{ "id": 683187, "name": "Henry PIFER v. SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION", "name_abbreviation": "Pifer v. Single Source Transportation", "decision_date": "2002-03-07", "docket_number": "01-807", "first_page": "851", "last_page": "859", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "347 Ark. 851" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "69 S.W.3d 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "66 Ark. App. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6138546 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/66/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.W.2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1675864, 1675849 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0645-01", "/ark/262/0635-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675864 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ark. App. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139087 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/75/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "1999 Ark. Acts 20", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ark. Acts", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2001 Ark. Acts 1757", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ark. Acts", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51350 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 939", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257774 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0939-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50383 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 Ark. 804", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1737910 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/237/0804-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862797 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111309 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(4)", "parenthetical": "A" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130684 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ark. App. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141492 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341-42" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/74/0322-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 715, "char_count": 13617, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.406782363371715e-07, "percentile": 0.9805824586684397 }, "sha256": "2bc61694707954eb352d9214b9a6345c05a9df078376a310548b9d8b53e2f95a", "simhash": "1:243d859f749fc336", "word_count": 2223 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:00:47.549724+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Henry PIFER v. SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "A NNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Justice.\nAppellant, Henry A. Pifer, was injured at work while returning to his truck from the restroom. The employer, Single Source Transportation, contested his claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. Pifer sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. In construing Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(4)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2001), the Arkansas Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission reversed the ALJ\u2019s award and dismissed Mr. Pifer\u2019s claim. The Commission found that Mr. Pifer was not performing employment services at the time of the accidental injury. The Arkansas Court of Appeals, in a 4-2 unpublished opinion, reversed the Commission\u2019s decision and remanded for further consideration consistent with Matlock v. Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. 322, 49 S.W.3d 126 (2001). See Pifer u Single Source Transportation, CA 01-86, slip op. (Ark. App. July 5, 2001). This court accepted Single Source\u2019s petition for review pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(e) (2001). On appeal, Mr. Pifer contends that the Commission erred in its interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u20149\u2014102(4) (B) (iii). We agree, and reverse the Commission\u2019s decision.\nStandard of Review\nUpon a petition for review, we consider a case as though it had been originally filed in this court. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commission\u2019s decision, and we uphold that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id. We will not reverse the Commission\u2019s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Id.\nFads\nHenry A. Pifer worked as a truck driver for Single Source Transportation during a seven-year period prior to the accident. On June 7, 1999, Mr. Pifer returned to his employer\u2019s terminal after delivering a load around 11:15 a.m. At that point, according to Mr. Pifer\u2019s testimony, he was in need of a restroom break: \u201cI had to go to the bathroom very bad and when I pulled around, I just locked the truck down \u2014 when I say locked down, I mean the brakes, and I run in to use the bathroom.\u201d The truck was left running. After using the restroom upstairs in the office, he spoke briefly with two co-workers and started to return to the truck to do his paperwork, complete his log book, secure the truck, and do a safety check. While returning to his truck, Mr. Pifer was hit on the left side of his back by a co-worker\u2019s pickup, knocking him five to six feet. Had he not been injured, Mr. Pifer testified that he would have done his paperwork, secured the truck, done a post check on the truck, turned in his paper work, and gone home after checking to see if there was another load for him that day.\nEmployment Services\nThe pivotal issue presented by this case is whether, pursuant to Act 796 of 1993, codified at Ark. Code. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-101, et seq. (Repl. 1996, Supp. 2001), Mr. Pifer was performing employment services when he sustained an injury while on a restroom break at an employer-provided restroom located on the employer\u2019s premises. To evaluate Mr. Pifer\u2019s claim and the full Commission\u2019s decision, we are called upon to interpret the phrase \u201cin the course of employment\u201d and the term \u201cemployment services\u201d as used in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 11-9-102(4) (A) (i) and 11-9-102(4) (B) (hi) (Supp. 2001). When interpreting a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, 346 Ark. 487, 58 S.W.3d 369 (2001); Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, 335 Ark. 272, 984 S.W.2d 1 (1998).\nAct 796 of 1993 made significant changes in the workers\u2019 compensation statutes and in the way workers\u2019 compensation claims are to be resolved. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra. Claims arising from injuries occurring before the effective date of Act 796 (July 1, 1993) were evaluated under a liberal approach. Eddington v. City Electric Co., 237 Ark. 804, 376 S.W.2d 550 (1964); Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 81-1325(b)(4) (Supp.1979). However, Act 796 requires us to strictly construe the workers\u2019 compensation statutes. Ark. Code. Ann. \u00a7 11-9-704(c)(3); White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra. The doctrine of strict construction directs us to use the plain meaning of the statutory language. Edens v. Superior Marble & Glass, supra, and Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, supra.\nAct 796 defines a compensable injury as \u201c[a]n accidental injury . . . arising out of and in the course of employment. ...\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-102(4)(A)(i). A compensable injury does not include an \u201c[ijnjury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. ...\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11 \u20149\u2014102(4)(B)(iii) (emphasis added). However, Act 796 does not define the phrase \u201cin the course of employment\u201d or the term \u201cemployment services,\u201d Olsten Kimberly Quality Care v. Pettey, 328 Ark. 381, 944 S.W.2d 524 (1997). It, therefore, falls to this court to define these terms in a manner that neither broadens nor narrows the scope Act 796 of 1993. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-1001 (Repl. 1996). When the meaning of a statutory term is ambiguous, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Stephens v. Arkansas Sch. for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939, 20 S.W.3d 397 (2000).\nSince 1993, we have twice been called upon to construe the statutory language found in sections ll-9-102(4)(A)(i) and 11-9-102(4) (B)(iii). See White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra, and Olsten Kimberly Quality Care, supra. We have held that an employee is performing \u201cemployment services\u201d when he or she \u201cis doing something that is generally required by his or her employer. ...\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100. We use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing \u201cemployment services\u201d as we do when determining whether an employee was acting within \u201cthe course of employment.\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., supra; Olsten Kimberley, supra. The test is whether the injury occurred \u201cwithin the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee [was], carrying out the employer\u2019s purpose or advancing the employer\u2019s interest direcdy or indirecdy.\u201d White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. at 478, 6 S.W.3d at 100 and Olsten Kimberly, supra.\nIt is well-settled that any interpretation of a statute by this court subsequentiy becomes a part of the statute itself. Night Clubs, Inc. v. Fort Smith Planning Comm\u2019n, 336 Ark. 130, 984 S.W.2d 418 (1999); Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993). The General Assembly is presumed to be familiar with this court\u2019s interpretations of its statutes, and if it disagrees with those interpretations, it can amend the statutes. Without such amendments, however, our interpretations of the statutes remain the law. Lawhon Farm Servs. v. Brown, supra; Sawyer v. State, 327 Ark. 421, 938 S.W.2d 843 (1997). Although aware of our interpretation of the term \u201cemployment services\u201d in White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. and Olsten Kimberley, the General Assembly has not changed section ll-9-102(4)(A)(i) or section ll-9-102(4)(B)(iii), other than to renumber those sections. See 2001 Ark. Acts 1757 and 1999 Ark. Acts 20. Accordingly, this court\u2019s interpretation of the pertinent statutory language remains the law.\nMr. Pifer would have this court either reaffirm the personal-comfort doctrine or hold that a restroom break is a necessary function and directly or indirectly advances the interests of the employer. Conversely, Single Source contends that an employee is not performing employment services during a restroom break, or any personal break, because the personal-comfort doctrine is not consistent with a strict construction of Act 796. Since the enactment of Act 796, we have not directly addressed the personal-comfort doctrine. To automatically accept a personal-comfort activity as providing employment services would impermissibly broaden the requirements of Act 796. On the other hand, to automatically reject a personal-comfort activity as not providing employment services would impermissibly narrow the requirements of Act 796. Instead of following either extreme position, the critical issue is whether the employer\u2019s interests are being advanced either directly or indirecdy by the claimant at the time of the injury. In addressing this issue, we decline to adopt the factors identified by the court of appeals in Matlock v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, supra.\nWe note that the activity of seeking toilet facilities, although personal in nature, has been generally recognized as a necessity such that accidents occurring while an employee is on the way to or from toilet facilities, or while he or she is engaged in relieving himself or herself, arise within the course of employment. As the court of appeals reasoned in Matlock v. Blue Cross, supra:\nRestroom facilities are provided in work settings because eliminating bodily toxins and wastes are natural and ordinary biological processes. Employers provide restroom facilities for the benefit of their customers, to be sure. But they also provide those facilities to accommodate their workers so as to avoid the work interruptions and delays that would certainly occur if workers were forced to leave the employment premises in order to find a public restroom at some distance from the work, their supervisors, and customers.\nMatlock v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 74 Ark. App. at 341-42, 49 S.W.3d at 139. Like the appellant in Matlock, Mr. Pifer had gone to a restroom provided by his employer and was returning to resume the employer\u2019s work when the accident occurred that resulted in his injuries. His conduct in returning to his truck was entirely consistent with the employer\u2019s interest in advancing the work. Everything in the record before us indicates that Mr. Pifer was engaged in conduct permitted by the employer, if not specifically authorized by the employer, and that the employer provided restroom facilities on its premises.\nBased on the record in this case, we hold that Mr. Pifer\u2019s restroom break was a necessary function and directly or indirectly advanced the interests of his employer. Consequently, his injury is not excluded from the definition of \u201ccompensable injury\u201d under section 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii) because the injury did not occur at a time when he was not performing employment services. The Commission\u2019s decision based on an incorrect interpretation of the law must, therefore, be reversed. In so holding, we overrule all prior decisions by the Arkansas Court of Appeals to the extent that they are inconsistent with this opinion.\nFinally, Single Source contends that substantial evidence supports the Commission\u2019s decision because Mr. Pifer stopped momentarily to speak with co-workers before returning to his truck. In support of that argument, Single Source cites a recent decision by court of appeals, Clardy v. Medi-Homes LTC Serv. LLC, 75 Ark. App. 156, 55 S.W.3d 791 (2001). The instant case is clearly distinguishable. Unlike Ms. Clardy, Mr. Pifer was not injured while talking with his co-workers.\nReversed and remanded for a determination of benefits.\nBecause the issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether Mr. Pifer was performing employment services at the time of the accident, we need not address the nature and extent of his injuries.\nThe personal-comfort doctrine states that:\nEmployees who, within the time and space limits of their employment, engage in acts which minister to personal comfort do not thereby leave the course of employment, unless the extent of the departure is so great that an intent to abandon the job temporarily may be inferred, or unless, in some jurisdictions, the method chosen is so unusual and unreasonable that the conduct cannot be considered an incident of the employment.\nArthur Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 21 (2001). Prior to Act 796 of 1993, this court adopted the personal-comfort doctrine in workers\u2019 compensation cases. Coleman\u2019s Bar-B-Que v. Fuller, 262 Ark. 645, 559 S.W.2d 714 (1978).\nWe disagree with the statement by the court of appeals in Beavers v. Benton County, 66 Ark. App. 153, 991 S.W.2d 618 (1999), that \u201cthe personal-comfort doctrine is no longer the law.\u201d Id. at 155. This court agreed in White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. that the claimant\u2019s injury was not compensable under the personal-comfort doctrine. White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999). However, we reversed the Commission\u2019s decision in that case on the ground that substantial evidence did not support the Commission\u2019s determination that the claimant was not performing employment services at the time of his injury. Id.\n\u201c[T]he wants ministered to are so obviously in the category of necessities that no question arises about their being basically in the course of employment. The only issue on which compensation is sometimes denied is that of seeking these facilities in an unreasonable manner.\u201d Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen\u2019s Compensation \u00a7 21.05 (2001).", "type": "majority", "author": "A NNABELLE CLINTON IMBER, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Dowd, Harrelson, Moore & Giles, by: Greg Giles, for appellant.", "Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, RA., by: Carol Lockard Worley and Julia L. Busfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Henry PIFER v. SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION\n01-807\n69 S.W.3d 1\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 7, 2002\nDowd, Harrelson, Moore & Giles, by: Greg Giles, for appellant.\nHuckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, RA., by: Carol Lockard Worley and Julia L. Busfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0851-01", "first_page_order": 881, "last_page_order": 889 }