{ "id": 939015, "name": "Brad BUTLER v. HEARST-ARGYLE TELEVISION, INC.; Arkansas Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.; and Rhonda Justice", "name_abbreviation": "Butler v. Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.", "decision_date": "2001-07-09", "docket_number": "01-126", "first_page": "462", "last_page": "471", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "345 Ark. 462" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "49 S.W.3d 116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "249 Ark. 952", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8724812 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/249/0952-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298548 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130674 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445731 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 1002", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6485670, 6485576, 6485872, 6485490, 6485751 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/1002-03", "/us/434/1002-02", "/us/434/1002-05", "/us/434/1002-01", "/us/434/1002-04" ] }, { "cite": "556 F.2d 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 956561 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/556/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 F. Supp. 1110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3664144 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1124, n. 15", "parenthetical": "noting that the difference between the actual malice standard and neutral reporting privilege is that the privilege applies regardless of the defendant's state of mind" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/584/1110-01" ] }, { "cite": "22 Media L. Rep. 2046", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "Media L. Rep. (BNA)", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "616 A.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 2014003 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/328/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688397 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "quoting the first Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, \u00a7 611" }, { "page": "94", "parenthetical": "quoting the first Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, \u00a7 611" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 F. Supp. 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3530966 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/555/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "973 F.2d 1431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10519381 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/973/1431-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 A.2d 498", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11900036 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/700/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ark. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1750230 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 798-99 (4th ed. 1971)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 798-99 (4th ed. 1971)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/277/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744899 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 485", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202607 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896972 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)" }, { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377541 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133-34", "parenthetical": "citing Fuller v. Russell, 311 Ark. 108, 112, 842 S.W.2d 12, 14 (1992) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984))" }, { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "citing Fuller v. Russell, 311 Ark. 108, 112, 842 S.W.2d 12, 14 (1992) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984))" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0123-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 954, "char_count": 18591, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.535654492458263e-08, "percentile": 0.3490047103132268 }, "sha256": "2ea2da4418294ed959eb244b40dda307054a68042415da1c3dba77252199f05f", "simhash": "1:b6ce05fd245eb2cb", "word_count": 2932 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:03:17.216423+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Brad BUTLER v. HEARST-ARGYLE TELEVISION, INC.; Arkansas Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.; and Rhonda Justice" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W.H. \u201dDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nAppellant, Brad Butler, brings the instant appeal challenging the Benton County Circuit Court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of appellees, Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc., its Arkansas affiliate, KHBS/KHOG-TV, and one of its reporters, Rhonda Justice. Butler, a former Benton County prosecuting attorney, complained that appellees committed the torts of defamation, invasion of privacy, and outrage by broadcasting portions of Benton County inmate Stephanie Roberts\u2019s videotaped affidavit alleging a sexual relationship with Butler. The Court of Appeals certified this first-impression case for us to consider whether the \u201cfair-report privilege\u201d shields appellees from liability under the instant facts. Our jurisdiction is authorized pursuant to Ark. R. Sup. Ct. 1-2(d) and 1-2(b)(1) and (6) (2000).\nBackground\nButler sued appellees on September 28, 1999, after KHOGTV aired a report containing clips from Stephanie Roberts\u2019s videotaped affidavit, detailing her alleged sexual relationship with Butler. In particular, Roberts claimed that she had sexual intercourse with Buder in his office during a time when she was being prosecuted by the prosecutor\u2019s office. According to Butler, he first met Roberts when she offered to wear a wire while sharing a jail cell with Brandi Orman, a murder suspect. The prosecutor\u2019s office utilized Roberts as an informant in a number of cases. Roberts was ultimately released on probation, subject to home detention and monitoring. Then, in late January 1999, Roberts told Butler that she was being sexually harassed by members of the Benton County Sheriffs Department. Although Buder never confirmed Roberts\u2019s allegations, he acknowledged that he investigated the complaint, took recorded statements from Roberts, and reviewed jail files.\nOn June 2, 1999, Roberts cut off her ankle-monitoring device and held herself at gunpoint inside a home in Bella Vista. According to witnesses, Roberts demanded to speak with Butler. Authorities eventually disarmed Roberts but allowed her to remain in the home until Butler arrived. Roberts explained that she wanted to tell Butler that she had miscarried his baby. KHOG-TV reporter Rhonda Justice, who had previously met with Butler about Roberts\u2019s sexual-harassment allegations against the jailers, observed the \u201cstrange treatment\u201d Roberts received during the stand-off and decided to visit her in the Benton County Jail later that evening. During their meeting, Roberts reported that she had miscarried Butler\u2019s baby. Justice met with Roberts again, a few days later, and also visited with her by telephone several times. During these interviews, Roberts admitted that she had numerous sexual encounters with Butler in his office and once in his Suburban while parked in front of her mother\u2019s home.\nIn light of Roberts\u2019s remarks, her attorneys questioned Butler about the allegations, which Butler denied. Her attorneys also informed Butler that he had \u201ctwenty-four hours to resign or else.\u201d In response, Butler filed a motion to voluntarily recuse from prosecuting Roberts\u2019s case. Roberts\u2019s attorneys then filed a cross-motion seeking Butler\u2019s recusal and the appointment of a special prosecutor. As an exhibit to the motion, Roberts\u2019s attorneys attached her videotaped affidavit detailing four alleged incidents of sexual intercourse with Butler, including three encounters in the prosecutor\u2019s office and one in his vehicle. She also discussed the events surrounding her stand-off with the police. Notably, Roberts explained that she made the affidavit in response to Rhonda Justice\u2019s claim that she had pictures of Butler and Roberts and planned to release them.\nOn July 2, 1999, KHOG-TV broadcast a report stating that Buder had been asked to recuse from Roberts\u2019s case because of allegations that . . . Butler and Roberts had ... an inappropriate sexual relationship while Roberts was on probation for check forgery. Attorneys also provided a video affidavit in which Roberts says she had sex with Butler on four occasions.\u201d The video clip contained Roberts\u2019s statement, \u201cI mean, to be blunt, we had sex in his office.\u201d The televised report also indicated that Butler called the allegations false, that he welcomed the appointment of a special prosecutor, and was \u201cconfident that there will be no evidence of criminal wrongdoing by him or his office.\u201d\nSpecial Prosecutor John Everett issued a report on December 1, 1999, concluding that, while there had been no criminal conduct involved, Butler and Roberts were certainly engaged in a relationship characterized as \u201cunprofessional, far outside the ordinary, [and] reflected adversely on the Prosecuting Attorney\u2019s Office, the criminal justice system in Benton County, the legal profession, and Brad Butler himself.\u201d Everett\u2019s report also noted that the relationship involved numerous late-night phone calls from Butler to Roberts, Butler\u2019s intervention in some of Roberts\u2019s criminal cases and probation matters, and Roberts\u2019s knowledge of matters about Butler \u201cwhich would not normally be known by a defendant in a criminal case,\u201d including the location of a scar on Butler\u2019s stomach and Butler\u2019s very new home address and phone number. Finally, Everett observed that Butler\u2019s response to the allegations was \u201cnon-committal\u201d and \u201cless than convincing as a denial and could be construed as a tacit admission.\u201d A footnote to the report addressed the existence of the rumored pictures but explained that \u201cno such photographs have been found and (Everett] believe[d] that none exist.\u201d\nFor his part, Butler complained that Rhonda Justice \u201cprecipitate^] Roberts\u2019 actions and . . . influence[d] Roberts\u2019 allegations against Butler . . . [and] intentionally manufactured the news story about Butler and Roberts as there [was] no sexual contact between Butler and Roberts.\u201d Although he conceded that the \u201cfair-report privilege\u201d protects the publication of statements made during a judicial proceeding if the report is fair, accurate, and complete, Butler asserted that KHOG-TV\u2019s report was not privileged because it was not fair, accurate, or impartial. Along those lines, Butler averred that appellees knew that Roberts\u2019s allegation that Justice had pictures was important to the story but delayed reporting that fact for twelve days following its initial report. Butler further reasoned that appellees should not be entitled to the privilege because they were \u201cinvolved in promulgating the story, and Justice had knowledge of the likely falsity of the allegations behind the story.\u201d\nAppellees responded to Butler\u2019s lawsuit by filing a motion for summary judgment, attaching Special Prosecutor Everett\u2019s report as an exhibit and asserting the fair-report privilege. Based on the pleadings and exhibits, the trial court granted appellees\u2019 motion for summary judgment. From that order, Butler filed the instant appeal challenging the application of the fair-report privilege to appellees. Specifically, appellant argues that the privilege does not apply \u201cwhen the defamatory statement results from elicitation and coercion\u201d and when the report was not fair, truthful, or accurate. We find no merit in appellant\u2019s arguments, and we affirm the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.\nI. Fair-report privilege\nAppellant first argues that the fair-report privilege does not protect appellees because the televised report was not a fair and substantially true account of official court proceedings. Because the First Amendment is involved in this case, we are \u201cobligated to make an independent examination of the whole record to make sure the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression.\u201d Southall v. Little Rock Newspapers, Inc., 332 Ark. 123, 133-34, 964 S.W.2d 187, 193 (1998) (citing Fuller v. Russell, 311 Ark. 108, 112, 842 S.W.2d 12, 14 (1992) (citing Bose Corp. v. Consumer\u2019s Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984))). Similarly, where the appellees\u2019 First Amendment right to free expression is at stake, we apply a heightened standard of review. Southall, 332 Ark. at 134, 964 S.W.2d at 193.\nThe fair-report privilege is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611 (1977), captioned \u201cReport of Official Proceeding or Public Meeting.\u201d Section 611 provides that:\nThe publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported.\nAccording to the comments to section 611, the basis of the privilege is the \u201cinterest of the public in having information made available to it as to what occurs in official proceedings and public meetings.\u201d Id., cmt. a. Significandy, the privilege exists \u201ceven though the publisher himself does not believe the defamatory words he reports to be true and even when he knows them to be false. Abuse of the privilege takes place, therefore, when the publisher does not give a fair and accurate report of the proceeding.\u201d Id.\nWith regard to the accuracy and fairness of the report, it is enough that it conveys a substantially correct account of the proceedings. Id., cmt. f. Furthermore, although it is unnecessary that the report be exhaustive and complete, it is necessary that nothing be omitted or misplaced in such a manner as to convey an erroneous impression. Id. The privilege does not apply where a person testifies in a proceeding solely for the purpose of obtaining the fair-report shield for himself or in collusion with a third party. Id., cmt. c.\nThis court has addressed the fair-report privilege under the Restatement (Second) of Torts in one other case. In KARK-TV v. Simon, 280 Ark. 228, 656 S.W.2d 702 (1983), the appellant argued that it was entided under \u00a7 611, cmt. h, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, to report the fact of an arrest. We declined to apply the privilege in that case because \u201cthe substance of the news story contained no truth at all.\u201d Indeed, there had been no robbery attempt or arrest. Id., 280 Ark. at 231, 656 S.W.2d at 703. In so doing, we recognized that the privilege granted under \u00a7 611 can be lost \u201cif abused by failure to give an accurate and fair report under [comment^,\u201d but also noted that \u201c[t]he report need not be precisely correct, as long as it is substantially correct.\u201d Id., 280 Ark. at 231, 656 S.W.2d at 704.\nFurthermore, in testing the accuracy of the reporting under the fair-report privilege, this court applied the \u201csubstantial truth\u201d doctrine previously recognized in Pritchard v. Times Southwest Broadcasting, Inc., 277 Ark. 458, 642 S.W.2d 877 (1982) (citing Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, 798-99 (4th ed. 1971)). Id. Under that doctrine, the literal truth is not necessary and substantial truth, sometimes referred to as the \u201cgist\u201d or the \u201csting,\u201d will suffice. Id. In other words, under the fair-report privilege, the gist or the \u201csting\u201d of an official action or proceeding must be accurately conveyed in the report.\nOther jurisdictions have used a similar standard in the context of the fair-report privilege to test the accuracy of the reporting. See First Lehigh Bank v. Cowen, 700 A.2d 498, 503 (Sup. Ct: Pa. 1997) (\u201cThe question of whether the fair report privilege has been abused has been distilled by the federal court to a \u2018gist\u2019 or \u2018sting\u2019 test. \u2018A statement is substantially accurate if its \u201cgist\u201d or \u201csting\u201d is true, that is, if it produces the same effect on the mind of the recipient which the precise truth would have produced.\u2019 \u201d); Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1992); Williams v. WCAU-TV, 555 F. Supp. 198, 202 (E.D. Pa. 1983).\nThe original Restatement applied the privilege if it was an \u201caccurate and complete or fair abridgment of such proceedings,\u201d but the privilege could be lost if the report was \u201cmade solely for the purpose of causing harm to the person defamed.\u201d Brandon v. Gazette Publishing Co., 234 Ark. 332, 334, 352 S.W.2d 92, 94 (1961) (quoting the first Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, \u00a7 611). Thus, the fair-report privilege could be lost if published with malice under the original Restatement. The modern view, codified in the Second Restatement, removes the malice requirement such that the privilege is lost only by a \u201cshowing of fault in failing to do what is reasonably necessary to insure that the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 611, cmt. b. See also Rosenberg v. Helinski, 616 A.2d 866, 678 (Md. App. 1992); Lawton v. Georgia Television Co., 22 Media L. Rep. 2046 (Ga. Super. 1994); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1124, n. 15 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (noting that the difference between the actual malice standard and neutral reporting privilege is that the privilege applies regardless of the defendant\u2019s state of mind); Edwards v. National Audubon Society, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom., Edwards v. New York Times, Co., 434 U.S. 1002 (1997).\nHere, appellant first argues that the fair-report privilege does not protect appellees because the televised report was not a fair and substantially true account of official court proceedings. However, a review of the media reports, including Roberts\u2019s videotaped affidavit, evidences no distortion of either Roberts\u2019s allegations or Buder\u2019s denials. In each report, Roberts\u2019s video clip alleging a sexual encounter was followed by a statement of Butler\u2019s denial of any such occurrence. Further, KFIOG-TV provided coverage when Buder filed his motion in response to Roberts\u2019s allegations and specifically noted that Butler\u2019s motion \u201cincludes a complete denial of the allegations made by Stephanie Roberts. In addition, Butler\u2019s attorneys provide thirteen documents they say support the denials. Included are various affidavits, plus a time sheet that contradicts the times given for the alleged sexual relationship.\u201d\nBuder relies heavily on comment c to section 611 and argues that a person cannot confer the privilege upon himself by making the original defamatory statement and then reporting to others what he stated. For example, he may not confer the privilege upon a third person, \u201ceven a member of the communications media, by making the original statement under a collusive arrangement with that person for the purpose of conferring the privilege upon him.\u201d Id., cmt. c. Given Butler\u2019s claim that Rhonda Justice colluded in the creation of Roberts\u2019s defamatory statements, he concludes that appellees are denied the privilege.\nA later televised report addressed the alleged involvement of Rhonda Justice in the events and aired Roberts\u2019s statement that she came forward in response to Justice\u2019s intimation that she had photographs of Roberts and Butler. The report also included an interview with Justice, who denied having any photographs or telling Roberts or Butler that she had pictures. This particular story concluded by noting that Butler had no comment and that the station had been advised to refrain from further comment on the unfinished investigation.\nIn short, Butler\u2019s claim, that Justice colluded with Roberts and participated in the creation of the defamatory statements by threatening Roberts with the exposure of photographs, is unsupported by the record. Justice denied Butler\u2019s allegation, and Butler offered no proof that Justice made the original defamatory statements about Butler to Roberts. Similarly, Butler presented no proof that Justice made any statements to Roberts in order to induce her to repeat an account for the purpose of conferring the fair-report privilege upon Justice. Neither is there evidence that Justice arranged, in any way, to have the story published. Special Prosecutor Everett also concluded that it was unlikely that any photographs existed.\nAs a result, we find no factual basis in the record for Butler\u2019s conclusory allegations and, indeed, observe evidence supporting a contrary conclusion. For example, Roberts\u2019s attorneys explained their decision to disclose the allegations to the court via videotaped affidavit as furthering their obligation to provide Roberts with the proper representation. They related that the \u201cvideo affidavit was not instigated by Rhonda Justice nor did she have any participation in the production of the video. The video was produced for the sole reason of defending Roberts and for placing what appeared to be truthful allegations before the proper forum.\u201d Thus, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact has been presented on the question of whether the fair-report privilege applies. See Clark v. Ridgeway, 323 Ark. 378, 914 S.W.2d 745 (1996).\nButler\u2019s contention that the privilege should not apply because the affidavit was not part of an \u201cofficial proceeding\u201d is likewise unpersuasive. Butler reasons that the affidavit was filed as an exhibit to a motion for recusal but no \u201cofficial action\u201d was taken. Section 611 does state that a \u201creport of a judicial proceeding implies that some official action has been taken by the officer or body whose proceedings are thus reported.\u201d Section 611 cmt. e. However, as appellees point out, the abstract of the record is devoid of any indication that Butler raised this issue before the trial court. Butler also failed to dispute this point in his appellate reply brief. Accordingly, we decline to reach the merits of his argument where the abstract does not reflect that appellant raised the issue below. See Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293, 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999); Barber v. Watson, 330 Ark. 250, 953 S.W.2d 579 (1997).\nIn light of the foregoing, we cannot say that the trial court erred by finding that appellees\u2019 report was a fair and substantially true account of official court proceedings entitled to the fair-report privilege. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order granting appellees summary judgment as a matter of law.\nThe fair-report privilege as defined in section 611 of the first Restatement of the Law of Torts was previously addressed by this court in Brandon v. Gazette Publishing Co., 234 Ark. 332, 352 S.W.2d 92 (1961), and Jones v. Commercial Printing Co., 249 Ark. 952, 463 S.W.2d 92 (1971).", "type": "majority", "author": "W.H. \u201dDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "The Mulkey Attorneys Group, P.A., by: Bruce L. Mulkey, for appellant.", "Warner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten, James M. Dunn, and Matthew C. Carter, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Brad BUTLER v. HEARST-ARGYLE TELEVISION, INC.; Arkansas Hearst-Argyle Television, Inc.; and Rhonda Justice\n01-126\n49 S.W.3d 116\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered July 9, 2001\nThe Mulkey Attorneys Group, P.A., by: Bruce L. Mulkey, for appellant.\nWarner, Smith & Harris, PLC, by: G. Alan Wooten, James M. Dunn, and Matthew C. Carter, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0462-01", "first_page_order": 484, "last_page_order": 493 }