{
  "id": 3799339,
  "name": "Wilbert RANDALL v. STATE of Arkansas",
  "name_abbreviation": "Randall v. State",
  "decision_date": "2006-12-07",
  "docket_number": "CR 06-331",
  "first_page": "279",
  "last_page": "282",
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:59:17.047242+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "Wilbert RANDALL v. STATE of Arkansas"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.\nAppellant Wilbert Randall was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for the 1976 shooting of Woodrow Lobley. On direct appeal, we affirmed in Wilkerson v. State, CR77-59 (Ark. Oct. 10, 1977), finding no reversible error and that the evidence was \u201camply sufficient\u201d to constitute substantial evidence that Randall killed the victim in the perpetration of a robbery. The facts and circumstances surrounding the murder and the evidence presented at trial were as follows:\nThe state adduced evidence that Randall was at the nightclub for several hours during which time he tried to persuade a club employee to lure the victim outside the club so that he, Randall, could \u201crip him off.\u201d When this witness refused and tried to dissuade him by telling him that he would be identified, Randall responded \u201che would take care of that.\u201d She observed Randall with \u201ca big gun,\u201d which he had \u201cpulled\u201d on a patron during the evening. There was evidence that Randall tried to get the victim to shoot pool for $50 a game. Randall, on a previous occasion, had been denied entrance to the club because he had a .38 caliber pistol in his possession. As previously indicated, Randall left the club around 5:30 a.m. in a car headed in the same direction as the victim\u2019s cab. Randall was identified by the cab driver as being at the victim\u2019s motel when the cab arrived. The cab driver testified that, as he waited for his passenger to return to the cab, Randall approached him, asked if he was \u201cfinished with the man that I had let out,\u201d and then told him \u201cto move it.\u201d As the cab driver complied, Randall headed in the same direction as the victim, who was entering the motel. As indicated, the victim was found dying shortly thereafter away from the motel without any money on his person. A witness, who found the victim, passed a white automobile as he approached the scene. Randall was found in a white automobile, covered with a quilt, when he was apprehended in a nearby town two days later. He denied killing or robbing the victim or having a gun at the club and presented an alibi.\nWilkerson v. State, CR77-59, slip op. at 1.\nIn 1981, Randall, proceeding pro se, filed a Rule 37 petition that was denied as being untimely. In 1984, Randall filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Jefferson County Circuit Court. The circuit court denied the petition and Randall failed to appeal.\nAlmost twenty years later, on April 14, 2003, Randall filed another habeas corpus petition pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001, codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-112-201 through 207 (Supp. 2003), alleging that scientific evidence not available at trial would establish his actual innocence. Court documents from 1976 confirm that the clothes taken from Randall and Wilkerson were \u201cstained with what appears to be blood\u201d and that the court ordered blood to be drawn and tested. Additionally, Randall\u2019s petition states that DNA testing would exonerate him because \u201ca reasonable scientific probability exists\u201d that if he shot and killed the victim or was involved in the murder, then blood would have been on his clothing as Lobley was shot at a close range and transported to a different location. In a certificate of service attached to the habeas corpus petition, Randall certified that a copy of the petition was mailed to the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General.\nInitially, Randall sought recusal of the trial judge to whom his case was assigned because the judge was a prosecutor in the 1976 trial. The judge promptly recused and the case was reassigned to another judge. On October 10, 2004, Randall sent a letter to the circuit court, requesting information on the status of his petition. Randall received a hand-written response informing him that the case had been reassigned a second time and there had been no action taken since that reassignment.\nEventually, by letter dated September 27, 2005, the circuit court requested that the prosecuting attorney provide it with a copy of the answer, or if no answer had been filed to \u201cplease have a response filed within ten (10) days in order for this matter to be resolved.\u201d That same day, the prosecuting attorney notified the circuit court that the Attorney General\u2019s office had not prepared a response as that office had not been served with the petition. The circuit court thereafter denied Randall\u2019s petition without a hearing. The order stated:\nUpon consideration of defendant\u2019s Habeas Corpus Petition, the Court doth find and order as follows:\nA writ of habeas corpus is to be issued upon a showing by affidavit or other evidence that the petitioner\u2019s commitment is invalid on its face or that the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction to enter or modify the sentence.\nA writ of habeas corpus is not issued to correct errors or irregularities that occurred at trial.\nThe allegations in defendant\u2019s petition speak only to potential errors in the presentation of evidence during his trial.\nTherefore, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.\nFrom that order, Randall now appeals. Our jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(a)(8) (2006). We affirm.\nFor his two points on appeal, Randall argues that the circuit court erred when it denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. First, Randall asserts that he was denied due process of law because the circuit court clerk failed to serve copies of his petition on the prosecuting attorney and the Attorney General in violation of Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-203(d) (Supp. 2003), and the prosecutor failed to file a response to his petition within twenty days as required by Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-112-204(a) (Supp. 2003). Second, Randall claims that he was denied due process of law by reason of the circuit court\u2019s summary denial of his petition \u201cwithout resort to a determination of whether it met the requisite showing dictated by [Act 1780].\u201d\nWe have held many times that constitutional claims may not be raised for the first time on appeal. London v. State, 354 Ark. 313, 125 S.W.3d 813 (2003). Randall did not seek any postjudgment relief from the circuit court on the basis that he was denied due process of law by the circuit court\u2019s alleged failure to follow several procedural requirements set forth in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-112-201 through 207. Thus, we are precluded from addressing Randall\u2019s two points on appeal because his due-process claims are not preserved for appellate review.\nAffirmed.\nThe conviction of Randall\u2019s co-defendant, James Wilkerson, was reversed and remanded on direct appeal.\nSection 16-112-203(d) provides that \u201c[t]he circuit clerk shall deliver a copy of the petition to the prosecuting attorney and to the Attorney General.\u201d\nSection 16-112-204(a) provides that \u201c[wjithin twenty (20) days after the filing of the petition, the prosecuting attorney or the Attorney General shall respond to the petition by answer or motion which shall be filed with the court and served on the petitioner if unrepresented or served on the petitioner\u2019s attorney.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Appellant, pro se.",
      "Mike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "Wilbert RANDALL v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 06-331\n244 S.W.3d 662\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered December 7, 2006\nAppellant, pro se.\nMike Beebe, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0279-01",
  "first_page_order": 305,
  "last_page_order": 308
}