{ "id": 1159707, "name": "Kenneth HARNESS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Harness v. State", "decision_date": "2003-03-20", "docket_number": "CR 02-452", "first_page": "335", "last_page": "345", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 Ark. 335" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "101 S.W.3d 235" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-307", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-306", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "parenthetical": "d" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "770 S.W.2d 170", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 6141721 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/27/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ark. App. 289", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ark. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513784 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "290 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1873683 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "3" }, { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/290/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233", "parenthetical": "quoting Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 3, 716 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1986)" }, { "page": "916-17", "parenthetical": "quoting Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 3, 716 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51330 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ark. 625", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1748278 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/278/0625-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ark. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1878631 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/284/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ark. 505", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 9161410 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/324/0505-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(c)(3)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738" }, { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ark. 408", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8721460 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/286/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 Ark. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1898866 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "240" }, { "page": "296" }, { "page": "242" }, { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "Mr. Bangs had fled during the period of suspension" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/310/0235-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 792, "char_count": 19720, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.312421495208296e-07, "percentile": 0.9685004801438231 }, "sha256": "94093073d4b14af4ac9ff6dffc724352852eb00dc72384fc1a0117f1edce78c2", "simhash": "1:f36ff5b44faadfae", "word_count": 3208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:39:04.439665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Kenneth HARNESS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Annabelle Clinton Harness Imber, Justice.\nAppellant Kenneth Roy Harness pleaded guilty to one count of manufacturing methamphetamine and to two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia. In an amended judgment and commitment order filed on March 30, 2001, the circuit court sentenced him to a term of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment and suspended the imposition of sentence as to an additional term of twenty years. Based on a violation prior to his incarceration, the trial court revoked the suspended portion of Mr. Harness\u2019s sentence and sentenced him to a term of thirty years\u2019 imprisonment. His only point on appeal is that the trial court did not have the power to revoke the suspended portion of his sentence prior to the commencement of the period of suspension. We agree and reinstate the original sentence as modified.\nThe facts are not in dispute. Upon sentencing, Mr. Harness was not instructed to report immediately to the Arkansas Department of Correction. Instead, he was placed under a $20,000 ADC bond and instructed to call the ADC each morning at 6:00 a.m. and surrender to the ADC when informed that it had room for him. Mr. Harness called in each morning from February 23, 2001, through March 6, 2001, except on February 28. On March 6, 2001, the ADC advised the Crawford County jail administrator that Mr. Harness should surrender at 5:00 a.m. the next morning, March 7, 2001. Mr. Harness did not surrender, and a warrant was issued for his arrest on March 14, 2001. On September 11, 2001, Mr. Harness was arrested in Utah, where he was working under an assumed name, and then returned to Arkansas.\nAfter a hearing, the circuit court revoked Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence and resentenced him to a term of thirty years\u2019 imprisonment in an amended judgment and commitment order filed on January 1-6, 2002. Mr. Harness filed a motion for reconsideration alleging that the original sentence was illegal because it was longer than the statutory maximum, that the circuit court was without the power to revoke the suspended portion of his sentence prior to the commencement of the period of suspension, and that the revocation violated his due-process rights. The circuit court denied his motion for reconsideration. The Arkansas Court of Appeals certified Mr. Harness\u2019s appeal to this court because it presents an issue of first impression involving statutory construction. Thus, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l), (2), (5) (2002).\nMr. Harness does not challenge his conviction or the lawfulness of his apprehension. His only challenge is to the propriety of the circuit court\u2019s revocation of the suspended portion of his sentence. First, he contends that a circuit court does not have the power to revoke a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the period of suspension. In the alternative, he presents a procedural due-process argument contending that he did not receive fair warning or other notice that the violation of a condition of suspension prior to the commencement of'his suspended sentence could lead to its revocation.\nI. The March 30, 2001 Amended Judgment and Commitment Order\nAs an initial matter, the sentence imposed in the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order is illegal in two respects. First, the original judgment reflects a sentence of forty years\u2019 imprisonment, as well as a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence, for a total of sixty years \u2014 a sentence not authorized for a class Y felony. Second, because the suspended portion of the sentence requires Mr. Harness to report to a supervising officer, the sentence is in reality imprisonment followed by probation \u2014 a sentence specifically prohibited by statute. Even though neither Mr. Harness nor the State challenges the legality of the sentence on appeal, we treat problems of void or illegal sentences similar to problems of subject-matter jurisdiction and review them even if not raised on appeal and not objected to in the trial court. Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294 (1992); Lambert v. State, 286 Ark. 408, 692 S.W.2d 238 (1985).\nSentencing is entirely a matter of statute in Arkansas. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 738, 43 S.W.3d 132, 137 (2001). \u201cNo defendant convicted of an offense shall be sentenced otherwise than in accordance with this chapter.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-104(a) (Supp. 2001). A circuit court has jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence even if it has been placed into execution. Meadows v. State, 324 Ark. 505, 922 S.W.2d 341 (1996); Bangs v. State, supra; Nelson v. State, 284 Ark. 156, 680 S.W.2d 91 (1984); Massey v. State, 278 Ark. 625, 648 S.W.2d 52 (1983). If we hold that a trial court\u2019s sentence was illegal and that the error had nothing to do with guilt, but only with the illegal sentence, we can correct the sentence in lieu of remanding. Banks v. State, supra.\nIn Lewis v. State, this court set out the parameters for interpreting a trial court\u2019s judgment. 336 Ark. 469, 986 S.W.2d 95 (1999). \u201cQ]udgments are generally construed like other instruments and the determinative factor is the intention of the court, gathered from the judgment itself and the record, including the pleadings and the evidence. . . . [I]t is to be presumed that a defendant has been accorded a fair trial, and that the judgment of conviction is valid.\u201d Id. at 475, 986 S.W.2d at 98. The March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order imposed a sentence of 480 months\u2019 imprisonment and a suspended sentence of 240 months, for a total of 720 months (or sixty years). The sentence for a Class Y felony is ten to forty years, or life. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-401(a)(1) (Repl. 1997). Mr. Harness\u2019s attorney pointed out the illegal length of the sentence to the trial court. After a brief discussion among the judge, the prosecutor, and Mr. Harness\u2019s attorney in which all agreed on the intended sentence, the judge ruled as follows: \u201c[a]ll right, then it will be amended to reflect 20 year sentence with 20 suspended.\u201d Based upon the record in this case, the clear intent of the circuit court and the understanding of both the State and the defendant was that Mr. Harness be sentenced to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment, followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence.\nOne of the conditions imposed by the circuit court in connection with the twenty-year suspended sentence was as follows: \u201cYou must report as directed to a supervising officer and permit him or her to visit you in your residence, place of employment, or other property.\u201d This reporting requirement makes the actual sentence imposed by the circuit court one of probation rather than suspension.\nSection 5-4-104 of the Arkansas Criminal Code provides in relevant part as follows: \u201cThe court may sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment and suspend imposition of sentence as to an additional term of imprisonment, but the court shall not sentence a defendant to imprisonment and place him on probation, except as authorized by \u00a7 5-4-304.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-104(c)(3) (Supp. 2001). Section 5-4-304 permits confinement as a condition of suspension; however, the period of confinement cannot exc\u00e9ed 120 days in the case of a felony or thirty days in the case of a misdemeanor. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-304(d)(l) (Supp. 2001). The original commentary explains that this section recognized the practice of Arkansas judges to use the shock of a short period of incarceration to enhance the effectiveness of a subsequent period of suspension or probation by giving the offender a \u201ctaste\u201d of imprisonment. Original Commentary to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-304 (Repl. 1995).\nAs noted earlier, the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney all agreed that the circuit court intended to sentence Mr. Harness to twenty years\u2019 imprisonment followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence. The issue before us is whether the condition that Mr. Harness report to a supervising officer transformed the suspension into probation. We addressed this same issue in Bangs v. State, 310 Ark. 235, 835 S.W.2d 294.\nThe distinction between probation and suspension is one of supervision. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-101 (1987) defines both probation and suspension as release without pronouncement of sentence. However, probation is defined as \u201crelease without pronouncement of sentence but subject to the supervision of a probation officer\u201d and suspension is defined as \u201crelease without pronouncement of sentence and without supervision.\u201d\nId. at 239-40, 835 S.W.2d at 296 (emphasis added). The Bangs court explained that when the current criminal code was written, imprisonment followed by suspension was authorized because it was a widespread practice by the Arkansas trial bench. Id. However, \u201cprobation was prohibited from following imprisonment because supervision by both the court and the Board of Pardons and Paroles is a needless duplication of effort conducive to jurisdictional disputes.\u201d Id. at 240, 835 S.W.2d at 296. The Bangs court held as follows: \u201cwe affirm the trial court\u2019s revocation based on the escape and modify the conditions so that appellant is no longer required to report to a probation officer.\u201d Id. at 242, 835 S.W.2d at 297 (Mr. Bangs had fled during the period of suspension). Accordingly, the conditions imposed by the circuit court in this case are hereby modified so that Mr. Harness is no longer required to report to a supervising officer.\nAs modified herein to reflect a sentence of twenty years\u2019 imprisonment, followed by a twenty-year suspended imposition of sentence, and with the above-mentioned modification to the conditions of suspension, the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order imposes a legal sentence. This then leads us to a consideration of Mr. Harness\u2019s point on appeal \u2014 whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to issue its amended judgment and commitment order on January 16, 2002, revoking Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence and imposing a term of thirty years\u2019 imprisonment.\nII. The January 16, 2002 Amended Judgment and Commitment Order\nThe first point on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the circuit court to revoke Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence for an action occurring prior to the commencement of the suspension period. This court has stated that \u201cwithout another statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, \u2018the jurisdictional statements contained in \u00a7\u00a7 41-1208 and 41-1209 [now \u00a7\u00a7 5-4-309 and 5-4-310] control [revocation of probation].\u2019\u201d Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 233, 85 S.W.3d 914, 916-17 (2002) (quoting Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 3, 716 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1986)). Therefore, resolution of Mr. Harness\u2019s point on appeal involves an issue of statutory interpretation. We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002). We construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Id. In construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect derived from the whole. Id. However, we will not interpret a statute, even a criminal one, so as to reach an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999).\nMr. Harness argues that a plain reading of the statutes limits a circuit court\u2019s power to revoke to the time during the period of suspension or probation and that to interpret the statutes to allow revocation prior to the commencement of the suspension period leads to absurd results. He acknowledges an opinion to the contrary by the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and asks this court to overrule Venable v. State, 271 Ark. App. 289, 770 S.W.2d 170 (1989). On the other hand, the State contends that the statutes permit a circuit court to revoke a suspended sentence at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension, not just during the period of suspension. When asked to specify the reason for revoking Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence, the circuit court replied that rather than surrendering to the ADC as ordered by the court, Mr. Harness fled to Utah under an alias \u201cspecifically for the purpose of avoiding the penalty here in Arkansas and the sentence here in Arkansas . . . .\u201d\nOur analysis begins with one of the statutory provisions that confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to revoke a suspended sentence. Section 5-4-309 provides in pertinent part:\nIf the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation, it may revoke the suspension or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-309(d) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). While this section clearly refers to the end of the period in which a circuit court can revoke a defendant\u2019s suspension, it does not-specify when the period of suspension begins. In order to make that determination, we must read section 5-4-309 in harmony with other sections dealing with the same subject matter. Short v. State, supra.\nWhen a circuit court considers whether to order a suspended sentence, it must first decide whether \u201c[t]here is undue risk that during the period of suspension . . . the defendant will commit another offense . . . .\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-301 (b)(1) (Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). A circuit court\u2019s power to impose terms and conditions of suspension is established in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303 (Supp. 2001). Although the court is directed to \u201cattach such conditions as are reasonably necessary to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life,\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303(a), it is required to provide as an express condition of every suspension \u201cthat the defendant not commit an offense punishable by imprisonment during the period of suspension . . . .\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303(b) (emphasis added). Thus, both the purpose and the mandatory conditions of suspension contemplate that the conditions are imposed during the period of suspension. The permissive conditions also contemplate that the conditions be imposed during the period of suspension. For example, a circuit court may require, as a condition of suspension, that the defendant support dependents, work faithfully, participate in community-based rehabilitation programs, refrain from consorting with designated persons, make restitution, post bond, or the court may require other conditions \u201cnot unduly restrictive of [the defendant\u2019s] liberty[.]\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303(c). The alternatives available to the court after revocation of suspension also assume that the revocation takes place during the period of suspension. The circuit court may continue the period of suspension, impose a period of confinement, direct the defendant to report to the court, require the defendant to remain within the jurisdiction of the court, and notify the court of any change of address or employment. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-303 (d).\nSection 5-4-306 requires that the suspension \u201cshall be for a definite period of time . . . .\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-306(a) (Supp. 2001). Section 5-4-307 explains that the period of suspension \u201ccommences to run on the day it is imposed,\u201d except where the suspension follows a term of imprisonment and then \u201cthe period of suspension commences to run on the day the defendant is lawfully set at liberty from the imprisonment.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-307 (Repl. 1997). Our review of section 5-4-309 along with the other sections that are relevant to the subject matter of suspended sentences leads us to conclude that a circuit court is statutorily authorized to revoke a period of suspension for a violation of the terms or conditions of suspension that occurs \u201cduring the period\u201d of suspension. ,\nIn any event, the interpretation suggested by the State would lead to absurd results because certain terms and conditions of suspension only make sense if imposed during the period of suspension. For example, as a condition of suspension, Mr. Harness was ordered not to associate with persons who have been convicted of felonies. He was required to be gainfully employed or a student, to pay household expenses, and to support his dependents. He was also ordered to remain within the state. If a defendant can violate the conditions of suspension before the commencement of the suspension period, then imprisonment itself would result in a violation. Upon imprisonment, the defendant necessarily associates with persons who have been convicted of felonies \u2014 a suspension violation. Moreover, incarceration prohibits the defendant from being gainfully employed to support his or her family and dependents, and it makes remaining within the state a meaningless condition. Thus, terms and conditions of suspension in this case only make sense if imposed during the period of suspension. Any other interpretation leads to an absurd result.\nNonetheless, the State relies on Venable v. State, supra, in which an equally divided court of appeals panel affirmed a trial court\u2019s revocation of a suspended sentence based on circumstances similar to those in this case. In revoking Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence, the circuit court relied on an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, that in turn relied on Venable v. State, supra. The Venable plurality based its reasoning primarily on policy considerations drawn from the decisions of federal courts and the courts of some, but not all, of our sister states. However, those decisions provide little guidance in the resolution of the issue before us because sentencing in Arkansas is strictly a matter of Arkansas statutes, and a trial court may only impose a sentence authorized by statute. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-104(a); Bunch v. State, supra. Because none of the cases from other state and federal jurisdictions are based on statutes containing the same language as the Arkansas statutes, we must rely on our own criminal code and case law.\nConstruing the statutes authorizing a suspended sentence as a whole and resolving all doubts in favor of the accused, as we must do, we hold that the statutes did not empower the circuit court to revoke Mr. Harness\u2019s suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the period of suspension. Because a sentence is void when the trial court lacks the authority to impose it, we reverse the January 16, 2002 amended judgment and commitment order. We reinstate the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order as modified herein.\nHaving concluded that the circuit court does not have the power to revoke a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period, we overrule Venable v. State, 27 Ark. App. 289, 770 S.W.2d 170 (1989), and all other court of appeals decisions in conflict with this holding. Because we reverse based on Mr. Harness\u2019s first point on appeal, we need not address his due-process argument.\nThe January 16, 2002 amended judgment and commitment order is reversed, and the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order is reinstated as modified.\nAffirmed as modified.\nCorbin, J., not participating.\nThe current Criminal Code retains the supervision distinction between probation and suspension. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-101 (Supp. 2001).", "type": "majority", "author": "Annabelle Clinton Harness Imber, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "James W. Robb, for appellant.", "Mark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Kenneth HARNESS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 02-452\n101 S.W.3d 235\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 20, 2003\nJames W. Robb, for appellant.\nMark Pryor, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0335-01", "first_page_order": 369, "last_page_order": 379 }