{ "id": 3695081, "name": "Henry MORGAN v. Don CHANDLER, Individually, and O/B/O a Class Similarly Situated, and Lenders Title Company", "name_abbreviation": "Morgan v. Chandler", "decision_date": "2006-10-12", "docket_number": "06-310", "first_page": "430", "last_page": "437", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ark. 430" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "241 S.W.3d 224" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "186 S.W.3d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lenders Title II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 Ark. 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8451484 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lenders Title II" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/358/0066-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Lenders Title I" }, { "parenthetical": "Lenders Title I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ark. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 36039 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629-30", "parenthetical": "holding that \" [i]t is well settled that to preserve arguments for appeal, even constitutional ones, the appellant must obtain a ruling below\"" }, { "page": "429", "parenthetical": "holding that \" [i]t is well settled that to preserve arguments for appeal, even constitutional ones, the appellant must obtain a ruling below\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/354/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ark. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3655886 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that when an appellant fails to obtain a ruling on an issue from the circuit court, his or her argument is not preserved for appeal because there is no decision of the circuit court for this court to review" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that when an appellant fails to obtain a ruling on an issue from the circuit court, his or her argument is not preserved for appeal because there is no decision of the circuit court for this court to review" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/366/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that First Bank waived the issue of attorney's fees and a 12% assessment against the insurance company by failing to obtain a ruling on this issue from the trial court" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that First Bank waived the issue of attorney's fees and a 12% assessment against the insurance company by failing to obtain a ruling on this issue from the trial court" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ark. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3556780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/363/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ark. 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5683094 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/361/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3695557 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "noting that our \"basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature\"" }, { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "noting that our \"basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/367/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5404999 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the proper standard of review for the interpretation of the attorney's lien statutes was de novo" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that the proper standard of review for the interpretation of the attorney's lien statutes was de novo" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158933 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ark. 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1884340 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" }, { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/302/0013-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 636, "char_count": 14096, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5185388005634788e-07, "percentile": 0.6688704631042196 }, "sha256": "970797a91b07d7d2148134da941ecb68333bce9ff6d1d0de383954004758e542", "simhash": "1:2f103ba7dc194772", "word_count": 2335 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:19:21.310389+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Dickey, J., not participating." ], "parties": [ "Henry MORGAN v. Don CHANDLER, Individually, and O/B/O a Class Similarly Situated, and Lenders Title Company" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Robert L. Brown, Justice.\nAppellant Henry Morgan appeals the order of the circuit court setting aside an attorney\u2019s Hen filed by him and a second order authorizing payment of attorney\u2019s fees to class counsel. Morgan contends on appeal that the dismissal of his attorney\u2019s lien was improper. On cross-appeal, appellees Don Chandler, individually and on behalf of the class, and Lenders Title Company (referred to jointly hereinafter as \u201cChandler\u201d) claim attorney\u2019s fees from Morgan for filing a nonjusticiable claim. We affirm on direct appeal and on cross-appeal.\nOn October 31, 2005, Morgan filed a notice of attorney\u2019s lien, in which he claimed to have a common-law attorney\u2019s lien and statutory lien pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-22-304 (Supp. 2005), on the settlement and attorney\u2019s fees to be awarded in the class-action lawsuit handled by Todd Turner, a lawyer who was Morgan\u2019s former employee. Morgan\u2019s position has always been that a written employment agreement between Turner and him entitled him to receive 40% of all attorney\u2019s fees collected by Turner from cases that had been initiated during Turner\u2019s employment. The agreement specifically included fees generated by Turner from those initiated cases after the termination of his employment with Morgan. Morgan asserted that he was entitled to $194,000, which represented 40% of the attorney\u2019s fees approved in the class-action settlement.\nOn November 15, 2005, Turner moved to set aside the attorney\u2019s lien filed by Morgan. Turner maintained that \u00a7 16-22-304 applies only to a situation where there has been an attorney\u2019s fee agreement between an attorney and his client. Accordingly, he also moved that the circuit court award him reasonable attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 16-22-309 (Repl. 1999), on the basis that Morgan had filed a lawsuit that was nonjusticiable.\nOn December 13, 2005, the circuit court entered a letter opinion and an order permitting Lenders Title Company to pay the $485,000 attorney\u2019s fees agreed to under the parties\u2019 settlement agreement into the registry of the court. On December 14, 2005, the circuit court entered an order setting aside Morgan\u2019s attorney\u2019s lien. In that order, the court found that Morgan was not designated as an attorney for the class certified in this case and that Morgan had not performed legal services for the benefit of any member of the class. As a result, the court determined that Morgan was not entitled to any portion of the court-awarded fee. The court, however, made no ruling regarding Turner\u2019s request for attorney\u2019s fees based on Morgan\u2019s allegedly nonjusticiable claim under \u00a7 16-22-309. On December 16, 2005, the circuit court entered an order authorizing payments from the registry of the court to the attorneys involved in the class-action lawsuit.\nMorgan filed a notice of appeal, in which he stated that he was appealing from the circuit court\u2019s December 14, 2005 order setting aside the attorney\u2019s lien and the circuit court\u2019s December 16, 2005 order authorizing payments from the registry of the court. Chandler then filed his notice of cross-appeal in which he said that he was appealing from \u201cthe Court\u2019s order which did not award the Plaintiffs attorney\u2019s fees and costs against [Morgan].\u201d\nI. Attorney\u2019s Lien\nMorgan first claims that the circuit court improperly dismissed and set aside his attorney\u2019s lien, and he contends that this court should apply the standard of review for a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Morgan explains that Turner and he entered into a \u201clegal services agreement,\u201d which provided, in pertinent part, that \u201cMorgan shall continue to be entitled to forty percent (40%) of all legal fees collected by Turner which are collected from the clients which continue to employ him for matters which arose prior to the date of separation.\u201d According to Morgan, Turner\u2019s representation of Chandler in the class-action lawsuit against Lenders Title Company began while Morgan and Turner were associated in the practice of law. Relying on Lockley v. Easley, 302 Ark. 13, 786 S.W.2d 573 (1990), Morgan maintains that the attorney\u2019s lien statute allows for a lien to be enforced against another attorney.\nMorgan contends, in the alternative, that if this court determines that the circuit court\u2019s order was actually a summary judgment because of the circuit court\u2019s consideration of matters outside the pleadings, then he claims that Chandler failed to meet proof with proof and that his own affidavit established his entitlement to an attorney\u2019s lien based on his legal services agreement with Turner.\nChandler responds by asserting that the attorney\u2019s lien statute clearly applies only to a dispute between a lawyer and his client. Moreover, he contends that, based on this court\u2019s holding in Butt v. Evans Law Firm, P.A., 351 Ark. 566, 98 S.W.3d 1 (2003), Morgan\u2019s claim is moot because Morgan failed to move for a stay or post a supersedeas bond and the court-awarded attorney\u2019s fees have been fully paid to class counsel. Chandler points out, as an aside, that Morgan\u2019s contractual dispute with Turner is the subject of a separate action filed in a different venue.\nWe first address the issue of mootness. As noted by Chandler, Morgan\u2019s issue raised on direct appeal may be moot because of the authorized payment of the disputed attorney\u2019s fees to Chandler\u2019s counsel on December 16, 2005, and because of this court\u2019s holding in Butt, supra. In Butt, this court determined that the appellant/intervenor was required to take steps to stay the order awarding attorney\u2019s fees or to post a supersedeas bond to prevent payment of the disputed fees. Because the appellant/intervenor in that case failed to take those steps, this court held that any claim to attorney\u2019s fees that were voluntarily paid was moot.\nSimilarly, in the instant case, Morgan took no steps to stay the order awarding attorney\u2019s fees, and he did not post a supersedeas bond. Rather, Morgan filed his notice of appeal after the circuit court entered its order setting aside his attorney\u2019s lien and after the court authorized payments from the registry of the court. Based on our reasoning in Butt, it appears that this matter is moot. Our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that the December 16, 2005 order authorized payment of the fees as of the date of the entry of the order. Moreover, in his brief on appeal, Chandler states that the attorneys for the class, including Turner, have received those fees, and this is not refuted by Morgan in his reply brief.\nThough the matter appears moot, there is no document of record evidencing the fact that the fees were actually paid. Out of an abundance of caution, we address the merits.\nWe turn first to the issue raised by Morgan of whether the circuit court\u2019s order was a dismissal order or summary judgment. We conclude that Chandler\u2019s motion to set aside the attorney\u2019s lien is neither a Rule 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim nor a Rule 56(c) motion for summary judgment. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 56(c) (2006). Clearly, both rules contemplate a motion being filed with respect to a pleading as defined by Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) (2006). Here, Chandler\u2019s motion to set aside an attorney\u2019s lien was filed in response to Morgan\u2019s notice of lien filed on October 31, 2005. No pleading was involved. Because of this, Morgan\u2019s argument regarding summary judgment and his filed affidavit simply have no relevancy to these facts.\nThe circuit court\u2019s order setting aside the attorney\u2019s lien in this case was based on the attorney\u2019s lien law, Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7\u00a7 16-22-302 \u2014 16-22-304 (Repl. 1999). This court reviews a circuit court\u2019s interpretation of a statute de novo, as it is for this court to determine what a statute means. See Mack v. Brazil, Adlong & Winningham, PLC, 357 Ark. 1, 159 S.W.3d 291 (2004) (holding that the proper standard of review for the interpretation of the attorney\u2019s lien statutes was de novo). This court has held that it is not bound by the circuit court\u2019s decision concerning an issue of statutory interpretation. See id. In the absence of a showing that the circuit court erred, however, this court will accept the circuit court\u2019s interpretation as correct on appeal. See id.\nIn matters concerning the meaning of a statute, we look to the intent of the General Assembly. See, e.g., Dep\u2019t of Human Servs. & Child Wefare Agency Review Bd. v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 62, 238 S.W.3d 1, 6 (2006) (noting that our \u201cbasic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature\u201d); Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205 S.W.3d 767 (2005). In the instant case, that intent is laid out clearly and unmistakably in a statute which reads:\nIt is hereby found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas. . . that an attorney should have the right to rely on his contract with his client, and that the Attorney\u2019s Lien Law should be reenacted to protect the contractual rights of attorneys. Therefore, it is the intent of \u00a7\u00a7 16-22-302 \u201416-22-304 to allow an attorney to obtain a lien for services based on his or her agreement with his or her client and to provide for compensation in case of a settlement or compromise without the consent of the attorney.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-22-301 (Repl. 1999) (emphasis added). This is the statute relied upon by the circuit court in its letter opinion setting aside the attorney\u2019s hen. We agree that there was no agreement between Morgan and Chandler or the class for legal services, which is an express prerequisite for obtaining an attorney\u2019s lien.\nIn addition, we conclude that Morgan\u2019s reliance on Lockley v. Easley, supra, is misplaced. Morgan\u2019s argument stems from the following language taken from our opinion in Lockley:\nThe [Attorneys Lien Law] explicitly provides that attorneys may rely on their contractual rights with clients and are entitled to obtain a hen for services based on such agreements. The Attorneys Lien Law also provides that, under appropriate circumstances, the lien may be enforced not only against the client but against anyone, including another attorney, who knowingly settles with an opposing litigant without the consent of the attorney.\nLockley, 302 Ark. at 17, 786 S.W.2d at 576. While Morgan correctly notes that an attorney\u2019s Hen may be enforced against another attorney, he mistakenly assumes that such a lien can be created as a result of an attorney\u2019s contract with another attorney. We said in Lockley that \u201cattorneys ... are entitled to obtain a lien for services based on . . . agreements\u201d with their clients. Id. We did not say that an agreement between attorneys creates the lien. Therefore, while an attorney\u2019s hen may in some instances be enforceable against another attorney, such a lien is not created where there is no attorney/client relationship.\nFinally, Morgan\u2019s argument that Chandler was his client by implication appears to be a new argument, and it is well settled that an appellant cannot make an argument for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Healthcare Recoveries, Inc. v. Arkansas Client Sec. Fund, 363 Ark. 102, 211 S.W.3d 512 (2005).\nII. Cross-Appeal\nTurning to the cross-appeal, Chandler asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied class counsel\u2019s claim for additional attorney\u2019s fees. Chandler contends that he was entitled to an award of attorney\u2019s fees pursuant to \u00a7 16-22-309(a)(l), which provides that a party is entitled to an award of attorney\u2019s fees when he defends against a claim that lacks a justiciable issue. He adds that these attorney\u2019s fees should be awarded because the notice of lien filed lacked merit and because Morgan published nonrelevant, personal, and confidential materials for no legitimate purpose.\nWe cannot reach the merits of this claim because there is no ruling by the circuit court on the issue of attorney\u2019s fees under \u00a7 16-22-309(a)(l). Chandler did raise the issue in his motion to set aside the attorney\u2019s lien, but his failure to obtain a ruling on this matter operates as a waiver of this argument on appeal. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. First Bank of Arkansas, 341 Ark. 851, 20 S.W.3d 372 (2000) (holding that First Bank waived the issue of attorney\u2019s fees and a 12% assessment against the insurance company by failing to obtain a ruling on this issue from the trial court); see also Arkansas Wildlife Fed\u2019n v. Arkansas Soil & Water Conservation Comm\u2019n, 366 Ark. 50, 233 S.W.3d 615 (2006) (holding that when an appellant fails to obtain a ruling on an issue from the circuit court, his or her argument is not preserved for appeal because there is no decision of the circuit court for this court to review); Carson v. County of Drew, 354 Ark. 621, 629-30, 128 S.W.3d 423, 429 (2003) (holding that \u201c [i]t is well settled that to preserve arguments for appeal, even constitutional ones, the appellant must obtain a ruling below\u201d). Hence, we affirm on cross-appeal as well.\nAffirmed on direct appeal. Affirmed on cross-appeal.\nDickey, J., not participating.\nThe class-action lawsuit involved in this case was Chandler v. Lenders Title Co., which was appealed to this court twice. See Lenders Title Co. v. Chandler, 353 Ark. 339, 107 S.W.3d 157 (2003) (Lenders Title I); Lenders Title Co. v. Chandler, 358 Ark. 66, 186 S.W.3d 695 (2004) (Lenders Title II).\nThe record reflects that on December 2,2005, Morgan filed a separate action in the Clark County Circuit Court against Turner based on the legal services agreement. In that complaint, Morgan alleged the following four causes of action against Turner: (1) breach of contract; (2) conversion; (3) an accounting and inspection of records; (4) a constructive trust.", "type": "majority", "author": "Robert L. Brown, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Gary Green, by: Gary Green and Randy Hall, for appellant.", "Nichols & Campbell, P.A., by: Greg Campbell and Mark Nichols; Dan Turner and Todd Turner, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Henry MORGAN v. Don CHANDLER, Individually, and O/B/O a Class Similarly Situated, and Lenders Title Company\n06-310\n241 S.W.3d 224\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered October 12, 2006\nLaw Offices of Gary Green, by: Gary Green and Randy Hall, for appellant.\nNichols & Campbell, P.A., by: Greg Campbell and Mark Nichols; Dan Turner and Todd Turner, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0430-01", "first_page_order": 454, "last_page_order": 461 }