{ "id": 3286104, "name": "Michael Raymond MacKOOL v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "MacKool v. State", "decision_date": "2006-03-09", "docket_number": "CR 05-609", "first_page": "416", "last_page": "458", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 Ark. 416" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "231 S.W.3d 676" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 Ark. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3285999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/365/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 N.W. 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.", "case_ids": [ 199688 ], "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nd/7/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "1 N.D. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.D.", "year": 1897, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Vt. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Vt.", "case_ids": [ 370002 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/vt/171/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "649 S.W.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 9946013 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/649/0598-01" ] }, { "cite": "19 A.2d 71", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Pa. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1204546 ], "year": 1941, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/341/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 S.E.2d 818", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567356 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 P. 207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 N.M. 433", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 8512772 ], "year": 1918, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/24/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 N.J. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 710777 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj/132/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 A.2d 831", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.H. 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 4412185 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/128/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Nev. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Nev.", "case_ids": [ 2421655 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nev/62/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 P.2d 978", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 5236673, 5237382 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/146/0305-01", "/mont/146/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 Mont. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mont.", "case_ids": [ 5237382 ], "year": 1965, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mont/146/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Mo. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mo.", "case_ids": [ 1786334 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mo/329/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "425 Mass. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 274581 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/425/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 N.W.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10605873 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/450/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 N.E.2d 1112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "126 Ill. 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App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6136135 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming trial court's practice of inviting jurors to question witnesses and noting our approval of the practice in Ration, supra, and Nelson, supra" }, { "parenthetical": "affirming trial court's practice of inviting jurors to question witnesses and noting our approval of the practice in Ration, supra, and Nelson, supra" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/84/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "257 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8717312 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" }, { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/257/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ark. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1700079 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682-83" }, { "page": "898" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/230/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 Ark. 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1365304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/340/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ark. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 36021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/354/0226-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ark. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1443745 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/317/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ark. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1896959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "stating that witness' testimony that he found the victim crying and when he asked what was the matter, she said, \"He's going to kill me\" was admissible as a present-sense impression showing the victim's fear under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3)" }, { "parenthetical": "stating that witness' testimony that he found the victim crying and when he asked what was the matter, she said, \"He's going to kill me\" was admissible as a present-sense impression showing the victim's fear under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/311/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ark. 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 377680 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that statements that victims had told witnesses they were afraid of Hpdge, one made three weeks before death and one made two months before death, were not too remote in time, were admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3), and were relevant" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that statements that victims had told witnesses they were afraid of Hpdge, one made three weeks before death and one made two months before death, were not too remote in time, were admissible under Ark. R. 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STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Jim Hannah, Chief Justice.\nOn September 12, 2003, Ballard was stabbed to death in her home. Subsequently, Ms. Ballard\u2019s daughter, Leslie MacKool, and her husband, appellant Mike MacKool, were charged with the crime. Leslie and Mike were tried separately; at both trials, Leslie admitted to killing her mother, but alleged that she was forced to do so by Mike. At his trial, Mike was convicted of first-degree murder and theft of property. He was sentenced to forty years for the first-degree murder conviction and twenty years for the theft-of-property conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively.\nMike raises several assignments of error on appeal. Specifically, he argues that the circuit court erred: (1) in denying his motion for a directed verdict; (2) in denying his motion to suppress out-of-court statements; (3) in denying his motion to redact prejudicial and irrelevant portions of his statements; (4) in allowing Leslie MacKool to testify against him over his assertion of the marital privilege; (5) in allowing cumulative, hearsay statements of the victim expressing her fear of the appellant; (6) in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine prohibiting him from questioning the State\u2019s expert forensic pathologist about the emotional nature of the murder; (7) in allowing jurors to question witnesses; (8) in allowing nineteen irrelevant and highly prejudicial financial documents into evidence; (9) in allowing evidence during sentencing of a thirty-two-year-old investigation and a ten-year-old expunged conviction; and (10) in denying his motion for mistrial based on cumulative error. We affirm.\nFacts\nAt 6:00 a.m., on September 13, 2003, Mickey Holloway, a crime scene specialist for the Little Rock Police Department, found Ms. Ballard dead in her home. Ms. Ballard had been stabbed over seventy times, and her throat had been slit in an attempted decapitation. Further, one of Ms. Ballard\u2019s vehicles, a coin collection, and jewelry were missing from the home.\nHolloway was a friend of Ms. Ballard\u2019s, and he checked in with her daily. Because he was unable to reach Ms. Ballard on the telephone, he stopped by her house on the morning of September 13. After finding Ms. Ballard\u2019s body, Holloway immediately contacted the Little Rock Police Department, and Officer Steve Dodge was dispatched to the Ballard home to secure the crime scene and begin an investigation into the murder. Upon Dodge\u2019s arrival, Holloway told him to question Leslie and Mike because they were probably responsible for the murder.\nHolloway suggested that Dodge question the two because on numerous occasions, Ms. Ballard had told Holloway that she was afraid that Leslie and Mike would kill her for her money. In the days leading up to her death, Ms. Ballard expressed those same fears to others. After her husband and Leslie\u2019s father, Lester Ballard, died on August 19, 2003, Ms. Ballard became much more fearful.\nUnder Mr. Ballard\u2019s will, Ms. Ballard was the primary beneficiary, and Leslie was entitled to receive only $25,000 of an estimated $2.4 million estate. Leslie testified that when Mike read the will, he interpreted it to say that if her mother died within thirty days of her father, Leslie would inherit everything. She said that Mike then began telling her that her mother deserved to die.\nLeslie further testified that Mike devised a plan for her to kill her mother, and he forced her to cooperate by telling her that if she did not do it, he would kill her and her mother. She said that Mike told her she was to dress all in black and wear a wig and gloves while committing the crime. Leslie testified that on the morning of the murder, Mike woke her and told her that they were going to her mother\u2019s house. 'She said that she did not dress herself; rather, Mike dressed her in a black turtleneck, black ski pants, and a black wig. She said that Mike gave her a backpack that contained a towel, a pair of \u201cwire clipper things,\u201d and a butcher knife. Leslie testified that Mike told her that in order to cause her mother\u2019s death, she needed to stab her mother in the neck, kidneys, and lungs.\nLater that morning, Mike dropped Leslie off at her mother\u2019s house, and Leslie waited in the bushes for twenty to thirty minutes until her mother arrived home, at which point Leslie followed her mother into the house and stabbed her over seventy times. Leslie testified that per Mike\u2019s instructions, she took her mother\u2019s jewelry and her father\u2019s coin collection, as well as other items in the house, and drove away in her mother\u2019s Cadillac. Leslie said that Mike instructed her to park the car at a place he had shown her in the Fourche Dam area.\nLeslie stated that, while the plan was for Mike to be there waiting for her at the designated spot, when she arrived, Mike was not there. Leslie drove around and eventually called Mike from a pay phone. He later arrived in his truck to pick her up. Leslie said that Mike put the backpack, jewelry, and coins into his truck. The Cadillac, with the keys in it, was abandoned, and the two then returned to their home.\nOnce back at home, Leslie stripped off her clothes and washed off in the backyard. Subsequently, Mike and Leslie went to Mike\u2019s parents\u2019 house in Hot Springs. Leslie said that while there, Mike started a fire in a fire pit located on his parents\u2019 property and told her he was going to burn her clothes, the backpack, and the knife. She further testified that Mike got mad at her and told her what a bad job she had done. According to Leslie, Mike told her that he probably needed to kill her because she was going to get him into trouble; however, Mike told her that he might let her live because he had things that he could hold over her head. It was then, Leslie said, that Mike told her he had not burned all of her clothes, but had hidden them at their home.\nThe following day, Leslie and Mike went to a jewelry store in Hot Springs to have the coins appraised. Thereafter, the two returned to their home in Little Rock, where the police soon arrived. Detectives informed each of the MacKools separately of Ms. Ballard\u2019s murder. Detective Eric Knowles was among the investigators who went to the MacKool home, and he testified that upon learning of Ms. Ballard\u2019s death, Mike reacted with loud sobbing and crying sounds and ran to embrace Leslie. He said that Mike hugged Leslie for a couple of minutes, and that his emotions were cut off as quickly as they were turned on, explaining that when Mike turned to face the investigators, he was dry-faced and had not shed a tear. Investigators requested that Mike and Leslie follow them to the police station for questioning. Leslie said that Mike drove them to the police station, and that during the drive, he told her repeatedly that if she even mentioned his name, he would find out and kill her. She further testified that Mike coached her on how she should behave, telling her to act upset and \u201cbe convincing.\u201d\nOnce at the police station, the MacKools were questioned separately; Detectives Alan Quattlebaum and Ronnie Smith questioned Mike. Mike said that he had been around Ms. Ballard only on a couple of occasions, and that while Ms. Ballard was nice to him, he knew she did not approve of him. Mike told police that a week prior to Ms. Ballard\u2019s death, Leslie went to her mother\u2019s home and returned with her father\u2019s coin collection and some pictures. According to Mike, Leslie was upset because her mother had already disposed of most of her father\u2019s things. Quattlebaum asked Mike whether Leslie had received an inheritance from her father, and Mike responded, \u201cDon\u2019t ask me. I have no idea what is in the will for her or what\u2019s hers or what\u2019s not hers or how much she\u2019s to get or anything. I don\u2019t know.\u201d Detective Smith testified that Mike\u2019s demeanor was \u201csilly,\u201d \u201cgoofy,\u201d \u201carrogant,\u201d and \u201cmanipulative,\u201d and he said that Mike did not seem to care about Ms. Ballard\u2019s death. For her part, Leslie claimed that she and Mike had a great relationship with her mother and denied any involvement in the murder.\nAfter Mike gave his statement, detectives told him he was free to go. However, police were still questioning Leslie, so Mike chose to remain at the station and wait for Leslie in the hallway. Detective Smith testified that while Mike waited, he appeared to nap on a bench, and at one point, Mike made a paper airplane and flew it in the hallway.\nDetectives continued to question Leslie and, eventually, she admitted that she had killed her mother. She also told police that Mike was involved in the murder. Subsequently, detectives arrested Mike and informed him that Leslie had implicated him in the murder, and he was placed in an interview room and given his Miranda warnings. Mike refused to waive his rights, so the detectives left. According to Detective John White, about five minutes later, Mike knocked on the door and asked White what Leslie was saying about him. White told Mike that Leslie had named him as a co-conspirator in the homicide. White testified that Mike then told him that he did not \u201ctake part in or have anything to do with Ms. Ballard being chopped up.\u201d When asked how he knew this detail of the crime, Mike said that he had heard the information in passing from other detectives; however, he was unable to name a particular detective who made the comment. White then told Mike that unless he waived his Miranda rights, detectives could no longer speak with him. Mike asked White to sit down and talk with him, and White said that they talked about \u201cpersonal matters\u201d in Mike\u2019s life, but they did not discuss the homicide. After talking to Mike for ten to fifteen minutes, White left.\nShortly thereafter, Mike barricaded himself in the interview room and cut his wrists. Detectives entered the room, using pepper spray to get Mike away from the door. Mike was treated by emergency medical technicians and then driven to UAMS for stitches to his wrist wounds. White testified that before leaving for the hospital, Mike told him he wanted to speak with him, so White told him that he would be brought back to the station after treatment so that they could talk.\nAfter being treated at UAMS, Mike was transported back to the police station by Officer John Bracey. While riding in the patrol car, Mike conversed with Bracey, and the mobile video recorder (MVR) in the car recorded their conversation. During the ride, Mike initiated topics of conversation and asked questions of Bracey. Mike said he knew that the detectives wanted him to go back to the station because they wanted more statements from him. Bracey said, \u201cThey want the truth this time?\u201d and Mike said, \u201cYep, they want that out [of] me.\u201d Bracey asked Mike if he was going to tell the truth this time, and Mike responded, \u201cNo,\u201d then \u201cI\u2019m going to tell the truth but I want my attorney there.\u201d A few minutes later, Mike asked, \u201cCan you kill the music while I ask you something?\u201d Bracey replied, \u201cYeah, sure. What\u2019s up?\u201d Mike said, \u201cI don\u2019t really know if you\u2019ll tell me the truth or not\u201d \u201cbut I\u2019m gonna ask you anyway.\u201d Mike then asked Bracey if he should be \u201cup front\u201d with the police, and Bracey told him, yes, that\u2019s what he would do, but that he couldn\u2019t tell Mike what to do. Mike continued talking about whether to tell the truth, and Bracey asked, \u201cWould you have asked me that question if you was not guilty?\u201d Mike replied, \u201cProbably, no. Ain\u2019t got no reason to.\u201d Later in the conversation, when the two were talking about what Leslie might be saying to police, Mike said, \u201cShe\u2019s the one who can cry and trying to say I made her do it, you know that\u2019s iust a bunch of bull.\u201d\nAfter arriving at the station, Mike was Mirandized and interviewed by Detectives White and Knowles. Mike told the detectives that Leslie felt betrayed by her mother because of an incident involving a condominium. He also said that he had wanted Ms. Ballard arrested because she had taken $2,000 worth of tools from him. When asked about Leslie\u2019s inheritance from her father, Mike said he thought Leslie was getting $25,000, and he said that Leslie told him she was \u201cgetting screwed\u201d because her uncle was getting $10,000, and the rest of her father\u2019s estate was going to her mother.\nAccording to Mike, Leslie decided to go over to her mother\u2019s house dressed all in black because she did not want to be recognized. Mike said that he could not figure out why Leslie would not want to be seen going to her mother\u2019s house. He said that he asked her why, but he could not remember what she said in response. Mike said that he dropped Leslie off at her mother\u2019s house, and that at that time, she was wearing a black wig and carrying her backpack. He said that he had no idea whether Ms. Ballard was home when he left.\nMike said that when he dropped Leslie off, she told him to come back and pick her up. Mike said that he went home, got his motorcycle, and rode back by the house to see if Leslie was still there and if she wanted to go for a ride on the motorcycle. At one point during his statement, Mike said that he waited an hour before going back to get Leslie. Later, he said he waited only ten minutes before returning. Mike stated that when he arrived back at Ms. Ballard\u2019s house, he did not see Leslie, so he pulled into the park across the street. Mike stated that while he was in the park, he saw two deer. He also said that he saw a postman who was asleep in the park, so he awakened the postman and showed him the deer.\nMike said that about two hours later, Leslie called him \u201cin a panic mode,\u201d and told him to come and pick her up. He said that Leslie gave him directions to where she was [the Fourche Dam area], and that when he arrived to pick her up, she jumped out of her mother\u2019s Cadillac and ran over to his truck, carrying two bags. Mike said that Leslie told him, \u201clet\u2019s get out of there, let\u2019s get out of there, [sic] I been driving around for two hours.\u201d Mike stated that Leslie then told him she and her mother had gotten into a fight and that she ended up stabbing her. He also said that after stabbing her mother, Leslie took her dad\u2019s coin collection and a couple of pictures. Mike said that after hearing Leslie\u2019s admission, he did not know what to do. He stated that Leslie said she wanted to keep him \u201cout of it completely \u2014 she \u2014 because I\u2019ve got two children, she just says I don\u2019t want you in it, she says, I\u2019ll take responsibility . . . she goes I did it, it\u2019s my responsibility.\u201d Mike admitted that after learning what had happened, he hid some things in a tire because he was afraid \u201cthat she\u2019s gonna frame me and I want to say look, I\u2019ve got this to show you that she did it, and I didn\u2019t do it because of her DNA and that\u2019s why I did it.\u201d\nMike said that when he and Leslie went to Hot Springs, Leslie burned two duffle bags in the burn pile on his parents\u2019 property. He also said that Leslie wanted to take the knife out of the bag and throw it into the lake and, with a map that he had drawn, Mike explained to detectives where the knife had been thrown. Mike further said that while they were in Hot Springs, Leslie again told him, \u201cyou didn\u2019t do it and it was all my idea and I\u2019m gonna take responsibility and if we get caught because it was my idea, I did it.\u201d\nMike maintained that he did not help Leslie kill her mother, and that he planned no part of the crime. He said that he did not drop Leslie off at her mother\u2019s house for her to kill her mother. Rather, he said that he took Leslie to her mother\u2019s house to get a car. Mike said he did not understand why Leslie wanted him to come back over in an hour on the motorcycle if she was going to be getting a car from her mother. He said that the only explanation he could think of was that Leslie had gotten into an argument with her mother and could no longer get the car.\nMike concluded his statement to White and Knowles by saying, \u201cYou know she\u2019s down there trying to make me the bad guy, the victim \u2014 the \u2014 the \u2014 planner, whatever, I mean if I want money, all I got to do is go cash my cashier\u2019s checks, go sell a couple of cars, go do whatever, sell my house, just move away I mean. . . .\u201d\nDirected-Verdict Motion\nFor his first point on appeal, Mike argues that the circuit court erred in failing to grant his motion for directed verdict. We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Coggin v. State, 356 Ark. 424, 156 S.W.3d 712 (2004). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. Stone v. State, 348 Ark. 661, 74 S.W.3d 591 (2002).\nA person commits murder in the first degree when he or she purposely causes the death of another person. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-102(a)(2) (Repl. 1997). A person acts \u201cpurposely\u201d with respect to his or her conduct or a result thereof when it is his or her conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 1997).\nA person commits theft of property when he or she knowingly takes the property of another person with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof; it is a Class B felony if the value of the property is $2,500 or more. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-36-103(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A) (Supp. 2005). A person acts knowingly with respect to his or her conduct when he or she is aware that his or her conduct is of that nature. Ark.'Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-202(2) (Repl. 1997).\nA person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person when he or she is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-402(2) (Repl. 1997). A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, he or she solicits, advises, encourages, or coerces the other person to commit it, or if he or she aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-2-403(a)(l), (2) (Repl. 1997).\nThe State\u2019s theory of the case was that Mike was Leslie\u2019s accomplice in the murder and theft of property of her mother. The circuit court determined that as a matter of law, Leslie was an accomplice. Arkansas law is clear that a conviction \u201ccannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice. . . unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant. . . with the commission of the offense.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111(e)(1)(A) (Supp. 2003). The corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof. Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-89-111 (e)(1)(B) (Supp. 2003). The corroboration must be sufficient, standing alone, to establish the commission of the offense and to connect the defendant with it. Tate v. State, 357 Ark. 369, 167 S.W.3d 655 (2004). The test for corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Id.\nCorroboration must be evidence of a substantive nature, since it must be directed toward proving the connection of the accused with the crime, and not directed toward corroborating the accomplice\u2019s testimony. Tate, supra. Circumstantial evidence may be used to support accomplice testimony, but it, too, must be substantial. Id. Corroborating evidence need not, however, be so substantial in and of itself to sustain a conviction. Id. Rather, it need only, independently of the testimony of the accomplice, tend in some degree to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. Id. The presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime, opportunity, and association with a person involved in the crime are relevant facts in determining the connection of an accomplice with the crime. Id. When two or more persons assist each other in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable, ultimately, for his own conduct, but he cannot disclaim responsibility because he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Andrews v. State, 344 Ark. 606, 42 S.W.3d 484 (2001).\nMike challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis that there was insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony. In support of his argument, he contends that the State made no effort to corroborate many of Leslie\u2019s claims about the incident itself, and in many instances, presented evidence that actually disproved the claims. Further, he contends that several of Leslie\u2019s claims \u201csimply made no common sense.\u201d While it is true that the State made no effort to corroborate some of Leslie\u2019s claims, it is not necessary that an accomplice be corroborated on every fact or detail. And, even if we assume, as Mike suggests, that some of Leslie\u2019s claims are false because they are illogical, the credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. Burley v. State, 348 Ark. 422, 73 S.W.3d 600 (2002). The jury may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence and may choose to believe the State\u2019s account of the facts rather than the defendant\u2019s. See, e.g., Cobb v. State, 340 Ark. 240, 12 S.W.3d 195 (2000). Although the jury must be instructed that circumstantial evidence must be consistent with the guilt of the defendant and inconsistent with any other conclusion, this is not the standard by which we review the evidence. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 938, 936 S.W.2d 509, 518 (1996). Our responsibility is to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, which means whether the jury could have reached its conclusion without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Id. (citing Cassel v. State, 273 Ark. 59, 616 S.W.2d 485 (1981)).\nStill, Mike contends that only one witness \u2014 Leslie \u2014 gave testimony, circumstantial or otherwise, connecting him to the crimes. Mike argues that when Leslie\u2019s testimony is excluded, there is insufficient evidence to connect him to the murder.\nAs previously stated, the test for corroborating evidence is whether, if the testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the case, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Tate, supra. Clearly, the remaining evidence established the commission of the murder. Mickey Holloway testified that he discovered Ms. Ballard\u2019s body on the morning of September 13, 2003. Dr. Erickson, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy, stated that there were well over seventy sharp-force injuries to Ms. Ballard\u2019s body. He further testified that it was his opinion that Ms. Ballard\u2019s death was caused by multiple stab wounds and that the manner of her death was certainly homicide. As to the theft-of-property charge, Holloway testified that when he went to Ms. Ballard\u2019s home on the morning of September 13, the Cadillac was missing from the garage. Furthermore, Mike stated that when he picked up Leslie in the Fourche Dam area, she was in her mother\u2019s Cadillac.\nThe remaining question is whether the evidence connects Mike with the crimes. In addition to Leslie\u2019s testimony, the State played for the jury three recorded statements Mike made to the police: Mike\u2019s statement as a \u201cperson of interest\u201d to Detectives Smith and Quattlebaum and, after he was arrested, Mike\u2019s statement to Officer Bracey while in the patrol car and Mike\u2019s statement to Detectives White and Knowles at the police station. The contents of Mike\u2019s statements reveal inconsistencies concerning the nature of his involvement in the murder of and theft from Ms. Ballard. In his first statement to the police, Mike denied any involvement in the crime, claiming that he had no knowledge of the murder. However, after learning that Leslie had implicated him in the murder, he informed White that he \u201cdidn\u2019t take part in or have anything to do with Ms. Ballard being chopped up.\u201d A short time later, Mike barricaded himself in the interview room and cut his wrists. Subsequently, when riding in the patrol car with Officer Bracey, Mike asked the officer if he should tell the truth about what happened, and Bracey said, \u201cWould you have asked me that question if you was not guilty?\u201d Mike replied, \u201cProbably, no. Ain\u2019t got no reason to.\u201d Then, in his statement to White and Knowles, Mike placed himself at the scene of the crime, and he admitted that he helped Leslie get rid of evidence.\nIn addition, Mike made a false statement to the police about the coins. During his interview with Smith and Quattlebaum, Mike said that Leslie received her father\u2019s coins about a week prior to Ms. Ballard\u2019s death. In his statement to White and Knowles, Mike said that Leslie took her father\u2019s coins at the time of the murder.\nMike also gave a false statement regarding his knowledge of Mr. Ballard\u2019s will. In his first recorded statement, Mike said that he had no idea what Leslie was to inherit under the will. On the other hand, when speaking to White and Knowles, he provided detectives with the details of the will; specifically, he stated that Leslie had told him she was to receive $25,000, her uncle was to receive $10,000, and her mother was to receive the rest.\nMike stated that even though he believed Leslie was exhibiting strange behavior, in that she was wearing all black clothing and a black wig in the middle of the day and stating that she did not want anyone to see her, he left her alone at her mother\u2019s house, even though he \u201chad no idea\u201d whether Ms. Ballard was at home. Mike also gave conflicting statements as to why he had taken Leslie over to her mother\u2019s house and why he had returned to the Ballard home on his motorcycle. Mike said that he took Leslie to her mother\u2019s house to get a car, but he also said that Leslie told him to pick her up in an hour on his motorcycle. At one point he said that he returned in an hour; yet, at another point, he said that he headed back to the Ballard home ten minutes after he had dropped Leslie off.\nThis court has held that false statements to the police may constitute corroborating evidence. See McGehee v. State, 348 Ark. 395, 72 S.W.3d 867 (2002). We have further held that the jury is not required to lay aside its common sense in evaluating the ordinary affairs of life, and it may infer a defendant\u2019s guilt from improbable explanations of incriminating conduct. Martin v. State, 346 Ark. 198, 57 S.W.3d 136 (2001). The jury may well have considered Mike\u2019s false statements to the police to be corroborative of his guilt. Moreover, the jury may well have found many of Mike\u2019s explanations of suspicious circumstances to be improbable.\nIt is well settled that the acts, conduct, and declarations of the accused, before or after the crime, may furnish necessary corroboration. McGehee, supra; Barnett v. State, 346 Ark. 11, 53 S.W.3d 527 (2001); Daniels v. State, 308 Ark. 53, 821 S.W.2d 778 (1992); Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983). Mike contends that the evidence presented by the State did nothing but leave the jury to speculation and conjecture as to his involvement in the crimes, and that there are other reasonable explanations for his acts, conduct, and declarations. For example, he argues that his act of cutting his wrists is not indicative of his guilt. Instead, he claims that another entirely logical and reasonable explanation for his self-injury is that he was distraught over his wife\u2019s duplicity and betrayal. Detective White testified that after Mike cut his wrists, he was upset and crying. Fie said that Mike was \u201cscreaming, yelling and just.. . more distraught than anything that he was being arrested and that [Leslie] was telling us. . . . everything that had taken place.\u201d\nWe note that Mike did not contend below, nor does he contend here, that the evidence is inadmissible. Rather, he appears to argue that the evidence cannot be considered as corroborative of his guilt because there is another reasonable explanation, other than his guilt, to explain why he cut his wrists. We believe that once it was admitted, the evidence of Mike\u2019s cutting his wrists and the significance to be attached to such evidence are matters exclusively within the province of the jury.\nIn addition to the corroboration by Mike\u2019s own statements and conduct, the State presented testimony from three of Ms. Ballard\u2019s friends concerning her fear of Mike. Aside from providing proof of Ms. Ballard\u2019s fear, the testimony also provided proof of the State\u2019s theory that the crimes were committed for financial gain. Holloway said that Ms. Ballard was afraid that both Leslie and Mike would kill her for her money, but that she was primarily concerned about Mike. Maddox also stated.that Ms. Ballard feared Mike and Leslie. She said that Ms. Ballard told her she was \u201cafraid of what they might do\u201d once Leslie received the information about her father\u2019s will. Stan Rauls testified that Ms. Ballard had related to him that she was extremely afraid of Mike, but that she had never told him she was afraid of her daughter.\nWe conclude that Mike\u2019s own statements to the police, some of which contained inconsistencies, Mike\u2019s conduct before and after the crime, and the statements of Ms. Ballard\u2019s friends regarding her fear of Mike tend to connect Mike to the offenses for which he was charged. We are not persuaded by Mike\u2019s argument that there is no evidence that tends to connect him to the theft-of-property charge because the State presented no evidence that he was ever in possession of the vehicle. A participant cannot disclaim responsibility because he did not personally take part in every act that went to make up the crime as a whole. Cook v. State, 350 Ark. 398, 86 S.W.3d 916 (2002). While there was no evidence that Mike ever drove the Cadillac or that he had the vehicle in his possession, the jury may well have determined that Mike facilitated the theft by leaving Leslie, without a vehicle, at her mother\u2019s house. Further, there was evidence that the theft of the Cadillac was part of the plan to murder Ms. Ballard. We are not required to isolate these incidents if they are part of a plan. See Thrash v. State, 291 Ark. 575, 726 S.W.2d 283 (1987); Sumlin v. State, 273 Ark. 185, 617 S.W.2d 372 (1981).\nFinally, we reject Mike\u2019s contention that the State presented inconsistent theories in the separate trials of Leslie and Mike. In connection with this argument, Mike claims that the State failed to prove an element of first-degree murder: that he acted purposely. Fie contends that throughout his trial, Leslie testified that she had nothing to do with the planning of the murder and did not purposefully kill her mother. Therefore, Mike contends, if Leslie \u25a0 did not act purposely, it follows that he, as her accomplice, did not act purposely. Mike acknowledges that Leslie has already been found guilty of capital murder, which required a finding that she committed \u201cpremeditated and knowing\u201d murder. Fie further acknowledges that first-degree murder, which requires that a person act \u201cpurposely,\u201d is a lesser-included offense of capital murder. However, he contends that the State has changed its theory since Leslie\u2019s trial, because in her trial, the State argued that Leslie was lying about enduring spousal abuse and being under severe duress, whereas in Mike\u2019s trial, the State argued that Mike did abuse Leslie and did cause her to act under severe duress.\nPrior to trial, defense counsel presented his inconsistent-theory argument to the circuit court when arguing that Leslie should not be allowed to testify. In response to this argument, the State contended:\n[T]he question isn\u2019t so much what her testimony is going to be. It\u2019s what the State argues that it\u2019s proof of this defendant\u2019s guilt, and is there a consistent theory of the case that \u2022\u2014 that attaches from that first trial through this trial? And we, adamantly, believe that there is. In fact, we tried that case mindful of that. We knew that\u2019s why defense counsel was sitting there watching the trial, because they wanted to be sure that we did not present what could be inconsistent facts. We will not be arguing that Ms. MacKool, you know, preceded [sic] because she was forced or brainwashed by this defendant. We believe that they are co-equal partners now. Is she going to admit to that? We don\u2019t think so, but we\u2019re not going to argue that. We think defense counsel will impeach her if we don\u2019t, and I figure that we\u2019ll probably bring out the inconsistencies so that the jury knows we\u2019re not presenting them inconsistent \u2014 the facts that we think are \u2014 that we don\u2019t \u2014\u25a0 make sure that the jury understands what we believe from her testimony and what we don\u2019t believe.\nThe circuit court determined that the State was not presenting an inconsistent theory, stating:\nBut \u2014 but excluding her from testifying because she\u2019s a liar and \u2014 and because of the fact that the State may be giving inconsistent or might be involved in giving an inconsistent or taking an inconsistent position. I\u2019m going to deny that.\nWe agree with the circuit court\u2019s ruling and find no abuse of discretion.\nMotion to Suppress\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress out-of-court statements he made to the police. At issue are statements Mike made after he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney. Before trial, Mike moved to suppress the statements he made while in the patrol car, as recorded on the MVR, and statements he made during his interview with Officers White and Knowles, as well as the fruits of those statements. A statement made while in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a custodial statement was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Flowers v. State, 362 Ark. 193, 208 S.W.3d 113 (2005). In order to determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, this court looks to see if the statement was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id. To make this determination, we review the totality of the circumstances surrounding the waiver, including the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the use of mental or physical punishment; and statements made by the interrogating officers and the vulnerability of the defendant. Id. We will reverse a trial court\u2019s ruling on this issue only if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.\nThe evaluation of the credibility of witnesses who testify at a suppression hearing about the circumstances surrounding an appellant\u2019s custodial confession is for the trial judge to determine, and this court defers to the position of the trial judge in matters of credibility. Id. Conflicts in the testimony are for the trial judge to resolve, and the judge is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, especially that of the accused, since he or she is the person most interested in the outcome of the proceedings. Id. So long as there is no evidence of coercion, a statement made voluntarily may be admissible against the accused. Id.\nMike first points to the conversation he had with White when he asked White what Leslie had said about him. While acknowledging that he asked White a question, he contends here, as he did below, that after White answered his question, he tried to induce Mike to make an incriminating statement. He states that after White told him what Leslie had said about him, he then told Mike that he knew Mike had been back to Allsopp Park on his motorcycle, and that he knew Mike was lying. Then, Mike argues, before White left the room, in an obvious effort to \u201cbait\u201d him, White added that unless Mike waived his rights, he could not talk to him any further.\nThe circuit court concluded that Mike reinitiated his contact with police when he asked White what Leslie had said, finding:\nI think that he reinitiated his contact with the \u2014 with the State when he asked what was going on. And I think the officer\u2019s response was appropriate. And also I need to make this additional \u2014 just to make the record clear, now, the officer did not take a statement from the defendant at that time. He \u2014 his concern was for him to \u2014 I mean, I think the defendant later on then did something and he \u2014 he \u2014 the defendant again said that he wanted to talk to the officer, but the officer \u2014 Officer White said, no, you know, you need to take care of yourself first and then, you know, I\u2019ll deal with you later. But I think that he subsequendy said, look, I want to talk to you. I want to talk. I want to talk. And he\u2019s like no, no, no, I don\u2019t want to talk right now. You need to go to the hospital and take care of yourself and I\u2019ll talk to you later.\nThe framework for analyzing the admissibility of statements made after a defendant invokes his right to counsel was set forth in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981), where the United States Supreme Court stated:\n[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights---- [A]n accused,... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\nThus, a statement will be admissible only if the accused initiated further contact, and in doing so knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked. Esmeyer v. State, 325 Ark. 491, 930 S.W.3d 302 (1996). The pertinent inquiry is whether the defendant initiated the interrogating process with the police after invoking his right to counsel. Id. Here, the circuit court did not err in concluding that Mike initiated the conversation with White. The record reveals that after White exited the interview room, Mike summoned him back by knocking on the door. White testified that when he arrived, Mike said, \u201cHey, can I talk to you?\u201d \u201cCan you tell me what\u2019s going on?\u201d \u201cCan you tell me what she said?\u201d Though Mike had previously invoked his rights, he clearly waived those rights when he initiated further communication with White.\nStill, Mike maintains that even if he waived his rights by initiating further communication with White at the police station, he again invoked his rights to Officer Bracey while being transported from UAMS to the detention facility. Although there is some dispute as to the exact wording of a few of the statements, the pertinent parts of the transcript of the MVR tape are as follows:\nMacKool: We got to go back down there? . . . You know why they want me to go?____ I know why they want me to go____Because they want more statements from me.\nBracey: They want the truth this time?\nMacKool: Yep, they want that out me.\nBracey: You ain\u2019t gonna tell \u2019em the truth [t]his time either?\nMacKool: I\u2019m going to tell the truth, but I want my attorney there.\nBracey: ... Okay.\nMacKool: If my attorney\u2019s there, I\u2019ll be glad to tell him whatever he wants to know.\nBracey: Okay.\nMacKool: Can you kill the music while I ask you something?\nBracey: Yeah, sure. What\u2019s up?\nMacKool: I don\u2019t really know if you\u2019ll tell me the truth or not.\nBracey: Okay.\nMacKool: But I\u2019m gonna ask you anyway.\nBracey: Go ahead.\nMacKool: Is it good to be up front with them? You\u2019re gonna say yes.\nBracey: Yeah, I mean, I would say yes regardless, I mean. If you didn\u2019t do it, say you didn\u2019t do it. If you did it, I mean, that\u2019s up to you. I\u2019d be up front. But that\u2019s just me, okay. I can\u2019t tell you how to do your thing.\nMacKool: Yeah.\nBracey: But of course, I\u2019m gonna say yeah. Wouldn\u2019t you expect somebody to be up front with you with everything? Huh?\nMacKool: If I was actually busted, I mean, if I was actually busted, I would actually think first, whatever they told me would be used against me whatever they told me.\nBracey: Well, let me ask you that here. Would you have asked me that question if you was not guilty?\nMacKool: Of the charges?\nBracey: Yeah. Would ya?\nMacKool: Probably, no. Ain\u2019t got no reason to.\nBracey: See, that\u2019s what I\u2019m talking about, I mean, if... no, I don\u2019t know. I wasn\u2019t there.\nMacKool: You hear all the time, tell them everything, they got you an attorney there.\nBracey; Well, if that\u2019s how you feel, I\u2019m gonna suggest you do that. You see what I\u2019m saying. If they\u2019ve read you your rights and, and told you you have a right to have your attorney there. Then that\u2019s the route should you go. If you want to talk to them without your attorney there, then all' of this is totally up to you. I mean, cause they read you your rights and you want your attorney there, then I\u2019m gonna suggest that you tell them you want to be with your attorney. If you feel like you don\u2019t want your attorney there and you want to go ahead on and get this off your chest, tell \u2019em what you want to. That\u2019s up to you too. I ain\u2019t got nothing to do with it. All I\u2019m doing is transporting.\nMacKool: Well, I really don\u2019t know what to do.\nBracey: Well, you can think about it, if you want to think about it, tell \u2019em you want to think about it. Everything is totally up to you. You wanna go in there and lie and say I don\u2019t, every time you lie, they subject to charge you for it too, so. That\u2019s the only reason why I tell people to be up front because if you start lying, they gonna charge you with lying, so. But the whole thing is totally up to you.\nMacKool: I\u2019m sure she\u2019s been with them all night long at the house and ain\u2019t no telling what all she\u2019s got against me.\nBracey: Who you talking about, your ex-wife? Oh, I don\u2019t know her, I have no idea about.\nMacKool: She\u2019s probably telling them I kicked her ass, you know what I mean?\nBracey: Yeah, I understand that.\nMacKool: She\u2019s the one who can cry and trying to say I made her do it, you know and that\u2019s just a bunch of bull.\nBracey: I don\u2019t know.\nMacKool: Well, I don\u2019t know how I can make somebody do something like that. Just don\u2019t make no sense.\nAgain, the circuit court found that Mike reinitiated contact with the police, concluding that \u201cthe statement \u2014 and the question that was going forth \u2014 back and forth between the officer and the defendant were not \u2014 although they were custodial, they were not given in violation of Miranda.\u201d The circuit court did not err. Although Mike makes reference to wanting his attorney present, a few minutes later, he wants Bracey to \u201ckill the music\u201d so he can ask a question. It is clear that Mike wanted Bracey\u2019s undivided attention. Neither the transcript nor the MVR tape reveals any coercion or intimidation on Bracey\u2019s part.\nViewing the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court did not err in denying Mike\u2019s motion to suppress. The State has shown that Mike\u2019s statements were voluntary, and Mike has failed to prove that any statements he gave were coerced. Further, while it is clear that Mike invoked his rights, it is equally clear that when he did speak to police, he initiated the further communication.\nFinally, Mike contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that Mike\u2019s second statement with Officers White and Knowles was voluntary because the State did not call Knowles to testify. In short, Mike contends that Knowles was a material witness and, as such, the State was required to either produce Knowles or explain his absence. We have stated that whenever evidence is produced indicating that a confession was induced by threats, coercion, or offers of reward, the State has the burden to produce all material witnesses connected to the controverted confession, or to give an adequate explanation for their absence. Foreman v. State, 321 Ark. 167, 901 S.W.2d 802 (1995). In determining whether a witness is \u201cmaterial,\u201d this court has stated that there must be some connection between the witness and the alleged acts of coercion or an opportunity to observe the alleged coercion. Id. Here, Mike claims that he was coerced by White and Bracey, not by Knowles. Even assuming there was some connection between Knowles and the alleged acts of coercion, or an opportunity for Knowles to observe the alleged coercion, the record reveals that Mike declined to testify at his suppression hearing; therefore, he did not offer testimony that his confession was induced in any way. Where there is no specific evidence to refute, the State\u2019s burden to produce all material witnesses does not arise. Anderson v. State, 357 Ark. 180, 163 S.W.3d 333 (2004); Fairchild v. State, 349 Ark. 147, 76 S.W.3d 884 (2002) (overruled on other grounds); Tanner v. State, 259 Ark. 243, 532 S.W.2d 168 (1976); Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976).\nMotion to Redact Portions of Statements\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to redact prejudicial and irrelevant portions of both the recordings and transcripts of his statements to police. After the circuit court denied Mike\u2019s motion to suppress, he filed a motion to redact those portions of his statements which referred to \u201chis record\u201d and his right to remain silent. The reference to Mike\u2019s record is contained in a statement he made prior to his arrest while being questioned by Detectives Quattlebaum and Smith. The relevant portion of the transcribed statement is as follows:\nQuattlebaum: . . . you said that for the most part you and Leslie\u2019s family \u2014 when her dad was- alive anyway uh \u2014 her mother and dad had gotten along pretty good uh \u2014 her mother didn\u2019t necessarily approve of the marriage because of an age difference, is that \u2014\nMacKool: I don\u2019t know if it was the age difference. I just \u2014 I don\u2019t know why. She never told me. I\u2019m just guessing. I\u2019m guessing it\u2019s my record and I\u2019m not good enough for her daughter is what I\u2019m guessing.\nThe State argued that the comment about his record was ambiguous and could mean something other than Mike\u2019s criminal record, such as his \u201crecord with the opposite sex.\u201d The circuit court agreed, refusing to allow Mike to redact the reference to his record. The decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse a trial court\u2019s decision regarding the admission of evidence absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005). We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to redact the reference to Mike\u2019s record.\nWith regard to his invocation of rights, the first statement Mike sought to redact was made at the end of his interview with Quattlebaum and Smith. Following is the relevant colloquy:\nSmith: When did you go to K-Mart?\nMacKool: I went to Wal-Mart.\nSmith: Wal-Mart \u2014 when did you go there?\nMacKool: This morning. We\u2019re going back through there. I\u2019m done \u2014 I\u2019m not talking anymore, I\u2019m done, this is enough.\nSmith: Okay.\nMacKool: Well, we\u2019re repeating and Chris Palmer\u2019s probably gonna be pissed off at me for even giving this statement.\nMike requested that \u201cI\u2019m done \u2014 I\u2019m not talking anymore, I\u2019m done, this is enough,\u201d and his statement regarding attorney Chris Palmer be redacted. The circuit court agreed to redact Mike\u2019s statement regarding the attorney; however, it refused to redact Mike\u2019s statement that he was \u201cdone\u201d and \u201cnot talking anymore.\u201d The circuit court concluded that the statement was relevant to the issue of voluntariness, in that once Mike said he was finished talking, the State stopped the interview. Though, he did not make this argument below, Mike points out in his brief on appeal that there was no longer an issue of voluntariness because the circuit court had already denied his motion to suppress. A circuit court\u2019s ruling on relevancy is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Morris v. State, 358 Ark. 455, 193 S.W.3d 243 (2004). Though we agree with Mike that the statement was not relevant to the issue of voluntariness, we will not reverse absent a showing of prejudice. Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002). Here, we fail to see how Mike was prejudiced by the statement at issue. When read or heard in context with the rest of the interview, we do not believe Mike\u2019s statement creates a negative inference that requires reversal.\nMike also sought redaction of a comment made by Officer White during Mike\u2019s interview with White and Knowles at the police station. During that interview, the following colloquy took place:\nWhite: But, my \u2014 through all \u2014 through everything, everything you\u2019ve gone through, we\u2019ve sit here and listened to you say how much you love your wife, that\u2019s the reason you did it. You take her over to her mother\u2019s and drop her off, come back on your motorcycle to pick her up and she\u2019s not there. Go back home \u2014\nMacKool: She said she was gonna be outside waiting.\nWhite: You go back home, she calls you \u2014 and you go out and pick her up. She\u2019s dressed in black, she tells you that she\u2019s just killed her mother.\nMacKool: And I freak out.\nWhite: And you freak out.\nMacKool: And I freak out.\nWhite: And after all this goes on, you were brought down \u2014 let me finish \u2014 you were brought down here to the Detective Division and we sit up in there and you asked us what she told us and we tell you and you still sat up there and refused to talk to us, am I correct?\nMike sought to redact the portion of White\u2019s statement where he makes reference to Mike\u2019s refusal to talk. The circuit court denied Mike\u2019s request. The State contends that White\u2019s statement was not a comment on Mike\u2019s silence, but part of a recap of Mike\u2019s contact with officers. We agree. We find no prejudice, and absent a showing of prejudice, we will not reverse. Thomas, supra.\nMike also argues that White again commented on his failure to waive Miranda rights while answeringjury questions. During the trial, the following question was submitted by a juror and asked by the circuit court: \u201cWhen he was transported to the hospital, was he read his rights before transportation?\u201d White responded: \u201cCan I ask you something, Judge?\u201d The circuit court agreed to answer a question, and White said: \u201cI don\u2019t know if I can talk about that. I don\u2019t know the ruling that the Court made on the first Miranda.\u201d Mike immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that White\u2019s statement created a negative inference that Mike had failed to waive his Miranda rights. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that nothing White said was prejudicial. While he did not make this argument to the circuit court, on appeal, Mike argues that pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 512, the circuit court erred in refusing to grant his request for a mistrial when White \u201ccommented on [Mike\u2019s] invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege during trial.\u201d This court will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal. Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001). Consequently, we will not address the argument concerning Ark. R. Evid. 512.\nMarital Privilege\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in allowing Leslie to testify against him over his assertion of the marital privilege. A communication is confidential if it is made privately by any person to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure to any other person. Ark. R. Evid. 504(a). An accused in a criminal proceeding has a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication between the accused and the spouse. Ark. R. Evid. 504(b). A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he . . . voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. ... Ark. R. Evid. 510. See also Barrett v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003). Thus, if the same information protected by privilege is disclosed to a third person, the privilege is waived. See, e.g., Dansby v. State, 338 Ark. 697, 1 S.W.3d 403 (1999); Halfacre v. State, 292 Ark. 331, 731 S.W.2d 179 (1987).\nAt a hearing on September 16, 2004, Mike requested that Leslie not be allowed to' testify with regard to \u201cany communications between her and her spouse regarding this incident.\u201d The circuit court ruled that it would allow testimony concerning events taking place from August 2003 up until the murder on September 12. We first wish to emphasize that the privilege applies to communications, not to what the spouse heard, saw, and observed in relation to a criminal charge. See, e.g., Findley v. State, 307 Ark. 53, 818 S.W.2d 242 (1991); Sumlin, supra (emphasis added). Therefore, the State correctly points out that Mike could not prevent Leslie from testifying about what she observed in relation to the criminal charges.\nThe State also contends that Leslie was properly allowed to testify as to communications that were intended to be disclosed to others rather than to be held confidential, such as the \u201calibi story\u201d that the MacKools concocted to tell the police. Indeed, this court has held that a fabricated story between spouses intended to be told to the police is not privileged. See David v. State, 286 Ark. 205, 691 S.W.2d 133 (1985). Mike argues in his reply brief that there is absolutely no evidence to indicate that he and Leslie concocted an alibi story to tell anyone and, further, the fact that their statements were so divergent would indicate just the opposite. While we are not convinced that there is evidence of the fabrication of an alibi, we do believe that there is evidence of the fabrication of a story to tell the police. Leslie testified that when she and Mike drove to the police station for questioning after being informed of her mother\u2019s death, Mike told her repeatedly that if she even mentioned his name while speaking to the police, he would find out and would kill her. She further stated that Mike told her that while she answered questions, she was to act upset and to be convincing. In David, the trial court allowed appellant\u2019s wife to testify that after he shot the victim, he told her to tell police that the victim had attacked her and that appellant killed the victim in an effort to rescue her. This court held that the spousal privilege did not apply because appellant intended the fabricated story to be told to the police. Appellant then argued that even though he intended for the fabricated story to be told to the police, he did not intend for his wife to disclose the fact that he told her to fabricate it. We disagreed and explained:\nThe fact that the appellant told his spouse to tell the story must be allowed into evidence, or else, as a practical matter, the spousal communication remains privileged, even though it is intended for communication. To illustrate, the distinction in this case is the difference between \u201cI told the police . . .\u201d and \u201cHe told me to tell the police . . .\u201d The statement \u201cI told the police . . .,\u201d standing alone, is not a spousal communication, and is not subject to the privilege under any condition. The statement \u201cHe told me to tell . . .\u201d is the predicate or the foundation by which the witness establishes that the remainder of the statement is exempt from the privilege since it establishes the intention to disclose to third persons.\nDavid, 286 Ark. at 210, 691 S.W.2d at 138. Pursuant to our holding in David, Mike\u2019s communication to Leslie about how she should act and what she should not disclose to the police is exempt from the privilege.\nThe State argues that the balance of Leslie\u2019s testimony is exempt from the privilege because Mike disclosed a significant part of the privileged information to a third party. In support of its argument, the State points to the contents of Mike\u2019s statements, specifically: (1) Mike\u2019s initial statement to the police late on September 13, 2003, as a person ofinterest, in which he denied any knowledge of the murder and claimed to have a cordial relationship with the victim; (2) Mike\u2019s statement that Leslie got the coin collection from her mother a week before her mother\u2019s death; (3) Mike\u2019s questions to Bracey concerning whether the police wanted to hear the truth and whether it was good to be up front; (4) Mike\u2019s telling Bracey \u201cprobably, no,\u201d and \u201cain\u2019t got no reason to,\u201d when Bracey asked him if he would have asked whether he should tell the truth if he was not guilty; and (5) Mike\u2019s statement that Leslie \u201ccan cry and trying to say I made her do it, you know and that\u2019s just a bunch of bull.\u201d The State\u2019s argument is well taken. We agree that in making the aforementioned statements to the police, Mike waived his privilege because he disclosed a significant part of the privileged matter.\nBefore leaving this point, we turn to Mike\u2019s remaining arguments, in which he contends that his case is distinguishable from those cases where a spouse testifies due to a waiver of privilege. Mike first argues that in the cases in which a defendant\u2019s spouse was allowed to testify at trial due to a waiver of the spousal privilege, the privileged comments h\u00e1d been communicated to a third person other than a police officer. Moreover, Mike argues, the statements in those cases corroborated the spouse\u2019s testimony. Mike contends that in this case, even if his comments to the police amounted to statements to third parties, the comments did not corroborate, but rather contradicted Leslie\u2019s testimony. Mike cites no authority for the proposition that in order to waive the privilege by disclosing a significant part of the privileged matter, the disclosure must be made to third parties other than police. Nor does he cite any authority for the proposition that any disclosure regarding the privileged information must corroborate the spouse\u2019s testimony at trial. This court does not consider arguments that are unsupported by convincing argument or sufficient citation to legal authority. Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238, 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002).\nHearsay Testimony\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in allowing the State\u2019s witnesses to repeat out-of-court statements made by Ms. Ballard, in which she expressed her fear of Mike. At trial, Mickey Holloway testified that Ms. Ballard told him she was afraid of both Mike and Leslie, but she was primarily concerned about Mike and afraid he was going to murder her for her money. Lisa Maddox testified that after Mr. Ballard\u2019s death, Ms. Ballard told her that she was concerned for her safety and afraid that Mike and Leslie would try to hurt her or kill her for her money. Stan Rauls, the attorney who handled Mr. Ballard\u2019s estate, testified that Ms. Ballard was extremely afraid of Mike. Further, he agreed that it was fair to say Ms. Ballard was afraid Mike would kill her.\nMike argues that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. Under Rule 803(3) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the following type of evidence is not excluded by the hearsay rule:\nThen Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the declarant\u2019s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition, such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health. . . .\nWe have noted that an expression of fear falls within the hearsay exception of Rule 803(3). See, e.g, Hodge v. State, 332 Ark. 377, 965 S.W.2d 766 (1998) (holding that statements that victims had told witnesses they were afraid of Hpdge, one made three weeks before death and one made two months before death, were not too remote in time, were admissible under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3), and were relevant); Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993) (stating that witness\u2019 testimony that he found the victim crying and when he asked what was the matter, she said, \u201cHe\u2019s going to kill me\u201d was admissible as a present-sense impression showing the victim\u2019s fear under Ark. R. Evid. 803(3)).\nMike argues that even if the statements fell within the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule, the victim\u2019s state of mind was not relevant to any issue at trial. Further, he argues that even if the statements were relevant, they were clearly more prejudicial than probative and should be excluded. The State argues that in addition to being admissible to show Ms. Ballard\u2019s fear under Rule 803(3), the statements are also relevant, and their probative value outweighed any prejudice, because (1) they showed the victim\u2019s fear of Mike, (2) the fact that the victim made these statements to many people is a possible explanation for Mike having Leslie physically commit the murder instead of doing it himself, and (3) the statements impeach Mike\u2019s original statement to police that he and Ms. Ballard had a good relationship. What is relevant evidence and what is prejudicial lies within the discretion of the circuit court. See, e.g, Evans v. State, 317 Ark. 532, 878 S.W.2d 750 (1994). We cannot say the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony.\nMike goes on to argue that the cumulative effect of these statements was prejudicial. We disagree. Evidence that is merely cumulative is not prejudicial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 354 Ark. 226, 118 S.W.3d 542 (2003).\nQuestions Concerning Emotional Nature of the Murder\nMike next argues that the circuit court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion in limine to prohibit him from questioning the State\u2019s witness, medical examiner Dr. Steven Erickson, about the emotional nature of the murder. Prior to Dr. Steven Erickson\u2019s testimony, the State made an oral motion in limine to prohibit him from answering questions regarding whether the murder was a classic case of \u201coverkill\u201d or whether it was an \u201cemotional killing.\u201d The State argued that Dr. Erickson, while qualified to testify as to the cause and manner of death, had never met Leslie, so it was improper for him to testify about her state of mind at the time of the murder. The circuit court ruled that it would allow the defense to elicit testimony about overkill, but that it would not allow Dr. Erickson to testify about the emotional state of the killer.\nThereafter, during direct examination by the State, the prosecutor asked Dr. Erickson if this was a classic case of overkill, and Dr. Erickson answered in the affirmative. During cross-examination, Dr. Erickson testified about a wound to Ms. Ballard\u2019s neck, commenting that the wound was the coup de grace. Dr. Erickson further testified that the wound might be inflicted to make sure someone was dead, or that it might be inflicted for other reasons, such as \u201cemotional things.\u201d The State did not object.\nMike then proffered Dr. Erickson\u2019s testimony. Dr. Erickson explained that when he said that the murder was \u201coverkill,\u201d he meant that the injuries were the result of an extreme emotional state by the perpetrator. He also stated that he hesitated to testify about the psychology of the crime because he was not a psychologist or a forensic psychologist. Dr. Erickson testified that he had performed or been involved in over 3,000 autopsies, had studied numerous forensic psychiatric articles, and through his experience, had learned to ascertain certain knowledge as to how murders occur. Dr. Erickson said that cases such as the instant case, while rare, are well-characterized in the medical literature, and that the distribution, pattern, and severity of these types of injuries are often characterized as being associated with strong, emotional aspects of the case. He said that in general, the case was consistent with a \u201chigh emotional content present.\u201d Finally, Dr. Erickson stated that while the case was ripe for psychological evaluation, he was \u201cnot going to do that.\u201d Mike argues that the circuit court erred by not allowing him to question Dr. Erickson about the emotional nature of the crime. He contends that Dr. Erickson\u2019s testimony was crucial to his defense, in that it contradicted Leslie\u2019s testimony that she killed her mother because Mike forced her to do so. He further contends that the testimony of Dr. Erickson would impeach Leslie\u2019s credibility.\nThe State contends that based on Dr. Erickson\u2019s own reservation about his qualifications to render such an opinion, the circuit court properly excluded the testimony. We agree. The standard of review for a circuit court\u2019s ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is abuse of discretion. Hinson v. State, 340 Ark. 530, 10 S.W.3d 906 (2000). The circuit court did not allow further questioning because it determined that Dr. Erickson was not qualified to testify about the psychology of the crime. We find no abuse of discretion. Further, as previously noted, when testifying before the jury, Dr. Erickson did express his opinion that the attempted decapitation was \u201coverkill\u201d and that the killer could have inflicted the wound to Ms. Ballard\u2019s neck due to \u201cemotional things.\u201d Thus, the testimony that Mike sought \u2014 that Leslie might have killed her mother for emotional reasons \u2014 was before the jury.\nQuestions Imposed by Jurors\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in allowing jurors to question witnesses. At trial, the court allowed jurors to question every witness by submitting written questions to the judge. After allowing counsel to object at the bench, the circuit court decided which questions would be asked of each witness. Counsel were then given a chance to ask follow-up questions pertaining to the subject matter of the jurors\u2019 questions.\nAt a pretrial hearing and again throughout the trial, Mike objected to the circuit court\u2019s policy of allowing jurors to question witnesses; however, the circuit court repeatedly overruled his objections. During the trial, jurors submitted fifty-nine questions to be asked of witnesses; six of those questions were disallowed by the circuit court, and the remaining questions were asked of the witnesses. Mike lists several questions that he contends were particularly prejudicial. While he does not specifically explain how he was prejudiced by each question, he argues that generally, his right to a fair trial was compromised by the circuit court\u2019s encouragement of jurors to become participants in the trial, rather than to serve as neutral fact-finders. He further argues that the circuit court\u2019s actions amounted to an implied invitation for the jury to prematurely deliberate and violated his right to due process by diminishing the State\u2019s burden of proof and shifting part of that burden to the jurors and him. Finally, he argues that the circuit court\u2019s actions violated his right to present a defense and to take the stand at trial by placing him in the untenable position of not being able to testify, for fear that jurors would ask him improper questions.\nThis court has previously determined that it is within a trial court\u2019s discretion to allow jurors to ask questions of witnesses. In Ratton v. Busby, 230 Ark. 667, 682-83, 326 S.W.2d 889, 898 (1959), this court cited with approval from 58 Am. Jur. 311:\nThe fact that the trial judge gave the jury permission to interrogate a witness without any special request from them for the privilege has been held not to constitute error so long as the questions asked are germane to the issue. Conceding the propriety of permitting a juror to examine a witness, the examination may be carried out in such a manner or under such circumstances as to warrant the trial court in declaring a mistrial or granting a new trial, or if it fails or refuses to do so, to warrant a reversal by the reviewing court; this largely depends upon the facts of the individual case. But it may be said that, generally speaking, the courts have been reluctant to require a reversal or new trial because of the manner in which a juror examined a witness. It has been held not to be error to permit questions by the juror concerning matters that might properly have been elicited on the direct examination of the witnesses, if they are such as tend to clarify material points in the testimony.\nLater, in Nelson v. State, 257 Ark. 1, 513 S.W.2d 496 (1974), we rejected the appellant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in permitting jurors to ask questions of the witnesses in a first-degree murder case. We noted that the jurors asked questions \u201cabout a half dozen times, and the judge was very careful to tell each witness not to answer until he had held the question to be proper.\u201d Id. at 4, 513 S.W.2d at 498. See also Superior Federal Bank v. Mackey, 84 Ark. App. 1, 129 S.W.3d 324 (2003) (affirming trial court\u2019s practice of inviting jurors to question witnesses and noting our approval of the practice in Ration, supra, and Nelson, supra). More recently, this court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant\u2019s motion to allow jurors to question him after the State completed its cross-examination. See Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993). Mike acknowledges our prior decisions on this issue, but he contends that in those cases, we did not address the specific arguments that he raises in this case. He urges this court to join the jurisdictions that forbid the practice of jurors submitting questions to witnesses. See, e.g, Matchett v. State, 257 Ga. 785, 364 S.E.2d 565 (1988) (stating that direct questioning of witnesses by jurors is not permitted); State v. Costello, 646 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 2004) (holding that no court shall permit juror questioning during criminal trials); Wharton v. State, 734 So.2d 985 (Miss. 1998) (condemning and outright forbidding the practice of juror interrogation of witnesses); State v. Zima, 237 Neb. 952, 468 N.W.2d 377 (1991) (prohibiting juror questioning of witnesses); Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that jurors are not permitted to question witnesses in criminal cases).\nAlthough Mike claims he was prejudiced by this practice, he does not point to a specific question that caused him to suffer prejudice; rather, he simply alleges that \u201cmany of these previously unasked questions went to the very heart of [his] defense and helped make up some of the State\u2019s deficiencies, thus removing some of the jury\u2019s reasonable doubt.\u201d It is axiomatic that this court will not presume prejudice where the appellant offers no proof of it, see, e.g., Rollins v. State, 362 Ark. 279, 208 S.W.3d 215 (2005), and some prejudice must be. shown in order to find grounds to reverse a conviction. See Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315 (2004). In light of our precedent in Ration, supra, and Nelson, supra, and because Mike has failed to demonstrate prejudice, we cannot say that it was error for the circuit court to allow the jurors to submit questions to the witnesses in this case.\nWhile we find no prejudice in this case, under the facts and arguments presented, we do wish to express that we have concerns about the practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses. We refer to the Supreme Court Committee on Criminal Practice and the Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice for consideration the question of whether and under what circumstances we should allow juror questioning of witnesses.\nAdmission of Financial Documents\nNineteen financial documents found spread out on the kitchen table in Mike and Leslie\u2019s home were admitted as evidence. The documents included a quitclaim deed giving their home to Mike\u2019s parents, collection letters, account statements, a default judgment against one of Mike\u2019s corporations, and an order voiding a lien to one debtor that was filed in Mike\u2019s Chapter 7 proceeding. All were dated in the months prior to Ms. Ballard\u2019s death. Mike contends that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting the documents because they had no probative value and were highly prejudicial. He states that the effect of the documents was to give the jury an image of a \u201cdead beat,\u201d unemployed defendant who had led an opulent lifestyle and then filed for bankruptcy. The State contends that the documents were admissible as evidence of Mike\u2019s lifestyle to show that the MacKools were having financial trouble and that financial gain was a motive for the murder. We agree. This court has stated that where the purpose of evidence is to disclose a motive for a killing, anything that might have influenced the commission of the act may be shown. See Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000). Evidence of circumstances that explain the act, show a motive, or illustrate the accused\u2019s state of mind, may be independently relevant and admissible. Id. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the financial documents.\nAdmission of Expunged Conviction and Testimony Concerning Prior Arrest During Sentencing\nMike argues that the circuit court committed reversible error during the penalty phase of the trial in allowing evidence of a thirty-two-year-old investigation and a ten-year-old expunged conviction. Bobby Thomas testified about the 1972 investigation into the death of fourteen-year-old Jeff Ward. Thomas was employed with the Little Rock Police Department as a homicide detective at that time, and as part of the investigation, he interviewed Mike MacKool, who at that time was seventeen years old. Thomas testified that after he advised Mike of his rights, he agreed to give a statement about the events surrounding Ward\u2019s death. Thomas then read Mike\u2019s statement aloud. In his statement, Mike said:\nI and Catfish Gray were messing around Friday, the 7th and went out to the Minute Man. We got out there standing around talking. When we started to leave, these three boys asked for a ride towards the Razorback Drive-In. I said okay. We got in the car and left. We stopped at the gas station and got 90 cents worth of gas. We then proceeded on and while driving down Cantrell, he threw up all in the backseat of my father\u2019s car. I asked \u2022\u2014 I asked him if he threw up and the other boy said no. It was the water and ice in the ice chest. Catfish then said you threw up, didn\u2019t you? He said no. I turned around and he had stuff all over his mouth. Then I rolled his back window down to get him some fresh air. When we got to Kavanaugh and Cantrell, we pulled in a service station. He got out and I then saw that the stuff [sic] he had lied about it. I just got out and walked around and hit him. He fell down. I tried to pick him up. He wouldn\u2019t get up. His eyes were closed. So I kicked him in the right shoulder to wake him up, but he still laid there. The other boys got out to take him home, I guess, and we left to go home.\nAfter reading Mike\u2019s 1972 statement, Thomas testified that he had confirmed through the medical examiner that Ward died as a result of the incident.\nThe State then called Everett Davis to testify. Davis stated that in 1994, while employed as a patrolman by the Little Rock Police Department, he responded to a reported domestic dispute at Mike MacKool\u2019s home. Davis said that while he was there, Mike was on the phone, talking to someone police later determined to be Mike\u2019s girlfriend, Tina Puddephatt. Davis testified that while Mike was on the phone with Ms. Puddephatt, he overheard Mike threaten to kill Ms. Puddephatt and their daughter. Davis testified that he requested that Mike come out of the house to talk to him. According to Davis, Mike refused to come out of the house, told Davis he could not come in, and informed Davis that he had a safe full of guns that he would use if necessary. Davis stated that Mike eventually surrendered himself, some five hours later, and was taken into custody.\nMike argues that this evidence was clearly inadmissible pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 404(b), 608, and 609. The State contends that the evidence of Mike\u2019s prior violent acts provided proof of his character and was relevant character evidence. The admissibility of proof in the penalty phase of a jury trial is governed by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-103 (Supp. 2003), and it provides a list of new evidence that may be admitted in the sentencing phase, although such evidence might not have been admitted during the guilt phase of the trial. Crawford v. State, 362 Ark. 301, 208 S.W.3d 146 (2005); Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002). Section 16-97-103(5) generally permits the admission of relevant character evidence at sentencing; whereas, Ark. R. Evid. 404 provides that character evidence is not admissible, except as otherwise permitted under the rule. Crawford, supra. Thus, character evidence that might not be admissible at the guilt phase could, under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-103(5), be admissible at sentencing. Likewise, Rule 608, which pertains to evidence of character and conduct of a witness, does not override the applicability of \u00a7 16-97-103. Further, as the State points out, the evidence offered during the penalty phase was not offered to attack Mike\u2019s credibility, so Ark. R. Evid. 609 does not apply.\nFinally, Mike argues that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of the thirty-two-year-old investigation and the ten-year old expunged conviction because, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-97-103(3)(iii) (Supp. 2003), acts occurring more than ten years prior to the offense charged are inadmissible. Mike is mistaken. Section 16-97-103(3) (iii) provides that in no event shall delinquency adjudications for acts occurring more than ten years prior to the commission of the offense charged be considered. Fiere, the prior acts do not involve delinquency adjudications; therefore, \u00a7 16-97-103(3) (iii) is inapplicable. A circuit court\u2019s decision to admit evidence in the penalty phase of a trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Buckley, supra. We find no abuse of discretion.\nCumulative Error\nMike argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on cumulative error. In addition to the errors set forth above, Mike argues that (1) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for change of venue, (2) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for mistrial when a potential juror stated in front of the entire jury panel that she had a negative perception of Mike, and (3) the circuit court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after Mickey Holloway told the jury that it was his opinion that Mike was involved in the murder.\nWe do not address Mike\u2019s assertion that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for change of venue because Mike fails to provide any argument on this issue. This court does not research or develop arguments for appellants. See, e.g., Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004).\nWe now turn to Mike\u2019s argument concerning the comment made by a potential juror within the hearing of the jury panel. During voir dire of the prospective jurors, Pam Fuller stated, \u201cMy husband and I work out. . . at the Little Rock Athletic Club where Mr. MacKool used to work out and I was acquainted with him there ... I do have a negative perception of him.\u201d After hearing Ms. Fuller\u2019s comment, Mike moved for a mistrial, and the circuit court denied his motion.\nA mistrial is a drastic remedy and should only be declared when there is an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be served by continuing the trial, or when fundamental fairness of the trial itself has been manifestly affected. Ferguson v. State, 343 Ark. 159, 33 S.W.3d 115 (2000). The trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying a motion for mistrial and absent an abuse of that discretion, the decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Id. The course and conduct of voir dire is within the circuit judge\u2019s sound discretion, and the latitude of that discretion is wide. Dillard v. State, 363 Ark. 491, 215 S.W.3d 662 (2005). Here, shortly after Fuller made her comment, the circuit court made curative remarks to the entire panel and began conducting individual voir dire, at the bench, of jurors who had existing opinions about the appellant or the case. None of those jurors referred to Fuller\u2019s statement, and the remaining jurors indicated that they had no opinions that would affect their decision. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mike\u2019s motion for mistrial.\nFinally, Mike argues that the circuit court erred in failing to declare a mistrial when Mickey Holloway testified that he told police he thought Mike was involved in the murder. The State argues that there was no abuse of discretion because the circuit court admitted the evidence only to show whether the witness made prior inconsistent statements and admonished the jury to consider the evidence only for that purpose and not as evidence of guilt or innocence. Still, Mike argues that an error of this type cannot be cured by an admonishment. We disagree. We defer to the circuit court, as it is in a superior position to determine the effect of the allegedly prejudicial remark on the jury. Ferguson, supra. In addition, the record shows that defense counsel had elicited nearly identical testimony from the same witness on cross-examination. We conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion.\nIn sum, we have considered all assertions of error and concluded that no reversible error occurred in Mike\u2019s trial. This court does not recognize the cumulative-error doctrine when there is no error to accumulate. See Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000); Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995).\nAffirmed.\nBoth Leslie and Mike were charged with capital murder and theft of property. In a separate trial, Leslie was convicted of both charges. She was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the capital-murder charge and five years\u2019 imprisonment for the theft-of-property charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. This court affirmed Leslie\u2019s convictions and sentences. See MacKool v. State, 363 Ark. 295, 213 S.W.3d 618 (2005).\nAlthough there was evidence that coins and jewelry were taken at the time of the murder, the Cadillac was the only property valued for the purpose of the theft charge. Defense counsel conceded at trial that the State had met its burden of establishing that the Cadillac was worth $2,500 or more.\nMany jurisdictions have held that evidence of an accused\u2019s attempt to commit suicide is admissible because it is probative of a consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 12 Cal.App.3d 189, 90 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1970); People v. Summitt, 104 P.3d 232 (Colo. Ct.App. 2004); McKinney v. State, 466 A.2d 356 (Del. 1983); Walker v. State, 483 So.2d 791 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1986); Aldridge v. State, 229 Ga.App. 544, 494 S.E.2d 368 (1997); State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P.2d 854 (1940); People v. Campbell, 126 Ill. App.3d 1028, 467 N.E.2d 1112 (1984); State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1990); Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 680 N.E.2d 75 (1997); State v. Painter, 329 Mo. 314, 44 S.W.2d 79 (1931); State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978 (1965); State v. Plunkett, 62 Nev. 258, 149 P.2d 101 (1944); State v. Brown, 128 N.H. 606, 517 A.2d 831 (1986); State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 625 A.2d 1102 (1993); State v. Blancett, 24 N.M. 433, 174 P. 207 (1918); State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982); Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71 (1941); State v. White, 649 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn. Crim.App. 1982); State v. Onorato, 171 Vt. 577, 762 A.2d 858 (2000). But see State v. Coudotte, 1 N.D. 109, 72 N.W. 913 (1897).\nMike contends that he said, \u201cAin\u2019t got no reason to lie\" (Emphasis added.)\nMike claims that he said, \u201cShe\u2019s the one who committed the crime.\u2019\nRule 512 provides in relevant part:\n(a) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.\n(b) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.\nSpecifically, Mike argues that the circuit court\u2019s ruling disallowing evidence from Dr. Erickson not only violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by eviscerating his right to meaningfully cross-examine a State witness, but also violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to present a defense. Mike did not make these arguments below; therefore, this court will not consider them on appeal. We have long held that we will not address arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Webb v. State, 365 Ark. 22, 223 S.W.3d 796 (2006).", "type": "majority", "author": "Jim Hannah, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Arkansas Public Defender Commission, by: Janice Vaughn, for appellant.", "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Michael Raymond MacKOOL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 05-609\n231 S.W.3d 676\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 9, 2006\n[Rehearing denied April 13, 2006.]\nArkansas Public Defender Commission, by: Janice Vaughn, for appellant.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0416-01", "first_page_order": 442, "last_page_order": 484 }