{ "id": 3712743, "name": "POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Populist Party v. Chesterfield", "decision_date": "2004-10-01", "docket_number": "04-994", "first_page": "58", "last_page": "74", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ark. 58" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "195 S.W.3d 354" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "415 U.S. 709", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6180289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0709-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ark. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8720641 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1946, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/210/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 F.2d 600", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1166976 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608-609" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/664/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871482 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "6 Ark. 9", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8726457 ], "year": 1845, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/6/0009-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886860 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-5-207", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "b" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 WL 2075415", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-5-203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-7-204", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-1-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(18)" }, { "page": "(22)" }, { "page": "(18)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)(E)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "B" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "B" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(5)", "parenthetical": "B" }, { "page": "(5)(B)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 7-8-301-307", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Repl. 2000 and Supp. 2003" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "355 Ark. 434", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 2649574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/355/0434-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ark. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1895782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/294/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210153 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "500" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "500" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "253 Ark. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1627417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ark/253/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 F.2d 600", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1166976 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/664/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(5)(B)" }, { "page": "(1)", "parenthetical": "A" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1173, "char_count": 34831, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.181100842601303e-08, "percentile": 0.42991502593394443 }, "sha256": "503228bff72b03cacbf16678fa0f443e52396c907679737f1b2d76923e70d73f", "simhash": "1:9bf61527204c1a30", "word_count": 5737 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:09.658813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Brown, J., concurs.", "Glaze, Imber, and Hannah, JJ., dissent.", "Imber and Hannah, JJ., join this dissent.", "Glaze and FIannah, JJ., join this dissent." ], "parties": [ "POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Betty C. Dickey, Chief Justice.\nThis is an appeal from Pulaski Circuit D. Fox\u2019s decision granting a writ of mandamus. Linda Chesterfield and the Democratic Party of Arkansas contested the certification of the Populist Party of Arkansas\u2019s Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates. Judge Fox granted the writ of mandamus, and the Populist Party, Presidential candidate Ralph Nader, and Vice Presidential candidate Peter Miguel Camejo bring five points for reversal: (1) whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction due to lack of standing; (2) whether the trial court had personal jurisdiction over Nader; (3) whether the trial court interpreted the requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B) in a constitutional manner; (4) whether the trial court misinterpreted Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-1-101(18); and, (5) whether the Secretary of State should be ordered to verify Nader and Camejo on the ballot even if the trial court\u2019s writ of mandamus is valid because the trial court did not remove Camejo from the ballot.\nFor the reasons explained below, we vacate Judge Fox\u2019s order granting the writ of mandamus and order the Populist Party of Arkansas\u2019s candidates, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, to be included on the 2004 presidential ballot.\nProcedural History\nOn September 10, 2004, Linda Chesterfield and the Democratic Party of Arkansas filed a complaint and petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment seeking the disqualification of Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo from the general election ballot as nominees for President and Vice President of the United States. Judge Fox heard the matter on September 17, 2004, first addressing Nader and Camejo\u2019s \u201cmotion to dismiss plaintiffs\u2019 complaint and petition for writ of mandamus and declaratory judgment by special appearance for lack of jurisdiction,\u201d filed September 17, 2004.\nJudge Fox did not make a ruling on the motion to dismiss but took testimony and evidence. He summarized the arguments by stating:\nI believe these are the areas that are in play. That The Populist Party of Arkansas, at least at some point in time, somebody signed as The Better Life of Arkansas, that it\u2019s not qualified as a party or a new party because it didn\u2019t receive three percent or more of the vote in the last Presidential election for a candidate ... And the next thing that happens is that you have to get at least 1,000 signatures that are in the proper form and from qualified folks to sign petitions. So those are two separate things. Then also the plaintiffs are arguing that the defendants Nader and Camejo have accepted the nomination in other states from parties that are different than The Populist Party and that they are therefore ineligible as candidates for that party in Arkansas pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-7-204 . . . the petition forms themselves are invalid regardless of the number of signatures, because they do not identify The Populist Party sponsorship of the candidates and they don\u2019t contain a canvasser\u2019s verification.\nOn September 20, 2004, after the hearing, Judge Fox issued a memorandum opinion determining that jurisdiction was proper as to Nader but that it did not have jurisdiction as to Camejo. Judge Fox also found that the petitions did not comply with the requirement of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B). The trial court wrote:\nThe General Assembly has established many requirements for \u201cpolitical parties\u201d with respect to their participation in the election process. \u201cPolitical parties\u201d have to receive at least three percent (3%) of the votes cast in the last general election for Governor or nominees for presidential electors. If \u201cpolitical parties\u201d fail to receive three percent (3%) they lose their status. In order to become a new \u201cpolitical party\u201d a \u201cpolitical group\u201d has to obtain the signatures of qualified electors, whichever is less, at the last preceding election. And \u201cpolitical parties\u201d are required to hold primary elections.\nBut the law is clear and unambiguous that the qualified electors signing the petitions of a \u201cpolitical group\u201d must declare that the names to be printed on the ballot be \u201cthe names of their candidate\u201d. The petitions submitted by the defendant \u201cpolitical group\u201d do not meet such threshold requirement. Accordingly, a writ of mandamus will issue to the defendant Daniels to recall the certified list and to remove the name of Ralph Nader from the certified fist as a candidate for the defendant \u201cpolitical group.\u201d\nJudge Fox ordered the immediate recall of the certification of full lists of all candidates to all county boards of election commissioners issued in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-5-203(a) and ordered the Secretary of State to issue a new list of candidates after removing the name of Nader as the candidate for the office of President.\nAppellants filed a notice of appeal on Tuesday, September 21, 2004, and a brief oral argument on the issue of whether to stay the trial court\u2019s order was heard in this court on Thursday, September 23, 2004. This court then issued an order directing the Secretary of State to advise the counties not to print any other ballots until this case was resolved. Upon review of the briefs filed and arguments made to this court we now vacate the trial court\u2019s issuance of the writ of mandamus. \u201cIn making our decision in this case we are guided by the overriding constitutional principles in favor of ballot access.\u201d The Reform Party of Florida v. Black, 2004 WL 2075415 (Fla.) (Sept. 17, 2004).\nBefore turning to the merits of Nader\u2019s argument regarding statutory interpretation, we note that the Populist Party, as a political group, is the party in interest in this case. Under Arkansas law, it is the political group that has a right to place names on the ballot for the office of President and Vice President of the United States. Thus, Nader was not a necessary and indispensable party here. Furthermore, Judge Fox found there is no statutory requirement for the name of the \u201cpolitical group\u201d to be on the petition. As to the issue of standing, it was waived by the Populist Party, as no objection was raised to the trial court below.\nThe Democratic Party of Arkansas and Chesterfield contend that the Populist Party did not have a valid political convention. However, on August 24, 2004, electors of the Populist Party met by conference call for their convention. Minutes were taken and a vote was taken on the delegates. Arkansas does not define what constitutes a convention and this court cannot say that the telephone conference convention is insufficient under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(E).\nWrit of Mandamus\nThis court has held that an action for mandamus is the proper method of enforcing the right set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-5-207 (b). State v. Craighead County Bd. of Election Comm\u2019rs, 300 Ark. 405, 779 S.W.2d 169 (1989). Mandamus is traditionally regarded as a remedy to be used on all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and justice and good government require it. Id.; Ex parte Trapnall, 6 Ark. 9 (1845). It is a writ which is used to enforce an established right. Id.; Gregg v. Hartwick, 292 Ark. 528, 731 S.W.2d 766 (1987). The right the appellant seeks to enforce is contained in Ark. Code Ann. 7-5-207(b) (1987). Id. That statute created a right in the people to the proper administration of election laws by prohibiting the inclusion of ineligible candidates on the ballot. Id.\nPresidential Group Candidate Petition\nThe Populist Party argues that the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (B) was unconstitutional. We agree.\nJudge Fox determined that the petition forms, used by the Populist Party, failed to comply with the technical requirements of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B), which states:\n(B) A political group desiring to have the names of its candidates for President and Vice President printed on the ballot shall file a petition with the Secretary of State by noon on the first Monday of August. The petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidate for President and Vice President. The Secretary of State shall verify the sufficiency of the petition within ten (10) days from the filing of the petition. If the petition is determined to be insufficient, the Secretary of State shall notify in writing the political group through its designated agent and shall set forth his or her reasons for so finding. When notice is delivered, the sponsors shall have an additional ten (10) days in which to do any or all of the following:\n(i) Solicit and obtain additional signatures;\n(ii) Submit proof to show that the rejected signatures or some of them are good and should be counted; or\n(iii) Make the petition more definite and certain.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B) (Supp. 2003). Judge Fox found that the petitions were insufficient because petitioners did not state on the petition that Nader and Camejo were \u201ctheir\u201d candidates. Rather, the petitions stated a desire to have \u201cthe\u201d particular candidates on the ballot. Specifically, the petition stated:\nWe, the undersigned, propose the name of Ralph Nader and Pete Miguel Camejo as President and Vice President to be placed on the ballot as Presidential group candidate in the General Election to he held on November 2, 2004, and each of us for himself or herself says: I have personally signed this petition; I am a legal voter of the State of Arkansas, and my printed name, date of birth, residence, city or town of residence, and date of signing are correctly written after my signature.\nHowever, there is no statutory requirement that each person who signs the nominating petition be a member of the group circulating the petition. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B) only requires that those persons signing the petition express their desire to have the group\u2019s candidates on the ballot and that the petitioners be qualified electors who are registered voters under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-1-101(22).\nMoreover, the Populist Party is not required to use either of the two forms contained in the \u201c2004 Candidate Information\u201d handbook published by the Secretary of State\u2019s Office because Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (B) does not prescribe a certain form. Under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B), the Secretary of State\u2019s Office is required to accept any form that contains at the time of filing \u201cthe names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors. . . declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidates for President and Vice President.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B). The petition used here by the Populist Party, and its candidates, clearly met this requirement\nFurther, there is no specific requirement that the petitioners declare their intention to actually vote for the candidate on the petition. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dealt with this issue in Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir 1981). In that case, the court found a Kentucky petition-signature statute unconstitutional. The court wrote:\nOf course, the \u201cdesire to vote\u201d provision is not precisely analogous to the factual situations previously discussed. However, this provision, as did the lack of partitions and the thin ballots, results in publicizing the way one intends to vote. Certainly, it can be claimed that the latter two were actual revelations for whom the subscriber voted, while the former is only a declaration of one\u2019s desire and intention to vote in a future election. However, we refuse to adopt such an artificial distinction because all such practices jeopardize the right to secrecy of the ballot. The declaration operates to discourage citizens from participation in the electoral process simply because they do not wish people to know how they will vote. Such a revelation invokes the fears sought to be quelled by the secrecy of voting laws in this country, and subjects an elector to the pressure of his neighbors, employers, and social peers. Since the declaration abridges the right to a secret ballot in such a direct and unacceptable manner, it cannot stand.\nId. at 608-609. We agree with the rationale of the Sixth Circuit that a law may not require an electorate to name \u201ctheir\u201d candidates for President and Vice-President. Further, a petitioning law may only require that the signers state their desire that the named candidate, or named party, appear on the ballot. Id. Otherwise, a party who is uncertain about whom he will support in the general election, but has an interest in the candidate, would be unable to sign the petition because of the requisite declaration. Id. Furthermore, \u201cthe possibility of having new candidates with unusual and creative political philosophies is greatly reduced. As a result this requirement fosters a system which favors the status quo, while discouraging independent candidates and new political parties.\u201d Id. at 609.\nOur own court has recognized that the right to become a candidate for public office is, under our form of government, a fundamental right, which should not be in any manner curtailed without good cause. Fisher v. Taylor, 210 Ark. 380, 196 S.W.2d 217 (1946). Any law or party rule, by which this inherent right of the citizen is diminished or impaired ought always to receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen desiring to exercise the right. Id.\nStatutes are not only presumed to be constitutional, but a court must construe a statute as constitutional if at all possible. Bunch v. State, 344 Ark. 730, 43 S.W.3d 132 (2001). As the Supreme Court has recognized, trial courts cannot impose a restriction that denies a group their right to associate or denies them access to the ballot unless narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315 (1974).\nHere, the manner in which the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (B) leads not only to an absurd result, but also renders the provision unconstitutional. This unconstitutional reading of the petitioning provision at issue infringes upon one of the fundamental civil liberties of our democracy, that of the secret ballot. Anderson, 664 F.2d 600. In sum, section Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B) does not state that an electorate name \u201ctheir\u201d candidate for President or Vice President. The statute only requires that the signer of the petition state their desire that the named candidates appear on the ballot.\nHaving vacated the writ of mandamus, we need not address the other issues raised in this appeal, such as the trial court\u2019s interpretation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-1-101(18) or whether the Secretaty of State should be ordered to verify Nader and Camejo on the ballot.\nFor the reasons stated above, the writ of mandamus is vacated. Our September 23, 2004, order to the Secretary of State advising the County Board of Election Commissioners to not initiate the further printing of ballots relating to the presidential election is hereby dissolved. The mandate shall issue immediately and the Secretary of State\u2019s Office is ordered to certify the ballot with the names of the Populist Party of Arkansas, Presidential Candidate Ralph Nader, and Vice Presidential candidate Peter Miguel Camejo.\nBrown, J., concurs.\nGlaze, Imber, and Hannah, JJ., dissent.", "type": "majority", "author": "Betty C. Dickey, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice,\nconcurring. I join the major-to vacate the writ of mandamus, and I write only to address the issues relating to the name of the political group and the convention requirement. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302 (Supp. 2003).\nSection 7-8-302 does not require that the specific name of the political group be included on the petitions for nomination. Moreover, the style \u201cPresidential Group Candidate Petition\u201d was included on each petition circulated for signatures, which alerted the signers of the petition that they were signing on behalf of a political group. The following steps were taken by the Secretary of State and the Populist Party to comply with \u00a7 7-8-302:\n\u2022 On August 11, 2004, the Secretary of State certified 1,234 signatures on the Nader petitions for. a political group known as The Better Life. This was the verification of sufficiency.\n\u2022 On August 24, 2004, the Populist Party advised the Secretary of State that the correct name of the political group is The Populist Party of Arkansas and not The Better Life. Tim Humphries, legal counsel for the Secretary of State, testified at the hearing that there was no problem with changing the name. He also testified that issuing another verification of sufficiency to The Populist Party was not necessary because \u201cit was the same group.\u201d\n\u2022 On August 24, 2004, Jim Macri, party chairman of The Populist Party, wrote to the Secretary of State that \u201cThe Populist Party of Arkansas with the slogan \u2018The Better Life\u2019 convened and unanimously nominated Ralph Nader . . . and Peter Miguel Camejo\u201d as the nominees for president and vice-president. An amended letter dated August 24, 2004, and filed September 1, 2004, with the Secretary of State added the statement that the Nader petitions had been presented on August 2, 2004, with additional petitions submitted during the ten-day cure period.\n\u2022 On August 24, 2004, the Populist Party, through its party chairman, Jim Macri, advised the Secretary of State of the names of its six presidential electors.\nJim Macri testified at the hearing that the convention for The Populist Party was held by conference call on August 24, 2004. He did not recall the timing of when the electors were chosen.\nMr. Macri also testified that he selected the delegates for the convention, which was by conference call, and about ten people, though probably four to six people participated. He had a written agenda for the conference call-convention and kept minutes. He used Roberts Rules of Order on how to proceed with the conference call.\nThe General Assembly does not define in \u00a7 7-8-302 how a group\u2019s convention is to be held or what comprises a convention. There is no requirement that it be by an assembly of people as opposed to a conference call. As chairman of The Populist Party, Mr. Macri complied with \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (E) by writing the Secretary of State and certifying the group\u2019s selection for president and vice-president.\nThe clear intention of \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (B) is to allow political groups access to the ballot for president and vice president, if they file a petition on behalf of their candidates with the signatures of one thousand qualified electors. The Populist Party complied with the requirement with signatures of more than one thousand electors. By doing so, it has shown a modicum of support for the group\u2019s candidates, which is what our statute requires.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice," }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\ndissenting. Most likely, due to the few days this court has had to and deliberate on the issues raised in this election case, the majority court\u2019s decision is confusing and reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of Arkansas\u2019 election process. I must dissent.\nFirst, I wish to address those pertinent Arkansas election laws and procedures that must be followed to permit a person\u2019s name to be printed on the ballot as a candidate for president or vice president. These statutory procedures must (shall) be conducted. In each year in which a president and vice president are chosen, each political party or group in the state shall choose, by its state convention, electors of president and vice president. Any political party or group which has qualified under \u00a7 7-8-302 shall by state convention certify its total list of electors to the secretary of state and the certificate shall be filed no later than September 15 in the year of the election.\nNow, it is necessary to understand how the names of a political party\u2019s candidates for president and vice president qualify to have their names printed on the general election ballot. If we are speaking of an established political party candidate, the party shall nominate by primary election. A political party under Arkansas law is defined as any group of voters which, at the last preceding general election, polled for its candidate for governor in the state or its nominees for presidential electors with at least three percent (3%) of the entire vote cast for the office. In our case, the Democratic and Republican Parties are political parties that are required to nominate by primary election. On the other hand, a new political party formed under our law may nominate by convention if the presidential election is the first general election after the party was certified. Applied in this case, the Populist Party sought to nominate by convention, assuming the political group complied with Arkansas law, especially the petition requirements set out in \u00a7 7-8-302(5) (B). That statutory provision dictates that a political group shall file with the secretary of state a petition containing the signatures of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors. In the petition, the electors must declare their desire to have printed on the ballot, the names of their candidates for president and vice president.\nIf the group\u2019s petition was found insufficient, the secretary of state must notify the group\u2019s designated agent of the deficiencies. Here, that person was Jim Macri. When the notice is delivered, the sponsors (group) have ten (10) days to correct the insufficiency, but any amendments or corrections shall not materially change and effect the petition, and no changes shall be made in the group\u2019s petition except to correct apparent typographical errors or omissions. Once the new political group qualifies by petition to place its candidate on the ballot, the group shall submit a certificate of choice, stating the names of its candidates for president and vice president, signed under oath by the chair, vice chair, or secretary of the new political party\u2019s convention.\nThe Populist Party repeatedly failed to comply with the laws required to establish its party in Arkansas. To begin with, the group seeking to form its party by petition never informed the person signing the petition of the name of the proposed new party sponsoring the group\u2019s petition. The group claims such identifying language is unnecessary because its candidates, Ralph Nader and Peter Camejo, were identified as candidates for president and vice president on some of the petitions. However, this procedure and language used by the Populist Party/Better Life Group are improper because this language is used by persons wishing to qualify as an independent candidates. The practice used by the Populist Party only confused matters further, because Arkansas does not authorize or permit persons to run for president and vice president as an independent candidate. In Arkansas, one can only run for president if one is selected and certified by a political party\u2019s state convention. Thus, because Arkansas law only provides for party candidates to have their names printed on the general election ballot, it is vital for the signers of the petition to be informed of the name of the party attempting to qualify so that it can later select its candidate for president and vice president by convention.\nAlso adding to the confusion in this case, the persons (or group) that first commenced circulating petitions called themselves the Better Life Party; after failing to gather the requisite number of signatures, the group changed its name to the Populist Party of Arkansas. Obviously, the persons who signed the group\u2019s initial petitions did not know what party was being formed because no party name appeared on the petitions. This leads one to ask the question, if a person and legal voter signing a petition is asked to sign a petition to establish a new party, shouldn\u2019t she or he be apprised of the name of that party? Too, Arkansas law on this subject is designed such that the names of the persons whom the party may select at its convention need not be identified. For example, in 1972, the American Party in Arkansas was previously known as George Wallace\u2019s Party. However, when Mr. Wallace could not run for president, the American Party leaders tried to qualify as a party in Arkansas so it could subsequently select John G. Schmitz as the party\u2019s new presidential candidate. The American Party failed to qualify as a party, so Schmitz was never selected. See American Party of Arkansas v. Brandon, 253 Ark. 123, 484 S.W.2d 881 (1972). Nonetheless, under Arkansas law, any political group that does qualify may wait to select its presidential candidates when its state convention meets. If a party has no candidate at the time petitions are circulated, or for some reason loses its intended candidates, the new party can still select other candidates to represent it, since it is the political party that selects its presidential candidates.\nIn the present case, the political group\u2019s failure to identify it by name could only lead to confusion and litigation. As noted above, the original petitions were circulated by persons who referred to themselves as the Better Life Group. That group later labeled itself the Populist Party. While this newly named group was referred to as one touting Nader for president, Nader is also a presidential candidate representing the Reform Party in some states. In his presidential bid in 2000, he ran as the Green Party candidate. Nader is now identifying himself as representing the Populist Party, but, again, that party\u2019s name did not appear on the petition that the people (legal voters) signed. It is difficult to know which party Mr. Nader represents. Surely some of this confusion could have been eliminated if the petitions circulated had consistently settled on one party and revealed the group\u2019s true name before and during the time the petitions were circulated. In short, it defies common sense to conclude that a political group\u2019s petitions are valid when they neither identify the group, nor indicate to the signers to the petition the name of the group seeking to gain access to the ballot. As stated by the appellants, if this court condones the Populist/Better Life Group\u2019s failure to follow Arkansas law and validates that group\u2019s circulation of petitions without identifying the political group\u2019s name, a political group could obtain the required number of signatures and later disclose the group\u2019s name is the Neo-Nazi Party, and its party\u2019s name would be listed as such on the ballot. Surely, the persons signing the petition should have the right to know what group they are proposing to be on the ballot. In addition, if this court approves a petition containing only individual candidates\u2019 names with no mention of party or group affiliation and finds that permissible, why did the general assembly provide that \u201conly political parties or groups\u201dcan have access to the presidential ballot?\nThe Populist Party also violated other requirements needed to place their presidential candidates names on the ballot. As alluded to above, Arkansas law required the Populist Party to hold a convention to select, nominate, and certify Nader and Camejo as its candidates. Mr. Macri, the Populist Party\u2019s designated agent and party chairman, conceded that he and Mr. Smith actually selected the list of electors, and that Macri said he held a convention via telephone conference call, which included four, five, or six people (electors). Although Mr. Macri could not recall if these electors were actually picked prior to the convention, his description of what happened before his conference call clearly reflects that the electors had been selected by him and Mr. Smith in preparation for the convention. The appellants take umbrage at calling Macri\u2019s conference call a nominating convention, and argue that a political convention is \u201can assembly of delegates chosen by a political party to nominate candidates for an approaching election.\u201d Appellants submit that Macri and Smith fell short of such an assembly. Appellants further argue that, if such a sparsely attended phone conference call can be considered a convention, where would the line be drawn?\nIn conclusion, it is apparent to me from all the evidence that the Populist Party had little staff and workers to perform the legal steps needed to establish a political party in Arkansas. Because of this, the support he did have simply was unable to perform those requirements the law provides to qualify political parties or groups. As a result, confusion prevailed. It is my firm belief that, while the trial court in this case decided Nader\u2019s and Camejo\u2019s names should not appear on the General Election ballots based on other grounds,\nI would affirm his order for the reasons set out above.\nImber and Hannah, JJ., join this dissent.\nAnnabelle Clinton Imber, Justice,\ndissenting. The central in this case is the of one fine in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(5)(B): (Emphasis added.) When interpreting a statute for the first time, we look to the plain language of the statute. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. 711, 718, 42 S.W.3d 496, 500 (2001). Here, the pivotal question is \u2014 in the phrase, \u201ctheir candidate,\u201d to whom does the word \u201ctheir\u201d refer? The trial court interpreted the plain language to mean the signers had to personally endorse Nadar and Camejo as \u201ctheir\u201d candidates. In doing so, it must have considered the plurality of the pronoun \u201ctheir\u201d in applying it to the obviously-plural noun, \u201celectors.\u201d This interpretation requires an unconstitutional declaration of how one intends to vote. Anderson v. Mills, 664 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1981). As we must construe a statute to be constitutional, if possible, the trial court\u2019s interpretation was incorrect. Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003).\nA political group desiring to have the names of its candidates for the President and Vice President printed on the ballot shall file a petition with the Secretary of State by noon on the first Monday of August. The petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring their desire to have printed on the ballot the names of their candidate for President and Vice President.\nUnder a plain-language interpretation, however, there is another option. The phrase \u201ctheir candidate\u201d could refer to the political group\u2019s candidate. While the \u201cpolitical group\u201d can be a singular noun with the appropriate possessive pronoun \u201cits\u201d, the term \u201cpolitical group\u201d is a collective noun and, thus, can also be plural, with the possessive pronoun \u201ctheir.\u201d For example, the jury rendered its verdict; but the jury took their seats. In this statute, the legislature refers to the candidates of the political group as both \u201cits candidates\u201d and \u201ctheir candidates,\u201d recognizing the collective nature of the noun. See Ark. Code. Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 7-8-302(1) (A), (5)(E) (2004). Applying this construction to the statute, it reads \u201cthe petition shall contain at the time of filing the names of one thousand (1,000) qualified electors of the state declaring the [qualified electors\u2019] desire to have printed on the ballot the names of [the political group\u2019s] candidate.\u201d Because this interpretation merely requires that the electors show their support for the political group\u2019s access to the ballot and not support for the individual candidates, it is a constitutional interpretation.\nAs the legislature did not intend to allow access to the presidential ballot for individuals, such a construction also gives effect to the intent of the legislature. When a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to the legislative intent. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. at 718, 42 S.W.3d at 500. Moreover, interpreting the statute as requiring individuals to indicate their support o\u00eda political group\u2019s access to the ballot (rather than supporting the access of an individual) advances the overall legislative scheme by requiring a higher level of support for the presidential petitions. While it may be relatively easy to find 1,000 people who are willing to support the ballot placement of one candidate, it is much more difficult to find 1,000 people who are willing to give that support to a political group. Thus, when looking at section 7-8-302 in connection with section 7-7-103 (dealing with the placement of independent candidates on the ballot), it follows that section 7-7-103 requires significantly more signatures.\nTwo statutes should always be construed so as to give effect to both, if possible. Garrett v. Andrews, 294 Ark. 160, 741 S.W.2d 257 (1987). Our review becomes an examination of the whole act. We reconcile provisions to make them consistent, harmonious and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Barclay v. First Paris Holding Co., 344 Ark. at 718, 42 S.W.3d at 500. Requiring that a presidential ballot petition under section 7-8-302 only state the desire of the signers that the named candidates appear on the ballot renders void the legislature\u2019s obvious use of very different language in the drafting of these two statutes. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant; and meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. Id. While constitutional, the majority\u2019s interpretation unnecessarily violates this fundamental tenet of statutory construction.\nIn light of the above arguments, the correct interpretation of section 7-8-302 is that a petition for a political group\u2019s access to the ballot must be signed by 1,000 electors who state their desire to have the political group\u2019s candidates placed on the ballot. Accordingly, as the petition in question did not request ballot access for any particular group but merely two individuals, it is invalid under the statute. Because the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason, I would affirm. Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500 (2003).\nFor the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.\nGlaze and FIannah, JJ., join this dissent.\nSee Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 7-8-301\u2014307 (Repl. 2000 and Supp. 2003).\nSee Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 7-8-302(1) (A) (2003).\nThis interpretation is consistent with the standard Presidential Group Candidate Petition form drafted by the Secretary of State\u2019s election expert, Mr. Tim Humphries, which specifically requires the name of the political group to be placed on the petition.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice, Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Wendy L. Kelley, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., and Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoon, Ltd., by: Sam Hilburn, for appellants.", "Vickery & Carroll, P.A., by: RobinJ. Carroll; and Brian D. Greer, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "POPULIST PARTY of ARKANSAS, Ralph Nader and Peter Miguel Camejo, et al. v. Linda CHESTERFIELD and Democratic Party of Arkansas\n04-994\n195 S.W.3d 354\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 1, 2004\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Wendy L. Kelley, Deputy Att\u2019y Gen., and Hilburn, Calhoon, Harper, Pruniski & Calhoon, Ltd., by: Sam Hilburn, for appellants.\nVickery & Carroll, P.A., by: RobinJ. Carroll; and Brian D. Greer, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0058-01", "first_page_order": 80, "last_page_order": 96 }