{ "id": 5459597, "name": "Roger SCHUBERT v. TARGET STORES, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Schubert v. Target Stores, Inc.", "decision_date": "2005-01-27", "docket_number": "04-882", "first_page": "404", "last_page": "412", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 Ark. 404" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "201 S.W.3d 909" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "17 Ark. App. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6655127 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/17/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 F. Supp. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 1437582 ], "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/187/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 344", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871461 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0344-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ark. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1724150 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/241/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 69", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74077 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" }, { "page": "546", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 443", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111386 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" }, { "page": "713", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0443-01" ] }, { "cite": "814 So.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9440450 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/814/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Ark. 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1678924 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/261/0622-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 832, "char_count": 19506, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.821851917098454e-07, "percentile": 0.7193205086474154 }, "sha256": "aa77d26525962a6ebb216703e00e725efcf12f912b3509a97a1249538a2113ff", "simhash": "1:30931dba95dd86c7", "word_count": 3103 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:58:07.617704+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Roger SCHUBERT v. TARGET STORES, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nAppellant Roger Schubert appeals from the circuit court\u2019s order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Target Stores, Inc. (Target). Schubert argues the following points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred in concluding that Arkansas\u2019 conflicts-of-law rules require application of the substantive law of the state of Louisiana to this case; and (2) the circuit court erred in its application of Louisiana law. We reverse and remand on the first point.\nSchubert is a resident of Enid, Oklahoma, and was employed by J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (Hunt), as a tractor-trailer driver. Hunt is a business corporation with its principal offices in Lowell, Arkansas. Target is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business outside of Arkansas, but it is authorized to do business in Arkansas. Target owns and operates a distribution center in Maumelle.\nOn April 1, 1998, Target entered into a transportation contract with Hunt wherein Hunt agreed to transport material for Target. Under the contract, Hunt was required to provide workers\u2019 compensation coverage for the benefit of both Target and Hunt in the event of an injury to one of Hunt\u2019s employees.\nOn February 19, 1999, Schubert was dispatched to hook up a sealed trailer that was loaded with bales of cardboard boxes by Target\u2019s employees at its distribution center in Maumelle. Schubert then transported the load to an International Paper facility in Mansfield, Louisiana, for recycling. Once there, Schubert opened the trailer doors, and a 1000 pound bale of cardboard fell from the trailer and hit Schubert, thereby injuring him.\nSchubert subsequently filed a workers\u2019 compensation claim against Hunt in Oklahoma and was awarded $46,476.30 in benefits minus attorney\u2019s fees and minus a credit in favor of Hunt. Thereafter, Schubert filed a complaint in Arkansas in Pulaski County Circuit Court against Target and alleged that Target\u2019s employees were negligent in loading the bales of cardboard into the trailer and inspecting the same. Schubert sought damages in excess of $50,000. Target next filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that Louisiana law should apply as the place of the accident and that Schubert\u2019s receipt of workers\u2019 compensation benefits was his exclusive remedy against Target under Louisiana law. According to Target, it was the statutory employer of Schubert under Louisiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation law, and as such, Schubert\u2019s claim was barred by Louisiana\u2019s exclusive-remedy doctrine.\nTarget attached an affidavit to its summary-judgment motion from Rodney Schluterman, the facility operations group leader at the Target distribution center in Maumelle, who averred that the distribution center in its course of business receives cardboard boxes from various manufacturers containing products that are then removed and placed in separate packaging. Schluterman further averred that the empty cardboard boxes have to be discarded. Accordingly, Target compacts the boxes into bales bound with wire that are then loaded by forklift into trailers that take the bales to various locations where the cardboard is recycled. Schluterman further asserted that the receiving, compacting, handling, loading, and shipping of cardboard boxes is an integral part of Target\u2019s business and is essential to the ability of Target to generate its products and service.\nThe circuit court held a hearing on the summary-judgment motion and then entered its order. In that order, the circuit court concluded that Louisiana law should apply after \u201cconsideration of a mixture of the five choice-influencing factors set forth in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Company, 261 Ark. 622, 550 S.W.2d 453 (1977) [,] as well as other Arkansas precedent considering the lex loci delicti approach.\u201d The order further stated:\n7. Under Louisiana Law, a principal which is a statutory employer of the plaintiff is immune from tort liability. A principal becomes a statutory employer when \u201cthere is a written contract between the principal and a contractor which is the employee\u2019s immediate employer or his statutory employer, which recognizes the principal as a statutory employer.\u201d See La. R. S. 23:1061 [(A)](3). Whether a principal is a statutory employer for workers\u2019 compensation purposes is a question of law for the court to decide. See Maddox v. Superior Steel, 814 So.2d 569, 572 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., 2001).\n8. The Court finds that the contract between Target andJ.B. Hunt recognizes Target as plaintiff\u2019s statutory employer for purposes of worker\u2019s compensation law. Specifically, the contract requires that J.B. Hunt retain worker\u2019s compensation insurance with Target as an insured under that policy. Since Target andJ.B. Hunt contracted that Target was to be insured by workers\u2019 compensation insurance, then the parties intended that Target be protected by the exclusive remedy doctrine. That protection is the essence of being a \u201cstatutory employer.\u201d\n9. This statutory employer status can be overcome only if the plaintiff can establish \u201cthat the work is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate that individual principal\u2019s goods, products or services.\u201d Id. at 23:1061 [(A)](3).\n10. The Court finds that Target\u2019s acquiring, storing and shipping of cardboard bales is an integral part or essential to the ability of Target to generate its goods, products or services.\nThe circuit court found that Target was a statutory employer and that Schubert\u2019s claim was barred by the exclusive-remedy doctrine.\nSchubert first argues that the circuit court erred in applying Louisiana law to this case, because while stating in its order that it considered the choice-influencing factors set out in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., supra, the circuit court\u2019s ruling at the hearing showed that the court only considered the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule to apply Louisiana law. This strict application was error, Schubert contends, because this court held in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra, that the five choice-influencing factors are to be used in conjunction with lex loci delicti, when deciding whether to apply the forum state\u2019s substantive law or another state\u2019s substantive law. Schubert next analyzes each of the five choice-of-law factors and concludes that this case had significant contacts with the state of Arkansas and that the better rule of law was found in Arkansas, not Louisiana.\nTarget responds that the circuit court correctly applied Louisiana substantive law under the doctrine of lex loci delicti, because this doctrine controls in tort cases and is not overcome unless application of choice-influencing factors demonstrates a compelling reason to decide a case otherwise. Target concludes that in this case, the choice-influencing factors do not override lex loci delicti. Target also examines the five Wallis factors and notes that Schubert forum-shopped by filing suit in Arkansas, because Arkansas has a three-year statute of limitations on tort claims, whereas Louisiana only has a one-year statute of limitations and Oklahoma has a two-year statute of limitations. Target urges that lex loci delicti, the five Wallis factors, and the suggestion of forum shopping militate in favor of an affirmance in this case. We disagree.\nThe law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\n. . . Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. On appellate review, we determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. We view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties.\nDodson v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 443, 447, 57 S.W.3d 710, 713 (2001) (internal citations omitted).\nThree Arkansas cases appear particularly pertinent in deciding which state\u2019s substantive law should be applied in this case. See Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 348 Ark. 69, 71 S.W.3d 542 (2002); Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra; McGinty v. Ballentine, 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966). In McGinty v. Ballentine, supra, this court followed the lex loci delicti choice-of-law rule and held that a victim\u2019s family could not file a wrongful-death claim in Arkansas (1) when the accident occurred in Missouri, (2) the victim did not reside in Arkansas, (3) the administratrix of the victim\u2019s estate was not appointed by an Arkansas court, and (4) the appellee-defendant only had a place of business in Arkansas. In McGinty, this court intimated that while Arkansas\u2019 wrongful-death statute of limitations is more favorable to the administratrix, she should not be permitted to forum shop for a state where the law was most favorable to her cause, especially when the case\u2019s connection with Arkansas was so minimal.\nIn Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra, we observed that the doctrine of lex loci delicti had fallen under much criticism and looked to five new factors in our analysis. In that case, Jeff Wallis and his mother, both residents of Arkansas, were returning to Arkansas from a trip to Ohio, when their vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer truck in Missouri driven by Howard Long, a resident of Pennsylvania. Long was an agent of Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., which is a Pennsylvania company authorized to do business in Arkansas. Wallis and his mother each brought an action against Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co. in Arkansas. At trial, the circuit court applied Missouri\u2019s law of contributory negligence as the law of the place of the accident, and the jury returned verdicts in favor of the defendant and against both Wallis and his mother.\nOn appeal, this court considered Dr. Robert A. Leflar\u2019s five choice-influencing factors, which include (1) predictability of results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum\u2019s governmental interests, and (5) application of the better rule of law. Focusing on the governmental-interest factor, this court found that the circuit court should have applied Arkansas\u2019 comparative-fault statutes in lieu of Missouri\u2019s contributory-negligence law, irrespective of the fact that the accident occurred in Missouri. The clear implication was that this was the better rule of law.\nIn Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., supra, this court affirmed the circuit court\u2019s application of Texas\u2019 two-year wrongful-death statute of limitations rather than Arkansas\u2019 three-year wrongful-death statute of limitations. In Gomez, a woman had been murdered in Texas by a recruiter employed by the appellee-defendant. The victim\u2019s family sued for wrongful death in Texas but failed to serve the correct defendant company within the two-year statute of limitations. Thereafter, the victim\u2019s family filed a wrongful-death action in Arkansas within Arkansas\u2019 three-year statute of limitations. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant company after applying Texas\u2019 statute of limitations. On appeal, this court looked to both the five choice-influencing factors set out in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra, and the doctrine of lex loci delicti and found that Arkansas did not have a significant relationship to the parties or to the injury, because every relevant action took place in Texas and every party was a resident of Texas. We analyzed the case, using the five factors, however, and said:\nIn Schlemmer v. Fireman\u2019s Fund Ins. Co., 292 Ark. 344, 730 S.W.2d 217 (1987), this court noted that it had adopted the Leflar choice-influencing approach in Wallis and had continued to use the approach. However, neither Schlemmer nor Wallis explicitly overruled McGinty and the other earlier cases applying the more mechanical lex loci delicti rule. Nor do we find it necessary to overrule McGinty and its progeny here. Instead, the adoption of the Leflar factors in Wallis and subsequent cases appears to be merely a softening of what previously had been a rigid formulaic application of the former rule of law.\nThis conclusion is consistent with Leflar\u2019s commentary on the issue.\nGomez, 348 Ark. at 76, 71 S.W.3d at 546 (internal citation omitted).\nIn the case at bar, after hearing arguments of counsel regarding summary judgment and after reviewing the briefs submitted, the circuit court granted Target summary judgment. The court reasoned that lex loci delicti was the prevalent choice-of-law rule, and it applied Louisiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation law, which barred Schubert\u2019s complaint. The ensuing circuit court\u2019s order states that the circuit court made its finding in favor of applying Louisiana law after considering lex loci delicti and the choice-influencing factors from Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra.\nIn McGinty, Wallis, and Gomez, this court began its analysis with a consideration of whether the case had any significant contacts with Arkansas. In the case at bar, Schubert is a resident of Oklahoma, and Target is not an Arkansas corporation but owns and operates a distribution center in Arkansas. However, Hunt is an Arkansas corporation, and the transportation of the cardboard bales began in Arkansas. Moreover, the cardboard bales were allegedly loaded in a negligent manner in Arkansas. Even though the accident occurred in Louisiana, we conclude that Arkansas has significant contacts with this case in light of the fact that the potential site of the negligence was where the bales were loaded, which was Arkansas, and Hunt\u2019s primary place of business is in this state.\nIt is clear to this court that we have evolved from a mechanical application of the law of the state where an accident occurred, as witnessed by our opinions in both the Wallis and Gomez cases. As we said in Gomez, this court adopted the choice-influencing factors in Wallis to soften the formulaic application of lex loci delicti. We turn then to an analysis of the five factors endorsed in both those cases.\nThe first factor is the predictability of results. The consideration here is the ideal that a decision following litigation on a given set of facts should be the same regardless of where the litigation occurs in order to prevent forum shopping. In the case at bar, Louisiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation law under La. R. S. 23:1061 (A) could bar Schubert\u2019s recovery under the statutory-employer theory and the exclusive-remedy doctrine. Arkansas\u2019 workers\u2019 compensation law, on the other hand, provides in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 ll-9-105(b)(l) (Repl. 2002), that an injured employee who does not receive the necessary benefits may file a workers\u2019 compensation claim or file a complaint in circuit court. Thus, it appears that resolution of this case depends on which state\u2019s law applies.\nThe second consideration, maintenance of interstate and international order, is not a great concern for purposes of this case. Residents of Louisiana will not likely engage in negligent conduct in Arkansas to avail themselves of our workers\u2019 compensation statutes, and residents of Arkansas will not likely engage in negligent conduct in Louisiana to avail themselves of Louisiana\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation statutes.\nThe third consideration, simplification of the judicial task, also is not a paramount consideration, because the law at issue does not exist for the convenience of the court that administers it, but for society and its members. In Gomez, this court followed Dr. Leflar\u2019s reasoning that where the out-of-state law is outcome-determinative and easy to apply, there is no good reason not to consider importing it as the law governing the case. In the case at hand, the Louisiana workers\u2019 compensation law is easy to apply and is outcome-determinative, because it appears to bar the case. The Arkansas workers\u2019 compensation law is also easy to apply and appears to allow a court suit. This factor does not appear to favor either party.\nLooking to the fourth consideration, advancement of the forum\u2019s governmental interests, this court examines the Arkansas contacts to decide this state\u2019s interest. Here, Arkansas\u2019 contacts to the accident are at the site in Maumelle where the negligence allegedly occurred and the fact that Hunt\u2019s principal place of business is Arkansas. Louisiana\u2019s sole contact is the place where the accident occurred. Arkansas has a significant governmental interest in this case, because Arkansas has a real interest in protecting its people from negligent behavior and in protecting Arkansas employees.\nUnder the fifth consideration, application of the better rule of law, we hold that the circuit court erred in applying Louisiana law, because that law prevents a suit in tort for negligence against a non-employer like Target. Louisiana law, according to the circuit court, would transform Target into a statutory employer and hold Target immune from tort liability. As a result, Schubert is foreclosed from his day in court. This is akin to the situation in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra, where we viewed the Arkansas comparative-fault law as superior to the Missouri contributory-negligence law, which would have denied the plaintiff-victim any damages.\nWe conclude that Arkansas has significant contacts with this case and that any assertion of forum shopping is unfounded. Moreover, Target\u2019s citation to a 1960 federal district court case, McAvoy v. Texas E. Transmission Corp., 187 F. Supp. 46 (W.D. Ark. 1960), is not determinative. McAvoy was decided before this court\u2019s opinions in Wallis v. Mrs. Smith\u2019s Pie Co., supra, and Gomez v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., supra. The fact that our court of appeals cited McAvoy in a 198.6 decision, Orintas v. Meadows, 17 Ark. App. 214, 706 S.W.2d 199 (1986), is clearly not binding on this court. We note, in addition, that the principles of lex loci delicti and the five choice-of-law factors were reiterated by this court as recently as 2002 in the Gomez case. In light of this history, the McAvoy decision is simply not controlling authority for this case.\nIn short, we hold that, based on the significant contacts Arkansas has with this case and its better rule of law, the substantive law of Arkansas applies. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of Target on the choice-of-law point and remand for further proceedings. Because we reverse on the first point, there is no need for this court to address Schubert\u2019s second point related to Louisiana\u2019s substantive law.\nReversed and remanded.\nThe distinguished law professor Dr. Robert A. Leflar, set out the five factors in his treatise, Robert A. Leflar et\u00fa., American Conflicts Law (4th ed. 1986) (previous editions released in 1959,1968, and 1977), and in several law review articles. See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Arkansas the Choice Influencing Considerations, 28 Arx. L. Rev. 199 (1974).", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Bassett Law Firm, by: J. David Wall, for appellant.", "Wright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: Kyle R. Wilson and Justin T. Allen, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Roger SCHUBERT v. TARGET STORES, INC.\n04-882\n201 S.W.3d 909\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 27, 2005\nBassett Law Firm, by: J. David Wall, for appellant.\nWright, Lindsey & Jennings, by: Kyle R. Wilson and Justin T. Allen, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0404-01", "first_page_order": 426, "last_page_order": 434 }