{
  "id": 3558125,
  "name": "Martez HARRIS v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Harris v. State",
  "decision_date": "2005-10-13",
  "docket_number": "CR 05-83",
  "first_page": "502",
  "last_page": "505",
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      "cite": "363 Ark. 502"
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      "reporter": "Ark.",
      "case_ids": [
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      "year": 1996,
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        {
          "parenthetical": "Appellant failed to make an objection during the sentencing phase and thus the issue was not preserved for appeal"
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        {
          "parenthetical": "Appellant failed to make an objection during the sentencing phase and thus the issue was not preserved for appeal"
        }
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    {
      "cite": "544 U.S. 13",
      "category": "reporters:federal",
      "reporter": "U.S.",
      "case_ids": [
        5879404
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      "year": 2005,
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:29:41.293594+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Martez HARRIS v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.\nAppellant Martez Harris was charged with aggravated robbery and theft of property as a habitual offender with four or more felony convictions. A jury found him guilty of the charged offenses. During the sentencing phase, the State introduced Exhibits 13 and 14 for the purpose of proving the existence of four prior felony convictions. Exhibit 13 consists of documents compiled by the Arkansas Department of Correction, also known as a \u201cpen pack.\u201d Those documents identify Appellant as \u201cMartrez\u201d Harris and \u201cMartez\u201d Harris. Exhibit 14 contains certified copies of Appellant\u2019s prior felony convictions and the docket sheets for each conviction. The circuit court concluded as a matter of law that the documents in the \u201cpen pack\u201d were intended to read \u201cMartez\u201d based on information disclosed in the DOC admission summary \u2014 Appellant\u2019s picture, physical descriptions, and date of birth. Moreover, the State called Detective Lynda Keel to testify that the date of birth on each prior conviction was also Appellant\u2019s date of birth. Both exhibits were admitted without objection. When the State rested, Appellant\u2019s counsel moved to dismiss \u201con these priors,\u201d arguing that the State had \u201cfailed to make a prima facie showing that those are, in fact, convictions [.]\u201d The court denied the motion, concluding that the State had satisfied its burden of proof as to the existence of four prior felony convictions.\nOn appeal, Appellant contends that pursuant to a recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), the circuit court erred when it considered the identifying information contained in the \u201cpen pack\u201d and Detective Keel\u2019s testimony as proof of Appellant\u2019s prior felony convictions. In summary, Appellant\u2019s sole point on appeal is that under Shepard v. United States, supra, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution restricted the circuit court\u2019s consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine that Appellant had four prior felony convictions.\nAs a threshold matter, we are precluded from addressing Appellant\u2019s argument because it has not been properly preserved for appellate review. Appellant asserts on appeal that he objected to the name on the documents produced by the State because the name on the documents was \u201cMartrez\u201d Harris and not \u201cMartez\u201d Harris. The record, however, does not reflect such an objection. According to the record of proceedings before the circuit court, the State offered two exhibits, Exhibits 13 and 14, which included a \u201cpen pack\u201d and certified copies of prior convictions and docket sheets. Those exhibits were admitted into evidence without objection. In fact, Appellant repeatedly stated that he had no evidentiary objection to the exhibits. After the exhibits were admitted, Appellant reminded the circuit court that the State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior convictions reflected in the exhibits were Appellant\u2019s priors. Appellant agreed that the State could \u201cput on whatever evidence they [sic] want.\u201d\nIn addition to the exhibits, the State offered Detective Keel\u2019s testimony. Without objection, the detective testified that the photo in the \u201cpen pack\u201d was Appellant, that his birth date matched the birth date on the exhibits, and that she could identify him by his unique tattoos. At the end of this testimony, the circuit court concluded that the exhibits were Appellant\u2019s prior convictions. Appellant then moved to dismiss the priors on grounds that the State failed to make a prima facie showing that Appellant was convicted of four or more prior felony convictions while represented by counsel. Thereafter, the circuit judge examined the exhibits to verify the number of offenses and that Appellant had been represented by counsel. Upon finding that the State had met its burden of proof, the circuit court denied Appellant\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nThe record does not reflect that Appellant objected on Sixth Amendment grounds to the circuit court\u2019s consideration of extrinsic evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial. To the contrary, Appellant freely encouraged the State to find any way that it could to meet its burden of proof, including the use of extrinsic evidence. It is a well-settled principle of this court that we will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. Brown v. State, 326 Ark. 56, 931 S.W.2d 80 (1996) (Appellant failed to make an objection during the sentencing phase and thus the issue was not preserved for appeal).\nWhile Appellant recognizes that he failed to explicitly make the Sixth Amendment argument to the circuit court, he nonetheless suggests that \u201cit would have been wholly futile to argue the Sixth Amendment to the trial court, because at the time of the trial Shepard had not yet been decided . . . .\u201d Other than the narrowly defined exceptions to our contemporaneous objection rule outlined in Wicks v. State, 270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), we do not follow the plain-error doctrine whereby appellate courts address plain errors affecting substantial rights which were not brought to the attention of the trial court. Horn v. State, 282 Ark. 75, 665 S.W.2d 880 (1984). Accordingly, because Appellant failed to object on Sixth Amendment grounds to the circuit court\u2019s use of extrinsic evidence during sentencing and because the matter clearly does not fall within any of the Wicks exceptions, we are precluded from considering this point on appeal.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "William R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Erin Vinett, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.",
      "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Laura Shue, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Martez HARRIS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 05-83\n215 S.W.3d 666\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 13, 2005\nWilliam R. Simpson, Jr., Public Defender, by: Erin Vinett, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Laura Shue, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0502-01",
  "first_page_order": 526,
  "last_page_order": 529
}