{ "id": 5368147, "name": "Pamela JEFFERSON v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES", "name_abbreviation": "Jefferson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services", "decision_date": "2004-04-08", "docket_number": "03-596", "first_page": "647", "last_page": "664", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "356 Ark. 647" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "158 S.W.3d 129" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "340 Ark. 42", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365223 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0042-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ark. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 226573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/343/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 207", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210108 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0207-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365256 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ark. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8719565 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/255/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 Ark. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/69/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884269 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 403", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1241012 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0403-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 Ark. App. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136834 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/78/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210158 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "452 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1313768 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" }, { "page": "33-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/452/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 976, "char_count": 28183, "ocr_confidence": 0.7, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5560058345751794e-07, "percentile": 0.8855522078700341 }, "sha256": "ff495176ce89a676791f0127fc81b85099f05901c2de10bb702363cab41c4396", "simhash": "1:0b5aa28e5716b378", "word_count": 4576 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:43:53.781338+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Pamela JEFFERSON v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nOn August 9, 2000, the Department of Human Services [DHS] received a report that D.J., the thirteen-year-old biological daughter of appellant, Pamela Jefferson, had been sexually abused by her older brother and her cousin. At the time the report was made, D.J., who lived with her grandmother, was visiting relatives in Michigan, and appellant was living in Georgia.\nAfter Michigan Protective Services interviewed D.J., and after she returned to Arkansas where she was temporarily placed in foster care, DHS filed a petition seeking emergency custody of D.J. The petition was granted, and the trial court set a probable cause hearing. Appellant did not participate in these proceedings. Following the hearing, the trial court concluded that there was probable cause to remove D.J. from appellant\u2019s custody.\nOn October 13, 2000, an adjudication hearing was held to, determine whether D.J. was dependent-neglected. Appellant was served with a copy of the petition filed by DHS when she arrived at the adjudication hearing. At that time, she was advised of her right to have legal representation during the proceedings. After briefly discussing the issue with the trial court, appellant chose to proceed with the hearing without an attorney.\nOn November 1, 2000, an order adjudicating D.J. dependent-neglected was entered. The trial court ordered that D.J. was to remain in the custody of DHS until appellant completed certain requirements. These requirements included entering a residential treatment facility for drug and alcohol abuse, locating housing and employment, and participating in therapy and parenting classes. The trial court in its order also appointed an attorney to represent appellant in future proceedings.\nOn March 22, 2001, August 9, 2001, February 28, 2002, and August 1, 2002, hearings were held to review the circumstances of the case and to determine proper placement for D.J. After each of the hearings, the trial court determined that returning D.J. to appellant\u2019s custody was contrary to D.J.\u2019s welfare and that it was in her best interest for DHS to have continued custody.\nOn December 6, 2002, DHS filed a petition seeking to terminate appellant\u2019s parental rights to D.J. pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341 (Repl. 2002). On January 30, 2003, a hearing was held on DHS\u2019s petition. Thereafter, the trial court granted DHS\u2019s petition and terminated appellant\u2019s parental rights.\nIt is from this order that appellant appeals. She raises four points for our consideration, and we affirm the trial court.\nIn her first point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it conducted an adjudication hearing without appointing an attorney to represent her. Appellant argues that the trial court\u2019s actions deprived her of her statutory right to counsel. Appellant also argues that to the extent that a person may waive this statutory right to counsel her waiver was not knowingly or intelligently made.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 9-27-316 (Repl. 2002) provides:\nUpon request by a parent or guardian and a determination by the court of indigence, the court shall appoint counsel for the parent or guardian in all proceedings to remove custody or terminate parental rights of a juvenile.\nId. We have explained that:\nWhether due process requires the appointment of counsel in a particular parental-termination proceeding is a matter for the trial court to determine, subject to appellate review. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 32, (1981). Although it may be wise public policy for the States to adopt higher standards of protection for parents in dependency-neglect and termination proceedings, the threshold requirement for state courts in determining whether to appoint counsel to indigent parents in termination proceedings is fundamental fairness. Id., 452 U.S. at 33-34. Consequently, according to the to the Supreme Court, there is no absolute due process right to counsel in all parental-termination proceedings. Id. Rather, it is an issue that must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Id. The State of Arkansas has chosen to allow the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in all parental-termination proceedings. \u00a7 ACA 9-27-316(h) (Supp. 1999). However, this is a State-conferred statutory right. The due process right to counsel arises only if the circumstances of each particular case indicate that fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel.\nBearden v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 317, 42 S.W.3d 397 (2001).\nIn Bearden, we also held that a parent involved in a termination of parental rights proceeding may waive his right to counsel. However, we noted that the waiver should be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made. We further noted that every reasonable presumption should be indulged against the waiver of such rights. Id. Finally, we explained:\nA waiver of the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel is valid only when:\n(1) the request to waive the right to counsel is unequivocal and timely asserted;\n(2) there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel; and\n(3) the defendant has not engaged in conduct that would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues.\nId.\nIn Bearden, applying the forgoing principles, we determined that the trial court did not err when it refused to allow a parent to waive her right to counsel and proceed pro se during parental-termination hearings. Our conclusion was based on a review of a colloquy between the parent and the trial court. We concluded that the parent\u2019s waiver was \u201cfar from unequivocal.\u201d Id.\nIn Battishill v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 78 Ark. App. 68, 82 S.W.3d 178 (2002), our court of appeals was asked to consider a case in which the parents, who were involved in a termination of parental rights case, argued that the trial court erred when it found that they had waived their rights to counsel. The court of appeals discussed the principles articulated in Bearden, and adding to our analysis, noted:\nIn order to effectively waive counsel the parent must be \u2018made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record-will establish that he knows what he is doing and that he has made his choice with his eyes open.\u2019\nId. (quoting Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403, 406, 989 S.W.2d 510, 512 (1999)).\nAfter reviewing the facts surrounding the parents\u2019 waivers, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred when it accepted their waivers. Specifically, the court of appeals concluded that the parents\u2019 waivers were not voluntarily or intelligently made because the trial court did not explain to them the desirability of having the assistance of an attorney during the proceedings or the disadvantages of not having an attorney during the proceedings. Battishill, supra.\nIn the case now before us, the following colloquy occurred:\nTrial court: So legally, since you\u2019re the person from whom custody was removed, Ms. Jefferson, you have a right to an attorney.\n* * *\nAppellant: I talked to one of the attorneys, and since I wasn\u2019t here at the first hearing, they said that, you know, that they didn\u2019t know whether or not I wanted legal representation because they thought my family was going to hire an attorney.\n* *. *\nTrial court: You\u2019re supposed to give [appellant] a copy of the petition that tells her all her rights [remarks addressed to DHS\u2019s attorney].That is why I said to serve her with a copy, not when she got to court. I mean, it does little good to give people their rights when they get to the court when we had a hearing awhile back.\n* # *\nTrial court: You have got a right to an attorney. Did you know that you had a right to an attorney before now, Ms. Jefferson?\nAppellant: Well, I didn\u2019t know that this state was going to. give me an attorney, because we had attempted to hire one, but then we just \u2014 I don\u2019t know what happened with that. They did \u2014 I mean, before I even got here, but then he didn\u2019t even show up, so I don\u2019t know what\u2019s the deal with that.\nTrial court: Do you have the money to hire one?\nAppellant: I didn\u2019t have a dime to hire one.\n*\u2022 * *\nTrial court: Are you employed?\nAppellant: No, ma\u2019am.\nH\u00bb \u00abf*\nTrial court: Any money at all coming in?\nAppellant: No, ma\u2019am.\nTrial court: Okay. Do you want the(do you want the court to appoint an attorney for you?\nAppellant: Yes, ma\u2019am. Here is a piece of paper that they gave me for \u2014 just a few minutes ago I was filing it out for an attorney.\nTrial court: Do you want to proceed without a lawyer, or do you want me to appoint an attorney for you before we have this hearing?\nAppellant: Will I see him this morning[?]\n* * *\nTrial court: The lawyer?\nAppellant: Yeah.\nTrial court: No, ma\u2019am. I don\u2019t even know who that will be yet. We have a list of lawyers that we call. I\u2019m asking you: Do you want me to appoint a lawyer for you? We\u2019ll have to put off this hearing and we\u2019ll have to squeeze it in because we cannot have the hearing past fifty days from the time we had the first hearing.\nAppellant: Okay.\nTrial court: But, I\u2019m saying, it\u2019s your call. Everything will stay like it is now, and we\u2019ll have a hearing within the time frame. Or do you want to proceed today with the hearing without the lawyer? Those are your two options. You can proceed today and represent yourself and I can appoint a lawyer for you later if the\u2014\nAppellant: Okay. We\u2019re going to proceed.\nTrial court: \u2014court finds dependency-neglect or\u2014\nAppellant: We\u2019re going to proceed.\nTrial court: \u2014you can put it off.\nAppellant: We\u2019ll proceed.\nTrial court: Proceed?\nAppellant: And you will appoint one for me later?\nTrial court: If we keep the case. If I dismiss the case, you won\u2019t need one, but, yes, ma\u2019am.\nAppellant: Okay.\nIn light of the relevant case law and the foregoing colloquy, appellant asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to appoint counsel to represent her during the adjudication hearing and that the trial court further erred by accepting her waiver of her right to counsel during the hearing. Before addressing the merits of appellant\u2019s arguments, we must consider a jurisdictional issue raised by DHS. Specifically, DHS asserts that we cannot consider errors resulting from the adjudication hearing in this appeal because the order from that hearing was final and appellant failed to appeal from its entry. DHS\u2019s assertion is correct.\nRule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure \u2014 Civil in relevant part provides:\n(a) An appeal may be taken from a circuit court to the Arkansas Supreme Court from:\n1. A final judgment or decree entered by the circuit court;\n* * *\n(c) Appeals in juvenile cases shall be made in the same time and manner provided for appeals from circuit court.\n* * *\n(3) In juvenile cases where an out-of-home placement has been ordered, orders resulting from the hearings set below are final appealable orders:\n(A) adjudication and disposition hearings.\nId.\nOn October 13, 2000, a hearing was held to adjudicate a petition filed by DHS alleging that D.J. was dependent-neglected. During the hearing, the trial court also considered whether D.J.\u2019s out-of-home placement was to continue. Appellant was present at the hearing. An adjudication order was entered on November 1, 2000. In that order, the trial court found that D.J. was dependent-neglected and that she should remain out of appellant\u2019s home and in the custody of DHS. Additionally, in that order, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent appellant.\nPursuant to Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. 2, the adjudication order was a final, appealable order. Appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal from that order. Such a failure deprives this court of jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in that order. See Hawkins v. Sate Farm Fire and Insurance Casualty, Co., 302 Ark. 582, 792 S.W.2d 307 (1990); Moore v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 69 Ark. App. 1, 9 S.W.3d 531 (2000). Accordingly, we cannot consider appellant\u2019s arguments relating to errors made during the adjudication hearing.\nAlthough we have concluded that a challenge to the order adjudicating D.J. dependent-neglected is not timely, we will consider whether the failure to provide counsel to appellant during the adjudication proceeding permeated or tainted the remainder of appellant\u2019s case so as to deprive appellant of fundamental fairness in subsequent proceedings. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the fundamental fairness of the proceedings leading up to the termination of appellant\u2019s parental rights was not jeopardized based on the trial court\u2019s failure to provide legal representation to appellant at the adjudication hearing. We note that the order entered after the hearing appointed an attorney to represent appellant during the remaining proceedings. Indeed, appellant had several attorneys during this case and was represented by an attorney at the hearing on DHS\u2019s petition to terminate her parental rights. Finally, although the issue raised by appellant is procedurally barred, we note that it implicates important safeguards imposed with respect to termination of parental-rights proceeding. For that reason, and out of an abundance of caution, we have decided to give no consideration to the testimony given by appellant at the adjudication hearing because such testimony was given without legal representation or a proper waiver thereof.\nIn her second point on appeal, appellant asserts that the trial court erroneously withheld custody of D.J. from her until she paid outstanding district court fines. Appellant contends that the trial court\u2019s actions were \u201ctantamount to placing [her] in \u2018debtor\u2019s prison.\u2019 \u201d In support of her contention, appellant cites several occasions in the record where the issue of her unpaid fines were discussed. The issue of appellant\u2019s unpaid fines was discussed at various review hearing because DHS was attempting to offer financial assistance to appellant. The parties entered into an agreement in which DHS paid appellant\u2019s rent in order to free up appellant\u2019s finances to pay her fines. The issue was also discussed during the review hearings because nonpayment of the fines resulted in warrants for appellant\u2019s arrest, and the trial court was concerned that appellant would be arrested while D.J. was in her custody. Although the issue was discussed, a review of the record and the order terminating appellant\u2019s parental rights reveals that the trial court did not withhold custody of D.J. from appellant or terminate appellant\u2019s parental rights to D.J. based on her failure to pay district court fines. Accordingly, appellant\u2019s contention that custody of D.J. was withheld from her because she had outstanding district court fines is without merit.\nIn her third point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court improperly considered D.J.\u2019s wish to be adopted as the \u201ccontrolling factor\u201d in its determination that appellant\u2019s parental rights should be terminated. Appellant\u2019s contention is misplaced. Throughout the proceedings, the trial court took into consideration D.J.\u2019s wishes concerning the proper goal for her case. At the time of the termination hearing, D.J. had been in foster care for approximately two-and-one-half-years. She testified at the hearing that she wanted to be eligible for adoption by her foster parents so that she could be in a stable environment. A review of the order entered following the hearing indicates that the trial court considered D.J.\u2019s wishes when it terminated appellant\u2019s parental rights. We have previously held that a trial court can consider a child\u2019s wishes when it is making custody determinations. See Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499 S.W.2d 634 (1973). However, further review of the order also shows that D.J.\u2019s wishes were not the \u201ccontrolling factor\u201d in the trial court\u2019s decision. Specifically, the order provides:\nFrom the testimony, exhibits, statements of the parties and counsel, the record herein, and other things and matters presented, the court noting the best interests, welfare, case plan, health and safety and appropriate placement alternatives does hereby find, order and adjudge:\n* * *\nThe mother has appropriate services offered to her, yet she has not complied with all the court orders and services offered. This court has repeatedly found that the mother was not in a position of emotional and mental stability to have [D.J.] returned to her custody.\n* * *\n[D.J.] has been in DHS custody for two years and five months and needs a safe and permanent home with parents who can provide for all of her needs.\n\u2021 * *\nThe court, however, will note that the relatives were not always willing to step forth and provide a placement for [D.J.]\n* * *\nThe court must view what is best in these matters from the child\u2019s point of view. [D.J.] deserves a safe, permanent home where she can be assured of continuity and stability. It is not fair for [D.J.] to require that she continue to have court hearings and have her case goal remain independence when there is another goal-that of adoption-which meets her needs. The foster parents want to adopt [DJ-]\nAfter reviewing the facts surrounding the case and the foregoing order, we conclude that the trial court gave proper weight to D.J.\u2019s wishes when it was considering DHS\u2019s petition to terminate appellant\u2019s parental rights. We further conclude that D.J.\u2019s wishes were not the \u201ccontrolling factor\u201d in the trial court\u2019s decision to terminate appellant\u2019s parental rights. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred.\nIn her last point on appeal, appellant contends that the order terminating her parental rights was not based on clear and convincing evidence. We have held that when the issue is one involving the termination of parental rights, there is a heavy burden placed upon the party seeking to terminate the relationship. Ullom v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 615, 12 S.W.3d 204 (2000). Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural rights of the parents. Dinkins v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001). Parental rights, however, will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Ullom, supra.\nThe facts warranting termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341. When the burden of proving a disputed fact in chancery court is by clear and convincing evidence, the question that must be answered on appeal is whether the chancery court\u2019s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence was clearly erroneous. Larscheid v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 343 Ark. 580, 36 S.W.3d 308 (2001). Clear and convincing evidence is that degree of proof that will produce in the factfinder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Baker v. Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Human Servs., 340 Ark. 42, 8 S.W.3d 499 (2000). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Dinkins, supra. In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due regard to the opportunity of the chancery court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Baker, supra.\nDHS sought termination of appellant\u2019s parental rights pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-341. Specifically, DHS alleged that:\n(2) That the juvenile has been adjudicated by the court to be dependent-neglected and has continued out of the home for twelve (12) months and, despite a meaningful effort by the department to rehabilitate the home and correct the conditions which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by the parents.\n(3) That, subsequent to the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect, other factors or issues arose which demonstrate that return of the juvenile to the family home is contrary to the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, or welfare, and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, the parents have manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors, or rehabilitate the parents\u2019 circumstances, which prevent return of the juvenile to the family home.'\n(4) At the permanency-planning hearing on August 1, 2002, this court found that mom has not gotten herself in an appropriate position mentally and emotionally to be able to properly provide for [D.J.\u2019s] needs. The court also found that [D.J.] made a reasonable request not to return to her mom\u2019s house.\nTo determine whether the trial court\u2019s order terminating appellant\u2019s parental rights was supported by clear and convincing evidence, we must review the facts of the case. In August of 2000, DHS took D.J. into custody based on allegation of sexual abuse. When DHS filed the petition seeking to gain emergency custody ofD.J., appellant had legal custody ofD.J. and appellant\u2019s mother had physical custody ofD.J.\nAfter D.J. was placed in DHS\u2019s custody, a hearing was held to determine whether she was dependent-neglected. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that D.J. was dependent-neglected and instructed appellant to: (1) enter a drug treatment program; (2) find housing and employment; (3) attend counseling; (4) participate in random, drug testing; (5) refrain from using drugs or alcohol; and (6) participate in parenting classes. The goal of the case at the conclusion of the adjudication hearing was reunification of appellant and D.J.\nOn August 9, 2001, a permanency planning and review hearing was held. At the hearing Deirdra Notto, a DHS employee testified that appellant had some \u201clegal problems,\u201d including outstanding district court fines and several warrants for her arrest. DHS agreed to provide monthly financial assistance to appellant to enable her to use the money that she received from her job to resolve her legal problems. Subsequent to this hearing, appellant was arrested.\nOn February 28, 2002, another review hearing was held. Appellant did not attend this hearing. During the hearing, Ms. Notto informed the trial court that DHS had provided appellant with four months of financial assistance, but that appellant had failed to pay the outstanding court fines and that she was facing an additional arrest warrant. Ms. Notto also informed the trial court that D.J. had reluctantly been visiting appellant and that she wanted to change the goal of the case to relative placement.\nMissy Chism, an employee with SCAN, also testified at the hearing. She explained that appellant was not regularly attending her counseling appointments. Ms. Chism further testified that appellant had either quit her job or was fired from her job.\nAfter hearing the testimony, the trial court made the following findings:\nMom\u2019s behaviors don\u2019t indicate that she\u2019s willing to work towards accepting services from the department and doing the things that she should do on her own to have [D.J.] returned to her custody. She\u2019s not present today. She\u2019s not made herself available for services from SCAN and DHS as required.\nShe has not made efforts to pay the outstanding court fines in Maumelle and Little Rock District Courts. She\u2019s not attending therapy on a regular basis.\nThereafter, on March 25, 2002, the trial court entered an order changing the goal of the case from reunification to relative placement with a concurrent goal of independence. This order was entered approximately seventeen months after the order adjudicating D.J. dependent-neglected was entered. Appellant was represented by counsel at all hearings held after October 2000.\nAt the permanency-planning hearing held August 1, 2002, Ms. Notto advised the trial court that she had not had contact with appellant for approximately six months. She further testified that appellant had not taken advantage of the services offered by DHS during the preceding six months. Ms. Notto described appellant\u2019s actions as \u201cnoncompliant\u201d or \u201cuncooperative.\u201d\nAppellant also testified at the hearing. She stated that her visits with D.J. were sometimes troubled. She also testified that she was unable to work. Finally, Janice Simmons, appellant\u2019s mother, testified. She stated that she did not think that appellant\u2019s home was the proper home for D.J. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found:\n[I]t\u2019s in [D.J.\u2019s] best interest for the permanency plan to be independence. Mom has not, at this point in her life, gotten herself into an appropriate position mentally and emotionally to be able to properly provide for [D.J.\u2019s] needs.\nOn January 30, 2003, a hearing was held to consider DHS\u2019s petition to terminate appellant\u2019s parental rights. At the hearing, Ann Brown, D.J.\u2019s therapist testified. She stated that she and D.J. had discussed the issue of appellant\u2019s parental rights being terminated. Ms. Brown testified that D.J. told her that she wanted the termination to go forward. Additionally, D.J. told Ms. Brown that she had \u201ca need for more stability in her life and planning for her future, and [that] she [felt] that [the termination] would be a positive step towards those things.\u201d Ms. Brown further testified that D.J.\u2019s relationship with her mother was a \u201csource of stress and frustration.\u201d\nAt the hearing, Ms. Notto reviewed the history of the case, outlined the services provided to the family, and discussed the failed attempts to identify a relative suitable for D.J.\u2019s placement.\nAppellant also testified. She stated that she was not employed and that she was receiving assistance from her family.\nOn February 20, 2003, the trial court entered an order terminating appellant\u2019s parental rights. In its order, the trial court found:\n[T]hat the petition to terminate parental rights should be granted. ...[.] [T]hat [D.J.] has been in the custody of DHS since August 21, 2000, when she was removed from her mother\u2019s legal custody and her grandparent\u2019s physical custody due to allegations of sexual abuse by her brother. She was found to be dependent neglected on October 13, 2000 and has continued out of her mother\u2019s custody since she was removed on August 21, 2000.\n* * *\nThe mother has appropriate services offered to her, yet she has not complied with all the court orders and services offered. This court has repeatedly found that the mother was not in a position of emotional and mental stability to have [D.J.] returned to her custody.\nAfter reviewing the foregoing facts, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s order is supported by clear and convincing evidence. The evidence established appellant did not have custody of D.J., who was adjudicated dependent-neglected, for more than twelve months. During that time, DHS provided numerous services to appellant and to D.J. in an effort to correct the conditions that led to D.J.\u2019s removal from the home. Specifically, DHS provided housing assistance, parenting classes, transportation assistance, therapy, substance abuse counseling, financial assistance, drug and alcohol testing, and other supportive services. Notwithstanding the efforts made by DHS and the trial court, appellant repeatedly failed to take appropriate actions to provide a stable home environment for D.J. Specifically appellant: (1) was evicted from her home; (2) was frequently unemployed; (3) was forced to rely on relatives for assistance; (4) was inconsistent in attending her therapy sessions; (5) was arrested and had outstanding court fines and arrest warrants; and (6) failed to follow the trial court\u2019s orders. We conclude that appellant manifested an incapacity or indifference to correct the conditions that led to D.J.\u2019s removal from her home. Upon considering the evidence in this case, the trial court concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to support an order terminating appellant\u2019s parental rights. We cannot say that its decision was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Anne Orsi Smith, P.A., by: Anne Orsi Smith, for appellant.", "Gray Allen Turner, for appellee.", "Stasia Burk, Attorney Ad Litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Pamela JEFFERSON v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES\n03-596\n158 S.W.3d 129\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 8, 2004\nAnne Orsi Smith, P.A., by: Anne Orsi Smith, for appellant.\nGray Allen Turner, for appellee.\nStasia Burk, Attorney Ad Litem." }, "file_name": "0647-01", "first_page_order": 671, "last_page_order": 688 }