{ "id": 5368265, "name": "David Ashley DURHAM and Ruthie Mae Durham, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Amanda Lynn Durham, Deceased v. Harold MARBERRY and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc.", "name_abbreviation": "Durham v. Marberry", "decision_date": "2004-03-25", "docket_number": "03-874", "first_page": "481", "last_page": "493", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ark. 481" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "156 S.W.3d 242" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "31 Santa Clara L. Rev. 809", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Santa Clara L. Rev.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "using the phrases \"loss of the pleasure of being alive\" and \"lost value oflife\" interchangeably to describe post-death damages" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Miss. L.J. 735", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Miss. L.J.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "746 P.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ark. 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1633418 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/251/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 575", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 634101 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0575-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 255", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11728850 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0255-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 N.M. L. Rev. 385", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.M. L. Rev.", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "368 A.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "a plaintiff is entitled to \"just damages\" which include \"compensation for the destruction of her capacity to carry on and enjoy life's activities in a way she would have done had she lived\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "872 P.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 1552565 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/117/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.M. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2-3", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.M. Stat. Ann.", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Haw. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12265508 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/87/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 Haw. 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12263602 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/77/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "769 F.2d 1173", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 361082 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/769/1173-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 A.2d 1188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 1749658 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/482/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 F. Supp. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7380979 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/747/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377661 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/332/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155493 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683438 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404462 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155516 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 956, "char_count": 21850, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.45615450578609e-08, "percentile": 0.5173365319754163 }, "sha256": "60a6c3f3256fb582447443e2d4a42b28ae61a4ad046b69710940c8f0d5db5bbe", "simhash": "1:752582935e065ecd", "word_count": 3602 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:43:53.781338+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "David Ashley DURHAM and Ruthie Mae Durham, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Amanda Lynn Durham, Deceased v. Harold MARBERRY and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Annabblle Clinton Imber, Justice.\nThis case arises out of a lawsuit that includes both wrongful death and survival claims. The appellants, co-administrators of the estate of Amanda Lynn Durham, sued appellees Harold D. Marberry and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc., for damages incurred when a mobile home transport vehicle collided with the vehicle driven by Miss Durham. It is undisputed that Miss Durham was killed instantly in the accident. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the appellees with regard to claimed \u201closs of life\u201d damages, finding that at least some period of life between injury and death is a condition for recovery of loss-of-life damages by a decedent\u2019s estate. Pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the trial court then certified its order regarding the loss-of-life damages claim as final for purposes of appeal. The appellants contend on appeal that no period of life between injury and death is required to recover loss-of-life damages. We agree with the appellants and reverse.\nAs a point of order, we note that both the appellants and the appellees have provided notice to this court that they have arrived at a contingent high-low settlement agreement. The settlement amount is contingent upon our decision in this appeal; therefore, we agree with both parties that the contingent agreement does not moot this appeal. Because this appeal involves the construction of a statute and is an issue of first impression before this court, we have jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1) and (6).\nConstitutionality Issue\nIn the hearing below, the appellees contended that the appellants\u2019 interpretation of \u00a7 16-62-101(b), if held to be the correct interpretation, would result in an unconstitutional provision for a punitive penalty without due process and would render the statute unconstitutionally vague. On appeal, the appellees limit their constitutional argument to one sentence: \u201cThe Circuit Court did not hold the statute unconstitutional, and [the appellees] make no argument that the statute is unconstitutional, if read correctly.\u201d The appellees have abandoned their constitutional argument on appeal; therefore, we do not address it.\nInterpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-101(b)\nThe Arkansas survival statute provides for the recovery of loss-of-life damages and reads as follows:\n16-62-101 Survival of actions \u2014 Wrongs to person or property.\n(a) (1) For wrongs done to the person or property of another, an action may be maintained against a wrongdoer, and the action may be brought by the person injured or, after his or her death, by his or her executor or administrator against the wrongdoer or, after the death of the wrongdoer, against the executor or administrator of the wrongdoer, in the same manner and with like effect in all respects as actions founded on contracts.\n(2) Nothing in subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be so construed as to extend its provisions to actions of slander or libel.\n(b) In addition to all other elements of damages provided by law, a decedent\u2019s estate may recover for the decedent\u2019s loss of life as an independent element of damages.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-101 (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). The issue in this appeal is the interpretation of subsection (b), which was added by the Arkansas General Assembly in Act 1516 of 2001. As we stated in City of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. 686, 120 S.W.3d 55 (2003):\nWe review issues of statutory interpretation de novo because it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Reding v. Wagner, 350 Ark. 322, 86 S.W.3d 386 (2002). The purpose of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Williams v. Little Rock School District, 347 Ark. 637, 66 S.W.3d 590 (2002). In doing so, we give the words of the statute their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, it is unnecessary to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. Id.\nCity of Maumelle v. Jeffrey Sand Co., 353 Ark. at 691, 120 S.W.3d at 57.\nPrior to the passage of Act 1516' of 2001, Arkansas had no statutory provision for loss-of-life damages, nor was there any such provision in our case law. Historically, damages recovered by a decedent\u2019s estate under the survival statute, with the exception of funeral expenses, compensated the decedent and were incurred pre-death. These include damages for medical expenses due to the injury, lost wages between injury and death, pain and suffering, etc. See, e.g., Advocat, Inc. v. Sauer, 353 Ark. 29, 111 S.W.3d 346 (2003); New Prospect Drilling Co. v. First Commercial Trust, N.A., 332 Ark. 466, 966 S.W.2d 233 (1998). The appellees argued below that the General Assembly\u2019s amendment, did not add a new element of damages, and that loss-of-life damages are merely a type of pain and suffering. However, subsection (b) states that loss-of-life damages are \u201cin addition to all other elements of damages provided by law.\u201d Therefore, logically, they must be new, because the phrase \u201call other elements of damages provided by law\u201d would encompass every element of damages \u2014 including pain and suffering \u2014 that was already recoverable under both statutory and case law. Indeed, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions \u2014 Civil were re-written to include loss of life as a separate element of damages recoverable by an estate in a wrongful death action. See AMI Civ. 4th 2216 (2004).\nOn appeal, the appellees concede that loss-of-life damages are a new element of damages, but they now argue that damages for loss of life are the equivalent of, and synonymous with, damages for the loss of enjoyment of life, and these types of damages are incurred pre-death and require a period of conscious life between injury and death.\nThere is some confusion amongst both case law and legal scholarship as to the definition of \u201closs of enjoyment of life\u201d damages. Some cases and scholars have used the term \u201closs of enjoyment of life\u201d to describe damages that compensate a predeath loss of the ability to enjoy life\u2019s activities while still living. Still others have used this term to mean the loss of the enjoyment of being alive that is incurred at the point of death forward. So the term \u201closs of enjoyment oflife\u201d is confusing and, at times, has been used in a way that is equivalent to \u201closs oflife.\u201d\nIn support of their contention that \u201closs of life\u201d damages are equivalent to \u201closs of enjoyment of life\u201d damages, the appellees cite to several cases. Among them are Sterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263 (D. Del. 1990) and Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d 1188 (1978). However, these cases do not support the appellees and, in fact, Sterner and Willinger both indicate the difference between damages for loss of enjoyment of life and damages for loss of life itself as follows:\n. Even where the victim survives a compensable injury, this Court has never held that loss of life\u2019s pleasures could be compensated other than as a component of pain and suffering. Indeed, the two types of loss are interrelated.... Thus, to a large extent it has been the plaintiffs consciousness of his or her inability to enjoy life that we have compensated under the rubric of \u201closs of life\u2019s pleasures.\u201d Unlike one who is permanently injured, one who dies as a result of his injuries is not condemned to watch life\u2019s amenities pass by. Unless we are to equate loss of life\u2019s pleasures with loss of life itself we must view it as something that is compensable only for a living plaintiff who has suffered from that loss. It follows that... damages for the pain and suffering that may flow from the loss of life\u2019s pleasures should only be recovered for the period of time between the accident and the decedent\u2019s death.\nSterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F. Supp at 272 (citing Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 393 A.2d at 1191) (emphasis added).\nAfter examining this citation from Willinger, the Sterner court concluded \u201cplaintiffs in the present action may not recover for the hedonic value of the decedent\u2019s lost life as a distinct basis for recovery under the Delaware survival action statute.\u201d Id. at 273. The federal district court based this holding on Delaware\u2019s survival statute and the fact that the case before it was a diversity action. However, the Sterner court recognized that, in a federal \u00a7 1983 action, the value of a decedent\u2019s lost life is recoverable even if state law does not allow for it. At the time Sterner was written, federal courts had begun to allow for loss-of-life damages in cases where police officers had shot and killed suspects in violation of their constitutional rights. The Sterner court cited to a decision by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in'a \u00a7 1983 action:\nWhere the constitutional deprivation sought to be remedied has caused death, state law that precludes recovery on behalf of the victim\u2019s estate for the loss of life is inconsistent with the deterrent policy of section. 1983 .... Such restrictive state laws must give way to federal common law rules that permit recovery. In sum, in a section 1983 action, the estate may recover damages for loss of life, conscious pain and suffering experienced by the decedent prior to death, and punitive damages.\nSterner v. Wesley College, Inc., 747 F. Supp. at 273-74 (citing Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir. 1985)) (emphasis added).\nClearly, then, loss-of-life damages and damages for loss of enjoyment of life are not the same, though some courts and scholars have used the term \u201closs of enjoyment of life\u201d to mean both. It is also apparent from the Seventh Circuit\u2019s decision in Bass by Lewis v. Wallenstein, supra, that federal common law allows for the recovery of loss-of-life damages and that restrictive state survival statutes that do not allow for these damages will be overruled in cases that implicate federal constitutional violations.\nIt is not just the federal courts that have allowed for loss-of-life damages. Several states also allow recovery of these damages. In Montalvo v. Lapez, 77 Haw. 282, 884 P.2d 345 (1994), the Hawaii Supreme Court noted, \u201cHedonic damages are damages \u2018for the loss of enjoyment of life or for the value of life itself, as measured separately from the economic productive value that an injured or deceased person would have had.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 284, 884 P.2d at 347, n. 2 (citing Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 391 (6th ed. 1990)). Though Montalvo was a personal injury case, the Hawaii Supreme Court used this reasoning to allow loss-of-life damages in Ozaki v. Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay, 87 Haw. 273, 954 P.2d 652 (1998).\nNew Mexico\u2019s statutes allow for \u201cfair and just\u201d damages in wrongful death cases brought by a decedent\u2019s estate:\nEvery such action as mentioned in [the New Mexico Wrongful Death Statute] shall be brought by and in the name or names of the personal representative or representatives of such deceased person, and the jury in every such action may give such damages, compensatory and exemplary, as they deem fair and just....\nN.M. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 41-2-3 (Michie 1978) (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that \u201cthe value of life itself is compensable under the Act.\u201d Romero v. Byers, 872 P.2d 840, 847 (N.M. 1994).\nLikewise, Connecticut has recognized damages for the loss of the value of a decedent\u2019s life in Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 (Conn. 1976):\nIn actions for injuries resulting in death, a plaintiff is entitled to \u201cjust damages together with the cost of reasonably necessary, medical, hospital and nursing services, and including funeral expenses.\u201d \u201cJust damages\u201d include (1) the value of the decedent\u2019s lost earning capacity less deductions for her necessary living expenses and taking into consideration that a present cash payment will be made, (2) compensation for the destruction of her capacity to carry on and enjoy life\u2019s activities in a way she would have done had she lived, and (3) compensation for conscious pain and suffering.\nId. at 183 (emphasis added). The defendants in Katsetos had appealed as excessive the amount of damages awarded for the wrongful death of a mother during childbirth. In upholding the jury award to the estate for the decedent\u2019s damages, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:\nThere was evidence from which the jury could have found that the decedent was 41 years of age at the time of her death and had a life expectancy of about 32 years. She was happily married and had four children including the child born on the day of her death. She was a very happy person and in good health before the delivery of her last child. She was a dedicated mother and homemaker and active in many outside activities. She was a state-licensed hairdresser and also had experience in office work. In 1962, she and her husband established a pizza business where she worked until she temporarily discontinued work because of her pregnancy.... The defendants argue that the verdict constitutes an award of an annuity of at least $20,000 a year and that it is excessive when one considers that the best indication of a possible salary for the plaintiff s decedent, if she ever returned to hairdressing, was $125 a week plus tips and that any wages she would have earned in the pizza business were limited. The defendants\u2019 argument takes into consideration only an evaluation of the destruction of the decedent\u2019s earning capacity and gives no consideration to the award of an amount based on the destruction of the capacity to carry on life\u2019s activities as well as compensation for pain and suffering.\nId. at 184 (emphasis added).\nIt is apparent from this quote that the Connecticut Supreme Court recognized \u201cthe destruction of the capacity to carry on life\u2019s activities\u201d began at death and went forward through the duration of the decedent\u2019s life expectancy. This was not an amount recovered for damages suffered by a wrongful-death beneficiary, but was an amount awarded for damages suffered by the decedent herself. Though covered in the Connecticut statutes as \u201cjust damages,\u201d these were damages for the loss of the decedent\u2019s life, which, in turn, led to the destruction of her ability to carry on life\u2019s activities.\nIn short, our review of case law from other jurisdictions shows that some jurisdictions award damages for loss of the enjoyment oflife that are pre-death, while others award damages for loss oflife that begin at death and run forward until the end of life expectancy. This distinction between damages for \u201closs oflife\u201d and those for \u201closs of enjoyment oflife\u201d is borne out by the legal scholarship written over the last quarter-century. Contrary to the appellees\u2019 assertion, although damages for \u201closs oflife,\u201d and \u201closs of enjoyment oflife\u201d are both hedonic, \u201closs oflife\u201d damages are not the equivalent of those for \u201closs of enjoyment oflife.\u201d See Cindy Domingue-Hendrickson, Wrongful Death \u2014 New Mexico Adopts Hedonic Damages in the Context of Wrongful Death Actions: Sears v. Nissan (Romero v. Byers), 25 N.M. L. Rev. 385 (1995); Maurice B. Graham & Michael D. Murphy, Hedonic Damages \u2014 Where Are We?, 51 J. Mo. B. 265 (1995) (Graham and Murphy point out that damage awards for loss of enjoyment oflife are much less controversial than loss-of-life damages).\nThis history is important, because it is with this backdrop that our legislature amended the Arkansas survival statute in 2001. Interestingly, the appellees cite Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992) for the proposition, \u201cIt is a familiar \u2018maxim that a statutory term is generally presumed to have its common-law meaning.\u2019\u201d Id. at 259 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 592 (1990)). The General Assembly presumably understood the difference between \u201closs oflife\u201d damages and \u201closs of enjoyment oflife\u201d damages, and they chose to allow for the recovery of loss-of-life damages in the Arkansas survival statute.\nThe appellees contend that only those damages suffered by a decedent between injury and death are compensable under the Arkansas survival statute. Thus, their argument is that Miss Durham\u2019s estate is not entitled to loss-of-life damages, since she was killed instantly in the accident and there was no period of time between her injury and death. In short, her injury was her death.\nIn Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-101(b), the Arkansas General Assembly chose to use the term \u201closs of life damages\u201d in its amendment to the survival statute. Thus, the appellees\u2019 arguments regarding the meaning and inception of the term \u201closs of enjoyment of life damages\u201d is irrelevant. Relevant to our inquiry instead is the plain language of the statute as amended. If the statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, we do not resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Williams v. Little Rock School District, supra. By its ordinary meaning in common parlance, \u201closs of life\u201d cannot occur prior to death because it necessarily presupposes death has occurred. One cannot both live and experience loss of life simultaneously.\nLoss-of-life damages seek to compensate a decedent for the loss of the value that the decedent would have placed on his or her own life. \u201cSurvival\u201d actions have traditionally included those damages suffered by the decedent between injury and death. Nonetheless, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-101 makes no distinction between \u201cpersonal injury\u201d or \u201cdeath\u201d when it speaks of the term \u201cinjury.\u201d In other words, when a person is killed instantaneously, as was Miss Durham, her injury is her death, which is compensated by loss-of-life damages.\nIn sum, because the legislature chose to amend the survival statute to add loss-of-life damages as a separate and independent element in addition to all other elements of damage already allowed by law, the appellants are correct that loss-of-life damages are a new element of damages. Moreover, because the phrase \u201closs of life damages\u201d as used by the legislature in \u00a7 16-62-101(b) is clear and unambiguous, and, since loss-of-life damages can only begin accruing at the point when life is lost, at death, there is no reason to believe the legislature intended to require the decedent to live for a period of time between injury and death. Therefore, we hold that it is not necessary for a decedent to live for a period of time between injury and death in order to recover loss-of-life damages under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7. 16-62-101(b). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to the appellees on the loss-of-life damages claim, and we reverse and remand.\nEvidentiary Issue\nThough the appellants do not argue this point on appeal, the appellees have noted that the appellants retained an economist to provide expert testimony about loss-of-life damages. This expert testimony was the subject of a motion in limine filed by the appellees, requesting that the expert testimony be excluded. However, the trial court did not reach the issue of the motion in limine because it granted summary judgment on the claim for loss-of-life damages. In a case decided three decades ago by this court, we determined that there is no hard and fast rule to determine compensatory damages for non-pecuniary losses:\nNo rule has been established \u2014 and in the nature of things none can be \u2022 \u2014 \u2022 for determining what compensation should be paid for loss of life, for pain and suffering, for loss or decrease of earning power, for mental anguish accompanied by physical injury, for loss of companionship, and for the various elements entering into damage actions.\nClark & Sons v. Elliott, 251 Ark. 853, 857, 475 S.W.2d 514, 517 (1972). While we do agree with the appellees that the determination of damages is within the purview of the jury, without a trial court ruling or order before us on the issue of expert testimony, this issue is not ripe for consideration.\nDuplicate Recovery\nThe appellees also assert that the \u201cthreat\u201d of duplicative damages is a reality because, they contend, the appellants\u2019 theory is that loss-of-life damages include the value of future lost earnings in addition to non-pecuniary loss. The appellees point out that future lost earnings are specifically recoverable by statutory beneficiaries under the Arkansas Wrongful Death Statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102 (Supp. 2003). However, the appellants have argued that they are making no wrongful death claim for pecuniary damages in this case and, therefore, there can be no double recovery for those damages. Again, without a ruling or order squarely before us, this issue is not ripe for consideration at this time. t\nReversed and remanded.\nSee, e.g., Kirk v. Washington State Univ., 746 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1987); Virginia Smith Gautier, Hedonic Damages: A Variation in Paths, the Questionable Expert and a Recommendation for Clarity in Mississippi, 65 Miss. L.J. 735 (1996).\nSee, e.g., Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172 (Conn. 1976) (a plaintiff is entitled to \u201cjust damages\u201d which include \u201ccompensation for the destruction of her capacity to carry on and enjoy life\u2019s activities in a way she would have done had she lived\u201d (emphasis added)) Jennifer L. Jones, Hedonic Damages: Above and Beyond Section 1983, 31 Santa Clara L. Rev. 809 (1991) (using the phrases \u201closs of the pleasure of being alive\u201d and \u201clost value oflife\u201d interchangeably to describe post-death damages).", "type": "majority", "author": "Annabblle Clinton Imber, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John F. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.", "Barrett & Deacon, P.A., by: D.P. Marshall, Jr., Kevin W. Cole, and Leigh M. Chiles, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "David Ashley DURHAM and Ruthie Mae Durham, Co-Administrators of the Estate of Amanda Lynn Durham, Deceased v. Harold MARBERRY and Advantage Mobile Homes, Inc.\n03-874\n156 S.W.3d 242\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 25, 2004\nJohn F. Gibson, Jr., for appellant.\nBarrett & Deacon, P.A., by: D.P. Marshall, Jr., Kevin W. Cole, and Leigh M. Chiles, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0481-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 517 }