable estoppel is a judicial remedy by which a party may be precluded by its own act or omission from asserting a right to which it otherwise would have been entitled, or pleading or proving an otherwise important fact.\u201d 28 AM.JUR.2d Estoppel and Waiver, \u00a7 28 (2000). The trial court\u2019s findings effectively determined that OCSE had a claim that could properly be asserted. Thus, contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, the findings did have something to do with the trial court\u2019s order and were not merely obiter dicta. The affirmative defense of estoppel would have been moot if OCSE had no right to be asserted. The trial court\u2019s findings as to assignment and limitations were, therefore, integral to its ultimate holding and not merely comments on the evidence.\nMr. Clemmons did not raise these issues in the first appeal, but sought to reopen the issues upon remand to the trial court based upon the court of appeals\u2019 instructions. The trial court refused to reopen the issues in the proceedings on remand, wherein the following exchange occurred:\nBy THE Court: Okay. Well, Mr. Hodges basically wants to relitigate the findings that I made earlier, and says that the propriety of the assignment, or the assignment of the interest was improper, and that the statute of limitations has run because of the improper assignment. I think that\u2019s basically what we are getting to.\nMR. HODGES: Yes, sir. I was just following the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nBy THE COURT: Well, I don\u2019t agree with either one of you, and I don\u2019t want to cut off any argument that you might want to make, but let me tell you how I see this. In my decision \u2014 Letter decision to you I found that the statute of limitations was ten (10) years. Well, that would cause \u25a0\u2014 it\u2019s in excess of the time that would cut off some of the support period. And based on that the arrearages, ten years of arrearages would be Fifteen Thousand dollars ($15,000.00). I had already made my decision on the issues that you raised again, Mr. Hodges, in regard to the propriety of the assignment and the statue (sic) of limitations, and I\u2019m not going to change my mind about that, nor do I want to hear anymore proof on that. I think that all was produced at the trial.\nNow, is there anything else?\nMr. Helms: Your Honor, I \u2014 the, uh \u2014 the letter ruling that you referred to\u2014\nBy the Court: uh-huh.\nMr. Helms: \u2014I guess I\u2019m reading that wrong. You said under the statute of limitations in this case is ten (10) years, unless the action was filed prior to the child becoming twenty-four (24) years of age\u2014\nBy the Court: Yes.\nMR. Helms: \u2014and then all arrearage accrued would be collectible.\n* * *\nBy THE COURT: Unless I\u2019m wrong about his age, I believe he was \u2014 he was born on June 5th of \u201973, and it was filed in \u201995. That\u2019s twenty-two (22). You may be right, Mr. Helms.\nMr. Helms: I never claimed to be good at math, your Honor.\nBy THE COURT: \"Well, I was doing it on my \u2014 in my head, and I put it on the calculator. He would have been twenty-two (22). So in that case your figures as to the arrearages would be correct....\n(Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court recognized that the issues of assignment and limitations had been conclusively determined at the first trial and did not reopen those issues in its deliberations on remand. Taking into account the propriety of the assignment and the applicable statute of limitations as had previously been determined, the trial court awarded arrearages. By doing so, the trial court followed the directive of the appellate court, which, contrary to the majority\u2019s conclusion, did not reopen the issues of assignment and limitations in its remand order.\nThe court of appeals issued a limited remand order, instructing the trial court to determine \u201cthe proper amount of child-support arrearage....\u201d In doing so, the appellate court did instruct the trial court to \u201ctak[e] into consideration the propriety of the assignment and the proper statute of limitations.\u201d The appellate court did not instruct the trial court to redetermine the propriety of the assignment and the proper statute of limitations. Those issues had already been determined. The remand order issued by the court of appeals was no more than a directive to the trial court to apply the findings it had previously made in determining the proper amount of child support to award in arrearage. If Mr. Clemmons thought those findings were made in error, he could have submitted the issues to the court of appeals for determination on cross-appeal and preserved those issues in case he lost on direct appeal. He failed to do so. Mr. Clemmons cannot now reopen findings that could have been addressed in the first appeal of this matter simply because he is dissatisfied with the manner in which those findings are now being applied.\nBecause I believe that the law-of-the-case doctrine bars the appellant from raising in this second appeal an issue that could have been raised in the first appeal, I concur with the majority in affirming the trial court.\nBROWN, J., joins in this concurrence.\nOne exception to the law-of-the-case doctrine arises where evidence is presented during the period between two appeals that materially varies from the evidence presented prior to the first appeal. In this situation, the law-of-the-case doctrine will not bar the second appeal, whereas otherwise the appellant would have been barred. Fairchild v. Norris, 317 Ark. 166, 876 S.W.2d 588 (1994). This exception does not apply to the case at bar because no new evidence has materialized that would substantially change the outcome of this case.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth A. Hodges, for appellant.", "Phillips & Douthit, by: Michael Lamoureux, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Stephen CLEMMONS v. OFFICE of CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT\n01-258\n47 S.W.3d 227\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 21, 2001\nKenneth A. Hodges, for appellant.\nPhillips & Douthit, by: Michael Lamoureux, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 377 }