{ "id": 683273, "name": "Steven EDWARDS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Edwards v. State", "decision_date": "2002-01-10", "docket_number": "CR 00-1452", "first_page": "364", "last_page": "367", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ark. 364" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "64 S.W.3d 706" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-90", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210177 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" }, { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ark. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 226521 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/343/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ark. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1893709 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/295/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210150 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-93-611", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 341, "char_count": 5058, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0221199873817964e-07, "percentile": 0.5456140493132997 }, "sha256": "8f6dcf8fe5f8c0577638b02775794e6ab1441651e65e54ce37a5ca0e24e2b737", "simhash": "1:b93e45b46c0ccb1c", "word_count": 817 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:00:47.549724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "IMBER, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Steven EDWARDS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "P ER CURIAM.\nAppellant pleaded guilty to murder in the first degree and was sentenced to forty years\u2019 imprisonment. Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-93-611 (Supp. 1997), appellant would not be eligible for parole until he had served at least seventy percent of his sentence. During the 1999 legislative session, the Arkansas General Assembly amended \u00a7 16-93-611 to allow circuit courts the discretion to waive the seventy percent requirement in some cases in which the defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-93-611 (Supp. 1999). Appellant filed a petition seeking to have the requirement waived in his case. The State filed a motion to dismiss arguing that because two years had passed since entry of the sentence, the circuit court was without jurisdiction to hear appellant\u2019s petition. The circuit court agreed and granted the State\u2019s motion. On appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the petition, because \u00a7 16-93-611, as amended, creates an exception to the limitations for modifying a sentence set by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16 \u2014 90\u2014111 and that \u00a7 16-93-611 should apply retroactively.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-93-611 provides:\n(a) Notwithstanding any law allowing the award of meritorious good time or any other law to the contrary, any person who is found guilty of or who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree, \u00a7 5-10-102 . . . shall not, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, be eligible for parole or community punishment transfer until the person serves seventy percent (70%) of the term of imprisonment, including a sentence prescribed under \u00a7 5-4-501, to which the person is sentenced. . . .\n(b) The sentencing judge, in his discretion, may waive subsection (a) of this section under the following circumstances:\n(1) The defendant was a juvenile at the time of the offense;\n(2) The juvenile was merely an accomplice to the offense; and\n(3) The offense occurred on or after July 28, 1995.\nAccording to appellant, the 1999 amendment to \u00a7 16-93-611 was proposed to specifically address appellant\u2019s case and others similarly situated by granting the trial court the discretion to waive the seventy percent requirement. Appellant claims that under the limited circumstances set forth in subsection (b), the trial court is reinvested with jurisdiction to consider a waiver of the requirement beyond the \u201c120 day (90 day) limit.\u201d\nIn an attempt to bolster his argument, appellant called State Senator Mike Bearden to testify to the legislative intent of the amendment, but Senator Bearden\u2019s testimony should not have been admitted into evidence. We have specifically held that the testimony of legislators with respect to their intent in introducing legislation is clearly inadmissible. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Richard\u2019s Honda Yamaha, 344 Ark. 44, 38 S.W.3d 356 (2001), citing Board of Trustees v. City of Little Rock, 295 Ark. 585, 750 S.W.2d 950 (1988). In short, if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Langley v. State, 343 Ark. 324, 325, 34 S.W.3d 364, 365 (2001). Aside from Senator Bearden\u2019s testimony, appellant offers nothing more than the conclusory allegation that \u00a7 16-93-611 creates an exception to the limitations set out in \u00a7 16-90-111. Appellant cites no authority or language in either statute supporting the allegation.\nThe plain language of \u00a7 16-93-611 allows a, circuit court discretion when deciding whether to waive the seventy percent requirement. According to the plain language of \u00a7 16-90-111, a court may not exercise that discretion outside of the limitations set by the General Assembly. Moreover, there is no mention of \u00a7 16-90-111 in the language of \u00a7 16-93-611. Because appellant filed his petition outside of the period set out in \u00a7 16-90-111, the circuit court was correct in dismissing his petition.\nFinally, there is no language in \u00a7 16-93-611 that expressly reflects the General Assembly\u2019s intent to make the statute retroactive, as appellant claims. Although Senator Bearden testified to such intent, that is not sufficient. Only when the General Assembly expressly provides, will a statute be applied retroactively. Eg., State v. Ross, 344 Ark. 364, 368, 39 S.W.3d 789, 791 (2001).\nAffirmed.\nIMBER, J., not participating.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-90-lll(b) (Supp. 1997) allowed a circuit court to reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence was imposed. In 1999, the Arkansas General Assembly lowered that limitation to 90 days. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-90-lll(b) (Supp. 1999). In his brief, appellant refers to the limitation as being \u201c120 days (90 days).\u201d However, appellant\u2019s petition was filed beyond the time period under either version.", "type": "majority", "author": "P ER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Ray Nickle, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Steven EDWARDS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 00-1452\n64 S.W.3d 706\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 10, 2002\nW. Ray Nickle, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0364-01", "first_page_order": 394, "last_page_order": 397 }