{ "id": 3712514, "name": "Teresa DAVIS v. Corliss M. WILLIAMSON", "name_abbreviation": "Davis v. Williamson", "decision_date": "2004-09-30", "docket_number": "03-682", "first_page": "33", "last_page": "46", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ark. 33" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "194 S.W.3d 197" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "351 Ark. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158933 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 Ark. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1404511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/350/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884279 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ark. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1881070 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/304/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 Ark. App. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6142126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/8/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 Ark. App. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6652845 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/11/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158927 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ark. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1935041 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/312/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ark. App. 96", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/41/0096-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-342", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "55 S.W.3d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 1111298 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ark. 124", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/266/0124-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895809 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ark. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1904321 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/308/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210125 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-109", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155489 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0225-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 898, "char_count": 20948, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.463252196629391e-07, "percentile": 0.8057396396469446 }, "sha256": "86c7f53f1c5965544ee744375bfeb2f43fd1cbf916f5a49e76f4ad6c9ec896c3", "simhash": "1:bf79efa7e45b4234", "word_count": 3589 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:09.658813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Teresa DAVIS v. Corliss M. WILLIAMSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Justice.\nTeresa Ann Davis appeals a decision of the Circuit Court her motion for attorney\u2019s fees. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(7) (2004), a subsequent appeal following an appeal decided in the Supreme Court. Davis v. Williamson, 353 Ark. 225, 114 S.W.3d 216 (2003).\nFacts\nOn July 31, 1996, a joint petition to establish paternity was filed. The petition sought a finding and order of paternity as well as an order on custody and child support. Paternity was not contested, and on April 27, 1998, an order establishing Williamson as the father of Chasen Williamson was entered. In the April 27, 1998, order, Davis was granted custody, and the issue of attorney\u2019s fees, as well as a number of other issues, were expressly reserved for later hearings. A final order on all issues except attorney\u2019s fees was entered September 11, 2002. This order resolved current support, arrearage, witness fees, and visitation. Davis attempted to appeal the September 11, 2002, decision, but failed to perfect her appeal. Her motion for rule on the clerk was denied. See Davis, supra. While Davis obtained custody in this paternity action, she failed to obtain the amount of child support, arrearage and other relief she sought.\nA motion for interim attorney\u2019s fees was filed August 16, 2001, and denied by an order entered December 18, 2001. Davis again filed a motion for attorney\u2019s fees at the close of the case September 25, 2002, seeking $118,943.00 in attorney\u2019s fees, which was denied in the order entered November 20, 2002.\nDavis appeals only the November 20, 2002, order. In the November 20, 2002, order, the circuit court noted that fees could be granted under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-109 (Repl. 2002), but that fees are granted at the discretion of the circuit court. The circuit court also noted that although Davis argued that disparity in income should require a grant of fees, that reason alone is not a basis for an award of attorney\u2019s fees. The circuit court then evaluated Ann Donovan\u2019s legal services, Davis\u2019s counsel. The circuit court stated that beyond complex financial issues, this case \u201cpresented straight forward legal issues.\u201d\nDavis appeals the denial of the motion for attorney\u2019s fees, arguing that throughout the course of the paternity case resulting in the September 11, 2002, order, the circuit court exhibited bias against Davis, and that this bias in the paternity case constitutes proof that the circuit court\u2019s decision to rule against Davis on the motion for attorney\u2019s fees was also the result of bias. Davis argues that \u201cTaken as a whole the court appeared to be an adversary of the appellant and her Orders concluding this case reflect that.\u201d\nInterim Attorney\u2019s Fees\nIn the single heading of her twenty-five page argument, Davis asserts that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to grant her August 16, 2001, Motion for Interim Attorney\u2019s Fees and in failing to grant an award of attorney\u2019s fees at the conclusion of the case. However, in her motion for attorney\u2019s fees at the conclusion of the case Davis seeks attorney\u2019s fees from the beginning of the case onward and states that total fees and costs sought for the case amount to $118,943.00. Therefore, this motion again seeks the fees Davis alleges the circuit court failed to grant earlier in denying the motion for interim fees, making denial of the motion for interim fees moot. We do not address moot issues. See, e.g., Benton v. Bradley, 344 Ark. 24, 37 S.W.3d 640 (2001). To the extent that Davis may assert denial of the motion for interim fees shows bias of the circuit court, that issue is addressed in the following sections of this opinion.\nAttorney\u2019s Fees in Paternity Actions\nDavis argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her motion for attorney\u2019s fees because acts by the circuit court prior to filing the motion for attorney\u2019s fees show bias and because the circuit court erred in determining that there was a lack of documentation for services, inflated billings, and a lack of expertise. Davis more specifically argues that statements, decisions, and actions taken by the circuit court prior to Davis filing the motion for attorney\u2019s fees are relevant to show an abuse of discretion in later denying her motion for attorney\u2019s fees. Davis points out in excess of twenty examples of alleged bias from the trial and hearings resulting in the September 11, 2002, order settling custody, support, and other issues relating to the paternity suit.\nThe parties cite Green v. Bell, 308 Ark. 473, 826 S.W.2d 226 (1992), a paternity case, on the issue of attorney\u2019s fees. We find the following relevant language in Green:\nFinally, appellant urges that the award of an attorney\u2019s fee of $40,000 was an abuse of the court\u2019s discretion. He recognizes that the court has broad discretion to award attorney\u2019s fees, Wilson v. Wilson, 294 Ark. 194, 741 S.W.2d 640 (1987), but maintains that the award is excessive. We stated our rule in Lytle v. Lytle, 266 Ark. 124, 583 S.W.2d 1 (1979).\nGreen, 308 Ark. at 480. There is no discussion in Green, supra, of the right to attorney\u2019s fees in paternity cases, making the case only marginally helpful in showing that attorney\u2019s fees may be granted.\nWith regard to attorney\u2019s fees, this court recently stated, \u201cArkansas follows the American Rule that attorney\u2019s fees are not chargeable as costs in litigation unless permitted by statute.\u201d Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark.130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001). Statutory authority for attorney\u2019s fees in paternity actions is found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-109 (Repl. 2002) and by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-27-342 (Supp. 2003). See Beavers v. Vaughn, 41 Ark. App. 96, 849 S.W.2d 6 (1993).\nArkansas Code Annotated Section 9-27-342(d) (Repl. 1998) provides:\n(d) Upon an adjudication by the court that the putative father is the father of the juvenile, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as established by the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments entered upon divorce. The court may award court costs and attorney\u2019s fees.\nArkansas Code Annotated Section 9-10-109(a) (Supp. 2001) provides in pertinent part:\nsubsequent to a finding by the court that the putative father in a paternity action is the father of the child, the court shall follow the same guidelines, procedures, and requirements as set forth in the laws of this state applicable to child support orders and judgments entered by the chancery court as if it were a case involving a child born of a marriage in awarding custody, visitation, setting amounts of support, costs, and attorney\u2019s fees....\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 9-10-109 (Supp. 2001). Thus, procedure applicable to child support orders entered upon divorce applies to a motion on attorney\u2019s fees in a paternity action. The decision to award attorney\u2019s fees and the amount of an award are discretionary determinations that will be reversed only if the appellant can demonstrate an abuse of discretion. Burns v. Burns, 312 Ark. 61, 847 S.W.2d 23 (1993).\nAlleged Bias of the Circuit Court\nDavis asserts that evidence of alleged bias of the circuit court in deciding child support, arrearage, and other issues, is relevant to show bias later in the decision on attorney\u2019s fees. We are told at the beginning of Davis\u2019s brief that \u201cappellant submits that she will demonstrate the biased mind-set of the court in the case in chief, which also shows the likelihood there would have been success on the merits.\u201d Later we are told, \u201cTaken as a whole the court appeared to be an adversary of the appellant and her Orders concluding this case reflect that.\u201d Davis thus argues that a showing of bias in the case prior to filing a motion for attorney\u2019s fees is relevant to show bias and an abuse of discretion in the decision on the fees. Davis argues that the alleged bias in the \u201ccase in chief\u2019 is relevant to show an abuse of discretion.\nRelevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Ark. R. Evid. 401; Barnes v. Everett, 351 Ark. 479, 95 S.W.3d 740 (2003).\nWe have considered every allegation of bias argued by Davis and include by way of example several of Davis\u2019s assertions.\n1. Statement by the circuit court about $5000 per month as support\nDavis states, \u201cThe trial court demonstrated bias and abused her discretion in this matter when she commented that no one child needs more than $5000 in child support.\u201d In the abstract, we are cited to page 1448 of the record where we find: \u201cAt that time, the Court did make an announcement to the parties, or the parties\u2019 counsel, at least that the Court could see no reason why a child of this age would need more than $5000 for living expenses.\u201d However, in this same discussion two pages later the circuit court stated:\nWhat I told counsel in chambers was that based upon the reading of both the trial briefs, the testimony of the expert witness so far, that I didn\u2019t feel that I was going to be giving the petitioner in this case fifteen percent of Mr. Williamson\u2019s income. And I stated that I had not heard all the evidence and I want to hear all the evidence and I might change my mind after I heard all the evidence that was presented in this court... I have not formulated an opinion . . . I have not heard all the evidence and I\u2019m certainly open to hearing all the evidence.\nDavis argues, in essence, that the circuit court prejudged the issue of the proper amount of child support before the evidence was presented and that this constitutes an abuse of discretion in denying attorney\u2019s fees. The record clearly shows that the circuit court had not prejudged the amount of child support, but rather stated, \u201cI have not formulated an opinion. ...\u201d\n2. Continuous Social Commentary by the Circuit Court\nDavis accuses the circuit court of continuously making \u201csocial commentary.\u201d Davis provides no cite to the abstract, or any cite whatever, to allow this court to even consider the assertions. However, we note the following comments by the circuit court in the September 11, 2002, final order on custody and support:\nMs. Davis testified that she used her savings to move to Fayetteville this summer. Ms. Davis has not handled \u201cthe money given to her in an exemplary manner\u201d as argued by counsel, nor has Ms. Davis had to be \u201cthrifty\u201d and was just \u201cgetting by\u201d on $5000 per month as argued.\nIt is apparent that the circuit court was concerned about the use of money in caring for Chasen, and there is nothing presented by Davis to show bias, or indeed imply anything beyond concern for the use of funds.\nMs. Davis, however, further argues:\nThe court in questioning even comments that it might be okay for Mr. Williamson to spend $1000.00 on shoes but it certainly was not alright for Ms. Davis to purchase a $3000 TV on her salary. The court is dictating the social and financial climate Chasen Williamson is to grow up in.\nDavis refers this court to page 189 of the abstract in support of this claim where we find the following questioning of witness Cheryl Shuffield by the circuit court:\nQ. My other question is did you do any sort of analysis here? You have Mr. Williamson who makes a lot of money and you know, he spends maybe a $1,000 on a pair of shoes and that might sound bad.\nA. Uh-huh.\nQ. But when you look at how much those shoes are versus how much money he\u2019s making, it\u2019s a little different.\nA. Sure.\nQ. Where you have Ms. Davis who makes less but she goes out and spends $2000 on a TV when she was not even making, well, she was making $35,000 at that point, I just wondered if there\u2019s some analysis that has been done to compare the two sorts. We\u2019re talking a lot about standard of living and that would be helpful, but you haven\u2019t done that analysis?\nA. No, Your Honor, I haven\u2019t.\nContrary to Davis\u2019s argument, this is hardly a comment by the circuit court that it is \u201cokay\u201d for Williamson to pay $1000 for a pair of shoes but improper for Davis to spend $2000 on a television. It is obviously a question by the circuit court in an attempt to determine what analysis had been undertaken on the issue of standard of living.\n3. Keeping the court file in the Circuit Court Judge\u2019s Office\nDavis apparently asserts that the circuit court was manipulating the record to favor Williamson. The record provides:\nMr. Watson: Judge, would the Court consider the possibility of awarding some interim attorney\u2019s fees or attorney\u2019s fees pending the outcome of the case. I think, actually there\u2019s a motion pending for those attorney\u2019s fees. I don\u2019t know that the Court has actually ruled on that.\nThe Court: I haven\u2019t seen it and the file\u2019s incomplete because I\u2019ve had the file for a couple of months now and probably the clerk\u2019s office is really mad at me, so I\u2019ve not seen it. But Mr. Tull, do you have anything to add?\nThere is nothing in the above quote to show a motive to keep documents and pleadings out of the file so it can be manipulated in Williamson\u2019s favor. This court finds no merit to Davis\u2019s claim of bias in the \u201ccase in chief.\u201d Furthermore, we are not convinced that the evidence of alleged bias in the \u201ccase in chief\u2019 was relevant to the question of whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion for attorney\u2019s fees.\nAlleged Abuse of Discretion in Deciding the Motion\nDavis does, however, argue an abuse of discretion in deciding issues presented by the motion on attorney\u2019s fees. She argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to recognize that this case presented difficult financial issues and was a complex case involving \u201cthe Statute of Limitations, unconstitutionality of the administrative order, equitable defenses of laches, waiver, equitable estoppel, and a contested hearing on child custody.\u201d The circuit court concluded to the contrary, that aside from the financial matters, this case presented \u201cstraight forward issues.\u201d Davis also notes that several \u201cextraordinary motions\u201d were filed in this case making costs and fees justifiably higher.\nDavis argues that the circuit court failed to properly consider disparity in income in denying attorney\u2019s fees. However, disparity in income is discussed in the order. The circuit court found that while disparity in income is a factor to be considered, it was not determinative in this case. Davis additionally argues that the circuit court erred in finding that counsel failed to provide \u201ctotal submission of bills.\u201d According to Davis, it is \u201cevident\u201d that certain activities are included in the billings, such as presumed follow-up activities based on the activity actually listed. The circuit court found that the billings were inadequate and that some billings were inflated. Examples of deficiencies were given in the order. Davis next argues that the hourly fees she and those she hired charged are reasonable. The circuit court denied the fees in total. Hourly fees are not discussed in the order.\nDavis also argues:\nThe court erred in her attorney fee Order in the following respects: The issue of attorney\u2019s fees was reserved from the hearing held in 1997, not from 2001 forward. In as much as the court had been unable to schedule the continuation of this hearing until 2001, the parties agreed that Mr. Williamson would pay a partial temporary attorney fee of $5000 in the year 2000. The only other award was $3000 out of a $23,552.50 expert witness fee.\nNo proof of any agreement on fees is offered. Davis also states, \u201cAt the time this decision was rendered Ms. Davis was unemployed and a student; she had been employed and was earning $31,123, which is misstated in the Order.\u201d The order states that Davis\u2019 employment status is based on the \u201cmost recent financial affidavit\u201d of Davis on earnings at the time of the issue of child support. Davis offers no proof of this not being so. Davis next argues that a great deal of time was spent in preparation for trial and that the circuit court could not know how long letters were or how long it took to review matters and do research. Davis argues that she need not provide actual billing of hours. She cites this court to Deaton v. Deaton, 11 Ark. App. 165, 668 S.W.2d 49 (1984) for this proposition. The relevant language from the case is:\nThe second point raised by the appellant is that the chancellor erred in awarding additional attorney\u2019s fees. He bases this argument on the fact that the appellee did not provide any documentation as to the time spent on the case by her attorney. Attorney\u2019s fees are a matter for the discretion of the trial court, and, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse his decision in that regard. In the case at bar, the chancellor had the opportunity to observe the parties and, as the chancellor noted, the appellant was extremely uncooperative in adhering to any of the court\u2019s orders. We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the chancellor. Further, this issue was not raised before the trial court nor was any documentation requested.\nDeaton, 11 Ark. App. at 166. Deaton states it is not an abuse of discretion to grant fees in the absence of documentation where the judge has observed the work and documentation was not requested. Davis provided documentation, but the circuit court found it was inadequate and exhibited problems in inflated billings and otherwise. The circuit court was of the opinion that counsel\u2019s billings were unreliable, that too much time was spent on a number of types of items, and that counsel exhibited a lack of expertise. The circuit court evaluated counsel\u2019s legal services in the order on attorney\u2019s fees, noting the following examples:\n1. Poor record keeping on billings as noted by Davis\u2019s own expert;\n2. Inflated billings, $750 for review of an order, $350 for review of a letter;\n3. Failure to bring copies of exhibits to trial for opposing counsel;\n4. Raising the issue in open court of the nature of Davis and Williamson\u2019s sexual relationship after paternity had already been established;\n5. Failure to understand what a proffer was;\n6. Further inflated times on billings;\n7. Lack of proper documentation;\n8. Request for reimbursement of improper items as part of fees;\n9. Lack of dates when work was done;\n10. Vague billings, such as for \u201cresearch;\u201d\n11. Unreadable entries in billings; and\n12. $450 for a single photo.\nThe circuit court looked to Paulson v. Paulson, 8 Ark. App. 306, 652 S.W.2d 46 (1983) for the factors to be considered in determining the amount, if any, to be awarded in attorney\u2019s fees. We first note that the factors in Paulson are very similar to the factors set out in Chrisco v. Sun Industries, Inc., 304 Ark. 227, 800 S.W.2d 717 (1990), with one exception. In the context of domestic relations cases, the financial abilities of the parties are also considered. Disparity in incomes is a relevant factor for the circuit court to consider, but standing alone it will not justify an award of attorney\u2019s fees. Scroggins v. Scroggins, 302 Ark. 362, 790 S.W.2d 157 (1990). The relevant Chrisco factors are:\n1. Experience and ability of the attorney;\n2. The time and labor required to perform the legal service prop- \u2022 erly;\n3. The amount involved in the case and the result obtained;\n4. The novelty and the difficulty of the issues involved;\n5. The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n6. The time limitations imposed on the client or by the circumstances; and\n7. That the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.\nChrisco, 304 Ark. at 229. While the decision to award attorney\u2019s fees and the amount awarded are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, factual findings of fact by a circuit court on the existence of the Chrisco factors is reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See, e.g., Phi Kappa Tau Housing Corp. v. Wengert, 350 Ark. 335, 86 S.W.3d 856 (2002). When reviewing findings of fact by a circuit court, this court uses a clearly erroneous standard. Butt v. The Evans Law Firm, 351 Ark. 566, 98 S.W.3d 1 (2003). The only factor that was not considered by the trial court was the preclusion of other employment by the lawyer. No argument about loss of other employment was made in this case. The finding of the circuit court on the factors was not clearly erroneous.\nThis court has considered all assertions of abuse of discretion in denying the motion for attorney\u2019s fees. The circuit court considered the proper factors in deciding Davis\u2019s attorney\u2019s fee motion. Davis fails to show an abuse of discretion by the circuit court.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Ann C. Donovan, for appellant.", "Quattlebaum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow PLLC, by: John E. Tull, E.B. Chiles IV, and Brandon B. Cate, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Teresa DAVIS v. Corliss M. WILLIAMSON\n03-682\n194 S.W.3d 197\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered September 30, 2004\nAnn C. Donovan, for appellant.\nQuattlebaum, Grooms, Tull & Burrow PLLC, by: John E. Tull, E.B. Chiles IV, and Brandon B. Cate, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0033-01", "first_page_order": 55, "last_page_order": 68 }