{ "id": 8451430, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF SCD, a Minor", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Adoption of SCD", "decision_date": "2004-06-17", "docket_number": "03-1283", "first_page": "51", "last_page": "59", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ark. 51" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "186 S.W.3d 225" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(7)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717291 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ark. 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717968 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/286/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-207", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ark. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 36052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/354/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-206", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-206", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 622, "char_count": 13730, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.766333807579969e-07, "percentile": 0.7107491595069828 }, "sha256": "03e339ed80b43f0ed39e06b5448f674da2e9e4be4c7425ba2459eb6dc5ba4d40", "simhash": "1:4ab57cb3f72ec3d2", "word_count": 2373 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:33.181986+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF SCD, a Minor" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nIn this adoption case, we are called upon ice. under what circumstances it is necessary to obtain the consent of a putative father before a child can be adopted pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-206 (Repl. 2002). The record has been filed under seal, and we refer to the parties by their initials: IT is the mother of the child placed for adoption; the KDs, from Albuquerque, New Mexico, are married and are seeking to adopt the baby; and TF is the putative father, who, prior to the baby\u2019s birth, registered as the baby\u2019s father under the Arkansas Putative Father Registry on May 15, 2003.\nFifteen-year-old IT, a resident of Mena, gave birth to a baby boy on June 2, 2003, and immediately put the baby up for adoption. On June 3, 2003, the KDs filed a petition for temporary guardianship in Pulaski County Circuit Court, and on June 5, 2003, the KDs filed a petition for adoption in Polk County Circuit Court. In the petition, the KDs alleged that only the consent of the mother, IT, and her guardian ad litem was needed for the adoption. The KDs further alleged that TF, the putative father, was only entitled to notice of the adoption petition.\nFour days later, on June 9, TF filed a response to the KDs\u2019 petition for adoption, and separately, he filed a petition for determination of paternity. In his petition, TF asked the trial court to order paternity testing to determine whether he was the biological father of the child, and he also sought custody of the baby if TF were determined to be the father.\nOn September 10, 2003, the KDs filed an amended petition for adoption. In it, they alleged again that IT and her guardian ad litem were the only parties who were required to consent. They further asserted that TF\u2019s consent was not required because he had not \u201clegitimated\u201d the child, as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-206 (a) (2) (Repl. 2002).\nOn that same date, IT filed a consent to adoption, in which she consented to the adoption of her child by the KDs \u201cconditioned\u201d upon the court\u2019s finding TF\u2019s consent was not required and that the adoption was found to be in the best interests of the minor child. IT\u2019s \u201cconditional\u201d consent further provided that, in the event the court found TF\u2019s consent to be required, she \u201creserve[d] the right to withdraw [her] consent to the adoption and to reserve all parental rights [she] may have to [the] infant, as though [she] had not executed this document.\u201d Later, on September 13, 2003, IT signed a second, \u201cunconditional\u201d consent to adoption.\nOn September 16, 2003, the Polk County Circuit Court held trials on both TF\u2019s paternity action and the KDs\u2019 adoption petition. At the conclusion of the paternity trial, after having admitted the results of a paternity test that showed a 99.99% probability that TF was the father, the court declared TF to be the baby\u2019s father. However, having heard testimony from both IT and TF, the court delayed ruling on the custody issue. Later the same day, the court proceeded with the adoption trial.\nThe court and counsel for all sides noted that there was no issue about the KDs being appropriate adoptive parents; instead, the issues addressed were 1) whether IT had properly consented to the adoption, and 2) whether TF\u2019s consent was required. After hearing testimony, the trial court denied the adoption petition, finding that TF had legitimated the baby in accordance with \u00a7 9-9-206 (a) (2), and that, consequently, IT and the KDs should have obtained TF\u2019s consent prior to the adoption. In its final written order, the court wrote that \u201c[c]onsent of both the child\u2019s mother and respondent-father was necessary in order for [the KDs] to prevail herein. They had neither.\u201d The court dismissed the KDs\u2019 petition for adoption, and from that order, the KDs appeal, raising two points for reversal: 1) TF\u2019s consent to the adoption was never required; and 2) the KDs\u2019 petition for adoption should have been granted.\nIn addressing the first point, the court is called upon to determine what the phrase \u201cotherwise legitimated\u201d in \u00a7 9-9-206(a)(2) means. Thus, our standard of review is de novo, as it is for this court to decide what a statute means. Greenhough v. Goforth, 354 Ark. 502, 126 S.W.3d 345 (2003). We are not bound by the decision of the trial court, but unless it is shown that the circuit court\u2019s interpretation was wrong, we will accept its interpretation on appeal. R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001). The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. R.N. v.J.M., supra.\nSection 9-9-206(a)(2) establishes the persons required to consent to an adoption, and provides in relevant part as follows:\n(a) Unless consent is not required under \u00a7 9-9-207, a petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if written consent to a particular adoption has been executed by:\n* * * *\n(2) The father of the minor if the father was married to the mother at the time the minor was conceived or at any time thereafter, the minor is his child by adoption, he has custody of the minor at the time the petition is filed, or he has otherwise legitimated the minor according to the laws of the place in which the adoption proceeding is brought.\n(Emphasis added.) Consent to adoption, however, \u201cis not required of . . . [t]he father of a minor if the father\u2019s consent is not required by \u00a7 9-9-206(a)(2).\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-207(a)(3) (Repl. 2002).\nHere, the trial court determined that TF had \u201cotherwise legitimated\u201d the child because he had timely registered with the Arkansas Putative Father Registry. The statutes governing that registry provide that \u201cthe registration of the father with his consent in the . . . registry . . . shall constitute a prima facie case of establishment ofpaternity, and the burden ofproof shall shift to the putative father to rebut such in a proceeding for paternity establishment.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-108(b) (Repl. 2002). The question before us is whether TF\u2019s registry some weeks prior to the birth of his child, coupled with his actions after the baby\u2019s birth, were sufficient to \u201cotherwise legitimate\u201d the baby. The KDs assert that the filing of the adoption petition served as a \u201ccutoff date\u201d that barred TF\u2019s attempt to subsequently legitimate the child by filing a petition for determination of paternity.\nArkansas has no case law that defines or explains what is meant by \u201cotherwise legitimated.\u201d Black's Law Dictionary defines \u201clegitimate\u201d as \u201cto make lawful; to confer legitimacy; e.g., to place a child born before marriage on the legal footing of those born in lawful wedlock.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 901 (6th ed. 1990). TF argues \u2014 and the trial court ruled \u2014 that his signing up with the Putative Father Registry and filing his petition for determination of paternity was sufficient to legitimate the child in this case. TF notes that, after registering with the Putative Father Registry, he never attempted to rebut the presumption of paternity established by that action, and he asserts that he \u201cembraced\u201d that presumption by initiating a proceeding to obtain custody of his child. Further, at the trial on the paternity petition, TF testified that, once IT had decided to keep the baby, he offered to marry her. He also testified that no one informed him of when the baby was born, and that he filed the paternity petition as soon as he found out that the KDs\u2019 adoption petition had been filed. Clearly, TF\u2019s actions indicate his interest in and willingness to confer legitimacy on the child.\nThe KDs, on the other hand, argue that the filing of the adoption petition served as a kind of cutoff date to determine the rights of the parties involved, and the fact that TF took actions to legitimate the baby after the adoption petition was filed should be of no moment. It is true that there are Arkansas cases that describe the filing of the adoption petition as a \u201ccutoff date\u201d for determining whether a natural parent must be given an opportunity to consent to the adoption. Flowever, those cases are factually distinguishable.\nFor instance, in Dixon v. Dixon, 286 Ark. 128, 689 S.W.2d 556 (1985), this court was presented with the question of when, under \u00a7 9-9-.207 (then Ark. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 56-207), a parent\u2019s consent was not required. The court there first noted that consent was not required of a parent of a child to be adopted when the child is in the custody of another \u201cif the parent for a period of at least one year has failed significantly without justifiable cause (i) to communicate with the child or (ii) to provide for the care and support of the child as required by law or judicial decree.\u201d See \u00a7 9-9-207 (a) (2). Using that language, the court then determined that the one-year period should be measured back from the time of the filing of the adoption petition, rather than from the time the adoption decree was rendered. Dixon, 286 Ark. at 130.-\nThe same result was obtained in Pender v. McKee, 266 Ark. 18, 582 S.W.2d 929 (1979), where this court again was faced with a question of how long the parent had failed to support the child; the Pender court held that the requisite period for abandonment had to be \u201cany consecutive period constituting a total of one year between [the day the child was born] and [the date] when the petition for adoption was filed.\u201d Pender, 266 Ark. at 29.\nThe KDs rely heavily on these cases in support of the argument that it is a putative father\u2019s actions only up to the time of filing of the adoption petition which are legally relevant. Flowever, as noted above, the subdivision of the statute involved in both Dixon and Pender was \u00a7 9-9-207 (a) (2), which provides that no consent is required if the parent has had nothing to do with the child to be adopted for a period of one year. Thus, in Dixon and Pender, it was obvious that the court needed a \u201cstarting date\u201d from which to determine whether that one-year period had run. That date, the court determined, was the date of the filing of the adoption petition.\nHere, however, there is no such temporal restriction. Section 9-9-107(a)(3) simply says that consent is not required of the father \u201cif the father\u2019s consent is not required by \u00a7 9-9-206(a)(2)\u201d; \u00a7 9-9-206(a)(2), in turn, provides that the father\u2019s consent is required if he has \u201cotherwise legitimated\u201d the child to be adopted. There is no explicit time period established in which the father must have accomplished that legitimation. Thus, the fact that TF did not file his paternity petition until a few days after the petition for adoption was filed does not preclude a finding that he \u201cotherwise legitimated\u201d the baby. This is not a case of a \u201cdeadbeat dad\u201d or a parent who has abandoned his children; indeed, at the trial on the adoption petition, IT and the KDs agreed that this was not a case involving abandonment, as that term is defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-9-202(7) (Repl. 2002)\nFurthermore, TF took additional steps after filing his paternity petition that clearly indicate his intent to legitimate the child. For example, he testified that he was pursuing a bachelor of science degree from Baylor University. In addition, he stated that he wanted to be \u201cresponsible for [the baby] in his growth and development,\u201d and that he would allow IT to be as involved in the baby\u2019s life as she wanted to be. When asked what he had done to prepare for raising the baby, TF stated that he had called and interviewed several day cares in the Waco, Texas, area, and had also looked into finding a pediatrician and health insurance for his son. TF testified that, if he were awarded custody, he would take his son with him to Baylor, and his (TF\u2019s) mother planned to follow him down there to help out until TF and the baby could get established. Clearly, TF has \u201clegitimated\u201d this child, not only by signing the Putative Father Registry, but also by petitioning for a determination of paternity, and by taking significant steps to prepare for having the baby with him if he is awarded custody by the trial court.\nIn conclusion, we hold that the \u201ccutoff date\u201d described in Dixon and Pender is inapplicable to the situation before us. Because TF legitimated the child by filing with the putative father registry, initiating a petition to determine paternity, and taking other actions to establish his parentage, the trial court correctly ruled that TF\u2019s consent was required before the adoption could occur. Because TF did not consent to the adoption, the trial court correctly denied the KDs\u2019 petition for adoption.\nAs we affirm on this first issue, we need not reach or address the KDs\u2019 second point on appeal, wherein it is stated, without any real argument or citation to authority, that the trial court should have granted the adoption petition.\nAffirmed.\nThe baby was born at a hospital in Little Rock.\n\u201cAbandonment\u201d means \u201cthe failure of the parent to provide reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the child through statement or contact, when the failure is accompanied by an intention on the part of the parent to permit the condition to continue for an indefinite period in the future, and failure to support or maintain regular contact with the child without just cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of abandonment!.]\u201d \u00a7 9-9-202(7).\nNeither do we reach TF\u2019s alternative argument, wherein he contends that IT never validly consented to the adoption.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kaye H. McLeod; and Wilson & Associates, by: H. Keith Morrison, for appellant.", "Gilbert Law Firm, by: Melinda R. Gilbert, for appellee.", "Mary M. Rawlins, attorney ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF the ADOPTION OF SCD, a Minor\n03-1283\n186 S.W.3d 225\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 17,2004\n[Rehearing denied September 9,2004.]\nKaye H. McLeod; and Wilson & Associates, by: H. Keith Morrison, for appellant.\nGilbert Law Firm, by: Melinda R. Gilbert, for appellee.\nMary M. Rawlins, attorney ad litem." }, "file_name": "0051-01", "first_page_order": 71, "last_page_order": 79 }