{ "id": 5400803, "name": "Robert HAMPTON v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Hampton v. State", "decision_date": "2004-05-20", "docket_number": "CR 03-1334", "first_page": "473", "last_page": "482", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "357 Ark. 473" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "183 S.W.3d 148" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-109", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 83", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240952 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1907817 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/316/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ark. 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1513738 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/349/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ark. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5367207 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ark. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 36078 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/354/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74080 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 639, "char_count": 14309, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4396162678458433e-07, "percentile": 0.6528965588341251 }, "sha256": "bd85ff55ab7d783c61e669a43612b717fc3c7f86912ae52bd056cbea0591545f", "simhash": "1:8f6255be3e0bf870", "word_count": 2332 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:35:50.829950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Dickey, C.J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Robert HAMPTON v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nOn September 26, 2001, acrimistice. filed charging appellant, Robert Hampton, with the offense of nonsupport in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401 (Supp. 2001). The information alleged that appellant had failed to provide court-ordered support for his child for approximately six years and that he was in arrears in the court-ordered support for more than $2,500. The information further alleged that the offense was a Class D felony.\nOn May 6, 2002, appellant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit the period of time in which the State could charge appellant for nonsupport and seeking to limit the amount of time whereby the State could calculate the amount of child support owed. After a hearing on the issue, the trial court denied appellant\u2019s motion.\nA jury trial was held in appellant\u2019s case on May 6, 2002. After considering the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of nonsupport. Appellant was placed on supervised probation for a period of seventy-two months and was ordered to pay $6,437.10 in restitution.\nAppellant appealed his conviction to our court of appeals. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed appellant\u2019s conviction. See Hampton v. State, CA CR 02-1313, slip opinion (Ark. App. Nov. 12, 2003).\nOn November, 25, 2003, the State filed a motion seeking our review of the court of appeals\u2019 opinion. On January 29, 2004, we granted the State\u2019s motion. When we grant a petition to review a decision of our court of appeals, we treat the matter as if the appeal had been originally filed in this court. Flores v. State, 348 Ark. 28, 69 S.W.3d 864 (2002). Appellant raises three points for our consideration. We affirm the trial court and reverse the court of appeals.\nIn his first point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003). In George v. State, 356 Ark. 345, 151 S.W.3d 770 (2004), we discussed our rules for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence. We wrote:\nThe test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and only evidence supporting the verdict will be considered. Additionally, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider evidence, which may have been inadmissible, in the light most favorable to the State\nId. (internal citations omitted).\nAppellant was convicted of violating Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401, which provides in relevant part:\n(a) A person commits the offense of nonsupport if he fails to provide support to:\n(2) His legitimate child who is less than eighteen (18) years old;\n(b)(1) Nonsupport is a Class A misdemeanor, except that it is a Class D felony if:\n(C) The person owes more than two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) in past-due child support, pursuant to a court order or by operation of law, and the amount represents at least four (4) months of past-due child support.\nId.\nAt the close of the State\u2019s case-in-chief, appellant\u2019s attorney requested a directed verdict. He argued that appellant was entitled to a directed verdict because \u201cnonsupport is for a person\u2019s child under eighteen. And no one with knowledge has testified that [appellant] has a child who is under eighteen years of age.\u201d This motion was properly renewed at the close of appellant\u2019s case-in-chief. Appellant continues this argument on appeal. Appellant argues that the testimony establishing the age of his child was hearsay and notes that it was gained through a question asked by the trial court.\nTo determine whether there was sufficient evidence upon which to convict appellant, we must review the testimony presented at trial. Paul Selby, an employee with the Office of Child Support Enforcement, testified that appellant was obligated to pay child support for his son, Chad Hampton, who Mr. Selby \u201cbelieved\u201d had turned \u201cseventeen.\u201d After Mr. Selby\u2019s testimony regarding the age of appellant\u2019s child, the trial court asked if either attorney had further questions for Mr. Selby. Thereafter, the State rested its case. Mr. Selby\u2019s testimony was not contradicted.\nBased on the foregoing testimony, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence whereby a jury could have determined that appellant had a child who was less than eighteen years of age. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied appellant\u2019s motion for a directed verdict.\nIn appellant\u2019s second point on appeal, he argues that the trial court erred when it denied his objection to Paul Selby\u2019s testimony. Specifically, appellant argues that Mr. Selby\u2019s testimony regarding the age of appellant\u2019s child was inadmissable hearsay. A trial court is accorded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). We will not reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on a hearsay question unless the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Peterson v. State, 349 Ark. 195, 76 S.W.3d 845 (2002).\nPursuant to Rule 801(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, \u201c \u2018hearsay\u2019 is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Id. Such testimony is generally inadmissible evidence. See Rule 802 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.\nAppellant argues that the trial court allowed Paul Selby to offer hearsay testimony. The challenged testimony is found in the following colloquy:\nTrial court: The court\u2019s got a question. Mr. Selby, who is this child support being paid for?\nPaul Selby: For Chad.\nTrial court: Chad?\nPaul Selby: Chad Hampton.Yes, sir.\nTrial court: Hampton?\nPaul Selby: Yes, sir.\nTrial court: Who is Chad Hampton?\nPaul Selby: Chad Hampton is Robert Hampton and Ann Barnett\u2019s son who, I believe, has turned seventeen.\nDefense counsel: Your honor, I\u2019m going to object to this because there\u2019s no way this gentleman would know other than hearsay.\nTrial court: Overruled.\nAppellant argues that Mr. Selby\u2019s testimony regarding Chad Hampton\u2019s age is hearsay. Appellant\u2019s argument is misplaced because the testimony does not meet the definition of hearsay. Specifically, Mr. Selby was not testifying about a statement made by someone else. He was merely giving his opinion. Mr. Selby did not testify about what he was told or read, instead he testified about what he believed. Although it could be speculated that Mr. Selby was basing his testimony on information that he gained from outside sources, that speculation was not developed by further examination. Because the challenged testimony was a statement made by the declarant while testifying at a trial, it was not hearsay. Accordingly, the trial court properly overruled appellant\u2019s objection and admitted the evidence.\nIn Piercefield v. State, 316 Ark. 128, 871 S.W.2d 348 (1994), a case which is useful in our analysis of the issues raised in the case sub judice, we were asked to consider whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony which the appellant argued was hearsay. Piercefield argued:\n[T]he trial court erred by allowing a witness for the State to give hearsay testimony based on Mr. Piercefield\u2019s medical records. This objection stems from the fact that the trial court allowed Officer Machund to give testimony concerning whether or not he believed Mr. Piercefield had suffered a head injury after he admitted he had looked at the medical records.\nId.\nAfter outlining the applicable rules of evidence, we considered Mr. Piercefield\u2019s argument:\nAfter ascertaining that the officer had seen Mr. Piercefield\u2019s medical record at the hospital, the prosecutor began a question as follows, \u201cBased on what you have seen, read and heard, and been told \u2014.\u201d The question was interrupted by objection. The trial court, at the bench cautioned that it sounded like the prosecutor was about to elicit hearsay. The question was rephrased, \u201cDo you have any reason to believe that Mr. Piercefield suffered from any sort of head injury that night?\u201d The testimony did not fit the basic definition of hearsay. The witness did not say what was said in the medical records. While it could be inferred that he was basing his opinion in part on the medical records, the statement was not one made by other than the declarant.\nId.\nThe evidentiary issue raised in Piercefield is factually similar to the case now before us. We consider the analysis articulated and conclusions reached in Piercefield instructive in our resolution of the issue raised in the case on review. Applying the analysis from Piercefield to the case sub judice, we conclude that Mr. Selby\u2019s testimony does not fit the definition of hearsay outlined in Rule 801 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.\nIn his final point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine. In his motion in limine, appellant asserted that he was charged with a Class D felony \u25a0 and that the statute of limitations for such crimes is three years. Based on the applicable statute of limitations, appellant requested that the trial court:\n[Ljimit the State of Arkansas to the three year period of time prior to September 26, 2001, [the date upon which the criminal information was filed] within which to charge [appellant] with nonsupport, and therefore to calculate the arrears therefor under the provisions of A.C.A. section 5-l-109(b)(2).\nAt a hearing held on appellant\u2019s motion, the State argued that the crime of nonsupport was a continuing crime and that as such appellant\u2019s statute-of-limitations argument was without merit. The trial court agreed with the State and denied appellant\u2019s motion.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-1-109 (Supp. 2001) provides in relevant part:\n(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses must be commenced within the following periods of limitation after their commission:\n(2) Class B, C, or D, or unclassified felonies, three (3) years;\n(e) For the purposes of this section, an offense is committed either when every element occurs or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time the course of conduct or the defendant\u2019s complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.\nId.\nAppellant was charged with nonsupport in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-26-401 (b)(1)(C), a Class D felony. Specifically, appellant failed to provide court-ordered support for his child for more than four months and he was in arrears in the court-ordered support for more than $2,500. We have held that nonsupport is a continuing offense. McLennan v. State, 337 Ark. 83, 987 S.W.2d 668 (1991).\nOn September 26, 2001, a criminal information was filed in this case. The information alleged that appellant had failed to provide court-ordered child support for his child \u201con or about a six-year period preceding September 25, 2001.\u201d Because in cases of continuing course of conduct the statute of limitations begins to run when the course of conduct or the defendant\u2019s complicity therein is terminated, the State\u2019s prosecution of the offense was within the three-year statute of limitations.\nAppellant also contends that the amount of restitution owed should be limited to the three-year statute of limitations outlined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-109. Specifically, he argues:\nAs the statute of limitations is three years for a Class D felony, and the State proved an amount of court ordered support arrearages in excess of $2,500.00 within three years preceding September 25, 2001 . . . the court erred in setting restitution herein at a sum of $6,437.10, when the sum of restitution should have been $25.00 per week for three years or $3,900.00.\nAppellant\u2019s contention is misplaced. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-1-109 outlines the statute of limitations for the prosecution of criminal offenses. The statute does not address limitations for calculation of penalties that may be imposed for particular offenses. Additionally, we note that limiting the amount of restitution that may be recovered in a criminal case based on a statute of limitations is contrary to the goal of restitution. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-90-301 (1987) provides:\nThe General Assembly recognizes that many innocent persons suffer injury, death, property damage, and resultant financial hardship because of crimes committed in this state and that there is a genuine need in this state to establish a method whereby the responsible offender, as far as practicable, may be required to make restitution to his victim so as to make that victim whole with respect to the financial injury suffered.\nId. Because the statutory provisions of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-1-109 set time limits for prosecution of crimes and not imposition of punishment, and because the goal of restitution is \u201cto make a victim whole,\u201d we conclude that the trial court correctly denied appellant\u2019s motion in limine and properly ordered appellant to pay the entire amount of unpaid child support for the.six-year period.\nAffirmed.\nDickey, C.J., not participating.\nIn our sufficiency of the evidence review, we need not consider whether the evidence establishing appellant\u2019s child\u2019s age was hearsay. As previously noted, in our review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all evidence even inadmissable evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See George, supra.\nWe note that the defense counsel did not inquire as to the basis of Mr. Selby\u2019s belief that Chad was seventeen. Without such an inquiry, we do not know whether Mr. Selby had known Chad since his birth, had reviewed a birth certificate, or had learned of Chad\u2019s age from other people or documents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "G.B. \u201cBing\u201d Colvin, Public Defender, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by; David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Robert HAMPTON v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 03-1334\n183 S.W.3d 148\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 20, 2004\nG.B. \u201cBing\u201d Colvin, Public Defender, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by; David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0473-01", "first_page_order": 495, "last_page_order": 504 }