{ "id": 5459915, "name": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Barbara SPEARS and Jerl Saeler", "name_abbreviation": "Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance v. Spears", "decision_date": "2004-12-16", "docket_number": "04-815", "first_page": "200", "last_page": "208", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 Ark. 200" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "200 S.W.3d 436" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "347 Ark. 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683375 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155530 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 21-9-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-703", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-211", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158885 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Spears I" }, { "parenthetical": "Spears I" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "315" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0305-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 522, "char_count": 14524, "ocr_confidence": 0.727, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.8648112720239546e-08, "percentile": 0.3680260895519391 }, "sha256": "59a38ed293f290cd1810bc68e063909f5bcb2fb0fa0f68ad7041a22476b699cc", "simhash": "1:7b324fd6881d56af", "word_count": 2346 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.617704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Thornton, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Barbara SPEARS and Jerl Saeler" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Justice.\nAppellant Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance (Farm Bureau) appeals from a jury verdict in Dallas County Circuit Court in favor of appellee Barbara Spears. Spears was driving a car owned by Jerl Saeler when a Coyote C-26 front-end loader, owned by the City of Fordyce and operated by Joseph Watson, collided with the vehicle. The jury found that Spears was entitled to uninsured-motorist coverage under an automobile policy with Farm Bureau, awarding damages in the amount of $15,188. Farm Bureau moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which was denied.\nOn appeal, Farm Bureau argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the jury delivered inconsistent verdicts and because Spears failed to meet her burden of proving that the front-end loader was an uninsured auto as defined in the insurance policy under which Spears was insured. In addition, Farm Bureau argues that the circuit court erred in instructing the jury that ambiguous terms in the insurance policy were to be construed against the insurer because Spears failed to present proof that the insurance policy contained ambiguous terms.\nWe hold that the circuit court erred in denying Farm Bureau\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, accordingly, we reverse and dismiss. As this is the second appeal of this matter to this court, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2 (a) (7).\nFacts\nA full recitation of the facts was set forth in the prior appeal of this case. Spears v. City of Fordyce, 351 Ark. 305, 92 S.W.3d 38 (2002) (Spears I). Here, we recite the facts that are pertinent to this appeal. In Spears I, Spears filed a complaint against the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, the operator of the front-end loader, and the Arkansas Public Entities Association (collectively referred to as \u201cthe City\u201d), alleging that she suffered physical injuries and property damages as a result of the negligence of the City of Fordyce and Joseph Watson. In addition, Spears claimed that she was entitled to receive benefits from Farm Bureau, based on an underinsured-motorist policy. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that the City was not required to carry liability insurance on the front-end loader because it was not a motor vehicle. Subsequently, Spears amended her complaint and alleged that in the event the circuit court determined that the City was immune from suit, she was entitled to recover the entire policy limits from an uninsured-motorist policy.\nThe circuit court granted the City\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that the City was immune from liability except to the extent of coverage by liability insurance. Further, the circuit court found that insurance coverage was not required for the front-end loader because it was \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-211 (Repl. 1994), and, as such, was not subject to registration with the State pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-703 (Repl. 1994).\nFarm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Spears\u2019s claim for benefits from the uninsured-motorist policy was improper because the front-end loader was not an \u201cauto\u201d as defined in the policy. The circuit court granted Farm Bureau\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that a front-end loader was special mobile equipment and was not a vehicle that was designed primarily to be used on public roads. Based on this finding, the circuit court concluded that Spears could not recover from the uninsured-motorist policy. In that case, we reversed and remanded the order of the Dallas County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of the City of Fordyce, Joseph Watson, and the Arkansas Public Entities Risk Management Association.\nSpears raised two points on appeal in Spears I. In her first point on appeal, she argued that the circuit court erred in determining that the front-end loader was \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d and, thus, not subject to registration with the State. We agreed and concluded that the appellants raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether the operation of the front-end loader on public roads was frequent and regular or merely incidental. See Spears I, 351 Ark. at 315, 92 S.W.3d at 44. Accordingly, we found that until this disputed factual question was resolved, it was impossible for us to determine whether the front-end loader is excepted from the statutory definition of \u201cmotor vehicle.\u201d See id.\nIn her second point on appeal, Spears argued that the circuit court erred when it granted Farm Bureau\u2019s motion for summary judgment. We held that the motion for summary judgment was premature, stating:\nSpecifically, we conclude that the issue of whether appellants may recover from Farm Bureau is not ripe for consideration until the issue of whether the City was required to carry insurance on the front-end loader is resolved. Because we have determined that this issue is not yet resolved, any consideration by the trial court of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Farm Bureau was premature, and any review by this court of the disposition of such a motion would also be premature. Accordingly, we decline to consider the merits of appellants\u2019 second point on appeal.\nSpears I, 351 Ark. at 315, 92 S.W.3d at 44.\nAfter our reversal in Spears I, in a bifurcated trial, the jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that the front-end loader owned and operated by the City constituted \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d as defined in \u00a7 27-14-211. Farm Bureau moved for a directed verdict. The circuit court denied the motion and submitted to the jury the issue of whether Spears was entitled to recover damages from Farm Bureau through uninsured-motorist coverage.\nThe jury returned a verdict in favor of Spears and fixed her damages at $15,188.00. Subsequently, Farm Bureau filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, raising the same arguments that it does here on appeal. The circuit court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.\nInconsistent Jury Verdicts\nWe begin by addressing Farm Bureau\u2019s argument that the jury verdicts in this case are inconsistent because as a matter of law, once the jury determined that the front-end loader was \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d in Spears\u2019s case against the City, it could not then determine that the front-end loader was an \u201cauto\u201d in Spears\u2019s case against Farm Bureau. Specifically, Farm Bureau contends that upon the jury\u2019s determination that the front-end loader was special mobile equipment, the question of whether or not the uninsured-motorist protection of the insurance policy applied was resolved because the front-end loader could not be both \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d and an \u201cauto\u201d at the same time. We disagree with Farm Bureau\u2019s argument that the issue was resolved once the jury determined that the front-end loader was special mobile equipment in Spears\u2019s case against the City. Rather, the issue of whether the front-end loader was special mobile equipment was the threshold issue in this case. Section 27-14-211 provides in part:\n\u201cSpecial mobile equipment\u201d means every vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and incidentally operated or moved over the highways, including farm tractors, road construction or maintenance machinery, ditch-digging apparatus, well-boring apparatus, and concrete mixers.\n(Emphasis added.)\nSince municipalities are immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they may be covered by liability insurance, see Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 21-9-301, and municipalities are not required to maintain liability insurance on special mobile equipment, see Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-703, then a finding by the jury that the front-end loader was special mobile equipment means that the City was not required to maintain liability insurance on the front-end loader. At that point, Spears could recover from: (1) the City if, despite not being required to maintain liability insurance, it had insured the front-end loader, or (2) Farm Bureau, if the front-end loader was an uninsured auto under the insurance policy.\nStill, Farm Bureau maintains that a vehicle which is deemed \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d and not a \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d pursuant to \u00a7 27-14-211 cannot be deemed an \u201cauto\u201d under the insurance policy. Perhaps this would be so if the definition of \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d under \u00a7 27-14-211 were the same as the definition of \u201cauto\u201d as set out in the insurance policy. Flowever, that is not the case here.\n\u201cSpecial mobile equipment,\u201d in relevant part, is \u201cevery vehicle not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property and incidentally operated or moved over the highways. . . .\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-14-211 (emphasis added). The definition of \u201cauto,\u201d as set out in the insurance policy, is \u201ca motor vehicle, semi-trailer or trailer designed primarily to be used on public roads.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Clearly, a vehicle could be designed primarily to be used on public roads, even though it is not designed or used primarily for the transportation of persons or property over the highways. Therefore, we reject Farm Bureau\u2019s argument that, as a matter of law, the front-end loader at issue cannot be both \u201cspecial mobile equipment\u201d under the Arkansas Code and an \u201cauto\u201d under the terms of the insurance policy.\nJudgment Notwithstanding the Verdict\nA circuit court is to evaluate a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict by deciding whether the evidence is sufficient for the case to be submitted to the jury; that is, whether the case constitutes a prima facie case for relief. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tucker, 353 Ark. 730, 120 S.W.3d 61 (2003). In making that determination, the circuit court does not weigh the evidence; rather, the circuit court is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. The standard of review for a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc. v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383 (2002). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. A motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence is a prerequisite to a post-trial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Ark. R. Civ. P. 50(b)(1).\nIn this case, the circuit court instructed the jury that Spears\u2019s claim against Farm Bureau was based on an insurance policy for uninsured-motorist coverage, and that to prevail on her claim, Spears had the burden of proving: (1) that she sustained damages; (2) that Joseph Watson was negligent; (3) that such negligence was a proximate cause of Spears\u2019s damages; (4) that an insurance policy issued by Farm Bureau for the benefit of Spears containing uninsured-motorist coverage was in effect at the time of the collision; and (5) that the front-end loader was an uninsured auto as defined in the insurance policy. Further, the circuit court stated:\nYou are instructed that an uninsured motorist provision of the policy under which Barbara Spears was insured, provided as follows:\nUninsured Motorist Coverage. This coverage will pay bodily injury damages, except punitive damages, that you are legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured auto. Bodily injury must be caused by an accident arising out of the operation, maintenance, or use of the uninsured auto.\nYou are instructed that the term auto, as used in plaintiffs automobile policy, means \u201ca motor vehicle, semi-trailer or trailer designed primarily to be used on public roads.\u201d\n* * *\nFarm Bureau argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Spears failed to present proof that the front-end loader was an \u201cauto\u201d as defined in the insurance policy. Specifically, Farm Bureau contends that Spears failed to offer substantial evidence that the front-end loader was \u201cdesigned primarily to be used on public roads.\u201d Farm Bureau maintains that the focus of Spears\u2019s proof at trial was the actual use of the front-end loader, as opposed to the purpose of the design of the front-end loader.\nAt trial, Joseph Watson, the operator of the front-end loader at the time of the accident, stated that the City used the front-end loader for cleaning ditches or making ditches, as well as clipping buildup on the side of the street and loading gravel and dirt. Fie further stated that the front-end loader was used frequently on the city streets. Watson testified that the front-end loader was designed for the purpose of \u201cmov[ing] dirt.\u201d Mayor William Lyon testified that vehicles such as front-end loaders are designed to be used \u201coff the street.\u201d No further evidence was presented concerning the purpose of the front-end loader\u2019s design.\nAs stated previously, Spears had the burden of proving that the front-end loader was an uninsured \u201cauto\u201d under the insurance policy. We agree with Farm Bureau\u2019s contention that the evidence presented at trial failed to prove that the front-end loader was \u201cdesigned primarily to be used on public roads\u201d and, thus, an \u201cauto\u201d as defined in the insurance policy. Since Spears failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the front-end loader was an uninsured auto under the insurance policy, an essential element in this case, we conclude that there is not substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict in favor of Spears. As such, we hold that the circuit court erred in denying Farm Bureau\u2019s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and we reverse and dismiss. It is unnecessary for us to address Farm Bureau\u2019s remaining arguments on appeal.\nReversed and dismissed.\nThornton, J., not participating.\nBoth Spears and Saeler, the owner of the vehicle Spears was driving, filed suit. For convenience, we refer only to Spears.\nSpears does not appeal this finding.\nOur resolution of the issue on this basis makes it unnecessary to address whether the font-end loader was uninsured.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wright, Berry, Hughes & Moore, by: Rodney P. Moore, for appellant.", "Holleman & Associates, P.A., by: John T. Holleman, IV, and Stacy D. Fletcher, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SOUTHERN FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY v. Barbara SPEARS and Jerl Saeler\n04-815\n200 S.W.3d 436\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 16, 2004\nWright, Berry, Hughes & Moore, by: Rodney P. Moore, for appellant.\nHolleman & Associates, P.A., by: John T. Holleman, IV, and Stacy D. Fletcher, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0200-01", "first_page_order": 222, "last_page_order": 230 }