{ "id": 36057, "name": "Maurice LONDON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "London v. State", "decision_date": "2003-10-09", "docket_number": "CR 02-970", "first_page": "313", "last_page": "321", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "354 Ark. 313" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "125 S.W.3d 813" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "336 Ark. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51228 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111379 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365304 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 765", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340390 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655433 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 627, "char_count": 13271, "ocr_confidence": 0.719, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.333489710869728e-07, "percentile": 0.9686728840175625 }, "sha256": "a9e9830e1e2a121753eabc52fea287ed193e9f72c6d302ab7aef3576f9e06a5b", "simhash": "1:8ffed6267b4e5a70", "word_count": 2156 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:05:30.600361+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Brown and Thornton, JJ., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Maurice LONDON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "W. H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chiefjustice.\nAppellant Maurice London appeals his conviction of robbery from the Pulaski County Circuit Court. Following conviction, the jury imposed a sentence of twelve years to be served in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court committed reversible error in handling appellant\u2019s Batson objection. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). We find no reversible error and affirm.\nJerry Rush testified at trial that on August 3, 2001, as he walked outside of his home, appellant put a gun to Rush\u2019s head and demanded money from him. Rush stated that he initially struggled with appellant, but then Rush told appellant he would go inside his home to retrieve the money. At that point, according to Rush, appellant left the premises and was gone for about five minutes. Meanwhile, Rush obtained $400 from inside his home. When appellant returned to Mr. Rush\u2019s home, Rush threw the money out the door.\nMaurine Rush, Jerry Rush\u2019s wife, testified at trial that she was inside their home with her grandson when the incident began. Mrs. Rush stated she saw appellant holding a gun pointed at her husband; and, at that time she called 911. However, once officers arrived, Mrs. Rush refused to give a statement to the officer because she testified that, at the time, she was angry with her husband for giving appellant money. Pulaski County Sheriff Deputy Joseph Dunn testified that he took a statement from Mr. Rush, but that Mrs. Rush refused to speak with him about the incident\nOn October 18, 2001, the State filed a one-count felony information against appellant for the aggravated robbery of Jerry Rush. The information also alleged that appellant was a habitual offender. On June 10, 2002, appellant stood trial in Pulaski County Circuit Court, Second Division, where the State presented three witnesses: Mr. Rush, Mrs. Rush, and Deputy Joseph Dunn. The defense presented no testimony.\nAfter closing arguments, the trial court submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned with a verdict of guilty on the lesser-included offense of robbery instead of aggravated robbery. After the sentencing phase, the jury recommended a sentence of twelve years to be served in the Arkansas Department of Correction. The trial court accepted that recommendation and sentenced him accordingly.\nIn this appeal, appellant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in handling appellant\u2019s Batson objection. Namely appellant contends that the trial court did not follow this court\u2019s Batson framework established in MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998); and, in the alternative, a portion of the MacKintrush framework was unconstitutionally interpreted and applied by the trial court.\nDuring voir dire, appellant objected on Batson grounds after the State struck from the jury panel three African-Americans whom were potential jurors. The State struck four prospective jurors in the first round of strikes, two of which were apparently African-Americans. During the second round of strikes, the State struck an African-American, resulting in three African-Americans being struck from the jury panel. At that time, appellant objected on Batson grounds. The following dialogue then occurred at the bench:\nDefense Counsel: I guess for the record, we\u2019re going to make a challenge at this time. The State has now struck five people, three of which have been African-American. The Defendant is African-American. I think the State may be using this to racially bias the jury panel this morning.\nDeputy Prosecuting Attorney: Well, we\u2019ve also struck, we\u2019ve also struck two, two white people in the first round. We also say three African-Americans, Your Honor. Regarding the last juror that was struck, I believe, there was a lot of tension and attitude between he and myself during the voir dire, and that was the sole reason for the, that strike.\nDefense Counsel: .And I believe the burden is also on them to show that their other previous strikes were not racially motivated also.\nThe Court: Well, there are still three blacks on the jury.\nDefense Counsel: The problem with that, Your Honor, is that they\u2019re systematically excusing three others who were, and now, obviously, the pound [sic] was heavily weighted toward the white. And by doing this, sixty percent of their strikes towards the blacks, solely, they have now shifted that balance even more. -\nDeputy Prosecuting Attorney: Your Honor, there\u2019s no pattern. Defense has to show a pattern of systematic discrimination, there\u2019s no pattern to this.\nDefense Counsel: think sixty percent, when you get above.\nThe Court: Well, your, there\u2019s still three on the panel, so I just don\u2019t think it\u2019s a systematic pattern at this point.\nDeputy Prosecuting Attorney: And, Your Honor, \u2014 also indicated she had a child that was prosecuted.\nThe Court: Well, I don\u2019t think, I just don\u2019t think, I\u2019m going to deny the motion. One had a child that had been prosecuted, I think that\u2019s a good reason. The other two, I don\u2019t recall.\nDeputy Prosecuting Attorney [sic]: And, Your Honor, juror number three also indicated that she had a child that had been prosecuted. She was left on there.\nThe Court: I\u2019m going to deny the motion.\nAppellant argues that the prosecutor and the trial court failed to follow this court\u2019s standard as set forth in MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998), wherein we outlined a three-step approach to be used in Batson situations. In 1986, the United States Supreme Court held that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the State from striking a venire person as a result of racially discriminatory intent. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Court left it up to the states to develop specific procedures for implementing Batson. Batson, supra; MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998).\nThe Supreme Court did not formulate set standards for state trial courts to follow in implementing Batson; however, it did provide a three-step process as guidance. In 1995, the United States Supreme Court clarified its holding in Batson with its decision in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995) (per curiam). In Purkett, the Court outlined the proper steps for a trial court to follow when a Batson claim is made:\n1. The defendant must make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent in making a peremptory strike;\n2. If a prima facie case is made, then the State must produce a race-neutral reason for the strike; and,\n3. The trial court must then make a determination as to whether the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion that the strike was fueled by racially discriminatory intent.\nPurkett, 514 U.S. at 767.\nRelying on the guidance found in Batson and subsequent federal case law, this court has formulated a specific procedure for the trial courts of Arkansas to follow. In MacKintrush v. State, this court established what is currently this state\u2019s three-step Batson procedure. First, the strike\u2019s opponent must present-facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination; that is, the opponent must present a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Hinkston v. State, 340 Ark. 530, 10 S.W.3d 906 (2000). Second, once the strike\u2019s opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. If a race-neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, wherein the trial court must decide whether the strike\u2019s opponent has proven purposeful discrimination. Id.\nThis court will reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on a Batson challenge only when its findings are clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999). Also, we accord some measure of deference to the trial court in that it is in a superior position to make these determinations because it has the opportunity to observe the parties and determine their credibility. Id.\nIn the present case, London objected in voir dire on Batson grounds after the State struck three African-American members of the venire panel, asserting that the State was attempting to obtain a racially-biased jury. London argues that the trial court erred in failing to find a Batson violation. More specifically, London argues that the trial court erred in failing to follow the three steps required in an analysis of a Batson violation when the trial court considered the race-neutral explanations offered by the State.\nStep one is making a prima facie case. MacKintrush, supra; Purkett, supra. However, the trial court first went to step two and allowed the State to offer race-neutral explanations and then decided that there was no Batson violation. In other words, the trial court ignored step one, heard argument on step two, and then decided the ultimate issue under step three. Once the party-striking jurors offered a race-neutral explanation, and the trial court rules on the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of a prima facie case becomes moot. Wooten v. State, 325 Ark. 510, 931 S.W.2d 408 (1996).\nTherefore, we need not analyze step one because the issue is moot. We must then determine whether the explanations offered were race-neutral and whether the trial erred in deciding that there was no Batson violation. In this regard, London argues that it was error for the trial court to allow the State to proffer only two race-neutral explanations when three African-Americans were struck from the panel. We will not consider this argument, however, as it was raised for the first time on appeal. Our law is well settled that issues raised for the first time on appeal, even constitutional ones, will not be considered because the trial court never had an opportunity to rule on them. Camargo v. State, 346 Ark. 118, 55 S.W.3d 255 (2001); J.C.S. v. State, 336 Ark. 364, 985 S.W.2d 312 (1999). As such, London\u2019s argument is not preserved for our review because he never objected to the State\u2019s proffer of only two race-neutral explanations.\nTurning now to the race-neutral reasons given below, the State argued that one juror was excused because of tension and attitude and a second because she had a child that had been prosecuted. The State\u2019s explanation must be more than a mere denial of racial discrimination, but need not be persuasive or even plausible, and, indeed, may even be silly or superstitious. Hinkston, supra. The explanations offered by the State are not mere denials of racial discrimination and meet the requirement of step two, which means the trial court then should have determined whether the strike opponent carried the burden of persuasion that the strikes were fueled by discriminatory intent. Purkett, supra.\nAlthough proceeding to step three, the trial court nonetheless stated that no \u201csystematic pattern\u201d was found, and then after some continued argument by counsel, denied London\u2019s Batson motion. Thus, the trial court relied on a pattern of jury strikes in deciding the ultimate issue of discriminatory intent under step three. London had alleged a pattern in his objection when he asserted a Batson violation where the State struck five jurors, and three of those jurors were African-American. He alleged this showed that there was a racially discriminatory intent. Reliance on numbers alone is not sufficient to prove a discriminatory intent. The United States Supreme Court in Batson, stated, \u201c[f]or example, a pattern of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.\u201d Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. A pattern certainly may provide facts showing a discriminatory intent if the pattern in fact shows a discriminatory intent. However, whatever facts are presented, they must give rise to an inference of purposeful discrimination. Hinkston, supra.\nHence, mere pattern or process alone is not sufficient to establish a showing of a Batson violation unless the pattern shows a discriminatory intent. Here, London did no more than point to the number of African-American jurors struck from the venire panel. Therefore, London has failed to show the trial court erred in denying his Batson motion.\nFinally, we note that London takes issue with this court\u2019s holding in MacKintrush. Specifically, appellant contends that MacKintrush has been misinterpreted to require the showing of a pattern of discrimination when raising a Batson challenge. However, again, we decline to address this issue. In arguing the Batson challenge below, appellant failed to object to the trial court\u2019s analysis on the basis of pattern, nor did London argue that he was not required to show a patten of discrimination. It is well settled that an argument not raised below will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Camargo, supra; J.C.S., supra.\nAffirmed.\nBrown and Thornton, JJ., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "W. H. \u201cDub\u201d Arnold, Chiefjustice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Erin Vinett, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Maurice LONDON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 02-970\n125 S.W.3d 813\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 9, 2003\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Erin Vinett, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Jeffrey A. Weber, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0313-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 347 }