{ "id": 1404473, "name": "Susie M. CARTER v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Carter v. State", "decision_date": "2002-10-03", "docket_number": "CR 01-1380", "first_page": "229", "last_page": "237", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "350 Ark. 229" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "85 S.W.3d 914" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "349 Ark. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513771 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740868 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ark. 1112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1719944 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/267/1112-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914593 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12024436 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1723897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ark. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1700092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/230/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3", "parenthetical": "holding that without another statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, \"the jurisdictional statements contained in \u00a7\u00a7 41-1208 and 41-1209 [now \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-309 and 5-4-310] control [revocation of probation].\"" }, { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "holding that without another statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, \"the jurisdictional statements contained in \u00a7\u00a7 41-1208 and 41-1209 [now \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-309 and 5-4-310] control [revocation of probation].\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "53 S.W.3d 520", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 1111368, 1111299 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0010-01", "/ark/346/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111299 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210188 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(e)" }, { "page": "(e)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298614 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding orders are effective upon their entry or filing" }, { "parenthetical": "holding orders are effective upon their entry or filing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0381-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 634, "char_count": 14710, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.6404991780584687e-07, "percentile": 0.8895810141826801 }, "sha256": "327aa26aaa289a537938ffb0fa530e3d0bdd3e99b276ccb73f0dfe5a42515500", "simhash": "1:87053e666a8dd2ee", "word_count": 2416 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:36:54.106154+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Susie M. CARTER v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.\nThis case concerns the jurisdiction of a circuit court to revoke probation. The appellant challenges the jurisdiction of the circuit court to revoke her probation after the expiration of the probation period, and she also argues that the revocation was not supported by sufficient evidence. We hold that, under the facts of this case, the court did not have jurisdiction at the time it issued its order revoking Ms. Carter\u2019s probation. We therefore reverse and dismiss.\nAppellant Susie Carter pleaded guilty to the charge of delivery of a controlled substance and was sentenced to five years\u2019 probation in an order filed on May 13, 1996. Ms. Carter was also ordered to pay fees and fines, to perform community service, to enroll in a substance abuse treatment program, and to enroll in a .GED program.\nThe State filed the first in a series of petitions to revoke probation in 1997. A second petition to revoke was filed by the State in 1998. On both occasions, the circuit court ordered that Ms. Carter\u2019s probation be continued under the conditions that were originally imposed.\nThe State then filed a third petition to revoke Ms. Carter\u2019s probation on December 7, 2000, alleging numerous violations of the terms of her probation. A probation revocation hearing was initially set for February 5, 2001. When Ms. Carter failed to appear, the circuit court issued an alias bench warrant for her arrest. After a hearing on March 5, 2001, the circuit court determined that she was indigent, appointed counsel, and set aside the alias warrant. At Ms. Carter\u2019s request, the hearing was postponed until April 2, 2001. Also at her request, the revocation hearing was postponed a second time until May 7, 2001. In an order filed on June 6, 2001, the circuit court revoked Ms. Carter\u2019s probation and sentenced her to a term of twelve years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.\nThe Arkansas Court of Appeals certified the instant appeal to this court as an issue of first impression and a significant issue needing clarification and development of the law, or overruling of precedent. Thus, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l), (5) (2002).\nJurisdiction\nThe order of probation was filed on May 13, 1996. The order revoking probation and imposing sentence was filed on June 6, 2001. Therefore, five years and twenty-four days elapsed between entry of the probation order and entry of the order revoking probation. See Johninson v. State, 330 Ark. 381, 953 S.W.2d 883 (1997) (holding orders are effective upon their entry or filing). For her first point on appeal, Ms. Carter argues that upon the completion of her five years\u2019 probation, the circuit court lost jurisdiction and had no power to revoke her probation. The State replies that the order setting the revocation hearing was issued before the expiration of the probation period; that the original hearing date of February 5, 2001, was within the probation period; and that the hearing was delayed only by Ms. Carter\u2019s actions. Furthermore, the State alleges that Ms. Carter\u2019s failure to appear and subsequent request for a postponement of the revocation hearing tolled the time in which the court had jurisdiction to act. In sum, the State contends the circuit court had jurisdiction so long as some type of process was issued by the State before expiration of the probation period.\nThe resolution of the jurisdictional issue involves the interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309 (Supp. 2001). This court adheres to the basic rule that a statute is to be interpreted in order to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly by giving words their usual and ordinary meaning. Kyle v. State, 312 Ark. 274, 849 S.W.2d 935 (1993). Criminal statutes are strictly construed with all doubts resolved in favor of the accused. Manning v. State, 330 Ark. 699, 956 S.W.2d 184 (1997).\nWith our standards of statutory construction in mind, we turn to the issue of whether the circuit court had jurisdiction under the controlling statutes. We begin with an analysis of whether revocation of probation subsequent to the probation period is indeed a jurisdictional question. A plea of guilty, coupled with a fine and probation, constitutes a conviction. Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2001). It is well settled that a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once a valid sentence is executed. See Bagwell v. State, 346 Ark. 18, 53 S.W.3d 520 (2001); Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2001); McGhee v. State, 334 Ark. 543, 975 S.W.2d 834 (1998); Harmon v. State, 317 Ark. 47, 876 S.W.2d 240 (1994). Thus, the issue of whether a circuit court can revoke probation after the expiration of the probation period is one of jurisdiction. See Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 3, 716 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1986) (holding that without another statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, \u201cthe jurisdictional statements contained in \u00a7\u00a7 41-1208 and 41-1209 [now \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-309 and 5-4-310] control [revocation of probation].\u201d).\nRevocation of probation is governed by section 5-4-309 of the Arkansas Criminal Code that provides in pertinent part as follows:\n(a) At any time before the expiration of a period of suspension or probation, the court may summon the defendant to appear before it or may issue a warrant for his arrest. The warrant may be executed by any law enforcement officer.\n* * * *\n(d) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation, it may revoke the suspension or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation.\n(e) The court may revoke a suspension or probation subsequent to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation, provided the defendant is arrested for violation of suspension or probation, or a warrant is issued for his arrest for violation of suspension or probation, before expiration of the period.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309 (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). Prior to adoption of the current criminal code, our case law had only required that the petition to revoke be filed prior to the expiration of the probation period. Parkerson v. State, 230 Ark. 118, 321 S.W.2d 207 (1959). Furthermore, under pre-code case law, the trial court did not lose jurisdiction where the defendant voluntarily and willfully withdrew from the jurisdiction. Reed v. State, 241 Ark. 836, 411 S.W.2d 285 (1967). To explain the intended effect of the codification, we may consider the code commentary. Kyle v. State, supra (noting that the commentary to a statute is highly persuasive, but not controlling). The original commentary states:\nThe Commission thought it preferable to set out the action necessary to toll the running of the suspension of [sic, or] probation period. That action \u2014 i.e., arrest or issuance of an arrest warrant \u2014 is the same as that sufficing to toll the statute of limitations for purposes of \u00a7 5-1-109.\nOriginal Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309 at 119 (Repl. 1995). The supplemental commentary states section 5-4-309(e) generally requires \u201cthat any revocation of suspension or probation occur within the period of suspension or probation originally imposed by the trial court.\u201d 1988 Supplemental Commentary to \u00a7 5-4-309 at 119. Thus, the commentary to section 5-4-309(e) indicates the Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission sought to replace the common law exceptions extending jurisdiction with specific statutory exceptions.\nIn one post-code case, we addressed the question of whether the issuance of an arrest warrant tolls the running of the probation period under section 5-4-309. Richmond v. State, 326 Ark. 728, 934 S.W.2d 214 (1996). The defendant in that case had been sentenced to five years probation on February 15, 1989. Id. On September 27, 1990, a petition for revocation was filed by the State. That same day, a bench warrant was issued for Richmond\u2019s arrest, but he was not served until July 13, 1995, approximately seventeen months after the probation period had expired. Id. Richmond argued that the warrant was not valid because it had not been served prior to the expiration of his probation period. Id. We noted that the warrant for Richmond\u2019s arrest was issued on September 27, 1990, which was well within the five-year probated sentence. Id. Under the plain language of section 5-4-309(e), this court affirmed the trial court\u2019s revocation of Richmond\u2019s probation. Id.\nIn contrast, the alias warrant in this case was issued for failure to appear. It was not a warrant for Ms. Carter\u2019s arrest for violation of probation. In Arkansas, an alias bench warrant is generally used when a person fails to appear at a court proceeding. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 313 Ark. 93, 95, 852 S.W.2d 109, 110 (1993). We have also acknowledged that an alias warrant is not based on the underlying charge against the person. See Hodges v. State, 267 Ark. 1112, 593 S.W.2d 494 (1980).\nUnder the plain language of section 5-4-309 (e), revocation of probation subsequent to the expiration of the probation period is only authorized upon an arrest for violation of probation or when \u201ca warrant is issued for his arrest for violation of. . . probation\u201d during the probation period. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309(e). Thus, the alias bench warrant issued for Ms. Carter does not meet the statutory requirements because it was not a warrant issued for her arrest for violation of probation.\nThe State, however, urges this court to only require substantial compliance with the statutory language in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309(e). To support its position, the State relies on Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396 (1984), in which this court allowed substantial compliance with a different portion of an earlier version of the section 5-4-309 \u2014 Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-1208 (Repl. 1977). Reynolds was serving a four-year suspended sentence when he was arrested for theft by receiving. Reynolds v. State, 282 Ark. 98, 666 S.W.2d 396. Six days before his trial on the theft-by-receiving charge, Reynolds was served with a petition for revocation of his suspended sentence, and after a hearing his suspended sentence was revoked. Id. Reynolds argued, in part, that the circuit court was without jurisdiction because he had not been arrested with a warrant for violation of his suspension; rather, he was under arrest on another charge. Id. This court held \u201c[t]he fact that the statute was not strictly complied with would not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the petition nor void the trial court\u2019s action.\u201d Id. at 100, 666 S.W.2d at 397. From this holding in Reynolds v. State, the State concludes that only substantial compliance with all the provisions of section 5-4-309 is required.\nThe State then suggests that the official commentary to section 5-4-309 (e) attempts to harmonize the conditions under which a circuit court retains jurisdiction after expiration of the probation period with the general statute of limitations provisions set out in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-1-109 (Supp. 2001). Because section 5-l-109(f) provides that a \u201cprosecution is commenced when an arrest warrant or other process is issued based on an indictment, information, or other charging instrument,\u201d the State urges this court to allow the issuance of some \u201cother process\u201d to extend the circuit court\u2019s jurisdiction to revoke beyond the probation period.\nWe decline the State\u2019s invitation to extend our holding in Reynolds v. State, supra, to the facts of this case. The revocation in Reynolds v. State occurred during the period of suspension; therefore, section 5-4-309 (e) was not at issue. Furthermore, Reynolds was arrested for committing a crime that could constitute a violation of the terms of his suspended sentence; whereas, in the instant case, the issuance of the alias warrant for Ms. Carter\u2019s arrest was not \u201cfor violation of suspension or probation,\u201d but merely for failure to appear. In view of the plain language in the jurisdictional statements adopted by the General Assembly in section 5-4-309(e), we reject the State\u2019s substantial-compliance argument.\nConcerning the original commentary to section 5-4-309 (e), we have already noted that it is not binding on this court; but even if it were, we disagree with the State\u2019s interpretation. The commentary clearly reflects that the Arkansas Criminal Code Revision Commission intended to codify the action necessary to toll the running of the probation period: \u201c[A]rrest or the issuance of an arrest warrant\u201d for violation of probation. Original Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309. To engraft the words \u201cor other process\u201d onto section 5-4-309 (e), as the State asks us to do, runs counter to the stated intent of the Commission, as well as our well-established policy of strictly construing criminal statutes. Manning v. State, supra. Thus, we decline to adopt a policy of substantial compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of section 5-4-309 (e).\nThe State also argues that the postponement of the revocation hearing at the request of Ms. Carter should toll the running of the probation period just as a defendant\u2019s request for a continuance prior to trial tolls the running of the speedy-trial period. Such reasoning is without a statutory basis. Section 5-4-309 clearly requires that the revocation order be entered during the probation period unless the probationer is arrested, or an arrest warrant is issued, for a probation violation before the probation period has expired.\nWhen Ms. Carter\u2019s probation period expired without her having been arrested for a probation violation and without an arrest warrant having been issued for violation of probation, the circuit court lost jurisdiction to revoke her probation under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4~309(e). Because we hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her probation, we need not address Ms. Carter\u2019s second point on appeal.\nReversed and dismissed.\nOur holding in Bagwell, Pike, McGhee, and Harmon, that a court loses jurisdiction to modify a sentence during a period of probation, has been superceded by Act 1569 of 1999, codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5 \u2014 4\u2014301 (d) (Supp. 2001). See Moseley v. State, 349 Ark. 589, 80 S.W.3d 325 (2002). In the instant case, however, we are concerned with whether a circuit court loses jurisdiction to revoke probation after the expiration of the probation period.", "type": "majority", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "D. Wayne Juneau, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Susie M. CARTER v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 01-1380\n85 S.W.3d 914\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 3, 2002\nD. Wayne Juneau, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Lauren Elizabeth Heil, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0229-01", "first_page_order": 253, "last_page_order": 261 }