{
  "id": 683194,
  "name": "Glenda R. ROGERS v. Irene LAMB",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rogers v. Lamb",
  "decision_date": "2001-12-06",
  "docket_number": "01-563",
  "first_page": "102",
  "last_page": "105",
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
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          "parenthetical": "requiring opponent to meet proof with proof, by showing a material issue of fact, once moving party makes prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment"
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          "page": "388",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:00:47.549724+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "IMBER, J., not participating."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "Glenda R. ROGERS v. Irene LAMB"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "w .H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice.\nAppellant, Glenda R. Rogers, brings the instant appeal from an order of the Crawford County Circuit Court (1) finding appellee Irene Lamb\u2019s right of title, as the surviving joint tenant of property held by Lamb and her deceased father, superior to Rogers\u2019s homestead claim, (2) issuing a writ of possession commanding the county sheriff to deliver the property to Lamb, (3) denying appellant\u2019s counterclaim for equitable relief, (4) denying appellee recovery of any rental payments, and (5) denying Rogers\u2019s motion for further proceedings and alternative motion for findings and a new trial. The court of appeals certified this case for us to consider whether a widow\u2019s constitutional homestead rights, created by Ark. Const, art. 9, \u00a7 6, may be defeated by the survivorship interest of a joint tenant in property conveyed pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. section 18-12-106 (Supp. 2001). Our jurisdiction is authorized by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1 \u2014 2(a)(1) and (d) (2001).\nThe instant dispute arose after the March 24, 2000 death of John D. Rogers, Lamb\u2019s father and appellant\u2019s purported husband. On July 28, 2000, Lamb filed a petition for ejectment against appellant based upon a warranty deed reflecting that Lamb and her father took title in 1986 to the subject property as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. According to Lamb, each paid one-half of the purchase price with the understanding that Rogers would occupy the property during his life. As a result of her father\u2019s death, Lamb averred that she held a fee-simple absolute interest in the property, free and clear of any claim by appellant.\nIn response, Rogers claimed a constitutional homestead interest in the property. Alternatively, she filed a counterclaim against Lamb asking the court to acknowledge her equitable interest in the property. In particular, appellant insisted that her financial contributions towards the home\u2019s maintenance, improvements, insurance, and taxes, entitled her to such relief. In light of the equitable counterclaim, Rogers also moved that the case be transferred to chancery court.\nFollowing a December 6, 2000 preliminary hearing and after reviewing only the parties\u2019 briefs, the trial court entered an order on March 7, 2001, finding that jurisdiction was proper in the circuit court, resolving the merits of the case in Lamb\u2019s favor, and denying Rogers any equitable relief. Notably, neither party filed a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. In other words, the trial court entered its order settling the case sua sponte.\nRogers raises three points on appeal. First, she argues that the trial court erred by determining that her homestead right was inferior to Lamb\u2019s survivorship interest in the property. Second, she challenges the validity of the trial court\u2019s judgment in the absence of an appropriate motion filed by either party and in view of the court\u2019s refusal to hold a hearing or accept evidence in support of her equitable claim. Third, she challenges the trial court\u2019s decision to retain jurisdiction and its implicit denial of her motion to transfer the cause to chancery court. We find merit in appellant\u2019s arguments, and we reverse and remand for further action consistent with this opinion. As an initial matter, we decline to address the merits of appellant\u2019s final point on appeal. Given the people\u2019s recent passage of Ark. Const, amend. 80, and the consequent abolition of courts of equity, the issue is moot.\nValidity of March 7, 2001 order\nAt first glance, the instant case appears to turn upon our resolution of a substantive legal issue, namely, whether a joint tenant\u2019s survivorship interest trumps a widow\u2019s homestead rights. However, closer inspection of the record on appeal reveals that the case hinges on appellant\u2019s second point, a procedural challenge to the validity of the trial court\u2019s March 7, 2001 order. Prior to the court\u2019s ruling, neither party was afforded the opportunity to introduce evidence or witness testimony in support of their positions. Moreover, since Lamb neither filed a motion for summary judgment, a motion to dismiss, or a motion for judgment on the pleadings, there was no resulting burden on Rogers to \u201cmeet proof with proof,\u201d nor was there any impetus for the court to decide the case sua sponte. See Dillard v. Resolution Trust Corp., 308 Ark. 357, 359, 824 S.W.2d 387, 388 (1992) (requiring opponent to meet proof with proof, by showing a material issue of fact, once moving party makes prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment).\nAlthough appellee insists that summary judgment was warranted as a matter of law, she fails to offer any argument or authority in support of a court\u2019s granting summary judgment in the absence of a proper motion filed pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 56. In any event, we are convinced that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute. For example, the parties disagree about the relevant facts supporting a homestead right. Contrary to Rogers\u2019s assertion, Lamb suggests that appellant did not five in Mr. Rogers\u2019s home for a fourteen-year period but maintained another residence in Forth Smith, Arkansas. Lamb also implies, in her brief, that Rogers may not have been married to her father during the relevant period.\nIn the absence of evidence on these matters, the trial court\u2019s order was based upon speculation and conjecture. Indeed, the trial court could only assume the existence of material facts, including whether appellant was married to the deceased, where she resided, and the nature and amount of any contributions she made to the property. The record is silent on these issues because there was no trial or pleadings to elicit the requisite proof.\nOn remand, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the merits of the existence or priority of the parties\u2019 property rights and the extent of any equitable counterclaims. The court must have proof that appellant was in fact Mrs. John D. Rogers, the deceased\u2019s widow, before it can even consider the applicability of an alleged homestead interest. Otherwise, the trial court puts the proverbial \u201ccart before the horse\u201d and entertains a purely academic question of law.\nReversed and remanded.\nIMBER, J., not participating.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "w .H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chief Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Christian & Byars, by: Joe D. Byars, Jr., for appellant.",
      "Gant & Gant, by: R. Derek Barlow, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Glenda R. ROGERS v. Irene LAMB\n01-563\n60 S.W.3d 456\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 6, 2001\nChristian & Byars, by: Joe D. Byars, Jr., for appellant.\nGant & Gant, by: R. Derek Barlow, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0102-01",
  "first_page_order": 130,
  "last_page_order": 133
}