{ "id": 74063, "name": "Ramona MOIX-McNUTT v. Robert J. BROWN", "name_abbreviation": "Moix-McNutt v. Brown", "decision_date": "2002-05-09", "docket_number": "01-283", "first_page": "518", "last_page": "523", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "348 Ark. 518" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "74 S.W.3d 612" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "299 Ark. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1888388 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/299/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914611 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation, and when a statute has been consistently construed in one way for many years, such construction ought not be changed" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that a cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation, and when a statute has been consistently construed in one way for many years, such construction ought not be changed" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ark. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1445745 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/323/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ark. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1902387 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/307/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906089 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377694 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "where this court listed three common approaches used to determine when a cause of action for malpractice accrues: 1" }, { "parenthetical": "where this court listed three common approaches used to determine when a cause of action for malpractice accrues: 1" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Ark. 821", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "year": 1877, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ark. 310", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 50368 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law" }, { "parenthetical": "three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/328/0310-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 467, "char_count": 8440, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1835313489996364e-07, "percentile": 0.5892086758726088 }, "sha256": "dee90d3c6865b306f39711977ce4c611710c8ca6c78aaa344b530c027816b081", "simhash": "1:39e4d67e21274228", "word_count": 1372 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:20:10.754650+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Imber, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Ramona MOIX-McNUTT v. Robert J. BROWN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TOM GLAZE, Justice.\nThis case involves the application of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases. We take jurisdiction under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(5), as the appeal involves the discipline of attorneys-at-law.\nRamona Moix-McNutt originally hired the law firm of Crockett and Brown, PLLC, in December of 1996 to represent her and her husband in a real estate transaction, and on January 2, 1997, Crockett and Brown filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy petition for Moix-McNutt. After a hearing in June of 1997, the bankruptcy court found that Moix-McNutt did not have enough income to meet the statutory requirements for a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. On July 17, 1997, the bankruptcy court ordered Moix-McNutt and her husband, Mark McNutt, to enter Chapter 11 bankruptcy or to consolidate and join in one Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition within twenty days; otherwise, Moix-McNutt\u2019s Chapter 13 bankruptcy case would be involuntarily converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding without notice or hearing at some future time.\nOn July 25, 1997, Brown filed a notice of appeal from the July 17 order, and on August 5, 1997, Brown filed a motion requesting a stay of the July 17 order pending the appeal. The bankruptcy court held a hearing on September 5, 1997, at which time the motion for stay pending appeal was denied. Brown did not file a motion to convert Moix-McNutt\u2019s Chapter 13 petition to a Chapter 11 petition or join Mark McNutt in the proceedings. On December 3, 1997, the bankruptcy court filed an order that involuntarily converted Moix-McNutt\u2019s Chapter 13 petition into a Chapter 7 proceeding, noting that Moix-McNutt was clearly ineligible for Chapter 13.\nOn August 14, 2000, Moix-McNutt filed this malpractice action against Brown. In her complaint, she alleged that, as a result of Brown\u2019s \u201cincompetent legal advice,\u201d she suffered an' involuntary conversion of her bankruptcy petition to a Chapter 7 proceeding, which resulted in a loss of an enormous sum of money. She further asserted that Brown knew or should have known that the conversion would take place if he took no further action following the bankruptcy court\u2019s July 17, 1997, order directing Moix-McNutt to convert her petition to a Chapter 11 petition.\nBrown filed a motion to dismiss Moix-McNutt\u2019s complaint, asserting that the three-year statute of limitations for bringing legal malpractice actions had expired. After a hearing on November 2, 2000, the trial court granted Brown\u2019s motion. From that order, Moix-McNutt brings this appeal, arguing that her cause of action did not accrue until the bankruptcy court\u2019s December 3, 1997, order. Moix-McNutt contends that she was not harmed or did not suffer any loss until this December 3 bankruptcy court order that converted her Chapter 13 petition into a Chapter 7 proceeding. It was this involuntary conversion, she asserts, that was the last essential element to her cause of action. Thus, because the statute of limitations commenced from the December 3, 1997, date, she claims the filing of her malpractice action on August 14, 2000, was well within the three-year statute of limitations.\nArkansas Code Annotated section 16-56-105 (1987) provides a three-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions against attorneys. See also O\u2019Mara v. Dykema, 328 Ark. 310, 942 S.W.2d 854 (1997) (three-year statute of limitations applies to all tort actions not otherwise limited by law). For over one hundred years, Arkansas has followed the \u201coccurrence rule\u201d with respect to the commencement of the statute of limitations in legal malpractice cases. See White v. Reagan, 32 Ark. 821 (1877). This rule provides that the statute of limitations applicable to a malpractice action begins to run, .in the absence of concealment of the wrong, when the negligence occurs, and not when it is discovered. See Ragar v. Brown, 332 Ark. 214, 964 S.W.2d 372 (1998) (where this court listed three common approaches used to determine when a cause of action for malpractice accrues: 1) the occurrence rule; 2) the \u201cdamage rule\u201d or \u201cdate of injury rule,\u201d with a variation called the \u201cdiscovery rule\u201d; and 3) the \u201ctermination-of-employment rule,\u201d also named the \u201ccontinuing representation rule\u201d; the Ragar court, however, adhered to the occurrence rule); Goldsby v. Fairley, 309 Ark. 380, 831 S.W.2d 142 (1992); Chapman v. Alexander, 307 Ark. 87, 817 S.W.2d 425 (1991).\nNotwithstanding this court\u2019s consistent refusal to retreat from the occurrence rule, Moix-McNutt continues, as mentioned above, to argue that the last essential element to her cause of action did not fall into place until the bankruptcy court\u2019s December 3, 1997, order involuntarily converting her bankruptcy proceeding to Chapter 7. She asserts that, but for the bankruptcy court\u2019s entry of that order, which forced her to enter a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and culminated in the liquidation of her assets, she would have had no complaint against anyone.\nTo accept this argument, however, Arkansas would have to abandon the occurrence rule and adopt the so-called \u201cdate of injury\u201d rule; this latter rule provides that the statute of limitations begins to run, not from the occurrence of the negligent act, but rather from the time injury results from the negligent act. See Chapman, supra. This court has held time and time again that \u201cif such a marked change is to be made in the interpretation of statutes that have long been the law, it should be done prospectively by the legislature and not retrospectively by the courts.\u201d Goldsby, supra; Flemens v. Harris, 323 Ark. 421, 915 S.W.2d 685 (1996); Morris v. McLemore, 313 Ark. 53, 852 S.W.2d 135 (1993) (holding that a cardinal rule in dealing with a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform interpretation, and when a statute has been consistently construed in one way for many years, such construction ought not be changed).\nA fundamental flaw in Moix-McNutt\u2019s argument is that she has faded to allege the date of any wrongdoing by Brown after July 17, 1997, when the bankruptcy court ordered her to convert her petition from Chapter 13 to Chapter 11. Although she argues that Brown continued his negligent actions in the days after that order was entered, and failed to advise her of the repercussions she would face if she ignored the bankruptcy court\u2019s order, she does not specifically plead the dates on which she alleges that Brown gave her negligent advice. In Ragar v. Brown, supra, this court held that such a failure caused the pleading to be deficient on its face. The trial court correctly recognized that all of the allegedly wrongful acts by Brown had been completed as of July 17, 1997, and Moix-McNutt has not pointed out to this court any evidence to the contrary. Although she argues that \u201ccommon sense\u201d says that one cannot have a cause of action until one has actually suffered a loss or damages arising out of the negligent act, this is precisely the argument that this court has rejected over and over again. See Ford\u2019s, Inc. v. Russell Brown & Co., 299 Ark. 426, 773 S.W.2d 90 (1989).\nIn conclusion, Arkansas has utilized the \u201coccurrence rule\u201d since 1877, and \u201c[t]his court has expressly declined to retroactively change the legal malpractice occurrence rule to any of the other approaches. The General Assembly\u2019s silence for over 100 years indicates tacit approval of this court\u2019s statutory interpretation.\u201d Ragar, 332 Ark. at 223. While Moix-McNutt may disagree with the application of the rule, \u201cstare decisis mandates this outcome.\u201d Id. at 224.\nBecause the three-year statute of limitations barred Moix-McNutt\u2019s malpractice action against Brown, the trial court did not err in 'granting Brown\u2019s motion to dismiss. We affirm.\nImber, J., not participating.\nThe law firm of Crockett and Brown, PLLC, has apparently since dissolved, and Moix-McNutt names only Robert J. Brown as the appellee; therefore, any references to Moix-McNutt\u2019s attorneys will simply be to Brown.\nTo the extent that Moix-McNutt argues that Brown\u2019s conduct constituted malpractice, we note that the trial court decided the case solely on the basis of the statute of limitations; therefore, that is the only issue we address in this opinion.", "type": "majority", "author": "TOM GLAZE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "McNutt Law Firm, by: Mona J. McNutt, for appellant.", "Cross, Gunter, Witherspoon and Galchus, P.C., by: M. Stephen Bingham, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Ramona MOIX-McNUTT v. Robert J. BROWN\n01-283\n74 S.W.3d 612\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 9, 2002\nMcNutt Law Firm, by: Mona J. McNutt, for appellant.\nCross, Gunter, Witherspoon and Galchus, P.C., by: M. Stephen Bingham, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0518-01", "first_page_order": 540, "last_page_order": 545 }