{ "id": 3713506, "name": "Alfred SHELNUTT v. Melba LAIRD and Max Laird", "name_abbreviation": "Shelnutt v. Laird", "decision_date": "2004-12-02", "docket_number": "04-01", "first_page": "516", "last_page": "522", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 Ark. 516" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "199 S.W.3d 65" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "357 Ark. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5401360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that we will not consider an argument raised on appeal where the appellant has failed to cite authority" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that we will not consider an argument raised on appeal where the appellant has failed to cite authority" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683358 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886809 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74064 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111298 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74158 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Ark. App. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6139736 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/75/0193-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 11354, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.0011153170616546e-08, "percentile": 0.3144681408066648 }, "sha256": "6e883e3327f6cfb00a458e76a4dd36abd76e82e83aa2bae40169694ff5e51482", "simhash": "1:2b078e3f775856c8", "word_count": 1884 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:12:09.658813+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Alfred SHELNUTT v. Melba LAIRD and Max Laird" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Ray Thornton, Justice.\nOn June 23, 1995, Don and Dixie McMann executed reciprocal wills. The wills provided that upon the death of one of them, their estate would pass to the surviving spouse, until their death, and the residue would pass to Sandra and Alfred Shelnutt. Sandra Shelnutt was Dixie McMann\u2019s daughter. Appellant, Alfred Shelnutt, is Sandra Shelnutt\u2019s husband. The McManns\u2019s wills also appointed Sandra Shelnutt as executrix. Mr. McMann\u2019s will contained the following language:\nI declare that this will is executed contemporaneously with a will of similar testamentary plan executed by my said wife, Dixie McMann, and I declare that my said wife and I have agreed that we shall not alter, amend or change our wills or do any act or suffer any omission which will have the effect of defeating the testamentary plan stated in our wills, except by mutual agreement at the time when both of us are alive.\nOn February 3,1998, Dixie McMann died. Thereafter, Don McMann moved in with his sister, appellee, Melba Laird. On July 14, 1998, Mr. McMann executed a new will in which he named Melba Laird as his sole heir and executrix. Additionally, following Mrs. McMann\u2019s death, certain assets were transferred out of Don McMann\u2019s name and into living trust accounts for Melba and Max Laird.\nOn June 5, 1999, Mr. McMann died. His first will was admitted to probate and Sandra Shelnutt was appointed the executrix of Mr. McMann\u2019s estate. On November 8, 1999, Mrs. Laird contested the will and attempted to have Mr. McMann\u2019s second will probated. She argued that Mr. McMann\u2019s second will from 1999 should have been admitted to probate rather than the first will from 1995. This matter was appealed to the court of appeals, and in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s order and remanded the case on the ground that the probate court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce the contract to execute reciprocal wills. See Laird v. Shelnutt, CA 00-1226 (Ark. App. Sept. 5, 2001).\nSandra Shelnutt, as executrix of Mr. McMann\u2019s estate, filed a separate action against Melba and Max Laird. In that case, Mrs. Shelnutt requested that the chancery court impose a constructive trust on funds that the Lairds had appropriated from Mr. McMann\u2019s estate.\nIn November of 1999, Mrs. Shelnutt hired an attorney to represent her and Mr. McMann\u2019s estate. She agreed to pay the attorney fifty percent of whatever was recovered for Mr. McMann\u2019s estate.\nOn January 12, 2001, the Saline County Chancery Court entered an order in which it concluded that the Lairds held a constructive trust in the amount of $738,000. The trial court\u2019s findings were appealed to our court of appeals. See Laird v. Shelnutt, 75 Ark. App. 193, 55 S.W.3d 795 (2001). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and the matter was then reviewed by our court. We also affirmed the trial court\u2019s finding that $738,000 was held in a constructive trust. See Laird v. Shelnutt, 348 Ark. 632, 74 S.W.3d 206 (2002).\nOn January 29, 2003, Mrs. Shelnutt, acting individually and as executrix of the estate of Don McMann, entered into an agreement with the Lairds in which she released the Lairds from all claims and damages in exchange for $180,000.\nOn April 1, 2003, Alfred Shelnutt filed a complaint in the Saline County Circuit Court. In his complaint, Mr. Shelnutt argued that Melba and Max Laird intentionally interfered with the contractual relationship between Don and Dixie McMann. He further claimed that he was a third-party beneficiary to that contract. Mr. Shelnutt argued that if the Lairds had not interfered in the McManns\u2019s contract, Don McMann\u2019s estate would not have been forced to pay legal fees to protect the assets of the estate and Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s portion of Mr. McMann\u2019s estate would have been larger. Mr. Shelnutt requested that the circuit court require the Lairds to pay him $413,240.24. This amount represented the attorney\u2019s fees and costs paid by Mr. McMann\u2019s estate.\nOn April 21, 2003 the Lairds filed a motion to dismiss Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint. The Lairds argued that the complaint should be dismissed for several reasons. Specifically, the Lairds argued: (1) that Mr. Shelnutt was not the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) that the statute of limitations for Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s cause of action had expired; (3) that Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint failed to allege the necessary facts to establish a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract; (4) that the complaint sought attorney\u2019s fees without stating a statutory basis for the fees; and (5) that Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint alleged a cause of action based upon tortious interference with an expected inheritance, which is a cause of action not recognized in Arkansas.\nOn September 5, 2003, a hearing was held on the Lairds\u2019s motion to dismiss. Thereafter, on October 7, 2003, the trial court entered an order granting the Lairds\u2019s motion. It is from this order that Mr. Shelnutt appeals. He raises five points for our consideration, and we affirm the trial court.\nAppellant is appealing from an order dismissing his complaint. We have outlined our standard of review of motions to dismiss on numerous occasions. In reviewing the trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to dismiss we treat the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the party who filed the complaint. Cotten v. Fooks, 346 Ark. 130, 55 S.W.3d 290 (2001). In testing the sufficiency of the complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the complaint, and the pleadings are to be liberally construed. Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Insurance Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d 174 (2002).\nMr. Shelnutt argues that the trial court erred when it granted the Lairds\u2019s motion to dismiss. In their motion to dismiss, the Lairds raised five separate grounds upon which the trial court could have dismissed Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint. The trial court\u2019s order does not expressly state upon which ground the motion was granted. Thus, Mr. Shelnutt is challenging all grounds asserted in the Lairds\u2019s motion. After reviewing the case, we have concluded that there was a valid ground upon which to grant the Lairds\u2019s motion to dismiss. We will discuss this issue first.\nIn their motion to dismiss, the Lairds asserted that the three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort actions, codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105 (1987), applied to Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint. The Lairds further contended that the actions that provide the basis for Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint occurred before November 9, 1999. Finally, the Lairds argued that Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint, which was filed on April 1, 2003, was barred by the statue of limitations and should have been dismissed. The Lairds\u2019s argument is well taken.\nThe three-year statute of limitations codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105 is applicable to the case now before us. We have held that a cause of action accrues the moment the right to commence an action comes into existence, and the statute of limitations commences to run from that time. Courtney v. First Nat\u2019l Bank, 300 Ark. 498, 780 S.W.2d 536 (1989). We have also noted that the statute of limitations begins to run when there is a complete and present cause of action. Id.\nIn the case now before us, Mr. Shelnutt filed a complaint alleging a cause of action against Melba and Max Laird for tortious interference with the contractual relationship between Don and Dixie McMann. To establish such a claim, a party must prove the following elements: (1) the existence of a valid contractual relationship; (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the interfering party; (3) intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship; (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted; and (5) that the conduct of the defendant was \u201cimproper.\u201d Faulkner v. Arkansas Children\u2019s Hosp., 347 Ark. 941, 69 S.W.3d 393 (2002).\nThe actions that Mr. Shelnutt alleges constituted interference with the contractual relationship between the McManns are as follows: (1) Mrs. Laird contacted an attorney for Mr. McMann and a new will was drafted in which Mr. McMann\u2019s estate was left to Mrs. Laird rather than the Shellnuts; (2) certain assets were transferred out of Mr. McMann\u2019s name and into living trust accounts maintained by Melba and Max Laird; and (3) Mrs. Laird contested Mr. McMann\u2019s first will in which the estate was left to the Shellnuts, and attempted to have Mr. McMann\u2019s second will probated.\nAfter reviewing Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint, we note that the foregoing actions were complete on November 8, 1999. According to the complaint, the new will was prepared and the assets were transferred prior to Mr. McMann\u2019s death. Mr. McMann died on June 5, 1999. The Shelnutts became aware of the transferring of assets after Mr. McMann\u2019s death. On November 8, 1999, Mrs. Laird filed a will-contest action and sought to have Mr. McMann\u2019s second will probated. It is established that Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s cause of action accrued no later than November 8, 1999. Therefore, this is the date upon which the statute of limitations began to run. Mr. Shelnutt had until November 8, 2002, to file his complaint against the Lairds. Mr. Shelnutt filed his complaint on April 1, 2003, which was more than three years after his cause of action accrued. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint.\nWe note that Mr. Shelnutt argues that his cause of action was of a \u201ccontinuing nature\u201d and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until January 30, 2003. Mr. Shelnutt has not provided us with authority to establish that the tort of intentional interference with a contractual relationship is a continuing tort. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument. See Gwin v. Daniels, 357 Ark. 623, 184 S.W.3d 28 (2004) (holding that we will not consider an argument raised on appeal where the appellant has failed to cite authority).\nAdditionally, we note that Mr. Shelnutt argues that he could not determine the amount of damages for his cause of action until 2003 when the funds for the McMann estate were retrieved from the Lairds and the attorney was paid for assisting in the retrieval of these funds. Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s contention is misplaced. Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s damages could have been calculated on the day that Mrs. Laird attempted to probate Mr. McMann\u2019s second will.\nHaving concluded that the trial court properly dismissed Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint, it is not necessary for us to review the remaining points on appeal because they involve alternative grounds upon which the trial court might have granted the Lairds\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nAffirmed.\nWe note that during the pendency of this case Mr. Laird has passed away.\nAlthough Mr. Shelnutt\u2019s complaint does not state the exact date upon which the Shellnuts learned of the transferred property, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the parties agreed that a complaint seeking the return of the assets was filed in 1999.", "type": "majority", "author": "Ray Thornton, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Baxter, Jensen, Young & Houston, by: Ray Baxter, for appellant.", "Richard F. Hatfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Alfred SHELNUTT v. Melba LAIRD and Max Laird\n04-01\n199 S.W.3d 65\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 2, 2004\nBaxter, Jensen, Young & Houston, by: Ray Baxter, for appellant.\nRichard F. Hatfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0516-01", "first_page_order": 538, "last_page_order": 544 }