{ "id": 4017176, "name": "Richard WEISS, Director of Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. Charles R. MAPLES, on Behalf of Himself & All Taxpayers Similarly Situated", "name_abbreviation": "Weiss v. Maples", "decision_date": "2007-03-22", "docket_number": "06-742", "first_page": "282", "last_page": "289", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 Ark. 282" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "253 S.W.3d 907" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "200 Ark. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1453414 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1940, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that the Commissioner of Revenues had no right to promulgate a rule contrary to statute" }, { "parenthetical": "holding that the Commissioner of Revenues had no right to promulgate a rule contrary to statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/200/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ark. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3695557 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/367/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 72", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210175 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 235", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ark. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3031793 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/364/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ark. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3694881 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/367/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ark. 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 74165 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/348/0577-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451179 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-414", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(24)" }, { "page": "(b)(24)" }, { "page": "(b)", "parenthetical": "B" }, { "page": "(b)(24)" }, { "page": "(b)(24)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(b)(24)(B)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 Ark. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5462418 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "McFadden III" }, { "parenthetical": "McFadden III" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ark. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5369501 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "McFadden II" }, { "parenthetical": "McFadden II" }, { "page": "132" }, { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-307", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155488 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "McFadden I" }, { "parenthetical": "McFadden I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0868-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 643, "char_count": 15254, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5678396616587726e-07, "percentile": 0.6781134730248752 }, "sha256": "dfd97980ed65d705355ba9c4248f3fe364d33828fabf4a391ff624bb55b10ee2", "simhash": "1:1d90fb067d4d9f10", "word_count": 2476 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:48.941240+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Richard WEISS, Director of Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. Charles R. MAPLES, on Behalf of Himself & All Taxpayers Similarly Situated" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis case concerns the constitutionality of the Emergency Income Tax Rule 2003-4 (\u201cEmergency Rule\u201d), adopted by the Department of Finance and Administration (DF&A) on August 29,2003, and applied in tax years 2003 and 2004. Appellee Charles R. Maples, on behalf of himself and all taxpayers similarly situated, filed this illegal-exaction lawsuit, claiming that the Emergency Rule violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and was unconstitutional. The circuit court agreed and ordered a refund to those who, like Maples, were improperly taxed in 2003 and 2004. On appeal, Appellant Richard Weiss, in his capacity as director of DF&A, contends that the circuit court erred in determining that the Emergency Rule was unconstitutional. We affirm.\nTo understand the development of this case, some background information is necessary. In Weiss v. McFadden, 353 Ark. 868, 120 S.W.3d 545 (2003) (McFadden I), this court declared Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-307(c) (Supp. 2003) to be unconstitutional. The statutory provision at issue stated that no recipient of benefits from an individual retirement account or from public or private employment-related retirement systems, plans, or programs was allowed to deduct or recover his or her cost of contribution in the plan when computing his income for state income tax purposes. In Weiss v. McFadden, 356 Ark. 123, 148 S.W.3d 248 (2004) (McFadden II), this court addressed the appropriate remedy or mechanism for the tax refund resulting from McFadden I. In Weiss v. McFadden, 360 Ark. 76, 199 S.W.3d 649 (2004) (McFadden III), the issue was, again, the mechanism for the tax refund.\nAfter McFadden I, but before McFadden II and III were decided, DF&A enacted Emergency Income Tax Rule 2003-4. The Emergency Rule stated in relevant part:\n1. For tax years beginning January \u00cd, 2003, and thereafter, individual recipients of benefits from a public or private employment-related retirement system, plan or program shall be allowed to deduct or recover their cost of contribution in the plan when computing income for state income tax purposes.\n2. The deduction allowed for Arkansas state income tax purposes for cost of contribution for each tax year shall be the same amount as allowed as a deduction for cost of contribution for federal income tax purposes for the same tax year pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Section 72 as in effect on July 1, 2003.\nHowever, at that time, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24) (Supp. 2003) provided that annuity income from employment-related retirement plans should be taxed in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-307. See \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B).\nOn March 29, 2004, Maples, on behalf of himself and all taxpayers similarly situated, filed the instant illegal-exaction action in Pulaski County Circuit Court. Maples contributed money previously taxed (\u201cafter-tax contribution\u201d) by the State to a public or private employment-related retirement system, plan or program. He received an annuity income from that retirement plan in tax years 2003 and 2004. For those tax years, Maples was bound by the Emergency Rule, requiring that annuity income from employment-related retirement plans be taxed in accordance with Internal Revenue Code \u00a7 72. Maples\u2019s illegal-exaction suit requested that the Emergency Rule be declared illegal and unconstitutional, because it conflicted with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24). Weiss responded, contending that there was no conflict between the Emergency Rule and our statutory law. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In response to Maples\u2019s undisputed facts, Weiss admitted the following:\n[T]he Department of Finance and Administration used [the] Emergency Income Tax Rule 2003-4, in conjunction with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-414, to determine [Maples\u2019s] Arkansas income tax liabilities for tax years 2003 and 2004, but that either source of authority was sufficient to mandate the use of [Internal Revenue Code] \u00a7 72 for those years.\n(Emphasis added.) The circuit court eventually entered an order granting Maples\u2019s motion for summaryjudgment and denying Weiss\u2019s motion. In the order, the circuit court concluded that the Emergency Rule was directly contrary to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b) (24) (B). As a result, the court ordered Weiss to refund the income taxes for tax years 2003 and 2004. From this order, Weiss filed a timely notice of appeal.\nSummaryjudgment is a remedy that should only be granted when there are no genuine issues of material fact to litigate and when the case can be decided as a matter of law. Norris v. Baker, 320 Ark. 629, 899 S.W.2d 70 (1995). Here, there are no factual issues in dispute; judgment can be entered as a matter of law. Moreover, we review issues of constitutional interpretation de novo, as it is for us to decide the meaning of a statute. Brewer v. Fergus, 348 Ark. 577, 581, 79 S.W.3d 831 (2002). In the absence of a showing that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the law, the interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Id.\nIn 2003 and 2004, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24) provided:\n(A) Sections 72(a), (b), and (c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as in effect on January 1,2001, relating to the exclusion from gross income of certain proceeds received under non employment-related life insurance, endowment, and annuity contracts, is hereby adopted for the purpose of computing Arkansas income tax liability.\n(B) Annuity income received through an employment-related retirement plan shall not be subject to the provisions of \u00a7 26-51-404(b). The income shall instead be subject to the retirement income provisions of \u00a7 26-51-307.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24) (Supp. 2003) (emphasis added). Under this provision, \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B) expressly directs that \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to annuity income received from an employment-retirement plan; instead, such income should be taxed in accordance with Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-307. In contrast, the Emergency Rule states that annuity income received from an employment-retirement plan should be taxed in accordance with \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code. In his undisputed facts, Weiss admits that the Emergency Rule applied to Maples, but Weiss contends that DF&A was allowed to do so. Weiss\u2019s argument is that \u00a7 26-51-404(b) did not expressly prohibit the use of Internal Revenue Code \u00a7 72; rather, that section simply stated that taxpayers must use \u00a7 26-51-307. Weiss asserts that subsection (c) became a nullity after \u00a7 26-51-307(c) was declared unconstitutional in McFadden I, leaving only the remaining part of \u00a7 26-51-307 intact. Thus, Weiss contends that, although \u00a7 26-51-307 was still intact, \u201cthe statute was not clear on how to allow cost recovery under employment-related . . . annuity contracts.\u201d Thus, Weiss\u2019s argument is that, because neither \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B) nor \u00a7 26-51-307 after McFadden I contained express prohibitions against the use of \u00a7 72, the Emergency Rule is constitutional. We must disagree.\nThe basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ainsworth v. State, 367 Ark. 353, 240 S.W.3d 105 (2006); Arkansas Dep\u2019t of Econ. Dev. v. William J. Clinton Presidential Found., 364 Ark. 40, 216 S.W.3d 119 (2005). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous, or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Id. However, when a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to the legislative intent, and our review becomes an examination of the whole act. Id. We reconcile provisions to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible in an effort to give effect to every part. Id. We also look to the legislative history, the language, and the subject matter involved. Id. Additionally, statutes relating to the same subject are said to be in pari materia and should be read in a harmonious manner, if possible. Id. Remaining mindful of these tools of statutory interpretation, we turn to the case at hand.\nIn McFadden II, we held in relevant part:\nIn [McFadden] I we held that both Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B) and \u00a7 26-51-307 are plain and unambiguous and we gave these statutes their plain meaning. The express terms of \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(A) clearly state that nonemployment-related retirement plans are covered under IRS Code \u00a7 72, while the express terms of \u00a7 26-51-404(b) (24) (B) clearly state that employment-related retirement plans are subject to \u00a7 26-51-307. The retirement plans at issue are employment-related; therefore, \u00a7 26-51-307 governs them.\nSubsection (c) of \u00a7 26-51-307 was the only subsection of the statute that addressed recovery of after-tax contributions. With the invalidation of subsection (c), the DF & A urges that a \u201cvoid\u201d now exists in the tax code with regard to after-tax contributions in employment-related retirement plans. The DF & A argues that the trial court should have applied \u00a7 72 to fill that \u201cvoid\u201d because, as it states in its argument, \u201cit is logical to assume the General Assembly would have intended\u201d for \u00a7 72 to be used as a guide.\nThere is nothing in \u00a7 26-51-307 to indicate that the General Assembly intended that \u00a7 72 be applied to recovery of after-tax contributions in employment-related retirement plans. We will not read into a statute a provision not put there by the General Assembly. Neeve v. City of Caddo Valley, 351 Ark. 235, 91 S.W.3d 71 (2002); State v. Goss, 344 Ark. 523, 42 S.W.3d 440 (2001). We thus hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to apply 26 U.S.C. \u00a7 72 to employment-related retirement plans.\nWeiss v. McFadden, 356 Ark. at 132, 148 S.W.3d at 254 (emphasis added). In this case, when read in its entirety, \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24) indicates that \u00a7 72 is not appropriate for use under subsection (b)(24)(B). Under these provisions, the General Assembly could not have been more clear that, at that time, \u00a7 72 should not apply to annuity income relating to employment-related retirement plans. While \u00a7 72 applied to the proceeds received under non-employment-related annuity contracts, see \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(A), the General Assembly had something else in mind with respect to annuity income relating to employment-related retirement plans; that is, that it wanted another provision of our statute to apply instead of \u00a7 72. See \u00a7 26-51-404(b) (24) (B). As we noted above in McFadden I and McFadden II, \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B) is plain and unambiguous. Moreover, as quoted above, McFadden II clearly held that there is nothing to indicate that the General Assembly intended that \u00a7 72 be applied to recovery of after-tax contributions in employment-related retirement plans, and we refused to read into the statute a provision not put there by the General Assembly. McFadden II, supra.\nLikewise, here, regardless of the status of\u00a7 26-51-307 after McFadden I, the General Assembly made it clear that \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code should not apply to annuity income received from employment-related retirement plans. The circuit court correctly determined that the Emergency Rule was in conflict with \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B).\nFor his final point on appeal, Weiss argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the Emergency Rule violates the separation-of-powers doctrine and is therefore unconstitutional. Recently, in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Howard, 367 Ark. 55, 238 S.W.3d 1 (2006), we explained that our government is composed of three separate independent branches: legislative, executive and judicial. Each branch has certain specified powers delegated to it. Id. The legislative branch of the State government has the power and responsibility to proclaim the law through statutory enactments. Id. The judicial branch has the power and responsibility to interpret the legislative enactments. Id. The executive branch has the power and responsibility to enforce the laws as enacted and interpreted by the other two branches. Id. The \u201cSeparation-of-Powers Doctrine\u201d is a basic principle upon which our government is founded, and should not be violated or abridged. Id.\nArkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 19-1-208 provides:\nThe director of the Department of Finance and Administration is vested with the authority to make such reasonable rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the law, as shall be necessary or desirable for the orderly discharge of the duties vested in the Department of Finance and Administration.\nId. (emphasis added). Thus, any rule or regulation adopted by the director of the DF&A must be consistent with the law. See id. Stated simply, if a rule or regulation is inconsistent with the law, the director acted beyond his or her statutory authority. Id.\nAs stated in the above section, in 2003 and 2004, \u00a7 26-51-404(b)(24)(B) plainly indicated that \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to annuity income received from employment-related retirement plans. In contrast, the Emergency Rule provided that \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code would apply to annuity income received from employment-related retirement plans. Because an inconsistency existed, the Emergency Rule is \u201cinconsistent with the law,\u201d and \u201cinfringe[s] a legislative function.\u201d Accordingly, the Emergency Rule is outside the scope ofWeiss\u2019s rule-making authority as set forth in \u00a7 19-1-208. See also State v. Burnett, 200 Ark. 655, 140 S.W.2d 673 (1940)(holding that the Commissioner of Revenues had no right to promulgate a rule contrary to statute). Consequently, we also affirm the circuit court\u2019s holding that the Emergency Rule violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and is, thus, unconstitutional.\nAffirmed.\nDuring the 2005 legislative session, the General Assembly passed Act 189 of 2005, which amended Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 26-51-307 and 26-51-404. These amended statutes now provide that \u00a7 72 of the Internal Revenue Code applies to annuity income received from an employment-retirement plan. However, those 2005 amendments are not at issue in the instant appeal.\nWeiss argues that our language from McFadden II on \u00a7 72\u2019s interaction with \u00a7 26-51-307 and \u00a7 26-5 l-404(b) (24) does not apply here because that conclusion in McFadden II only applied to tax years 1999-2002. However, that argument is without merit because the relevant parts of these statutes were not amended until 2005.\nDespite Weiss\u2019s argument to the contrary, our decision in McFadden III did not approve the use of \u00a7 72; rather, we affirmed the equitable remedy fashioned by the circuit court in its application of the voluntary-payment rule for tax years prior to 1999.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Revenue Legal Counsel, by; William E. Keadle, for appellant.", "Nichols & Campbell, P.A., by: Mark W. Nichols, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Richard WEISS, Director of Arkansas Department of Finance & Administration v. Charles R. MAPLES, on Behalf of Himself & All Taxpayers Similarly Situated\n06-742\n253 S.W.3d 907\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered March 22, 2007\nRevenue Legal Counsel, by; William E. Keadle, for appellant.\nNichols & Campbell, P.A., by: Mark W. Nichols, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0282-01", "first_page_order": 306, "last_page_order": 313 }