{ "id": 5683145, "name": "Charles SLUDER and Misty Sluder v. STEAK & ALE of LITTLE ROCK, INC. d/b/a Bennigan's Grill & Tavern of Texarkana, and MRS Management Company, LP", "name_abbreviation": "Sluder v. Steak & Ale of Little Rock, Inc.", "decision_date": "2005-03-31", "docket_number": "03-1138", "first_page": "267", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 Ark. 267" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "206 S.W.3d 213" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "249 S.W. 21", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1923, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ark. 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1357168 ], "year": 1923, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/157/0528-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ark. 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 369325 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/325/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ark. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 51260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/336/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ark. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 130713 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/339/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ark. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3713299 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/359/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "234 Ark. 280", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1688363 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/234/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "245 Ark. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1606782 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/245/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ark. 963", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 683375 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Cadillac Cowboy IF'" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Cadillac Cowboy IF'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/347/0963-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240941 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Cadillac Cowboy T'" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Cadillac Cowboy T'" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-3-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ark. 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 236168 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/329/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ark. 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1734179 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/238/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 S.W.3d 923", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 5460571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 Ark. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5462930 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 S.W.3d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 5405052 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 Ark. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5459720 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." }, { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 S.W. 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "123 Ark. 308", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1556213 ], "year": 1916, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/123/0308-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ark. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1871490 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/292/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ark. 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1240941 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ark/337/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 874, "char_count": 21260, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7457237907404424e-07, "percentile": 0.7077520735764904 }, "sha256": "8ee8a5d81d8d33b8b6a99ffca6a5f4cbb0dbf1f26d99b7e9b1bee93ad4d153ce", "simhash": "1:c12f8370586c16d4", "word_count": 3493 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:38:22.368604+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, J., dissents." ], "parties": [ "Charles SLUDER and Misty Sluder v. STEAK & ALE of LITTLE ROCK, INC. d/b/a Bennigan\u2019s Grill & Tavern of Texarkana, and MRS Management Company, LP" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Gunter, Justice.\nThis appeal arises from a Miller County Circuit Court\u2019s order granting a motion to dismiss filed by appellee, Steak & Ale of Little Rock d/b/a Bennigan\u2019s Grill & Tavern of Texarkana and MRS Management Company, LP (jointly \u201cBennigan\u2019s\u201d), pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state facts upon which relief could be granted. Appellants, Charles and Misty Sluder, appeal the trial court\u2019s order of dismissal, arguing that the facts alleged in their complaint were sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. We affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe following facts are alleged in appellants\u2019 complaint. On January 24, 2000, appellants were patrons of Bennigan\u2019s in Texarkana, and were socializing with a group hosted by Mr. Jon Beck. Mr. Beck was a regular customer at Bennigan\u2019s who frequently ran up expensive bar tabs and provided the bartenders with generous gratuities. In exchange for these tips, the bartenders frequently served Mr. Beck and others in his party after they became intoxicated. According to appellants\u2019 complaint, on January 24, 2000, the bartenders at Bennigan\u2019s served \u201cmultiple alcoholic beverages to [appellants] and others in their party\u201d who were \u201cclearly intoxicated\u201d at the time of the sale. Further, they alleged that Bennigan\u2019s, by and through their agents and employees, knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to Mr. Beck and other members of his party who were clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale and under circumstances where they should have known that individuals in the Beck party were clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale.\nAfter appellants left Mr. Beck\u2019s party at Bennigan\u2019s, Mr. Sluder drove his vehicle off the road, struck a tree, and was ejected from the vehicle. As a result, Mr. Sluder sustained severe and permanent injuries to his body, and incurred medical expenses in excess of $250,000.00.\nOn January 23, 2003, appellants filed a negligence action against appellees pursuant to the Arkansas Dramshop Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-101 et seq. (Supp. 2003). In the fourth paragraph of their complaint, appellants averred:\nBennigan\u2019s Grill & Tavern employees owed a duty to [appellants] to exercise reasonable care. Bennigan\u2019s Grill & Tavern employees breached that duty by negligendy serving several members of the Beck party alcoholic beverages when they were clearly intoxicated and posed a clear danger to themselves and others. As a direct and proximate result of the negligence of Bennigan\u2019s Grill 8c Tavern employees\u2019 conduct, Charles Sluder was involved in an automobile accident, which foreseeably and proximately resulted in serious and permanent personal injury to Charles Sluder and resulting damages to himself and Misty Sluder as set forth hereinafter.\nAppellants further alleged that Bennigan\u2019s knew or should have known that its conduct would result in injury to appellants or other;;. Appellants requested two-million dollars in damages for Mr. Sluder\u2019s medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, lost earning capacity, physical pain, and mental anguish. Mrs. Sluder sought damages for loss of consortium.\nOn February 19, 2003, appellees filed a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that appellants failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In their brief to support their motion to dismiss, appellees contended that they were not liable for injuries sustained by Bennigan\u2019s intoxicated patrons. Appellants responded on July 9, 2003. A hearing on the matter was held before the trial court on July 10, 2003. On July 11, 2003, the trial court granted appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). From this order, appellants bring their appeal.\nW e have repeatedly set forth our standard of review for orders of dismissal pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Branscumb v. Freeman, 360 Ark. 171, 187 S.W.3d 846 (2004). We review a trial court\u2019s decision on a motion to dismiss by treating the facts alleged in the complaint as true and by viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. In viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the facts should be liberally construed in plaintiff s favor. Id. Our rules require fact pleading, and a complaint must state facts, not mere conclusions, in order to entitle the pleader to relief. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).\nFurther, we are required to interpret Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104. We articulated our rules of statutory construction in Kyzar v. City of West Memphis, 360 Ark. 454, 201 S.W.3d 923 (2005), where we stated:\nThe first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction. Where the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Finally, the ultimate rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.\nId. (citations omitted). With these standards of review in mind, we turn to the merits of appellants\u2019 appeal.\nFor their sole point on appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, appellants contend that their complaint sets forth facts upon which relief can be granted under the Arkansas Dramshop Act. Appellants maintain that they do not assert a typical first-party dramshop case, but rather they argue that Bennigan\u2019s sale of alcoholic beverages to Mr. Beck, not Mr. Sluder, resulted in Mr. Sluder\u2019s injuries.\nIn response, appellees argue that the trial court was correct in granting their motion to dismiss because section 16-126-104 does not create a first-party cause of action against an alcoholic retailer, Bennigan\u2019s, for the self-inflicted injuries of Mr. Sluder. Appellees further contend that the motion to dismiss should have been granted because appellants did not allege in their complaint that Mr. Beck was the \u201cclearly intoxicated\u201d person under section 16-126-104 who inflicted Mr. Sluder\u2019s injury.\nThis issue requires our interpretation of Act 1596 of 1999, commonly known as the Dramshop Act, which is found at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-101 et seq. For years before the codification of these statutes, we declined to recognize dramshop civil liability for service of alcohol to intoxicated adults or minors. See Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965). However, in Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997), we modified our common-law rule set forth in Carr, supra, and held that a licensed vendor\u2019s violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-3-202 (Repl. 1996), which prohibited the sale of alcohol to minors, was evidence of negligence to be submitted to a jury. We concluded that the General Assembly had assigned a high duty of care to licensed alcohol vendors. Id. The reason that we modified our rule was in response to the legislature\u2019s enactment of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-3-202 for the purpose of protecting minors as a special class of citizens. See Branscumb v. Freeman, 360 Ark. 171, 187 S.W.3d 846 (2004).\nSubsequently, in Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999) (\u201cCadillac Cowboy T\u2019), we held that alcohol vendors can be held liable for negligence if they sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons who cause injury to third persons. In Jackson, appellee, Cadillac Cowboy, through its agents and employees, sold alcoholic beverages at the Sundowners Club to Kevin Holliday, who was intoxicated. He drove himself home, and on the way, struck the vehicle of a third party, James Jackson, and caused Mr. Jackson\u2019s death. Pam Jackson, the administratrix of his estate, filed suit against Cadillac Cowboy and its owners. Cadillac Cowboy and its owners moved to dismiss Jackson\u2019s complaint under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, we overruled Carr, supra, and its progeny and held that evidence of the sale of alcohol by a licensed vendor to an intoxicated person is some evidence of negligence. We reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. Id.\nIn response to our decision in Cadillac Cowboy I, but prior to the trial on remand, the General Assembly passed Act 1596 of 1999. Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-126-101 provides:\nThe General Assembly finds and determines that it needs to clarify and establish its legislative intent regarding the sale of aleoholic beverages as addressed by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Shannon v. Wilson, 329 Ark. 143, 947 S.W.2d 349 (1997),and Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999).\nId.\nPursuant to our opinion in Cadillac Cowboy I, the case was remanded, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Ms. Jackson. Cadillac Cowboy appealed, and in Cadillac Cowboy v. Jackson, 347 Ark. 963, 69 S.W.3d 383 (2002) (\u201cCadillac Cowboy IF\u2019), we held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applied and that the trial court was correct in applying the duty of care that we set forth in Cadillac Cowboy I, which was based on statutes that existed at the time of that decision.'We concluded that the trial court was bound by our mandate in Cadillac Cowboy I and that the newly-enacted Dram-shop Act did not apply. Id.\nHere, unlike the circumstances in Cadillac Cowboy II, the 1999 Dramshop Act applies because appellants filed their complaint on January 23, 2003. Thus, we will review the applicability of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104 to the present case.\nWith our statutory-construction rules in mind, we turn to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104, which involves the imposition of civil liability for the sale of alcohol to a clearly intoxicated person. The statute provides:\nIn cases where it has been proven that an alcoholic beverage retailer knowingly sold alcoholic beverages to a person who was clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or sold under circumstances where the retailer reasonably should have known the person was clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale, a civil jury may determine whether or not the sale constitutes a proximate cause of any subsequent injury to other persons. For purposes of this section, a person is considered clearly intoxicated when the person is so obviously intoxicated to the extent that, at the time of such sale, he presents a clear danger to others. It shall be an affirmative defense to civil liability under this section that an alcoholic beverage retailer had a reasonable belief that the person was not clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or that the person would not be operating a motor vehicle while in the impaired state.\nId.\nAppellants argue that, under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104, the sale from Bennigan\u2019s to Mr. Beck proximately caused Mr. Sluder\u2019s injuries. The facts alleged in appellant\u2019s complaint attempt to follow the statute by claiming that: (1) Bennigan\u2019s is the \u201calcoholic beverage retailer,\u201d (2) Mr. Beck is the \u201cclearly intoxicated\u201d person, and (3) Mr. Sluder is the \u201cother person\u201d who was injured.\nAppellants\u2019 argument is misplaced. Under section 16-126-104, the question of \u201cwhether or not the sale constitutes a proximate cause of any subsequent injury to other persons\u201d is for a civil jury to decide. Appellants allege the following facts regarding Bennigan\u2019s vis-a-vis Mr. Beck: (1) that Bennigan\u2019s knew that Mr. Beck was clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale, and (2) that Bennigan\u2019s reasonably should have known that Mr. Beck was clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale. However, appellants\u2019 complaint is deficient in that it fails to establish a sufficient nexus between the sale to Mr. Beck and the injury to Mr. Sluder. To establish a prima facie case under section 16-126-104, the plaintiff must allege that the intoxicated person, i.e., Mr. Beck, caused the injury. Appellants in this case failed to do so. During oral argument, appellants represented that Mr. Beck continued to order rounds of alcoholic beverages and to provide those drinks to Mr. Sluder, but appellants failed to plead those particular facts in their complaint. We have said that proximate cause is that cause which, \u201cin a natural and continuous sequence, produces damage.\u201d AMI Civ. 3rd 501; Bull v. Manning, 245 Ark. 552, 433 S.W.2d 145 (1968); Ben M. Hogan & Co. v. Krug, 234 Ark. 280, 351 S.W.2d 451 (1961). Here, the statute adds a specific requirement that the \u201cnatural and continuous sequence\u201d include a causal link between the intoxicated person and the injured third-party. Because appellants failed to plead the elements in that \u201cnatural and continuous sequence,\u201d which is required by the statute, we conclude that appellants\u2019 complaint is insufficient.\nIn construing section 16-126-104, we note that the legislature has established an affirmative defense, which provides that \u201can alcoholic beverage retailer had a reasonable belief that the person was not clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or that the person would not be operating a motor vehicle while in the impaired state.\u201d Id. Based upon our reading of this affirmative defense, we conclude that a causal connection must be pleaded between the sale to a \u201cclearly intoxicated person\u201d and the \u201csubsequent injury to other persons.\u201d\nWe further note that the legislature intended to leave intact existing law on pleadings and proof of proximate cause, particularly in light of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-105 (Supp. 2003), whereby the legislature specifically mentions that \u201cthe consumption of any alcoholic beverage, rather than the furnishing of any alcoholic beverage, is the proximate cause of injuries . . .\u201d except \u201cin the knowing sale of alcohol to a minor or to a clearly intoxicated person[.]\u201d Id.\nThus, we hold that, in order to sustain an action under section 16-126-104, appellants must establish in their pleadings a connection between the sale to a clearly intoxicated person and the subsequent injury to another person. To hold otherwise would produce an absurd result. We have said that we will not engage in interpretations that defy common sense and produce absurd results. See Shipley, Inc. v. Long, 359 Ark. 208, 195 S.W.3d 911 (2004); Green v. Mills, 339 Ark. 200, 4 S.W.3d 493 (1999); Yarbrough v. Witty, 336 Ark. 479, 987 S.W.2d 257 (1999); Citizens To Establish A Reform Party v. Priest, 325 Ark. 257, 926 S.W.2d 432 (1996).\nThe dissent maintains that Mr. Sluder voluntarily became intoxicated, but that fact is not alleged in Mr. Sluder\u2019s complaint. He avers that Bennigan\u2019s \u201cserved multiple alcoholic beverages to Plaintiffs and others in their party[,]\u201d and that \u201cBeck and other members of his party\u201d were \u201cclearly intoxicated.\u201d While Mr. Sluder may have been intoxicated on the night of the sale, Mr. Sluder does not name himself as an intoxicated person in his complaint. We cannot make such an inference because, based upon our standard of review, we look to the four corners of the complaint. Logan v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co., 157 Ark. 528, 249 S.W. 21 (1923). We treat the facts alleged in Mr. Sluder\u2019s complaint as true, and we view those facts in the light most favorable to him. Branscumb, supra.\nTherefore, based upon the foregoing conclusions, as well as our standard of review, we hold that the trial court correctly granted appellees\u2019 motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\u2019s order.\nGlaze, J., dissents.", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Gunter, Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\ndissenting. Sluder asks this court to recognize a cause of action against Bennigan\u2019s for having served \u2014 not sold \u2014 him alcohol, causing him to be impaired and causing his one-vehicle accident and resulting injuries. Until 1999, this court had long recognized the rule that a licensed retailer who sells alcoholic beverages is not responsible for injuries to a patron or third party. See First American Bank of North Little Rock v. Associated Hosts, Inc., 292 Ark. 445, 730 S.W.2d 496 (1987), and Bolen v. Still, 123 Ark. 308, 185 S.W. 811 (1916). Our court modified this rule in Jackson v. Cadillac Cowboy, Inc., 337 Ark. 24, 986 S.W.2d 410 (1999), stating that vendors of alcohol can be held liable for negligence if they sell alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons who, in turn, cause injury to third persons. However, the Jackson case in no way touches on or changes our longstanding rule of law that a licensed retailer has no liability for injuries sustained by a patron who voluntarily gets intoxicated and subsequently sustains injuries in a one-vehicle accident as Sluder had here.\nSluder attempts to include himself as an innocent \u201cthird party\u201d under the Jackson holding, and he characterizes himself as a third party under the facts of this case by labeling the retailer, Bennigan\u2019s, as the first party, Jon Beck as the party buying the alcohol, and Sluder as the \u201cother person\u201d allegedly injured as a result of Beck\u2019s purchase of alcohohc drinks for Sluder and others attending his party. Sluder tries to buttress his argument by relying on Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-126-104 (Supp. 2001), from the Dram-Shop Act, which reads in pertinent part as follows:\nIn cases where it has been proven that an alcohohc beverage retailer knowingly sold alcohohc beverages to a person who was clearly intoxicated at the time of such sale or sold under circumstances where the retailer reasonably should have known the person was clearly intoxicated at the time of the sale, a civil jury may determine whether or not the sale constitutes a proximate cause of any subsequent injury to other persons. (Emphasis added.)\nSluder reads \u00a7 16-126-104 to say he is the \u201cother person\u201d under the facts of this case because he was injured as a result of Beck\u2019s being intoxicated and Beck\u2019s purchasing the drinks that Sluder and \u201cother persons\u201d were served. Under present case law, a third party or other person does not include one who is injured as a result of his own intoxication. I cannot agree with Sluder\u2019s argument or reading of the statute. His reading ignores cases like Bolen, supra, and Associated Hosts, Inc., supra, which plainly hold that a retailer has no liability for injury to a patron who bought drinks from a tavern owner and subsequently became intoxicated and was injured as a result.\nSection 16-126-104 contains no language that even suggests that a guest or person who voluntarily becomes intoxicated and impaired should be able to sue the retailer/vendor furnishing the alcohol. Neither Arkansas case law nor statutory law provides such a remedy to a person whose own unlawful acts caused the injuries he sustained. As noted above, Sluder argues he is the \u201cother person\u201d alluded to in \u00a7 16-126-104, but nothing in Arkansas law provides a cause of action for personal injury of a voluntary inebriant.\nBennigan\u2019s maintains that Arkansas law only protects innocent third persons injured by an inebriate, and an intoxicated inebriate behind the wheel of a motor vehicle can hardly be described as an innocent third party. I agree. Bennigan\u2019s refutes Sluders\u2019 interpretation that Sluder is protected as the \u201cother person\u201d under the Dram-Shop Act by pointing out that the General Assembly could have written \u201cany person,\u201d if it had intended to broaden the effect of the protection, but chose not to do so.\nIn particular, \u00a7 16-126-106 specifically protects social hosts from civil liability resulting from personal injuries or property damages when an adult becomes inebriated as a guest. This is the only statute in the Dram-Shop Act in which the legislature specifically referred to \u201cpersonal injury.\u201d Clearly, the legislature was aware that personal injury could occur from excessive drinking and wanted to protect social hosts from such liability. I find it difficult to imagine that the General Assembly did not specifically omit a cause of action for adult inebriants who suffer from what amounts to a self-inflicted injury. Surely, the public policy of this state encourages personal responsibility and stewardship of one\u2019s drink.\nBecause \u00a7 16-126-104 does not specify that an alcohol beverage retailer is liable to a person who voluntarily gets drunk from alcohol served, not sold, to him, the person furnishing the alcohol under the statute is not liable as a matter of law for injuries that are self-inflicted.\nThe majority court merely affirms dismissal of Sluder\u2019s case because his complaint failed to pass muster under Rule 12(b) (6). In my view of this case, Sluder could rework the facts and allegations over and over, in an attempt to state a cause of action, but he will fail because Bennigan\u2019s owes no legal duty to Sluder in these circumstances. Therefore, I agree that Sluder\u2019s case should be dismissed, but I would do so with prejudice.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Mercy, Carter, Tidwell, L.L.P., by: W. David Carter, for appellants.", "Atchley, Russell, Waldrop & Hlavinka, L.L.P., by: Jeffery C. Lewis, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Charles SLUDER and Misty Sluder v. STEAK & ALE of LITTLE ROCK, INC. d/b/a Bennigan\u2019s Grill & Tavern of Texarkana, and MRS Management Company, LP\n03-1138\n206 S.W.3d 213\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 31, 2005\nMercy, Carter, Tidwell, L.L.P., by: W. David Carter, for appellants.\nAtchley, Russell, Waldrop & Hlavinka, L.L.P., by: Jeffery C. Lewis, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0267-01", "first_page_order": 287, "last_page_order": 299 }