{ "id": 5404141, "name": "Derrick Xavier SHIELDS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Shields v. State", "decision_date": "2004-05-06", "docket_number": "CR 03-866", "first_page": "283", "last_page": "290", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "357 Ark. 283" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "166 S.W.3d 28" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "344 Ark. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 S.W.3d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 74080 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ark. 447", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513749 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0447-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158915 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "802 P.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Cal. Rptr. 788", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Cal.3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2375207 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-3d/52/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.W.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10166281 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/367/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914642 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing State v. Wilson, 367 S.W.2d 589 (N.C. 1988)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing State v. Wilson, 367 S.W.2d 589 (N.C. 1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 Ark. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1342428 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/342/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ark. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 2649040 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/355/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ark. 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 862778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/335/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451183 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "when a young offender is ultimately charged in circuit court, the failure of law enforcement officers to obtain parental consent to waiver of right to counsel, pursuant to \u00a7 9-27-317, does not bar admissibility of confession" }, { "parenthetical": "when a young offender is ultimately charged in circuit court, the failure of law enforcement officers to obtain parental consent to waiver of right to counsel, pursuant to \u00a7 9-27-317, does not bar admissibility of confession" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 111", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130719 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0111-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 136", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210155 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74148 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ark. 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 939000 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/345/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-317", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(i)(2)(A)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 650, "char_count": 12512, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7918852753435686e-07, "percentile": 0.7151158233549524 }, "sha256": "d63bc5cf9e3b1b60ad3d2133625272ff7c03ac3b52850ddfdd70c8a40f63fb89", "simhash": "1:1aebc286536711f2", "word_count": 2096 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:50.829950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Derrick Xavier SHIELDS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nLaurie Troup was shot to death on tice. 1999, while she was working as a clerk at Movie Magic in Blytheville. Appellant Derrick Shields, who was fourteen at the time of the murder, was questioned about the shooting at the time, but was not charged. In March of 2001, Officer Scott Adams of the Blytheville Police Department was investigating a burglary in which Shields was involved. During the course of that investigation, Adams developed Shields as a suspect in the 1999 Troup murder. Shields was later charged with capital murder and aggravated robbery as an adult. The trial court denied Shields\u2019s request to transfer his case to juvenile court, and Shields was subsequently tried and convicted by a jury of capital murder and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life in prison.\nFor his first point on appeal, Shields argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he gave to the police; he argues that he was fifteen at the time he gave his statements, and the investigating officers never informed him of his Miranda rights in his \u201cown language,\u201d as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-317(i)(2)(A) (Repl. 2002). He also argues that the officers never informed him that he had a right to have a parent present during questioning. In cases involving a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003); Cox v. State, 345 Ark. 391, 47 S.W.3d 244 (2001).\nShields gave four statements to police. On March 26, 2001, Investigator Scott Adams was investigating a burglary which included an interview with Shields. Shields\u2019s father brought the fifteen-year-old to the police station, and Adams read Shields his Miranda rights, using the general form used by the police for adult suspects. At that time, after signing the rights form, Shields admitted that he had knowledge of the burglary. Following this interview at the police station, Adams, Shields, and Shields\u2019s father returned to Shields\u2019s house, where the father consented to a search of the residence. During the search, the officer found a note in Shields\u2019s bedroom that described a robbery attempt, and it was that note which prompted Adams to speak further with Shields. Adams took Shields back to the police station and again read him his Miranda rights; Shields again signed the rights form and gave a statement, though he made no mention of the Troup murder.\nAfter questioning Shields further, Officer Adams spoke with Detective Ross Thompson about Shields\u2019s statement regarding the burglary. Detective Thompson commented that at one time, Shields had been a suspect in the Troup homicide. Officer Adams again questioned Shields, once more advising Shields of his Miranda rights, and this time asking him about the murder. Shields offered information about the gun used in the shooting. The next day, March 27, 2001, Officer Adams and Detective Thompson took Shields to search for the murder weapon, but they did not find it. Adams and Thompson then returned with Shields to the police station, where Adams advised Shields of his Miranda rights for a fourth time. This time, Shields gave a statement admitting his involvement in the Troup murder, though he denied that he fired the fatal shots.\nOn appeal, Shields argues that Officers Adams and Thompson did not comply with the protections afforded by \u00a7 9-27-317, in that they (1) failed to advise him of his Miranda rights \u201cin his own language,\u201d and (2) failed to inform him that he had a right to have a parent present. Shields acknowledges that this court had held that \u00a7 9-27-317 does not apply to juveniles who are charged as adults, see Jenkins v. State, 348 Ark. 686, 75 S.W.3d 180 (2002), and Ray v. State, 344 Ark. 136, 40 S.W.3d 243 (2001), but suggests these cases should be overruled. However, Shields offers no persuasive authority for why our precedent should be overturned; therefore, we decline to do so. See Riggs v. State, 339 Ark. 111, 3 S.W.3d 305 (1999). Further, those cases make it clear that the provisions of \u00a7 9-27-317(h) & (i) \u201care applicable only to matters being considered by the juvenile court.\u201d See Jenkins, 348 Ark. at 703-04. As the felony information charging Shields was not filed in juvenile court, he has no right to assert that his father should have been present during his questioning. See id; see also Ring v. State, 320 Ark. 128, 894 S.W.2d 944 (1995) (when a young offender is ultimately charged in circuit court, the failure of law enforcement officers to obtain parental consent to waiver of right to counsel, pursuant to \u00a7 9-27-317, does not bar admissibility of confession).\nTo the extent we consider Shields\u2019s suppression motion at all, we affirm the trial court\u2019s ruling. The trial court noted that, although both Shields and his father testified at the suppression hearing that Shields had asked to speak to his father, the court found the testimony of the officers \u2014 who stated that no such request was made \u2014 more credible. The evaluation of the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding an appellant\u2019s custodial confession is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Wright v. State, 335 Ark. 395, 983 S.W.2d 397 (1998). Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused since he or she is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Winston v. State, 355 Ark. 11, 131 S.W.3d 333 (2003).\nAdditionally, when asked at the suppression hearing whether he understood the rights form, Shields stated, \u201cYeah.\u201d He further stated that, before this encounter with the police, he had been \u201cto the police department\u201d twice, that he was advised of his rights on those occasions, that he had completed the eighth grade, and that he had no difficulty reading. He also admitted that he understood the statement, \u201cyou have the right to remain silent,\u201d and agreed that, during the tape-recorded statement he gave to police, he stated that he understood his rights and that the statement was of his own free will. Given the totality of the circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial court was clearly erroneous in ruling that Shields\u2019s confession was knowing and intelligent, and that Shields did not ask to speak to a parent. We hold the trial court did not err in denying Shields\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFor his second point on appeal, Shields argues that the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine seeking to exclude testimony that Troup\u2019s father, William Utley, had been an informant for law enforcement authorities, and had provided information that resulted in drug arrests. On review, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow evidence to be admitted. Walker v. State, 353 Ark. 12, 110 S.W.3d 752 (2003); Burmingham v. State, 342 Ark. 95, 27 S.W.3d 351 (2000).\nWe have held that a defendant may introduce evidence tending to show that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged, but such evidence is inadmissible unless it points directly to the guilt of the third party. Evidence which does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to another\u2019s guilt is inadmissible. Zinger v. State, 313 Ark. 70, 852 S.W.2d 320 (1993) (citing State v. Wilson, 367 S.W.2d 589 (N.C. 1988)). This rule does not require that any evidence, however remote, must be admitted to show a third party\u2019s possible culpability; evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant\u2019s guilt. There must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. Burmingham, supra; Zinger, supra (citing People v. Kaurish, 52 Cal.3d 648, 276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278 (1990)).\nOn appeal, Shields notes that two drug dealers were sent to jail on the basis of Utley\u2019s information, and he urges that it \u201ctakes no great leap of insight to conclude that drug dealers who are arrested and sent to the penitentiary based upon the testimony of a drug informant could and would seek revenge on that informant.\u201d However, even assuming this \u201cleap of insight\u201d suggests the guilt of a third party, it plainly does no more than create an inference or conjecture as to that third party\u2019s guilt. Even though the evidence regarding the drug dealers may have demonstrated that someone else may have had a motive to commit Troup\u2019s murder, there was no direct or circumstantial evidence linking the drug dealers to the actual perpetration of this particular crime. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine.\nShields\u2019s third and final point for reversal is that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Adams to testify about a note Adams found in Shields\u2019s bedroom when he searched Shields\u2019s house following their first interview. The note itself was not introduced into evidence, but the court allowed Officer Adams to testify about the note, because it was the note that prompted the officer to consider Shields\u2019s involvement in the Troup murder. Trial courts have broad discretion in deciding evidentiary issues, and their decisions are not reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003); Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 69 S.W.3d 864 (2002); Flores v. State, 348 Ark. 28, 69 S.W.3d 864 (2002); McFerrin v. State, 344 Ark. 671, 42 S.W.3d 529 (2001).\nAdams testified that he found the note during the search to which Shields\u2019s father consented, and the note lead him to think there may have been \u201ca robbery planned.\u201d Adams stated that he took the note back to the police department and discussed it with Detective Thompson. Adams then questioned Shields again and asked him about the note; Adams then asked Shields about the murder. During these questions, Shields mentioned a gun of the specific gauge that had been used in the murder. Adams never asserted that the note mentioned plans of any specific robbery, and certainly not the robbery at the Movie Magic that culminated in Troup\u2019s murder. Adams simply testified that the note caused him to believe that there was \u201ca robbery planned.\u201d\nShields argues that the testimony of Officer Adams had no independent relevance, because there- was no issue about why Adams was questioning Shields. Further, he argues that, to the extent that it was relevant, it was more prejudicial than probative of anything, and should therefore have been excluded under Ark. R. Evid. 403. The State, on the other hand, argues that the testimony about the note indicated that Shields was motivated to commit crimes for pecuniary gain. Thus, the State claims, information regarding the note was admissible for establishing Shields\u2019s motive and served as an answer to his alibi defense.\nAdams\u2019s testimony was relevant in that it showed the jury how he developed his investigation. The trial court\u2019s ruling \u2014 that this evidence would show why this officer suddenly connected Shields to a murder that had occurred over a year and half ago \u2014 was not an abuse of discretion. Further, Adams\u2019s statements were not inherently prejudicial; he did not testify that the note described Shields\u2019s intent to rob the Movie Magic or to kill Troup. The testimony about the note was relevant, and its relevance was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Adams to testify about the note.\nBecause Shields was sentenced to life in prison, the record has been.examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to the appellant, and no error has been found. See Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h).\nAffirmed.\nThe State also offers an argument to the effect that the testimony about the note was not hearsay; however, Shields does not raise a hearsay argument on appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss the State\u2019s hearsay arguments.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "John H. Bradley, Managing Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Derrick Xavier SHIELDS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 03-866\n166 S.W.3d 28\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 6, 2004\nJohn H. Bradley, Managing Public Defender, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0283-01", "first_page_order": 305, "last_page_order": 312 }