{ "id": 8451988, "name": "Glenn E. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "George v. State", "decision_date": "2004-06-24", "docket_number": "CR 04-12", "first_page": "269", "last_page": "288", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ark. 269" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "189 S.W.3d 28" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "356 Ark. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5368094 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ark. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1914588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding argument not preserved where trial court reserved a ruling initially and appellant subsequently failed to obtain a ruling" }, { "parenthetical": "holding argument not preserved where trial court reserved a ruling initially and appellant subsequently failed to obtain a ruling" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/313/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 F.3d 781", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11583888 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding the information provide in the affidavit was not stale because Horn was likely to still be in possession of child pornography three or four months later" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/187/0781-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 F.3d 1043", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9436434 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause because a \"magistrate judge could find a fair probability that Chrobak had child pornography at his home three months after [the attorney general's interception of pornographic images]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/289/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "968 F.2d 750", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10517346 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/968/0750-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ark. App. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6141266 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/75/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 897", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11340969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "280 Ark. 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1744800 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/280/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ark. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5368330 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 Ark. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1675822 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/262/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ark. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1876589 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citing Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977)" }, { "parenthetical": "citing Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/287/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158954 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 U.S. 856", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 601664, 601091, 600295, 602248, 599240, 601384, 600523, 600563, 600438, 601720, 602394, 600699, 601885, 601215 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Because of the sexual innocence of children, that which constitutes 'lascivious exhibition' of a child's genitals will be different from that of a 'lascivious or lewd exhibition' of an adult's genitals.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/484/0856-05", "/us/484/0856-10", "/us/484/0856-03", "/us/484/0856-01", "/us/484/0856-02", "/us/484/0856-06", "/us/484/0856-07", "/us/484/0856-14", "/us/484/0856-04", "/us/484/0856-09", "/us/484/0856-08", "/us/484/0856-12", "/us/484/0856-11", "/us/484/0856-13" ] }, { "cite": "812 F.2d 1239", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1694949 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/812/1239-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 F. Supp. 828", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3868154 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/636/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ark. App. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139104 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/73/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-303", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155525 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(2)", "parenthetical": "E" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5401599 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-401", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(3)" }, { "page": "(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5402372 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ark. App. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6140641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"George F'" }, { "parenthetical": "\"George F'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-304", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1189, "char_count": 32547, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5102671245601219e-07, "percentile": 0.6673344662179146 }, "sha256": "734990b96616f17535f56a8945b124ba9d229a94c2f3aaeb25b8205bdb061023", "simhash": "1:3938e0df00007364", "word_count": 5294 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:33.181986+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "F\u00edannah, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Glenn E. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from the constice. Glenn George, of nine counts of possessing visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct of children, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-304 (Repl. 1997), a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, a Garland County jury-convicted appellant and sentenced him to ninety years\u2019 imprisonment and $78,000.00 in fines. On appeal, appellant makes four allegations of error. We affirm the jury\u2019s findings, and we reverse the court of appeals.\nOn April 2, 2001, Detective Paul R. Norris of the Hot Springs Police Department filed an affidavit for a search warrant in which the following facts were alleged. On March 22, 2001, a woman reported that her fourteen-year-old daughter, B.T., told her that appellant provided alcohol to her and to her friends, and that at appellant\u2019s apartment, B.T. observed nude photographs of other girls whom she knew to be fourteen or fifteen years old.\nDuring an interview on March 26, 2001, B.T. told Detective Tim Smith that appellant gave her an alcoholic drink, and that she saw nude photographs of her friends about her age on appellant\u2019s computer.\nB.T.\u2019s friend, J.T., was also interviewed on the same day by Detective Smith. She stated that appellant gave her an alcoholic drink while at appellant\u2019s house. J.T. found a video on appellant\u2019s computer of her friend, K.T., dancing nude.\nAt trial, Detective Norris testified that these interviews were conducted on March 26, 2001. Based upon the information obtained in those interviews, Detective Norris prepared the affidavit for a search warrant, which stated:\nIn the city of Hot Springs . .. , there is now being concealed certain property, namely: the evidence associated with the producing, directing, or promoting sexual performances and employing or consenting to use of child in sexual performance.\nWhich are[:] evidentiary items in a sexual exploitation investigation and in direct violation of Arkansas state statute, 5-27-402 and 5-27-403.\nAnd that the facts tending to establish the foregoing grounds for issuance of a search warrant are as follows: that on 03-22-01, pB.T. \u2019s mother] reported her fourteen year old daughter, [B.T.], revealed to her Glenn George provided alcohol to her and other friends and that she observed nude photographs of other girls she knows to be age fourteen or fifteen. [B.T.] was interviewed and stated Glenn George gave her an alcoholic beverage to drink and she saw nude photographs on George\u2019s computer of girls she knows to [be] fourteen or fifteen years old. That a friend of [B.T.\u2019s], [J.T.], was also interviewed and stated George provided her with an alcoholic beverage and she found a video on George\u2019s computer of friend, [K.T.], dancing nude.\nThe affidavit for search warrant was signed by Detective Norris and was sworn before Judge Homer Wright with a handwritten date of March 26, 2001.\nOn March 26, 2001, the search warrant was executed. The warrant stated:\nIn the city of Hot Springs . . ., there is now being concealed certain property, namely; the evidence associated with the producing, directing, or promoting sexual performances and employing or consenting to use of child in sexual performances.\nWhich are[:] evidentiary items in a sexual exploitation investigation and in direct violation of Arkansas state statute 5-27-402 and 5-27-403.\nAnd I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the property so described is being concealed on the (premises) (person) above described and that the foregoing grounds for application for issuance of the search warrant exist.\nThe attached affidavit for search warrant is hereby incorporated by reference.\nDetective Norris, Detective Smith, Detective Waterfield, and Lieutenant Hill executed the search warrant at appellant\u2019s address on March 26, 2001. The police officers seized appellant\u2019s computer system, which contained digital photographs of \u201cyoung, nude females in different positions.\u201d Each was labeled with the girl\u2019s name. The officers also found a video that showed a \u201cyoung, white female dancing, exposing her breasts and vaginal area.\u201d The video was labeled with her name as well. Additionally, the officers seized a camcorder, twelve camcorder discs, sixty video tapes, and four computer discs. The officers also seized sexually explicit photographs, a pistol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia. After leaving a copy of the warrant and a receipt of the items seized at appellant\u2019s residence, Detective Norris brought a return slip that contained a list of the items seized pursuant to the warrant.\nAppellant was arrested on March 28, 2001. Appellant filed a motion to suppress on the basis that the physical evidence was obtained under a defective search warrant. The suppression hearing was held on April 29, 2002. Defense counsel argued that the affidavit for the search warrant was flawed because \u201cthere is nothing in here that provided the court a time frame to determine that there were materials that could be seized in the home at the time the warrant was requested.\u201d The State responded by stating, \u201c[A]s to the time problem, the bottom line as a test is whether the affidavit contained enough information to give the magistrate, or in this case you, substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. I believe it did.\u201d\nOn May 3, 2002, the trial court denied appellant\u2019s motion to suppress and ruled:\nI\u2019m denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and upholding the warrant issued in this matter, primarily based on the fact that the grounds alleged were that there \u2014 the time was indefinitely stated or not stated on the face of the warrant; and it\u2019s my belief that looking at the four corners of the document there is sufficient time frame alleged that the court could feel that there was just cause for the issuance of the warrant. The matters that were being sought were not consumables; they were not items that are normally moved in the course of illegal commerce; there\u2019s nothing to indicate that the times would not remain in place for a substantial period 'of time; they were being kept by the defendant for what appeared to me off the facts alleged for his own \u2014 for his personal use, primarily \u2014 although the facts did allege that other people were being exposed to these images \u2014 and the time frame that is set out on the warrant I think gave me sufficient cause to believe that there was \u2014 that this illegal material remained on his premises on the date that the warrant was issued.\nOn May 15, 2002, appellant\u2019s jury trial commenced. Eight girls testified during the State\u2019s case-in-chief. C.B. testified that she was fourteen years old when she and appellant began sexual relations. Appellant videotaped their sexual activities. L.J. testified that she was fourteen-and-a-half when she began having a sexual relationship with appellant, and it continued for five years. Through L.J., the State admitted a tape of appellant and another girl, T.D., whom L.J. babysat, having sex while L.J. was in the room. T.D. testified that she and appellant began having sexual relations when she was twelve that continued until she was eighteen. During that time, appellant taped their activities. K.T. testified she had made a movie during which she danced nude. Appellant later found the movie on his computer and kept it. K.T. was fourteen years old at the time the movie was made. K.B. testified that, when she was thirteen years old, she bared her breasts during appellant\u2019s filming. B.T. testified that she exposed her breasts in front of appellant\u2019s computer and web camera. J.T. testified that she was in pictures with B.T. and K.B., opening their mouths and lifting their shirts. L.H. testified that appellant took nude photos of her in his apartment when she was fourteen. In these pictures, L.H. is posed in a variety of ways that expose her breasts and genitalia. Appellant entitled many of these photographs with sexually explicit captions.\nThe trial court denied appellant\u2019s motion for directed verdict. Appellant rested and renewed his motion, which the trial court denied. The State called T.D., L.H., and L.H\u2019s mother during the sentencing phase. The jury found appellant guilty of nine counts of possession of a visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child. Those nine convictions stem from those counts involving C.B., L.J. and T.D.,\"T.D., K.T., K.B., B.T., E.T., and L.H. The jury sentenced appellant to ninety years\u2019 imprisonment and $78,000.00 in fines.\nIn a 4-2 decision, the court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court should have granted appellant\u2019s motion to suppress on the basis that the affidavit for the search warrant did not have a specific time-frame, thereby resulting in an insufficient search warrant under Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.1(b). See George v. State, 84 Ark. App. 275, 140 S.W.3d 492 (2003) (\u201cGeorge F\u2019). We accepted the State\u2019s petition for review. When we grant review following a decision by the court of appeals, we review the case as though it had been originally filed with this court. See Baird v. State, 357 Ark. 508, 182 S.W.3d 136 (2004).\nAppellant argues four points on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence because of an invalid warrant. Second, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because additional evidence was seized. Third, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges based upon a speedy-trial violation. Fourth, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on three counts.\nThe preservation of appellant\u2019s right against double jeopardy requires that we consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before we consider alleged trial error even though the issue was not presented as the first issue on appeal. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).\nAppellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict as to the three counts involving the three girls who exposed their breasts in front of appellant\u2019s web camera or still camera. Specifically, he contends that this behavior does not fall within the statutory definition of \u201csexual conduct\u201d defined in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-401(3) (Repl. 1997).\nIt is well settled that we treat a motion for a directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Jones v. State, 357 Ark. 545, 182 S.W.3d 485 (2004). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Evidence is substantial if it is of sufficient force and character to compel reasonable minds to reach a conclusion and pass beyond suspicion and conjecture. Id. On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only that evidence that supports the verdict. Id.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 5-27-304 prohibits the possession of visual or print medium depicting a child engaging sexually explicit conduct. The statute provides in pertinent part:\n(a) No person, with knowledge of the character of the visual or print medium involved, shall do any of the following:\nH\u00bb\n(2) Knowingly solicit, receive, purchase, exchange, possess, view, distribute, or control any visual or print medium depicting a child participating or engaging in sexually explicit conduct.\nId. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a75-27-401(3) (Repl. 1997) states, \u201c \u2018Sexual conduct\u2019 means.. . lewd exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person or the breasts of a femalef.] \u201d Id. See also Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-302(2) (E) (i-ii) (Repl. 1997).\nThe issue then is whether the photographs showing the breasts of these three girls constitute a \u201clewd exhibition\u201d under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-401(3). In Cummings v. State, 353 Ark. 618, 110 S.W.3d 272 (2003), we held that there was sufficient evidence to support Cummings\u2019s conviction of permitting his child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for use in visual or print medium, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-303(b). In Cummings, we cited with approval the court of appeal\u2019s decision of Gabrion v. State, 73 Ark. App. 170, 42 S.W.3d 572 (2001), where we stated:\nThough \u201clewd\u201d is not defined in the Arkansas Code, the court of appeals has stated that \u201clewd\u201d is a common word with an ordinary meaning. See Gabrion v. State, 73 Ark.App. 170, 173, 42 S.W.3d 572 (2001). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201clewd\u201d as \u201c[ojbscene or indecent; tending to moral impurity or wantonness.\u201d 919 (7th ed. 1999).\nIn Gabrion, the appellant was convicted of two counts of pandering or possessing a visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct involving a child. In that case, two individuals stated that Gabrion possessed videotapes containing child pornography. 73 Ark. App. at 172. Gabrion admitted that he had made the videotapes of the girls, whom he knew to be fourteen years old. Id. \u201cOn the tapes, Gabrion can be seen and heard directing both girls to undress and assume suggestive poses that showed off their breasts and buttocks.\u201d Id. Further, the court of appeals noted that \u201c[t]he tapes contained full frontal nudity of both young girls as they donned costumes that Gabrion had provided for them.\u201d Id. Gabrion argued that the videotapes were not lewd. The court of appeals concluded that, in arguing that the images on the videotapes were not lewd, Gabrion wanted the court to \u201cignore the fact that the girls were underage and consider the same acts as if they were performed by adults.\u201d Id. at 172; see also United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal 1986), aff'd, 812 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987) (\u201cBecause of the sexual innocence of children, that which constitutes \u2018lascivious exhibition\u2019 of a child\u2019s genitals will be different from that of a \u2018lascivious or lewd exhibition\u2019 of an adult\u2019s genitals.\u201d) In addition, the court of appeals stated that even if the scenes depicted on the videotapes were not \u201clewd,\u201d the scenes \u201cwere at the very least indecent and, therefore, \u2018lewd\u2019 as contemplated by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-401(3).\u201d Id.\nSimilarly, in the present case, the scenes depicted in the videotapes show full frontal nudity of C.G. One of the photographs featured on the website partially shows C.G.\u2019s breast; another photograph shows C.G.\u2019s pubic area.\nCummings, supra (footnote omitted).\nIn light of this well-established precedent, we turn our attention to appellant\u2019s sufficiency challenge. At trial, appellant made the following motion for directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case-in-chief:\n[A]s to each of the counts that involve these young girls just baring their breasts for the video camera. At least two of them testified that they took them, and there was nothing to show that [appellant] knowingly possessed the items, even if they met the definition of sexual behavior. I don\u2019t think they do, because they don\u2019t qualify as a lewd exhibition. It\u2019s the same sort of flashing behavior you see maybe in New Orleans for the Mardi Gras where they toss jewels and silly things like that. It\u2019s more akin to mooning [than] to lewd behavior.\nAppellant\u2019s argument, however, is misplaced. These photographs at issue were found on videoclip on two CD-ROMs, which were admitted into evidence as State\u2019s Exhibit A and B. The still images from these two CD-ROMs were admitted as State\u2019s Exhibits E, F, and J.\nState\u2019s Exhibit E contains a picture entitled \u201cPicture 37,\u201d which displays B.T.\u2019s bare breasts. Other pictures included in State\u2019s Exhibit E show B.T. posing provocatively. State\u2019s Exhibit F contains a picture that appellant entitled \u201c[B.T.\u2019s] Tits,\u201d another picture of B.T.\u2019s bare breasts. Other images in State\u2019s Exhibit F show B.T. in various lewd poses. State\u2019s Exhibit J contains an image entitled, \u201cPicture 166,\u201d of B.T., J.T., and K.B. baring their breasts. Other photographs in State\u2019s Exhibit J depict the girls holding their mouths open and making suggestive gestures at the camera.\nJ.T., B.T., and K.B. testified at trial. J.T. testified that she, B.T., and K.B. were in pictures in which they opened their mouths, and appellant entitled the picture, \u201cGoodbigdicksuckers.\u201d J.T. also testified that she, B.T., and K.B. were in another picture, which is Picture 166, where they lifted their shirts. J.T. further stated that these pictures were taken when she was fourteen years old. B.T. testified that she exposed her breasts in front of appellant\u2019s computer and web camera. She further testified that she was the girl depicted in Picture 37 in State\u2019s Exhibit E. B.T. stated that she was born on July 12, 1986, and that the picture was taken on August 10, 2000. K.B. testified that, when she was thirteen years old, she bared her breasts for the camera while appellant videotaped her. She further testified that appellant filmed her several times.\nWe hold that these images in appellant\u2019s possession constitute \u201csexually explicit conduct\u201d under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-304. These images concern children, as in Gabrion, supra, and contain the bare breasts of fourteen-year-old girls, which constitute a \u201clewd exhibition\u201d under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-401(3). Therefore, based upon our holding in Cummings, supra, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could convict appellant of \u201cpossessing visual or print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct\u201d under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-27-304.\nAppellant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence because of an invalid warrant. Specifically, appellant makes four arguments: (1) that the warrant had an inadequate reference to time; (2) that the warrant contained an inadequate description of the property to be seized; (3) that the warrant contained a number of irregularities; and (4) that additional property not described in the warrant was seized by. the police officers.\nOur standard of review for a trial court\u2019s decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress requires us to make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, to review findings of historical facts for clear error, and to determine whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or probable cause, while giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court. See Davis v. State, 351 Ark. 406, 94 S.W.3d 892 (2003). Our review of the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant is confined to the information contained in the affidavit as that was the only information before the magistrate when he issued the warrant. Herrington v. State, 287 Ark. 228, 697 S.W.2d 899 (1985) (citing Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977)).\nRule 13.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure sets out the requirements for the issuance of a warrant. Rule 13.1(b) provides:\nThe application for a search warrant shall describe with particularity the persons or places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized, and shall be supported by one (1) or more affidavits or recorded testimony under oath before a judicial officer particularly setting forth the facts and circumstances tending to show that such persons or things are in the places, or the things are in possession of the person, to be searched. If an affidavit or testimony is based in whole or in part on hearsay, the affiant or witness shall set forth particular facts bearing on the informant\u2019s reliability and shall disclose, as far as practicable, the means by which the information was obtained. An affidavit or testimony is sufficient if it describes circumstances establishing reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place. Failure of the affidavit or testimony to establish the veracity and bases of knowledge of persons providing information to the affiant shall not require that the application be denied, if the affidavit or testimony viewed as a whole, provides a substantial basis for a finding of reasonable cause to believe that things subject to seizure will be found in a particular place.\nId. (emphasis added).\nWe outlined the test for the adequacy of an affidavit in Coggin v. State, 356 Ark. 424, 156 S.W.3d 712 (2004), where we stated:\n[T]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the \u201cveracity\u201d and \u201cbasis of knowledge\u201d of persons supplying the hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a \u201csubstantial basis for ... concluding]\u201d that probable cause existed.\nId.\nAppellant makes the argument that the warrant is inadequate because of an insufficient reference to time. Specifically, he contends that the affidavit contains the date that B.T.\u2019s mother called and reported the crime, but it does not contain the time that he possessed these materials.\nIn Herrington, supra, we cited Collins v. State, 280 Ark. 453, 658 S.W.2d 877 (1983), for the proposition that a time-reference must be included in the affidavit supporting a search warrant. We said:\n[W]hile inferences the magistrate may draw are those which a reasonable person could draw, certain basic information must exist to support an inference. All the magistrate had in this case was the affidavit and the information which we have recited. We find one defect that cannot be cured. The affidavit mentions no time during which the criminal activity occurred____\nIt is the uniform rule that some mention of time must be included in the affidavit for a search warrant. The only softening of this position occurs when time can be inferred from the information in the affidavit. For example, where an affidavit recited that the contraband was \u201cnow\" in the suspect\u2019s possession and that the search was urgent, that was found to be adequate to satisfy the time requirement... In another case where the affidavit said that contraband was \u201crecently\u201d seen, coupled with the use of present tense as to the location of the contraband, that was held to be sufficient----Time is crucial because a magistrate must know that criminal activity or contraband exists where the search is to be conducted at the time of the issuance of the warrant____ That is not an unreasonable nor technical demand of the law.\nHerrington, supra (emphasis added). In Herrington, we held that, because of the affidavit\u2019s failure to specify any reference to time, the affidavit did not provide sufficient information upon which a probable cause determination can be made. Id.\nAppellant argues that \u201c[w]hile the affidavit tells when the information was relayed to the officer, it has absolutely nothing to show when the informants\u2019 observations were made.\u201d Appellant\u2019s argument is wrong. The present case is distinguishable from Herrington, supra, because the affidavit does contain a sufficient reference to time. The affidavit for a search warrant averred that, on March 22, 2001, B.T.\u2019s mother reported that B.T., age fourteen, revealed to her that she observed nude photographs of other girls whom she knew to be fourteen or fifteen years old. Based upon an interview with B.T. and B.T.\u2019s friend, J.T., Detective Norris prepared an affidavit reciting the date of March 22, 2001. On the basis of the affidavit, the magistrate was able to make a practical, common sense decision that there was a fair probability that appellant possessed these materials, and the search warrant was executed on March 26, 2001. See Coggin, supra.\nEven if there had been an insufficient time-frame reference in the affidavit, appellant\u2019s argument still would fail. Under our good-faith exception articulated in Herrington, supra, we look to the four corners of the affidavit to determine if we can establish with certainty the time during which the criminal activity was observed. Id. (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)). If the time can be inferred in this manner, then the police officer\u2019s objective good faith reliance on the magistrate\u2019s assessment will cure the omission. Herrington, supra.\nIn reviewing the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, there are four errors that an officer\u2019s good faith cannot cure. Those are: (1) when the magistrate is misled by information the affiant knew was false; (2) if the magistrate wholly abandons his detached and neutral role; (3) when the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. Herrington, supra (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).\nThe court of appeals held in George I, supra, that the good-faith exception did not apply because the \u201creliance on the warrant by the police officers executing the search warrant was unreasonable.\u201d Id. We disagree with the court of appeals\u2019s holding that the police officers\u2019 reliance upon the warrant was unreasonable. Here, in our examination of the four corners of the affidavit, it appears that appellant\u2019s criminal activity of possessing print medium depicting sexually explicit conduct of minors was present at the time the affidavit was signed on March 26, 2001. Additionally, under Collins, supra, we observe the fact that the affidavit contains the word now. The affidavit states that \u201c[t]here is now being concealed . . . evidentiary items in a sexual exploitation investigation and in direct violation of Arkansas state statute 5-27-402 and 5-27-403\u201d (emphasis added). Under Herrington, supra, and Collins, supra, the March 22, 2001, date, coupled with the use of present tense as to the location of the sexually explicit materials, is clearly sufficient to satisfy the time requirement needed for application of the good-faith exception.\nWe also agree with the State\u2019s position that, in the context of child pornography cases, the nature of the crime itself should be an additional reason to support the magistrate\u2019s conclusion that appellant would continue to be in possession of sexually explicit photographs of children on March 26, 2001. In Chrobak v. State, 75 Ark. App. 281, 58 S.W.3d 387 (2001), the court of appeals affirmed the denial of Chrobak\u2019s motion to suppress on the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule in a case involving Chrobak\u2019s transmittal of pornographic images of children from his home computer. In Chrobak, the court of appeals was persuaded by the reasoning of the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Rugh, 968 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1992), which held that other factors must be considered, including the nature of the criminal activity [child pornography] and the kind of property subject to search, in addition to time. Chrobak, supra. The Eighth Circuit determined that the \u201ccontinuous nature of an ongoing child-pornography ring and the tendency of pedophiles to retain child pornography for a long period of time minimized the lapse of time between the information in the affidavit and the execution of a search warrant.\u201d Chrobak, supra. See also United States v. Chrobak, 289 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the warrant was supported by probable cause because a \u201cmagistrate judge could find a fair probability that Chrobak had child pornography at his home three months after [the attorney general\u2019s interception of pornographic images]\u201d) (emphasis added); United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding the information provide in the affidavit was not stale because Horn was likely to still be in possession of child pornography three or four months later).\nIn the present case, the nature of appellant\u2019s criminal activity is similar to that in Chrobak, supra. Here, appellant possessed numerous digital and still images of girls approximately fourteen years of age posing nude and exposing their breasts and genitalia. This information was provided to detectives by the girls themselves. Based upon the nature of the criminal activity in this case, appellant was likely to have possessed these materials at the time the search warrant was executed. Thus, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.\nAppellant further argues that the warrant is invalid because the warrant contained an inadequate description of the property to be seized. Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 13.2 provides for the contents of the search warrant. Rule 13.2(b) provides that the warrant shall describe with particularity \u201cthe persons or things constituting the object of the search and authorized to be seized[.]\u201d Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.2(b)(iv). Here, the affidavit properly identified \u201cevidence associated with the producing, directing, or promoting sexual performances and employing or consenting to [the] use of child in sexual performances.\u201d This evidence included the \u201cnude photographs\u201d and \u201cvideo\u201d seen by B.T. and J.T.\nAppellant also argues that items other than his personal computer, particularly the video tapes, camcorder disks, gun, and drug paraphernalia, were unlawfully seized. Appellant is mistaken. Under Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.3(d), \u201c[i]f in the course of such search, the officer discovers things not specified in the warrant which he reasonably believes to be subject to seizure, he may also take possession of things so discovered.\u201d Id. Based upon Ark. R. Crim. P. 13.3(d), the officers properly seized the additional tapes, disks, gun, and drug paraphernalia.\nAppellant makes an additional argument concerning various technical irregularities, such as the judge\u2019s identity, the return of the warrant, and others. However, the trial court did not rule on these matters. We agree with the State that appellant is barred from raising this argument on appeal because he failed to obtain a ruling. Vickers v. State, 313 Ark. 64, 852 S.W.2d 787 (1993) (holding argument not preserved where trial court reserved a ruling initially and appellant subsequently failed to obtain a ruling).\nIn summary, we conclude that appellant\u2019s four arguments relating to the adequacy of the warrant are without merit. Therefore, based upon our standard of review regarding the adequacy of a warrant, as well as the foregoing analysis, we hold that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Coggin, supra. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying appellant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nFor his remaining point on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the charges for violation of the speedy-trial rule. Specifically, he contends that a speedy-trial violation occurred because his trial began thirteen-and-one-half months after his arrest.\nArkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 28 governs speedy trial. Any defendant charged in circuit court shall be entitled to have the charge dismissed with an absolute bar to prosecution if not brought to trial within twelve months from either the date the charge is filed or the date of arrest, whichever is earlier. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.1(c) and Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.2(a). Certain periods of time are excluded in computing the time for trial. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 28.3. We have repeatedly held that delays resulting from continuances requested by the defendant or defense counsel are excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. Romes v. State, 356 Ark. 26, 144 S.W.3d 750 (2004).\nPlere, appellant was arrested on March 28, 2001, and his trial began on May 15, 2002. Piowever, appellant moved for a continuance on January 10, 2002, and the trial court granted the continuance until May 15, 2002. The additional forty-eight days beyond the twelve-month period were during this continuance, and under Romes, supra, all of the time from January 10, 2002, until May 15, 2002, should be excluded from the calculation of the speedy-trial period. For these reasons, we hold that a speedy-trial violation did not occur.\nAccordingly, we affirm the jury\u2019s conviction and sentence of appellant, and we reverse the holding of the court of appeals.\nF\u00edannah, J., not participating.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "T.B. Patterson, P.A., for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Glenn E. GEORGE v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 04-12\n189 S.W.3d 28\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered June 24,2004\n[Rehearing denied September 9,2004.]\nT.B. Patterson, P.A., for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee.\nHannah J., not participating." }, "file_name": "0269-01", "first_page_order": 295, "last_page_order": 314 }