{ "id": 8452513, "name": "Garrick ASHLEY v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Ashley v. State", "decision_date": "2004-09-16", "docket_number": "CR 03-703", "first_page": "414", "last_page": "423", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 Ark. 414" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "191 S.W.3d 520" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "348 Ark. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74059 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ark. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 2649879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/355/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155554 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ark. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 938991 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/345/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243584 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ark. 390", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1655433 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/334/0390-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ark. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 36026 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/354/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 939020 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/345/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 388", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111307 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0388-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683235 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0226-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 721, "char_count": 15370, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3401140228940246e-07, "percentile": 0.7920743641810777 }, "sha256": "78f43cb683bc6bad035ae819b73d5e00fd8dfc6f7fda8343bf882c5b08d32f9b", "simhash": "1:ab1965b837da07d2", "word_count": 2542 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:06:33.181986+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Garrick ASHLEY v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Justice.\nGarrick Ashley (\u201cGarrick\u201d) appeals his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence of fife in prison. Garrick argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict, in overruling a Batson objection to the State\u2019s exercising a peremptory challenge to juror Adanah Washington, and in denying the motion to suppress the in-custody statements. We find no merit in Garrick\u2019s assertions of error, and we affirm.\nFacts\nOn January 11, 2000, police were called to Lusby\u2019s Ambulance Station in Pine Bluff. Upon arrival, police were shown the body of three-year-old Brittany Ashley. Brittany\u2019s father Garrick Ashley and Garrick\u2019s mother Betty Ashley had brought her body to Lusby\u2019s and were present when police arrived. Police saw evidence of abuse on the body and suspected Brittany\u2019s death might be a homicide. Garrick became a suspect in Brittany\u2019s death when it was learned that the injuries were sustained while she was alone with Garrick, and when Garrick gave an explanation that was not credible.\nGarrick was transported to the police station. In the first interview with police, Garrick reported that Brittany suffered her injuries while riding a bike when she fell down a set of steps. However, after a visit to the site after the first interview was completed, Garrick changed his story in the second interview, reporting that Brittany fell in the house and bumped her head on the carpet. Over the course of three in-custody interviews, Garrick admitted to beating Brittany. As the interviews progressed, Garrick admitted to additional mistreatment of Brittany. He ultimately stated that one beating went on for five minutes and that he had just \u201clost it.\u201d He also claimed to have been under the influence of drugs at the time and did not understand that his blows were severe enough to injure her. At trial, Garrick did not deny that he killed Brittany, but rather argued about his culpability.\nDr. Frank Peretti, a State Medical Examiner, testified that Brittany sustained at least one hundred identifiable recent injuries. He further testified that Brittany had multiple scrapes and abrasions to her face, the bridge of her nose, and around the eye. She also had a large bruise on her forehead with an underlying hematoma. Other contusions to her head were noted. Her brain was \u201cvery edematous or swollen. . . consistent with blunt force trauma to the head.\u201d Dr. Peretti opined that Brittany was struck in the head with an object. In fact, he found evidence of multiple blows to the head. Pattern injuries were found on her chest that were caused by a belt. Other bruises and contusions were pointed out on Brittany\u2019s chest. There were multiple internal injuries including hemorrhages in the tissue between her ribs. She had rib fractures. She had internal bleeding, and in the course of the autopsy, a cup and a half of blood was removed from her abdominal cavity. The left lobe of her liver was completely transected and lacerated. Her pancreas was lacerated. Tissue around her kidneys showed contusions. Dr. Peretti opined that Brittany suffered injuries from kicks or blows. Multiple bruises were found on her back. Abrasions consistent with being beaten with a switch were present as well. Additional contusions from a belt were found on her leg.\nDr. Peretti opined that the injuries were recent and caused her death, and he also stated that she would have died from any one of the several injuries she suffered. He also testified that there was evidence of earlier injuries dating back at least six months.\nDirected Verdict\nGarrick moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State\u2019s case and at the close of all the evidence. At the close of the State\u2019s case, Garrick stated in relevant part:\nYour Honor, I want to make a motion for a directed verdict on the capital murder charge.\nAt the close of all the evidence, Garrick stated, \u201cI wanted to renew my previous motion. . . .\u201d In his motion for a directed verdict, Garrick argued that the State failed to prove capital murder and asked the court to rule on whether a directed verdict should be granted on the charge of capital murder. Garrick was tried for capital murder; however, he was convicted of first-degree murder. The circuit court was never asked to determine whether a motion for a directed verdict should be granted on first-degree murder. To appeal the denial of a motion for directed verdict, the motion for a directed verdict must challenge the crime for which the defendant was convicted. There is no ruling for this court to review. It is the appellant\u2019s obligation to obtain a ruling to preserve an issue for appeal. Huddleston v. State, 347 Ark. 226, 61 S.W.3d 163 (2001). This court has specifically considered the issue of a directed verdict motion on capital murder where the defendant is convicted of first-degree murder and held that the denial of a directed verdict motion based on a failure to prove capital murder will not provide a basis on which to appeal where the criminal defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001); Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001). Thus, Garrick has no directed verdict motion to appeal.\nBatson\nGarrick argues that the circuit court erred in overruling his Batson objection to the State\u2019s peremptory challenge of potential juror Adanah Washington. Under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), a criminal prosecutor may not use a peremptory challenge to exclude a juror solely on the basis of race. At trial, Garrick objected to the State\u2019s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Washington. The State responded by offering as a race-neutral explanation that during voir dire, Washington exclaimed, \u201cAmen Sister,\u201d when another potential juror stated reluctance at imposing the death penalty. Because the death penalty was sought against Garrick, the State argued Washington could have even been excused for cause. Garrick countered this explanation by arguing that Washington\u2019s position on the death penalty could not be considered by the circuit court because no question on the subject was asked of her on the record. Thus, Garrick argued, the court had to seat Washington because the only information on Washington\u2019s opposition to imposition of the death penalty came from a representation by the State.\nThis court recently discussed a Batson challenge in Holder v. State, 354 Ark. 364, 124 S.W.3d 439 (2003):\nWe have delineated a three-step process to be used in the case of Batson challenges. MacKintrush v. State, 334 Ark. 390, 978 S.W.2d 293 (1998). First, the strike\u2019s opponent must present facts to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination; that is, the opponent must present a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. Second, once the strike\u2019s opponent has made a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the proponent of the strike to present a race-neutral explanation for the strike. Id. If a race-neutral explanation is given, the inquiry proceeds to the third step, wherein the trial court must decide whether the strike\u2019s opponent has proven purposeful discrimination. Id. Here, the strike\u2019s opponent must persuade the trial court that the expressed motive of the striking party is not genuine but, rather, is the product of discriminatory intent. Id.\nHinkston, 340 Ark. at 538-39.\nHolder, 354 Ark. at 378-79.\nUpon Garrick\u2019s Batson objection, the State immediately offered a race-neutral explanation. The circuit court then found the reason offered by the State to be racially neutral and that the explanation was not pretextual. As we have previously stated, where the parties make the first step in the analysis moot by skipping it and proceeding directly to step two, our analysis begins at step two. Holder, supra. The circuit court concluded that the reason given by the State for excusing Washington was reasonable, or in other words, that it was not pretextual.\nWe review the circuit court\u2019s findings on discriminatory intent by determining whether the circuit court\u2019s decision was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Holder, supra. This court accords \u201csome measure of deference\u201d to the circuit court in that the circuit court is in a superior position to observe the parties and determine credibility. Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 112, 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999). Unless discriminatory intent appears in the State\u2019s explanation, \u201cthe reason given will be considered race neutral.\u201d Williams, 338 Ark. at 112. The circuit court should consider the objection and weigh and assess the facts and arguments presented. Williams, supra. The circuit court did so in this case, and the decision is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.\nMotion to Suppress In-Custody Statements\nGarrick asserts that he was questioned before being read his rights in violation of Miranda, that police made false promises of leniency to induce his confession, and that he was intoxicated at the time of questioning and could not have knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. We find no merit in any of these assertions.\na. Miranda\nAccording to Garrick\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing, he was never read his rights prior to questioning. Garrick was interviewed twice on January 11, 2000, and once on January 12, 2000. Garrick made incriminating statements in all three interviews, and the transcripts from all three interviews include affirmations by Garrick that he was read his rights and understood them. Sergeant Terry Hopson was the lead detective on the investigation into Brittany\u2019s death and was the first detective to make contact with Garrick. According to Hopson\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing, once he examined Brittany\u2019s body at the paramedic station, determined from that examination that there was apparent abuse, found that Garrick was the caregiver at the time of the injuries, and found that Garrick\u2019s explanation of how the injuries were suffered was not credible, he ceased contact with Garrick until Garrick was transported to the police station and his rights were read to him. According to Hopson\u2019s further testimony, while Garrick was at the police station, he was read his rights, initialed his responses, and signed a rights form before questioning began. Again according to Hopson, in the second interview on January 11, 2000, a new rights form was not used and read because it had only been about an hour and a half since the first interview had been completed and because Garrick had been in Hopson\u2019s presence and custody the entire time since the first interview was terminated. Between the first and second interviews, Hopson and Garrick went to the home where Brittany was injured to examine the scene. However, the transcript of the second interview shows that at the beginning of the second interview, Hopson confirmed with Garrick that he had been read his rights in the prior interview, that he understood them, and that he had initialed and signed the form in the first interview.\nOfficer Danny Belvedresi was present at the second interview and testified at the suppression hearing that Hopson asked Garrick in the second interview if he understood his rights and had previously signed and initialed the form, and that Garrick stated \u201cYes.\u201d Belvedresi testified further that he was present at the third interview and that Garrick was read the rights form and that he signed it. Detective Mack Cook testified at the suppression hearing that he was present at the third interview, but that he could not recall being present when the rights form was read to Garrick prior to commencing the third interview. However, Cook did recall-Garrick affirming that the form was read to him and that he understood his rights. Garrick admits.that he affirmed in the interviews that he had been read his rights, but that his affirmation was not true. He contends that he only stated the rights were read because he believed he was following Hopson\u2019s lead as part of an agreement to get leniency if he cooperated.\nHopson\u2019s testimony shows that once Garrick was taken into custody and transported to the police station, he was not questioned until his rights were read to him. Garrick contradicts this and asserts that he was not read his rights prior to the interviews even though the signed rights forms are in the record and he affirmed in the interviews, that he had been read his rights and understood them. The issue becomes one of credibility. The circuit judge was not required to accept Garrick\u2019s version of events. Rather, evaluation of the credibility of witnesses at a suppression hearing lies within the circuit judge\u2019s sound discretion. Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 45 S.W.3d 820 (2001). Any conflict in the testimony of the different witnesses at a suppression hearing is for the circuit court to decide. Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003). The circuit judge in this case determined that Garrick\u2019s rights were read to him, and we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit judge\u2019s determination.\nb. Promise of leniency\nIn his brief, Garrick argued:\nThe officer even admitted that he somewhat promised the Defendant that he would try to help him, which in itself was misleading and in the defense\u2019s opinion he made a promise that induced the Defendant to give evidence against himself, whether it was reliable or not.\nThis is the sum total provided this court on the issue of an alleged promise of leniency by police. We only have Garrick\u2019s assertion of something an officer \u201csomewhat promised\u201d without any reference to the abstract. Utterly no authority is cited, and we are asked to rely on the \u201cdefense\u2019s opinion\u201d in lieu of argument. Garrick fails to develop the argument which precludes us from considering the issue. Scott v. State, 355 Ark. 485, 139 S.W.3d 511 (2003). Further, a failure to cite authority is also reason to affirm. Robinson v. State, 348 Ark. 280, 72 S.W.3d 827 (2002).\nc. Intoxication\nGarrick testified at the suppression hearing that at the time of the interviews, he was \u201chigh off drugs.\u201d Garrick further testified that he had smoked marijuana that had been dipped in embalming fluid and did not understand what was going on in the interviews. Hopson testified that Garrick appeared to be in a clear state of mind and did not seem to be under the influence of any intoxicants. Belvedresi testified that Garrick did not appear to be under the influence of any intoxicants at either the second or the third interview. Cook also testified that Garrick had been in custody for a day by the third interview and that he did not appear to be under the influence of intoxicants. The circuit court concluded that Garrick was cognizant of what was going on in the interviews, and that he was not inebriated. Again we defer to the circuit court and find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court\u2019s factual findings. Grillot, supra.\nRule 4-3(li) Review\nGarrick was sentenced to life imprisonment. Therefore, the record has been reviewed for error on adverse rulings as required by Supreme Court Rule 4-3(h) (2004). No such error has been found.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "William M. Howard, Jr., for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Valerie L. Kelly, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Garrick ASHLEY v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 03-703\n191 S.W.3d 520\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 16,2004\nWilliam M. Howard, Jr., for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Valerie L. Kelly, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0414-01", "first_page_order": 440, "last_page_order": 449 }