{ "id": 1155492, "name": "COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH SHERWOOD FIRE DEPARTMENT v. Virginia HILLMAN, Pulaski County Election Commission; Charles King; Sally Stevens; Ann Smith; Jason Fender; Tommy Sanders", "name_abbreviation": "Committee to Establish Sherwood Fire Department v. Hillman", "decision_date": "2003-06-05", "docket_number": "02-1165", "first_page": "501", "last_page": "515", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "353 Ark. 501" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "109 S.W.3d 641" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "736 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "432 Mass. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 285277 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/432/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "790 A.2d 989", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 9395602, 404594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/790/0989-01", "/pa/567/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 Pa. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 404594 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/567/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907803 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260-61", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 630", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158895 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0630-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-28-501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-28-507", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886860 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407" }, { "page": "407-08" }, { "page": "412" }, { "parenthetical": "Emphasis added." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-9-502", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "884 S.W.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1455740, 1455863 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0239-01", "/ark/318/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455740 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ark. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1342344 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/342/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ark. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1455695 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/318/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404457 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0462-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 933, "char_count": 25049, "ocr_confidence": 0.732, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3616482467810596e-07, "percentile": 0.6364372980818572 }, "sha256": "93e4a32f76487709948606c42ee14c56ff58c77673c183d7ed46315ebecba3d6", "simhash": "1:7ff134e7a1dafc80", "word_count": 4141 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:12:52.629354+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze and Imber, JJ., concurring.", "Corbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating.", "Imber, J., joins this concurrence.", "Corbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH SHERWOOD FIRE DEPARTMENT v. Virginia HILLMAN, Pulaski County Election Commission; Charles King; Sally Stevens; Ann Smith; Jason Fender; Tommy Sanders" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Justice.\nThe Committee to Establish Municipal Sherwood Fire Department (\u201cCommittee\u201d) appeals a judgment of the Pulaski County Circuit Court, Second Division, which declared a ballot title and initiative petition unconstitutional. The Committee argues that since the circuit court granted the Committee\u2019s motion to intervene, the circuit court should have allowed the Committee to participate in the litigation concerning the constitutionality of the ballot title and initiative petition. In addition, the Committee argues that it was denied rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, and article 2, section 4, and amendment 7, of the Arkansas Constitution, and that the judgment of the circuit court which declared the ballot title and initiated proposal unconstitutional should be vacated.\nAppellees Jason Fender and Tommy Sanders filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Committee lacked standing to intervene in the matter. We agree that the Committee lacked standing to intervene in the matter; therefore, we grant the appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we will not address the Committee\u2019s points on appeal. We have jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(4) (2002).\nFacts\nThe Committee circulated a petition to place an ordinance \u201cto create a fire department\u201d on the City of Sherwood\u2019s November 5, 2002, general election ballot. On September 6, 2002, Virginia Hill-man, City Clerk for the City of Sherwood, certified the petition to the Pulaski County Election Commission (\u201cCommission\u201d).\nThe proposed ballot title stated:\nBE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF SHERWOOD, ARKANSAS: AN ORDINANCE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRE DEPARTMENT FOR THE CITY OF SHERWOOD, ARKANSAS.\nThe text of the proposed ordinance stated:\nWhereas, the City of Sherwood is currendy served by two fire departments, and\nWhereas, the City of Sherwood is empowered by A.C.A. \u00a7 14-53-101 to establish a City of Sherwood Fire Department, and NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF SHERWOOD, ARKANSAS:\nSECTION 1. That beginning with the City of Sherwood\u2019s budget for calendar year 2003, the City Council shall establish a fire department and provide personnel, proper engines and such other equipment as shall be necessary to extinguish fires and preserve the property of the city and of the inhabitants from conflagration.\nSECTION 2. The uniformed employees of the Sherwood Fire Department shall be covered by the Sherwood Civil Service Commission except for the Fire Chief.\nFender and Sanders, registered voters of the City of Sherwood, filed a complaint against Virginia Hillman, in her official capacity as City Clerk of the City of Sherwood; the Commission; Charles King, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Commission; Sally Stevens, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Commission; and Ann Smith, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Commission. The complaint alleged that both the ballot tile and the proposed text of the ordinance were patendy misleading. Fender and Sanders sought an immediate and expedited hearing, a declaration that the popular name and ballot tide of the proposed initiative were constitutionally invalid, and an injunction to prevent the inclusion of an amended version of the petition on the November 5 ballot and to prevent the certification of the results of any votes cast under the petition.\nOn October 23, 2002, the circuit court entered an order consolidating a trial of the action on the merits with the hearing on the application for a temporary injunction. At the hearing, the circuit court heard testimony from Fender; Sanders; Lee Wilkins, Battalion Chief of the North Little Rock Fire Department; and Billy Jack Harmon, Mayor of the City of Sherwood. Counsel for the Commission and counsel for City Clerk Hillman were present at the hearing; however, they did not call witnesses or present any argument.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated:\n... I just don\u2019t think it gives, the ballot title gives the voters a, a constitutionally firm understanding of what they\u2019re voting on when they go. . . into that booth. ... I think this is unconstitutionally written, I think also the initiative has some problems, and I know that\u2019s not, you, I really feel that the initiative, if people understood what this initiative was when they signed it, you know may not have as many people signing it. And so, I think there\u2019s a double issue in this case, and I don\u2019t think it is a proper statement of, of the impact of. . . this proposed ordinance. So, I\u2019m going to rule that is unconstitutional on both those grounds, and let you guys do a record and take it up and let the folks that are smarter than me decide.\nOn October 24, 2002, the Committee filed a motion to intervene. The Committee stated that it had never been notified that an action had been filed to remove the initiative from the ballot. The Committee stated that it became aware of the action upon reading about the action in the newspaper. The Committee argued that, since it submitted the petition for the proposed initiative, it should have been joined as a necessary party to an action challenging the initiative. Fender and Sanders argued that the Committee had no standing to intervene. In addition, Fender and Sanders argued that the Committee was not incorporated. They also argued that, even assuming the Committee had standing, it failed to satisfy the requirements of intervention as required by Rule 24 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, they argued that, even assuming the Committee had standing, its attempt at intervention was not timely.\nOn October 30, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing on the Committee\u2019s motion to intervene. The circuit court granted the motion to intervene, and the Committee moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it was a necessary party that was not served in the lawsuit. The circuit court denied the Committee\u2019s motion to dismiss. The Committee argued that it should have been given the opportunity to present its case and that it should have been allowed to cross-examine the witnesses present at the October 23 hearing.\nThe circuit court stated that the Committee could make further arguments as to the merits; however, the Committee stated that it was not prepared to litigate on the merits because the circuit judge\u2019s clerk had advised the Committee that, on October 30, the only matter before the court would be the Committee\u2019s motion to intervene. The circuit court informed the Committee that a hearing on the merits could only be set on a date after the election.\nThe circuit court then stated that the ballot title was deficient according to the standard set by the supreme court, and that by granting the Committee\u2019s motion to intervene, the circuit court was allowing the Committee to appeal to the supreme court.\nJudgment was entered on October 30, declaring the ballot title and initiative petition unconstitutional and enjoining Hillman and the Commission from placing the ballot title on the ballot. Alternatively, the circuit court ordered that any votes cast on the proposed initiative not be counted or certified.\nOn October 31, 2002, the Committee filed a notice of appeal and a motion to stay the judgment pending appeal. On November 1, 2002, the appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the Committee had no standing in the case and that the Committee was not incorporated. In addition, the appellees argued that even assuming the Committee did have standing, its appeal is untimely, prejudices the appellees, and does not afford the court the time needed for deliberation. On November 4, 2002, this court denied the Committee\u2019s motion to stay. This court passed the motion to dismiss to be submitted with the case.\nWhile the election has already been held in this case, we chose to address the issue of whether the Committee had standing to intervene, even though the issue concerning the constitutionality of the ballot title and initiated proposal is moot. We have previously stated that \u201c[t]his is not uncommon in matters pertaining to elections where there is a public interest involved and where the issue is such that it tends to become moot before it can be fully litigated.\u201d State v. Craighead County Board of Election Commissioners, 300 Ark. 405, 407, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989). We also note that nothing in the record or abstract indicates that the Committee ever moved this court to expedite this appeal, which explains why the appeal is being considered in May 2003 rather than in a more expedited manner. See Willis v. King, 352 Ark. 55, 98 S.W.3d 427 (2003).\nStanding\nAmendment 7 of the Arkansas Constitution provides, in part:\nMunicipalities and Counties - The initiative and referendum powers of the people are hereby further reserved to the local voters of each municipality and county as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every character in and for their respective municipalities and counties, but no local legislation shall be enacted contrary to the Constitution or any general law of the State, and any general law shall have the effect of repealing any local legislation which is in conflict therewith.\n. . . Fifteen per cent of the legal voters of any municipality or county may order the referendum, or invoke the initiative upon any local measures. . . .\n(Emphasis added.)\nRule 24 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part:\na) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant\u2019s interest is adequately represented by existing parties.\n(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of this state confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant\u2019s claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. ... In exercising its discretion, the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.\nThe appellees argue that the Committee has no standing to intervene because \u201cthe constitutional grant afforded by Amendment 7 is one reserved only to voters.\u201d Further, the appellees state:\nThe Committee is not registered or incorporated with the Arkansas Secretary of State .... There is no indication who comprises this committee, be it local voters or others outside the City of Sherwood. The Committee is neither a registered voter nor a taxpaying entity, and it does not purport to represent any registered voter or taxpayer.\nAt the hearing, the following colloquy took place between counsel for the plaintiffs, counsel for the Committee, and the circuit court:\nCounsel For Committee: . . . This entity was created when it filed with the Arkansas Ethics Commission its statement of organization and responsibilities, this was done by the entity, it is not necessary that they file with the Secretary of State that they incorporate or have any other type of legal status other than hey, we\u2019re a committee, and we\u2019re going to try to get this on the ballot, and we want to see it passed by the citizens of Sherwood. ... I think the law is clear, you know, we have a dog in this hunt, and we ought to be allowed to, to argue the case instead of having only people whose interest are all the same come before this Court ....\nCounsel For Plaintiffs: . . . The case law that I have found that permits intervention in ballot title cases permits intervention by voters who have an interest in the outcome of it. I can find no support for a committee that is not a voter, and in some amalgam of interested parties to be permitted to intervene\nThe Court: Well, I think there is a difference in, too, in a person who has, is on a ballot who is a, a someone who\u2019s involved in election dispute as a contestant as opposed to \u2014 .... But, but then, ... I tend to agree . . . who is going to represent the other side of this, this petition ....\nCounsel For Plaintiffs: It should be a voter, and whoever, whoever assuming this committee, and he has attached no evidence to demonstrate this committee is registered with any entity, there\u2019s nothing before this Court to even assume what he\u2019s saying is true, but assuming this committee is what it is, it\u2019s backed by presumably voters who care about it. Those are, according to the case law, I found, those persons individually as voters an on behalf of a committee have been permitted to intervene. What I\u2019m telling the Court is right now it is Plaintiffs\u2019 position as this is presendy framed, there is not a proper party to intervene this morning in this suit. . . and we\u2019ve quoted to you in our Brief this morning, Amendment Seven, quote, is reserved to local voters of each municipality ....\nThe Court: You may be right, but when you have a Petition that\u2019s signed by a thousand or whatever registered voters, I would think that that would be close enough to, it\u2019s horseshoes. . . . probably the folks out on the hill need to decide this case. . . . And I don\u2019t think in the present sense without their intervention, it will get out there. So I\u2019m going to grant your Motion to Intervene.\nThe Committee argues that it has standing, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-28-507 (Repl. 2001), which provides:\n(a) A nonprofit association, in its name, may institute, defend, intervene, or participate in a judicial, administrative, or other governmental proceeding or in an arbitration, mediation, or any other form of alternative dispute resolution.\n(b) A nonprofit association may assert a claim in its name on behalf of its members if one or more members of the nonprofit association have standing to assert a claim in their own right, the interests the nonprofit association seeks to protect are germane to its purposes, and neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of a member.\nA nonprofit association is \u201can unincorporated organization, other than one created by a trust, consisting of two or more members joined by mutual consent for a common, nonprofit purpose.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-28-501(2) (Repl. 2001). The Committee offers no proof to support its argument that it is a nonprofit association. At no time does the Committee assert that it consists \u201cof two or more members joined by mutual consent for a common, nonprofit purpose.\u201d There is no proof as to what, if anything, was filed with the Arkansas Ethics Commission. There is no proof that the members of the Committee are Sherwood voters. In fact, the only \u201cmember\u201d referred to in the record is \u201cRobert Walla,\u201d who is later identified as the Committee\u2019s chairman. Moreover, the Committee failed to make this argument before the circuit court. We have repeatedly stated that we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Vanderpool v. Pace, 351 Ark. 630, 97 S.W.3d 404 (2003).\nAdditionally, the Committee argues that, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure, it should have been joined in the action concerning the constitutionality of the ballot title and the proposed initiative. Rule 19(a) provides, in part:\n(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if. . . (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that interest . . .\nArk. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (2002).\nThe Committee states that Craighead Board of Election, supra, supports the Committee\u2019s argument that it should have been joined as a necessary party. In that case, a citizen petitioned the circuit court for a writ of mandamus ordering the Board of Election Commissioners to remove the names of three candidates from the November 8, 1988, general election ballot. Id. at 407. The candidates were not named as defendants in the action. Id. at 407-08. The court noted that mandamus was not a \u201cperfect remedy for this type of action\u201d because it does not \u201cprovide for the joinder of all affected parties.\u201d Id. at 412. The court stated: \u201cThe trial judge was concerned, as are we, that the candidates in this case were not parties to the action. When a mandamus action is brought in a case such as this, courts will have to see that all necessary parties are joined under ARCP 19.\u201d Id. (Emphasis added.) The Committee argues that \u201c[t]he same rationale applies when citizens through a ballot-question committee present an initiative petition.\u201d The present case can be distinguished from Craighead Board of Election, supra. In that case, the removal of candidates\u2019 names was at issue; in the present case, the removal of a proposed initiative is at issue. The Committee offers no proof that \u201ccitizens through a ballot-question committee\u201d presented an initiative petition. Further, the Committee again fails to recognize that the initiative powers of the people are \u201creserved to the local voters.\u201d See Ark. Const, amend. 7.\nThe appellees\u2019 argument concerning the Committee\u2019s lack of standing to intervene is well-taken. In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 316 Ark. 251, 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994), the court held that political supporters of elected officials had standing to file an action for declaratory judgment. The court wrote:\nSurely, the ability of Hill and Herget to participate in the political process on behalf of certain candidates and as voters for those same candidates is in jeopardy which brings into play impairment of speech and association rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The same holds true for the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, which has standing to participate on behalf of its voter-members.\nHill, 316 Ark. at 260-61 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nIn Hill, the parties had standing to bring the action for declaratory relief because, in the case of Hill and Herget, they were voters and, in the case of the League of Women Voters of Arkansas, it represented its voter-members. In the present case, the Committee is not a local voter, and the Committee makes no contention that it represents local voters. Rather, the Committee states that it is \u201ca committee . . . [trying] to get this one on the ballot, and we want to see if it [is] passed by the citizens of Sherwood.\u201d Further, the Committee states: \u201cSurely, the Committee has a strong interest on the challenge to the petition it submitted.\u201d While it may be true that the Committee has a \u201cstrong interest,\u201d in the challenge, it does not follow that the Committee, which does not purport to represent the interests of local voters, has standing to intervene in a matter concerning a local initiative, a power which is \u201creserved to the local voters.\u201d See Ark. Const, amend. 7.\nOther jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions. For example, in Albert v. 2001 Legislative Reapportionment Commission, 567 Pa. 670, 790 A.2d 989 (2002), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that entities which were not authorized by law to exercise the right to vote lacked standing to challenge a reapportionment plan. In Mazzone v. Attorney General, 432 Mass. 515, 736 N.E.2d 358 (2000), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that police associations and district attorneys in their official capacities lacked standing to raise constitutional challenges to an initiative petition. The Mazzone court noted that its state constitution reserved initiative and referendum powers to qualified voters, and it reasoned that since police associations were not entitled to vote and since \u201c[n] either the police association nor the district attorneys in their official capacities would be permitted to propose an initiative petition,\u201d it should follow that the police association and district attorneys in their official capacities lacked standing to challenge an initiative petition. Mazzone, 736 N.E.2d at 517 n.4.\nIn the present case, the Committee, which is not joined by a local voter and, further, does not purport to represent local voters, lacked standing to intervene in a case concerning rights which, pursuant to Amendment 7, are reserved to the local voters.\nMotion to dismiss appeal granted.\nAppeal dismissed.\nGlaze and Imber, JJ., concurring.\nCorbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating.\nIn addition, the Committee fails to explain how, even it were recognized as a nonprofit association, it would have standing to intervene in an action concerning rights which are reserved to the local voters under Amendment 7.\nHowever, the court stated:\nAlthough we hold that those unauthorized to vote lack standing to challenge the reapportionment scheme, in four of the five specific petitions that the Commission asserts a standing challenge, individual voters have also been named in the suit. Thus, the claims raised in these petitions are properly before the Court.\nAlbert, 790 A.2d at 995 n.6.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\nconcurring. Fender and Sanders argue that the appeal in this matter was essentially filed too late. I agree. The Committee to Establish Sherwood Fire Department filed its notice of appeal on October 31, 2002. No motion for expedited consideration was filed. They point the court to the case of Ward v. Priest, 350 Ark. 462, 88 S.W.3d 416 (2002). In Ward, Harry Ward, on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, and a ballot question committee known as APPLES, sought an expedited review in conjunction with an original action filed by APPLES on October 28, 2002, pursuant to Amendment 7 to the Arkansas Constitution, and Act 877 of 1999. The petition requested the court to enjoin the Secretary of State, Sharon Priest, from placing the food tax on the November 5, 2002, ballot, or, in the alternative, that the votes not be counted. Another committee, ALERT, objecting to the request for expedited consideration, intervened. This court in Ward engaged in the following analysis:\nThis case is like McCuen v. Harris, 318 Ark. 522, 891 S.W.2d 350 (1994), in which we denied a motion for expedited review where the motion and brief were presented to this court just five days prior to the election. We stated that such time limitations would not only be unfair to the appellee, it would also not give this court the time needed for deliberation of the issue or issues to be presented. Id.; see also Stilley v. Young, 342 Ark. 378, 28 S.W.3d 858 (2000); Mertz v. State, 318 Ark. 239, 884 S.W.2d 264 (1994).\nThe original-action petition filed by APPLES on October 28, 2002, alleges that this court has jurisdiction pursuant to Amendment 7 and Act 877 of 1999 to review the sufficiency of the popular name and ballot title of the proposed constitutional amendment. We take this opportunity to once again note that the purpose of Act 877 is to provide for the timely and expeditious review of the legal sufficiency of initiative petitions by the Supreme Court. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-9-502(b) (Repl. 2000). Furthermore, Act 877 was intended to provide a process to timely review the legal sufficiency of a measure in a manner which avoids voter confusion and frustration which occur when measures are stricken from the ballot on the eve of an election. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-9-502(b) (Repl. 2000).\nThere are only six days between now and the date of the election. Election-eve review is contrary to Act 877 of 1999, the statute under which APPLES now proceeds. Moreover, to grant review at this late hour would not only be unfair to the adverse parties, but it would not give this court a sufficient amount of time necessary for meaningful deliberation of the issues presented. We, therefore, must deny the motion for expedited review. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss filed by ALERT is moot.\nAlthough \u00a7 7-9-502 applies to statewide initiatives, and this is a municipal matter, the need for meaningful deliberation of the issues remains. See Stilley v. Young, 342 Ark. 378, 28 S.W.3d 858 (2000). This court has decided in several cases that there has to be enough time for the adverse parties to prepare and for the court to be able to engage in meaningful deliberation. Id.; McCuen v. Harris, 318 Ark. 522, 891 S.W.2d 350 (1994). For this reason alone, I would dismiss this appeal.\nImber, J., joins this concurrence.\nCorbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Nickels Law Firm, by. James E. Nickels, for appellants.", "No response." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COMMITTEE TO ESTABLISH SHERWOOD FIRE DEPARTMENT v. Virginia HILLMAN, Pulaski County Election Commission; Charles King; Sally Stevens; Ann Smith; Jason Fender; Tommy Sanders\n02-1165\n109 S.W.3d 641\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 5, 2003\nNickels Law Firm, by. James E. Nickels, for appellants.\nNo response." }, "file_name": "0501-01", "first_page_order": 525, "last_page_order": 539 }