{ "id": 3287421, "name": "MILLER BREWING COMPANY v. ED ROLESON, JR., INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Miller Brewing Co. v. Ed Roleson, Jr., Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-01-19", "docket_number": "04-1163", "first_page": "38", "last_page": "53", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 Ark. 38" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "223 S.W.3d 806" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 4-72-201", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 Ark. 516", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1886783 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/300/0516-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159703 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "935 S.W.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ark. 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 12025384 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/326/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 F. Supp. 486", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 12254638 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the five-year, catch-all statute applied to a claim under the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act because the Act contained no statute of limitations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/830/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-109", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-104", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-207", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-115", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74092 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 F.3d 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 302562 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/122/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)", "parenthetical": "A" }, { "page": "(8)" }, { "page": "(7)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-206", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(6)" }, { "page": "(6)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-5-1108", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 Ark. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 298572 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/330/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ark. 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 243564 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/338/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(1)" }, { "page": "(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1061, "char_count": 30399, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0421592402476633e-07, "percentile": 0.5511753774061731 }, "sha256": "8ae669bf0f555cc517b7b6255efee0f04e662313d1cdd95a66bfeeaa2fd34cb6", "simhash": "1:ab4f66d2d1950350", "word_count": 4876 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:57:27.447488+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Glaze, J., concurs in part, dissents in part." ], "parties": [ "MILLER BREWING COMPANY v. ED ROLESON, JR., INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Gunter, Justice.\nAppellant, Miller Brewing Company (\u201cMiller\u201d), appeals a judgment entered by the Crittenden County Circuit Court on a jury\u2019s verdict, awarding Ed Roleson, Jr., Inc. (\u201cRoleson\u201d) $1,600,000.00 in damages for breach of contract, violation of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, and civil conspiracy. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nSince 1943, Roleson has been, and continues to be, a wholesale beer distributor for Miller. Mike Roleson is the president of Roleson, which is located in Paragould. Under the Distributor Agreement between Roleson and Miller, Miller \u201cagree[d] to sell and [Roleson] agree[d] to buy and market\u201d specifically designated brands of beer in Greene, Poinsett, and Mississippi Counties.\nIn 1996, Miller developed an internal consolidation plan known as the \u201cWhite Paper\u201d in which Miller determined that it needed to reduce the number of wholesale distributors in Arkansas for optimum financial performance. In this plan, Miller concluded that Roleson would sell its business to White River Beverage Company, Inc. (\u201cWhite River\u201d), a Coors and Miller distributor located in Newport and owned by George O\u2019Conner. This internal memo was not made known to Mr. Roleson. In 1999, Mr. O\u2019Conner made an offer to purchase Roleson, which Mr. Roleson rejected. At trial, Mr. Roleson presented evidence that in order to remain economically viable in the current beer-distribution market, a distributor must maintain a market share of at least 25% to 30%; at the time of trial, Roleson\u2019s market share was about 24%. A Miller representative also testified at trial that, in order to maintain profitability in the current market, Roleson must grow its business. Otherwise, he thought that Roleson should exit the market.\nIn an effort to increase its market share in 2001, Roleson attempted to purchase Charles Campbell Distributing Company-(\u201cCampbell\u201d) in Blytheville. Campbell serviced the same territory serviced by Roleson. Campbell\u2019s primary business was distributing Coors products, but it had distribution rights for four brands of beer for which Miller had acquired the rights in 1999. These four brands (the \u201cAcquired Brands\u201d) \u2014 Hamm\u2019s, Henry Weinhard\u2019s, Mickey\u2019s, and Old English \u2014 made up about 4% of Campbell\u2019s business. While it is clear that Campbell and Roleson never entered into a signed contract, it is not clear exactly how close they came to that goal. There is no dispute that the parties were in negotiations. Campbell sent a letter to Roleson\u2019s accountant dated January 29, 2001, stating that he could not provide certain sales data, in case the sale did not go through, and stating that he would take \u201csix dollars per case for the year 2000 sales.\u201d In April of 2001, Roleson delivered to Campbell an unsigned contract whose terms appear slightly different from those mentioned in Campbell\u2019s letter and an earnest-money check.\nIn the meantime, Mr. Roleson met with a Miller representative, Jim Young, on February 12, 2001. During that meeting, Mr. Roleson told Mr. Young that he was in negotiations to buy Campbell\u2019s business. Mr. Young allegedly told Mr. Roleson that Roleson would get Campbell\u2019s Acquired Brands, and that he would help Roleson become an approved Coors distributor as well. Mr. Roleson and Roleson\u2019s general manager, Larry Holcomb, both testified that Mr. Young asked them to give him ten days to meet with his counterpart at Coors to help arrange the transfer. The day after his meeting with Mr. Roleson, Mr. Young met with George O\u2019Conner, the owner of White River. Mr. Roleson alleged, and Mr. O\u2019Conner denied, that Mr. Young informed Mr. O\u2019Conner about Roleson\u2019s negotiations with Campbell and instructed Mr. O\u2019Conner to purchase Campbell. In any event, Mr. O\u2019Conner and Mr. Campbell met on February 19, 2001, and entered into an oral agreement for White River to purchase Campbell. This oral agreement was later documented, and White River purchased Campbell. Mr. O\u2019Conner admitted that the February 19, 2001, meeting was the first time he had spoken with Mr. Campbell about buying his business, and testified that it was his president Jan Bratcher\u2019s idea to purchase Campbell. However, Mr. Bratcher testified that he did not think it was a good idea to purchase Campbell, that he did not know where Mr. O\u2019Conner got the idea to purchase Campbell, and that he set up the February meeting several days before February 19th at Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s request.\nMr. Roleson testified that Mr. O\u2019Conner called him on February 27, 2001, and offered to purchase Roleson. When Mr. Roleson rejected his offer, Mr. O\u2019Conner stated that he was in a \u201cmoral dilemma\u201d because he was going to buy Campbell. Both Mr. O\u2019Conner and Mr. Roleson testified that Mr. Young informally authorized White River\u2019s purchase of Campbell, but they differ as to whether this \u201cauthorization\u201d was a request by Mr. Young or merely permission and whether it occurred before or after the February 19th meeting. Mr. O\u2019Conner also told Mr. Roleson that he needed to sell to Mr. O\u2019Conner before \u201che had a heart attack fighting Miller.\u201d\nFinally, Mr. Roleson presented testimony that he attempted to acquire a Miller distributorship in Mountain Home in March of 1999, but was prevented from doing so by Miller. Miller would not approve any Arkansas purchasers, and the Mountain Home distributorship was sold to a Missouri distributor.\nRoleson filed a lawsuit against Miller, White River, and George O\u2019Conner. By the time the case was tried to the jury, the following claims remained against Miller: breach of contract, violation of the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, tortious interference with business expectancy, and civil conspiracy. At the close of Roleson\u2019s case, Miller moved for a directed verdict on each of the claims, which was denied by the circuit court. The jury returned a verdict in Miller\u2019s favor on the tortious-interference claim, but found for Roleson on the breach-of-contract claim, the violation of Franchise Act claim, and the civil-conspiracy claim. In response to interrogatories, the jury awarded $1,600,000.00 in damages on each of the three counts to Roleson. The circuit court then entered a judgment, awarding Roleson a total of $1,600,000.00 in damages. The circuit court denied Miller\u2019s subsequent motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. Miller appeals all three adverse verdicts; Roleson conditionally cross-appeals the tortiousinterference verdict, conditioned on our reversing all three verdicts in its favor.\nWe review the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for directed verdict, denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and denial of new-trial motion for whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, 991 S.W.2d 555 (1999); Mercantile Bank v. B & H Assoc., Inc., 330 Ark. 315, 954 S.W.2d 226 (1997). Substantial evidence is defined as evidence of sufficient force and character to compel a conclusion one way or the other with reasonable certainty; it must force the mind to pass beyond mere suspicion or conjecture. Swaim, supra. When making this determination, we examine the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the party on whose behalf judgment was entered. Id. Using this standard, we consider Miller\u2019s points on appeal.\nI. Violation of Franchise Practices Act\nWe first consider Miller\u2019s point on appeal involving the jury\u2019s finding that Miller violated the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act (\u201cFranchise Act\u201d or \u201cAct\u201d). Miller asserts that the trial court erred in submitting this claim to the jury for two reasons: (1) Roleson had no express or implied right under the Franchise Act or the franchise agreement to acquire additional brands or territories; and (2) Roleson\u2019s claim under the Franchise Act is preempted by the Arkansas Beer Wholesaler Statute, specifically, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-5-1108(a) (Repl. 1996).\nThe statutory provision of the Franchise Act at issue is set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-206 (Repl. 2001), which states in relevant part as follows:\nIt shall be a violation of this subchapter for any franchisor, through any officer, agent, or employee to engage directly or indirectly in any of the following practices:\n(6) To refuse to deal with a franchise in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faithf.]\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-206 (Repl. 2001). \u201cFranchise\u201d is defined by the Act as Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202(1) (A) (Repl. 2001). \u201cGood faith\u201d means \u201chonesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202(8) (Repl. 2001). The Franchise Act does not define \u201ccommercially reasonable manner.\u201d\na written or oral agreement for a definite or indefinite period in which a person grants to another person a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic within an exclusive or nonexclusive territory or to sell or distribute goods or services within an exclusive or nonexclusive territory at wholesale or retail, by lease agreement, or otherwise.\nWhether Miller dealt with the franchise in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith is a fact question for the jury. See Mercantile Bank v. B & H Associated, Inc., 330 Ark. 315, 320, 954 S.W.2d 226, 229 (1997). The question before us is whether, examining the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to Roleson, there was substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict that Miller did not deal with the franchise in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith. Id. We hold that there was substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s finding that Miller refused to deal with its franchise with Roleson in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith.\nMiller argues that there was no evidence to support this claim because the claim is not based on Roleson\u2019s rights under his existing contract with Miller, but on rights Roleson might have to enter into a future contract to purchase Campbell\u2019s business. Relying on the definition of franchise as \u201ca written or oral agreement,\u201d Miller argues that, because the Distributor Agreement between Miller and Roleson conferred no rights upon Roleson to enter into new contracts for other franchises covering other brands, there was no \u201cfranchise\u201d with regard to these other brands. Miller claims that, because Roleson had no franchise agreement with Miller with respect to Roleson\u2019s ownership of other brands and territories not specifically listed in the Distributor Agreement, Roleson could not make a claim of a violation of the Franchise Act with regard to such brands. We disagree.\nRoleson is not claiming that Miller violated some nonexistent franchise agreement between Miller and Roleson regarding other brands, but that Miller refused to deal with the existing franchise between Miller and Roleson in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith. According to Roleson, Miller adopted and executed a plan to eliminate Roleson as a distributor and applied pressure to other distributors \u2014 including Campbell, White River, and Mountain Home \u2014 in furtherance of that plan. While Miller\u2019s actions may not have caused Roleson to lose the brands and territories listed in the existing Distributor Agreement, Roleson claims that Miller\u2019s actions prevented it from growing its business and increasing its revenues, which was critical to its ability to remain competitive in the changing beer market.\nWhile we have not had an opportunity to interpret this provision of the Franchise Act, an opinion by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals offers some guidance. In Southern Implement, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 122 F.3d 503 (8th Cir. 1997), a franchisee ofjohn Deere equipment sued its franchisor, alleging that the franchisor permitted an unauthorized dealer to sell within the franchisee\u2019s assigned territory. Because the contract did not give the franchisee an exclusive right to sell Deere products in its \u201carea of responsibility [AOR]\u201d and because the contract did not require the franchisor to police a franchisee\u2019s AOR or prevent other dealers from establishing facilities in the AOR, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the franchisor on the Franchise Act claim. Id. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that \u2014 in spite of the lack of a specific contractual obligation \u2014 a jury could have found that the franchisor had an obligation to investigate and prevent others from operating an unauthorized facility. The court held that the failure to do so in that case could constitute bad faith. Id.\nWhile the Distributor Agreement between Miller and Roleson did not specifically address Roleson\u2019s acquisition of additional brands and territories, the law requires the parties to deal with the franchise in a commercially reasonable manner. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202(7) and 206(6). Without enumerating all of a franchisor\u2019s acts which might constitute a failure to deal with a franchise in a \u201ccommercially reasonable manner,\u201d we hold that a franchisor\u2019s attempt to force a franchisee out of business may constitute a refusal to deal with a franchise in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-206(6).\nWe now review whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict that Miller violated this provision of the Franchise Act. Roleson presented evidence at trial of the White Paper, which set forth Miller\u2019s plan to eliminate Roleson as a distributor. Testimony at trial indicated that this plan was not disclosed to Roleson. Larry Holcomb, Roleson\u2019s general manager, testified that he and Mr. Roleson found out from a Miller representative at a national sales meeting that Miller had thwarted Roleson\u2019s efforts to purchase Campbell in furtherance of that plan. The Miller representative stated that Miller simply \u201cwanted to grow the size of [certain] Miller distributors\u201d and that Roleson was not one of those distributors. The Miller representative said that Roleson was not \u201cin Miller Brewing Company\u2019s long term plans.\u201d Furthermore, in a courtesy call to Mr. Roleson to let him know that White River had made a deal to purchase Campbell and to make an offer to purchase Roleson, Mr. O\u2019Conner testified that he told Roleson he should sell before he died of a heart attack fighting Miller. The jury could have inferred from this testimony that Mr. O\u2019Conner knew of Miller\u2019s plan to force Roleson out of business.\nThere was also evidence in the testimony of Jim Young, Miller\u2019s representative, Jan Bratcher, White River\u2019s president, and Ed Roleson from which the jury could have found that the sale of Campbell to White River was executed in furtherance of Miller\u2019s overall plan to eliminate Roleson as a distributor. Mr. Bratcher stated that the plan to buy Campbell\u2019s business came unexpectedly from Mr. O\u2019Conner, and that he advised Mr. O\u2019Conner that it was a bad deal. Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s decision to buy Campbell and his subsequent meeting with Mr. Campbell occurred within days of Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s meeting with Mr. Young. Considering the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to Roleson, as we must under our standard of review, we hold that there was substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict that Miller \u201crefuse[d] to deal with a franchise in a commercially reasonable manner and in good faith\u201d in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-206(6).\nFinally, we reject Miller\u2019s argument that Roleson\u2019s Franchise Act claim is preempted by the Beer Wholesaler\u2019s Act. Miller cites a provision of the Act which requires a supplier, such as Miller, to pay \u201creasonable compensation\u201d to a wholesaler when the supplier has terminated, amended, or modified their agreement or otherwise interfered with a transfer of the wholesaler\u2019s business. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-5-1108(a) (Repl. 1996). It also provides that \u201cnothing contained in this subchapter shall give rise to a claim against the supplier or wholesaler by any proposed purchaser of a wholesaler\u2019s business.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Roleson\u2019s claim under the Franchise Act is not a claim against Miller by a proposed purchaser of a wholesaler\u2019s business, but by its own franchisee. Roleson\u2019s claim is that Miller refused to deal with the franchise in a commercially reasonable manner by attempting to put Roleson out of business. Miller\u2019s alleged interference with the potential purchase of Campbell was merely evidence used to support Role-son\u2019s claim. Thus, we hold that Roleson\u2019s Franchise Act claim is not preempted by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-5-1108(a) (Repl. 1996).\nII. Breach of Contract and Civil Conspiracy\nThe circuit court entered a total judgment amount of $1,600,000.00 upon the jury\u2019s verdict stating an amount of $1,600,000.00 in damages for each of the three counts in favor of Roleson. The parties have agreed that if we affirm on any one of the jury\u2019s three verdicts, the court\u2019s judgment must be affirmed. Because we have affirmed the jury\u2019s verdict on the Franchise Act claim, and therefore affirmed the jury\u2019s damages award of $1,600,000.00, we need not address Miller\u2019s arguments regarding the jury\u2019s verdicts on breach of contract or civil conspiracy.\nIII. Failure to Prove Damages and Injury\nMiller\u2019s next point on appeal is that the trial court erred in submitting Roleson\u2019s breach-of-contract and violation of Franchise Act claims to the jury because Roleson presented no evidence of damages. The gist of Miller\u2019s argument is that Roleson\u2019s claims involved Miller\u2019s interference with Roleson\u2019s \u201cright\u201d to purchase the Acquired Brands from Campbell. Miller contends that, because only 4% of the lost profits proven by Roleson resulted from failure to purchase the Acquired Brands, there were essentially no damages. We reject this argument.\nWith regard to the Franchise Act violation, Roleson\u2019s damages were whatever amount the jury determined that Roleson lost as a result of Miller\u2019s actions. It is irrelevant that only 4% of Campbell\u2019s profits resulted from the sale of Miller brands; the jury was not limited by the lost profits from the purchase of Campbell\u2019s Miller brands. The jury could have concluded, and obviously did conclude, that Miller\u2019s violation of the Franchise Act prevented Roleson from purchasing all of Campbell\u2019s brands.\nMiller\u2019s next point on appeal is that the trial court erred in submitting each of Roleson\u2019s claims to the jury because Roleson failed to prove that an injury was caused by the alleged wrongful acts. Miller argues that because Roleson\u2019s lost-profit damages were based almost solely upon its failure to acquire Campbell, Roleson must have shown that but for Miller\u2019s wrongful conduct, it would have acquired Campbell. Miller argues that there is not substantial evidence to support this causation element, and we must therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment on all claims.\nAgain, we review the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion for directed verdict, denial of motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and denial of new-trial motion for whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s verdict. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Swaim, 338 Ark. 49, 991 S.W.2d 555 (1999); Mercantile Bank v. B & H Assoc., Inc., 330 Ark. 315, 954 S.W.2d 226 (1997).\nFirst, causation is a question of fact for the jury to decide. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lee, 348 Ark. 707, 74 S.W.3d 634 (2002). The jury was free to believe Mr. Roleson\u2019s testimony regarding his negotiations with Campbell and discount Mr. Campbell\u2019s statements. In fact, our review requires us to review the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Roleson. Swaim, supra. Roleson offered several letters between it and Campbell regarding the purchase, clearly indicating that the parties were in negotiations prior to Roleson and Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s meeting with Mr. Young in February. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that Mr. Campbell and Mr. Roleson continued negotiating after February. In fact, Mr. Campbell admitted that he \u201ccould have\u201d had a telephone conversation in August with Mr. Roleson in which they agreed to a deal. The jury was free to infer that, absent Miller\u2019s involvement, this \u201cdeal\u201d would have been set forth in a formal contract and closed. Mr. Bratcher testified that he did not know where Mr. O\u2019Conner got the idea to buy Campbell\u2019s business, but that he advised Mr. O\u2019Conner that it was a bad deal. Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s decision to buy Campbell and his subsequent meeting with Mr. Campbell occurred within days of Mr. O\u2019Conner\u2019s meeting with Mr. Young. Both Mr. Roleson and Mr. Holcomb testified that they were told at a national sales meeting in April that Miller\u2019s executives did not want Campbell to go to Roleson but to White River. The jury was free to believe the testimony and inferences therefrom that Miller instructed Mr. O\u2019Conner to purchase Campbell and that, absent Miller\u2019s interference, Roleson and Campbell would have entered into a deal for the sale of Campbell\u2019s business to Roleson. Based upon the evidence presented, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the jury\u2019s finding.\nIV Statute of Limitations\nMiller argues that the trial court erred in submitting the Franchise Act claim because some of the evidence to support the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. This evidence concerned Miller\u2019s alleged interference with the potential purchase by Roleson in 1999 of a Mountain Home distributor\u2019s business. The trial court held that the five-year statute of limitations, set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-115 (1987), applied. Miller argues that the three-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105 (1987) should have applied. Roleson does not argue that the claim would not have been barred under a three-year limitations period, but that the trial court correctly applied the five-year limitations period. We review the trial court\u2019s interpretation of statutes de novo. Willis v. King, 352 Ark. 55, 98 S.W.3d 427 (2003).\nWhile Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-207 (Repl. 2001) contains a five-year statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions under the Arkansas Franchise Practices Act, the Act does not contain its own statute of limitations for civil actions. For this reason, the circuit court applied the five-year, catch-all statute of limitations set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-115 (1987). This statute applies to any Act or cause of action which does not specify its own limitation period and does not fit within one of the following specific statutory limitations periods: one year, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-104; three year, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105; statutory penalties, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-108; or actions against sheriffs, coroners, and other officials, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-109. See also Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993).\nMiller relies on our decision in Chalmers v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 326 Ark. 895, 935 S.W.2d 258 (1996), to support its argument that the three-year statute of limitations applies to civil claims under the Franchise Act. Miller\u2019s reliance is misplaced. The appeal in that case involved a fraud claim and whether the claim was tolled by fraudulent concealment and the continuing tort doctrine. Chalmers does not govern the issue before us.\nIn order to fit within the three-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105, the Franchise Act claim must be (1) \u201can action founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability not under seal and not in writing,\u201d section 105(1), or (2) \u201can action founded on any contract or liability, expressed or implied[,]\u201d section 105(3). Flowever, the franchise agreement is in writing and would arguably fit more appropriately within Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-111(a) (Supp. 2005), a five-year statute of limitations period for \u201c[ajctions to enforce written obligations, duties, or rights.\u201d See also Chalmers, supra (holding that the statute of limitations for breach of a written contract is five years).\nWe hold that neither Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-105 nor Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-111(a) applies in this case. The circuit court was correct: the catch-all, five-year statute of limitations applies to claims under the Franchise Act because none of the other statutes specifically applied. To hold otherwise would negate the very purpose of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-56-115. See, e.g., Jackson v. Swift-Eckrich, 830 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ark. 1993) (holding that the five-year, catch-all statute applied to a claim under the Arkansas Unfair Practices Act because the Act contained no statute of limitations).\nV Expert Testimony\nFinally, Miller argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of Roleson\u2019s two experts on damages because the experts repeatedly changed their opinions and methodology, making the opinions unreliable. This court has long recognized that the admissibility of expert testimony rests largely within the trial court\u2019s broad discretion, and we will not reverse the trial court\u2019s determination absent an abuse of that discretion. Mercantile Bank v. B & H Associated, Inc., 330 Ark. 315, 323, 954 S.W.2d 226, 231 (1997); See also Coca-Cola Bottling Company v. Gill, 352 Ark. 240, 261, 100 S.W.3d 715, 728 (2003).\nGenerally, the tendency is to permit the jury to hear the testimony of the person having superior knowledge in a given field unless clearly lacking in either training or experience, and too rigid a standard should be avoided. Mine Creek Contractors, Inc. v. Grandstaff, 300 Ark. 516, 780 S.W.2d 543 (1989). If some reasonable basis from which it can be said the witness has knowledge of the subject beyond that of persons of ordinary knowledge, his evidence is admissible.\nMercantile Bank, supra. Expert opinion testimony is admissible \u201cif. . . specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.\u201d Ark. R. Evid. 702.\nMiller argues that the trial court did not act as a \u201cgatekeeper\u201d as required by the Supreme Court\u2019s holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and our decision in Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000). Under those cases, the circuit court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying expert testimony is valid and whether the reasoning and methodology used by the expert has been properly applied to the facts in the case. Coca-Cola Bottling Company, 352 Ark. at 262, 100 S.W.3d at 729. Miller\u2019s primary concern is that Roleson\u2019s experts did not calculate lost profits with an assumption of sufficient risk. Miller also disagreed with the methodology used to calculate the projected future profits.\nMiller\u2019s arguments go to the weight of the expert\u2019s testimony and not to its admissibility. Miller elected not to call its own expert witness on damages to present contrary evidence using a different methodology including more potential risk. Miller was free to and did cross-examine both experts regarding their methods and risk assessment. We hold that both experts\u2019 knowledge and experience were sufficient to assist the jury in understanding the evidence and in determining the fact issues under Rule 702. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Roleson\u2019s experts to testify regarding damages.\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nGlaze, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.\nWe note that under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 3-5-1108 (Repl. 1996), a beer supplier may not terminate a distributor agreement without payment of reasonable compensation to the distributor.\nRoleson filed a motion for voluntary nonsuit of Mr. O\u2019Conner, which was granted by the circuit court. The circuit court also granted White River\u2019s motion for summary judgment, dismissing it from the lawsuit.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 4-72-201 to 210 (Repl. 2001).", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Gunter, Justice." }, { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice,\nconcurring in part; dissenting in part. The majority opinion affirms the trial court based on Miller\u2019s violation of the \u201cgood faith\u201d provision contained in the Franchise Act. In doing so, the majority affirms the trial court\u2019s award of damages for $1.6 million. It can be assumed that this amount represents Roleson\u2019s lost profits that he would have earned had he successfully purchased Campbell\u2019s entire business, including his Coors distributorship.\nThe Franchise Act defines \u201cfranchise\u201d as follows:\n[A] written or oral agreement for a definite or indefinite period, in which a person grants to another a license to use a trade name, trademark, service mark, or related characteristic within an exclusive or nonexclusive territory, at wholesale, retail, by lease agreement , or otherwise.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202(1) (Repl. 2001). According to the statute, the definition of franchise is expressly limited to the terms of the \u201cwritten or oral agreement.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 4-72-202(1) (Repl. 2001). In other words, the Franchise Act only governs what is contained within the franchise agreement. It is undisputed that Roleson did not have a right to acquire Campbell\u2019s Coors brands under the franchise agreement. Consequently, Roleson cannot collect full damages based on a violation of the Franchise Act alone.\nIn conclusion, it is my view that Roleson is limited to lost profits from the acquired brands, and is not entitled to damages stemming from Coors brands. If Roleson is entitled to the $1.6 million in damages, it must be based on either the tortious interference or civil conspiracy cause of action.\nCampbell\u2019s business was approximately 96% Coors and 4% acquired brands.\nThe opinion is incorrect when it states that, \u201cThe parties have agreed that if we affirm on any one of the jury\u2019s three verdicts, the court\u2019s judgment must be affirmed.\u201d", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice," } ], "attorneys": [ "Williams & Anderson PLC, by: Peter G. Kumpe and Kelly S. Terry; Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, by: Kent J. Rubens; and King & Spalding LLP, by: Michael W. Youtt, pro hac vice, for appellant.", "Tony L. Wilcox, P.A., and On, Scholtens, Wilhite & Averitt, PLC, by: Chris A. Averitt and Jay Scholtens, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MILLER BREWING COMPANY v. ED ROLESON, JR., INC.\n04-1163\n223 S.W.3d 806\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 19, 2006\n[Rehearing denied February 23, 2006.]\nWilliams & Anderson PLC, by: Peter G. Kumpe and Kelly S. Terry; Rieves, Rubens & Mayton, by: Kent J. Rubens; and King & Spalding LLP, by: Michael W. Youtt, pro hac vice, for appellant.\nTony L. Wilcox, P.A., and On, Scholtens, Wilhite & Averitt, PLC, by: Chris A. Averitt and Jay Scholtens, for appellee.\nGLAZE,J., would grant rehearing as to point two. CORBIN,J., not participating." }, "file_name": "0038-01", "first_page_order": 64, "last_page_order": 79 }