{ "id": 36082, "name": "Joshua BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. State", "decision_date": "2003-09-18", "docket_number": "CR 01-1196", "first_page": "30", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ark. 30" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "117 S.W.3d 598" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "352 Ark. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159729 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "500" }, { "page": "489-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ark. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1869661 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/293/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ark. 385", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1892720 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/296/0385-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451218 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753650 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236242 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655450 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ark. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1678979 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ark. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 939000 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/345/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155554 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0294-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 694, "char_count": 13280, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.36036363132472e-08, "percentile": 0.4814037420714489 }, "sha256": "e070cccf742fe4fa8d5723c37eda8c1e27b5fd08bad2bdebc660173e68f4b27a", "simhash": "1:1b2b4e20d7278186", "word_count": 2220 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:30.600361+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Corbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Joshua BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellant Joshua Brown appeals from his convictions for first-degree murder and rape. Brown\u2019s sole point for reversal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress two custodial statements he gave to police shortly after the murder.\nBecause Brown does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, only a brief recitation of the facts is necessary. At about 4:50 a.m. on the morning of September 26, 1999, police responded to a 911 call from an apartment located at 1207 Sunset Drive in Rogers. Upon arriving, officers encountered a middle-aged man yelling, \u201cHe\u2019s not breathing, he\u2019s not breathing,\u201d and a second, younger man who was entirely naked and holding a flashlight and a telephone. An adolescent was found on the floor of the apartment\u2019s bedroom; the boy was naked and not breathing. Officers noted that the boy had some duct tape wrapped around one hand, and there were feces on his abdomen and genitals. An empty pill bottle was on the mattress next to the child. The boy, thirteen-year-old Jesse Dirkhising, was taken to St. Mary\u2019s Hospital in Rogers, where he was pronounced dead. The cause of death was later determined to be suffocation and positional asphyxia, with acute amitryptiline intoxication.\nThe two men in the apartment \u2014 thirty-eight-year-old Davis Don Carpenter and twenty-two-year-old Joshua Brown \u2014 were subsequently questioned by the Rogers police. Brown was arrested at the apartment for second-degree battery after he struck one of the investigating officers. After giving a number of statements to the police, Brown was charged with capital murder and six counts of rape. The rape charges were later reduced to one count, and Brown was convicted of rape and first-degree murder. A jury sentenced him to twenty-five years on the rape conviction; after the jury deadlocked on a sentence for the murder conviction, the Benton County Circuit Court sentenced Brown to life imprisonment. As noted above, Brown\u2019s appeal challenges only the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress two of his statements, implicating both himself and Carpenter.\nThis court recently clarified the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a trial court\u2019s ruling on the voluntariness of a confession. Applying that standard, our court makes an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Grillot, v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003); Cox v. State, 345 Ark. 391, 47 S.W.3d 244 (2001). Any conflict in the testimony of different witnesses is for the trial court to resolve. Cox, supra. In reviewing the trial court\u2019s ruling, we will reverse it only if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Grillot, supra; Giles v. State, 261 Ark. 413, 549 S.W.2d 479 (1977).\nBrown\u2019s argument for reversal centers on two statements he gave to investigating officers Jared Mason and Hayes Minor. These two statements were the last of four statements Brown gave during the thirty-six hours following Jesse\u2019s death. Brown argues that the trial court erroneously ruled that these statements, given to officers Minor and Mason, were not the result of false promises of leniency.\nThis court has summarized our analysis of an allegedly false promise of leniency in both Conner v. State, 334 Ark. 457, 982 S.W.2d 655 (1998), and Pyles v. State, 329 Ark. 73, 947 S.W.2d 754 (1997). That analysis is as follows:\nIf a police official makes a false promise which misleads a prisoner, and the prisoner gives a confession because of that false promise, then the confession has not been voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. In determining whether there has been a misleading promise of reward we look at the totality of the circumstances.The totality is subdivided into two main components!:] first, the statement of the officer and second, the vulnerability of the defendant. Because these two factors create such a multitude of variable facts, it has been impossible for us to draw bright lines of substantive distinction.\nConnor, 334 Ark. at 469-70; Pyles, 329 Ark. at 77-78 (quoting Davis v. State, 275 Ark. 264, 630 S.W.2d 1(1982)).\nIf, during the first step, this court decides that the officer\u2019s statements are unambiguous false promises of leniency, there is no need to proceed to the second step because the defendant\u2019s statement is clearly involuntary. See Pyles, supra; Durham v. State, 320 Ark. 689, 899 S.W.2d 470 (1995); Hamm v. State, 296 Ark. 385, 757 S.W.2d 932 (1988). If, however, the officer\u2019s statement is ambiguous, making it difficult for us to determine if it was truly a false promise of leniency, we must proceed to the second step of examining the vulnerability of the defendant. See Pyles, supra; Durham, supra; Hamm, supra. Factors to be considered in determining vulnerability include: 1) the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; 2) how long it took to obtain the statement; 3) the defendant\u2019s experience, if any, with the criminal-justice system; and 4) the delay between the Miranda warnings and the confession. Connor, supra; Free v. State, 293 Ark. 65, 732 S.W.2d 452 (1987).\nBrown argued below and in this appeal that the statements he gave to Minor and Mason were the result of the officers\u2019 false promise of leniency. Specifically, he points out Mason\u2019s testimony from the suppression hearing that Mason told Brown \u201cthat this was his chance to help himself.\u201d Although Brown\u2019s statement was tape-recorded, Mason made this statement to him prior to turning the tape recorder on. At the suppression hearing, Mason agreed that \u201chelp\u201d could mean \u201cbenefit,\u201d but he asserted that he did not intend for his remarks to be construed by Brown \u201cin a way of giving him hope of a benefit or giving him hope.\u201d Mason denied making Brown any promises or threatening him in any way, and he stated that he \u201cdid not convey to [Brown] how he was to help himself if he was to cooperate.\u201d\nBrown also argues that Minor made false promises to him, and asserts that it was Minor\u2019s intent to make Brown believe that by continuing to give statements, he would be helping himself. Brown argues that, by using this tactic, Minor intentionally created in Brown the false hope that he would receive some benefit in exchange for his cooperation. Minor\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing reflected that he \u201ctold [Brown] that this wasn\u2019t a deal-making process, that we really had no say in what would happen to him in the future.\u201d Minor also testified that he did not recall that he specifically advised Brown that he had an opportunity to help himself, but agreed that it was \u201cnot something I wouldn\u2019t say.\u201d Minor said that he told Brown that he \u201cneed[ed] all the help you can get right now,\u201d but Minor averred that he \u201cmade no specifics on how [Brown] could help himself out.\u201d Minor also testified he told Brown that he could not \u201cmake . . . any promises what is going to happen yet.\u201d The trial court denied Brown\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAs noted above, in reviewing a trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to suppress, this court makes an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Considering all of the circumstances, and taking into account the factors this court must address, it is clear that the trial court did not err in denying Brown\u2019s motion to suppress his statements. The first step in this court\u2019s analysis is to examine the officer\u2019s statement and determine whether it was an ambiguous promise of leniency. See Connor, supra; Pyles, supra. Here, although the trial court initially expressed what it termed \u201cserious doubts\u201d about the officers\u2019 tactics, the court ultimately found that the officers\u2019 statements to the effect that Brown could \u201chelp himself\u2019 were ambiguous promises. This court\u2019s recent case of Roberts v. State, 352 Ark. 489, 102 S.W.3d 482 (2003), is quite similar and controls our analysis here. In Roberts, this court held that an officer\u2019s encouragement to the defendant to \u201cget it off your chest, we\u2019ll help,\u201d \u201ccould mean anything from letting Roberts cleanse his guilty conscience, ... to allowing him to speak to a clergyman .... It certainly was not specific enough to be viewed as a false promise to get Roberts a reduced charge or a lesser sentence if he confessed.\u201d Roberts, 352 Ark. at 500, 102 S.W.3d at 489-90.\nIn the instant case, Mason testified that, by telling Brown he had the opportunity to help himself, he meant that Brown had an opportunity to not be the only person charged with the crime. Mason denied, however, that he was trying to give Brown any hope that there would be an exchange of leniency. Likewise, Minor testified that he told Brown that he needed all the help he could get, and that he \u201chad an opportunity to help himself by giving [Minor] a statement,\u201d but denied that he made any specifics about what the word \u201chelp\u201d meant. Clearly, these were, at best, ambiguous promises.\nBecause the statements were ambiguous, the court must then examine Brown\u2019s vulnerability. The factors to consider, as noted above, are 1) the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; 2) how long it took to obtain the statement; 3) the defendant\u2019s experience, if any, with the criminal-justice system; and 4) the delay between the Miranda warnings and the confession. Here, the trial court first pointed out that Brown\u2019s first two inculpatory statements were unquestionably proper, and the officers taking those statements had made Brown \u201cas comfortable as he could be.\u201d The trial court also noted that, at the time he gave the latter two statements, Brown already knew that he was going to be charged with murder, that he had voluntarily gone to the hospital to give a DNA sample, and that he was much calmer at the time he gave the two challenged statements. Considering the context of the entire exchange leading up to Brown\u2019s third statement, the court found that Brown was not so vulnerable at that point in time that the suggestions that he would be helping himself overrode his free will and turned an otherwise voluntary statement into something that was involuntary. With respect to the fourth statement, the court highlighted the fact that Brown had been given the chance to sleep overnight, and that he had been aware for nearly twenty-four hours that he was under suspicion of murder. The trial court concluded that there was \u201cno way\u201d it could find that anything Brown had said was in response to or in reliance upon some sort of promise by the police to help him.\nIn Roberts, where the police told Roberts to \u201cget it off his chest,\u201d this court affirmed the denial of a suppression motion where Roberts was thirty-one years old, had a high school education, and had held a job for the last six years. He was detained by the police for only about two hours, and there was no lengthy delay between the time he was given his Miranda warnings and when he gave his confession. Therefore, this court concluded, the evidence did not demonstrate that Roberts was so vulnerable that the officer\u2019s statements to him rendered the confession involuntary.\nIn the present case, at the time of the murder, Brown was twenty-two years old, and his forensic mental evaluation revealed that he had a full-scale IQ of 114; Dr. Michael Simon, who conducted the evaluation, indicated that this score meant Brown was \u201cpresently functioning in the high average range of intelligence.\u201d The first of Brown\u2019s two statements was given at 10:51 p.m. on the same day the murder took place, and the second occurred at 9:18 the following morning. With respect to Brown\u2019s experience with the criminal justice system, he had been arrested at least three times before and had been to jail briefly. Brown had been advised of his Miranda rights prior to each of his earlier statements, and both Detective Mason and Sergeant Minor reminded him of those rights just before the two statements in question. Based on these factors, we cannot say that Brown was so vulnerable that his statements were involuntary, and it is apparent that the trial court did not err in denying Brown\u2019s motion to suppress these statements.\nThe record in this case has been reviewed for other reversible error in accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h), and none has been found.\nAffirmed.\nCorbin and Thornton, JJ., not participating.\nAt trial, Brown moved only for a directed verdict on the charge of capital murder, and did not move for a directed verdict on any lesser-included offense. See Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). During his opening statements, Brown conceded that the rape had occurred.\nAt this point in their investigation, the officers had found some handwritten documents at Brown and Carpenter\u2019s apartment that they believed were instructions fiom Carpenter to Brown about what to do to the victim; Mason testified that he was trying to get Brown to tell him what the papers were.\nBrown had been arrested twice for possession of marijuana, once on a contempt citation for failure to report to his probation officer, and once for having an expired license plate.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Duell, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Joshua BROWN v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 01-1196\n117 S.W.3d 598\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 18, 2003\nCharles M. Duell, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0030-01", "first_page_order": 56, "last_page_order": 63 }