{ "id": 4017652, "name": "Anthony SLOAN, M.D., and Valerie Sloan, M.D. v. ARKANSAS RURAL MEDICAL PRACTICE LOAN and SCHOLARSHIP BOARD; and Alan Sugg, in His Official Capacity as President of the University of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Sloan v. Arkansas Rural Medical Practice Loan & Scholarship Board", "decision_date": "2007-04-26", "docket_number": "06-1477", "first_page": "442", "last_page": "446", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 Ark. 442" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "255 S.W.3d 834" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "365 Ark. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3285832 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/365/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.W. 908", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ark. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1315947 ], "year": 1911, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/98/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ark. App. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark. App.", "case_ids": [ 6137773 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/30/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ark. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3557207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/363/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155519 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 Ark. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5461008 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227-28", "parenthetical": "citing Arnold v. Camden News Publishing Co., 353 Ark. 522, 528, 110 S.W.3d 268 (2003)" }, { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "citing Arnold v. Camden News Publishing Co., 353 Ark. 522, 528, 110 S.W.3d 268 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/360/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-81-714", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 565, "char_count": 10293, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.517131663547277e-07, "percentile": 0.6686235375112604 }, "sha256": "1ae991d6b8684960666c44a105c61a495cab028925c4e1011c6f028d39ded934", "simhash": "1:e851c3465b2a6bb0", "word_count": 1738 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:01:48.941240+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Anthony SLOAN, M.D., and Valerie Sloan, M.D. v. ARKANSAS RURAL MEDICAL PRACTICE LOAN and SCHOLARSHIP BOARD; and Alan Sugg, in His Official Capacity as President of the University of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nAppellants, Doctors Anthony and Valerie Sloan (\u201cthe Sloans\u201d), entered into Community Match Contracts with the Rural Medical Practice Student Loan and Scholarship Board (\u201cthe Board\u201d) and the community of Coming, Arkansas. Under the terms of the contract, the Sloans promised to practice primary-care medicine in the Coming community following the completion of their medical school and residency training. In exchange for their promise to practice in Coming, the Board and Coming contributed to annual loans for the Sloans\u2019 medical-school tuition.\nUpon completion of their medical training, the Sloans returned to Corning, but the Sloans soon alleged that, due to the circumstances in Corning, it was impossible to practice medicine in the Corning community. For instance, they alleged that, since they had entered into their agreement, things had drastically changed in Corning \u2014 the existing physician population had more than doubled from three to seven, and the clinic they were promised was insufficient to practice medicine and provide them a living. As a result, the Sloans decided not to practice full-time in Corning, as they agreed under the contract. The Board determined that the Sloans were in breach of the parties\u2019 contract, and it demanded repayment of their medical-school loans, with interest and penalties, and notified the State Medical Board to suspend the Sloans\u2019 medical licenses for breach of the Community Match Contract.\nThe Sloans appealed the Board\u2019s decision to Alan Sugg, President of the University of Arkansas, as permitted under the Rural Practice Act. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 6-81-714 (Repl. 2003). President Sugg affirmed the Board\u2019s decision. The Sloans then sought judicial review and declaratory judgment in Pulaski County Circuit Court. In an order dated June 23, 2006, the circuit court concluded that neither the Rural Practice Act nor the Administrative Procedures Act provided for the appellate review of President Sugg\u2019s decision. Consequently, the circuit court denied the Sloans\u2019 petition for judicial review and declaratory judgment.\nOn September 29, 2006, the Sloans filed a notice of appeal, wherein they purported to appeal the circuit court\u2019s order entered on June 23, 2006. It is self-evident that the Sloans\u2019 notice of appeal was filed outside of the 30 days required for filing the notice under Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. 4(a) (2006); that period of time expired on July 24, 2006.\nThe Sloans tried to reconcile this jurisdictional problem by filing a motion on September 21, 2006, to \u201cextend the time for filing a notice of appeal\u201d under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(3) (2006), contending that the circuit clerk\u2019s office \u201cfailed to disseminate the order\u201d to the parties and attorneys until September 7, 2006. Without holding a hearing, the circuit court granted the Sloans\u2019 motion on September 21, 2006, and, consequently, the Sloans filed the September 29, 2006, notice of appeal within 14 days of the circuit court\u2019s order extending the time. See Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. 4(b)(3). The jurisdictional issue now before the court is whether the Sloans\u2019 allegations regarding the clerk\u2019s asserted negligence or failure to provide copies of the circuit court\u2019s order on June 23, 2006, was reason for the Sloans to file a belated appeal. See Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. 4(b)(3). In Arkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 200 S.W.3d 444 (2004), we explained:\n[I] t is only logical and reasonable that parties assume some modicum of obligation to exercise diligence in keeping up with the status of their case .... It is, in fact, mandated by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that attorneys exercise due diligence on behalf of their clients. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3.\nArkco Corp. v. Askew, 360 Ark. 222, 227-28, 200 S.W.3d 444, 448 (2004) (citing Arnold v. Camden News Publishing Co., 353 Ark. 522, 528, 110 S.W.3d 268 (2003)). Stated simply, the record must reflect that the parties exercised diligence in keeping up with the status of the case. Id.\nHere, as mentioned above, the record reflects that the Sloans filed a motion requesting that the circuit court extend the time for filing the notice of appeal because the clerk\u2019s office had \u201cfailed to disseminate the order\u201d to the Sloans. This bare allegation is the only evidence in the record used to assert grounds for an extension under Rule 4(b)(3). This conclusion and self-serving allegation falls far short of establishing the diligence required of the Sloans and their attorneys so they may acquire any help or benefit from Rule 4(b)(3). See Arkco Corp. v. Askew, supra. Because the Sloans did not satisfy Rule 4(b)(3)\u2019s due-diligence requirement to entitle them to receive a notice-of-appeal extension, we are without jurisdiction of this appeal.\nThe Sloans have also filed a motion asking our court to dismiss the appeal, pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2006), for lack of a final order. However, we must first consider the jurisdictional issue related to the timeliness of the notice of appeal before proceeding to the Rule 54(b) issue raised in the Sloans\u2019 motion.\nThe timely filing of the notice of appeal and record is a threshold jurisdictional prerequisite for this court. Rule 4(a) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure - Civil states in relevant part that \u201ca notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days from the entry ofthejudgment decree or order appealedfrom.\u201d Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 4(a) (emphasis added). As a matter of practice, our clerk will not allow an appeal to proceed without both a timely notice of appeal and record. The reason for this practice is that Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 4 is paramount to appellate-court jurisdiction. The plain language of the rule requires that the notice of appeal be filed within thirty (30) days from the judgment decree or order appealedfrom. Rule 4(a). While Ark. R. App. P. \u2014 Civ. 2 sets forth the orders that are appealable, it is for the appellate court to determine whether the order properly fits within one of Rule 2\u2019s subsections once an appeal is lodged. For example, Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 2(a) (11) provides that an appeal may be taken from an order that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties if the circuit court has directed entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties and has made an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and has executed the certificate required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Whether an order has properly been appealed pursuant to Rule 54(b) is indeed a jurisdictional question, which this court may address sua sponte. See e.g. Jones v. Huckabee, 363 Ark. 239, 213 S.W.3d 11 (2005). Piowever, such a determination for Rule 2 purposes is always secondary to whether a timely notice of appeal and record has been filed.\nNotably, a review of our case law reveals no instance where this court has ever dismissed a case for a lack of a final order without the notice of appeal and record having been timely filed, nor have the Sloans cited any such authority. The reason is logical \u2014 when the notice of appeal and record are not timely filed, our clerk does not permit the appeal to be lodged.\nTherefore, because the notice of appeal in the instant case was not properly and timely filed within thirty (30) days of the \u201corder appealed from,\u201d this court is without jurisdiction of this case.\nAppeal dismissed.\nThe thirtieth (30th) day fell on Sundayjuly 23,2006, causing the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal to extend until the end of the next day the Clerk\u2019s office was open. Ark. R. Civ. P. 6 (2006). Thus, the thirty days expired on July 24,2006.\nFollowing Askew, we revised Rule 4(b)(3) in 2006 to expressly reflect its holding. Reporter\u2019s Notes to Ark. R. App. P. - Civ. 4 (2006 Amendment). See also Newbern & Watkins, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure, \u00a7 40.4 (2007) (stating, \u201cAs amended in 2004, [Ark. R. App. P.\u2014 Civ. 4(b)(3)] compelled the circuit court to grant an extension of time upon finding that notice of the judgment, order, or decree had not been received and that no party would be prejudiced by an extension. However, the Supreme Court subsequently held that diligence by counsel \u2018in keeping up with the court\u2019s docket\u2019 must also be shown to warrant the extra time.\u2019 \u201d); John J. Watkins, Notice of Appeal: Timing is Everything, 30 Ark. Law 13 (1996) (citing Ark. State Hwy. Comm\u2019n v. Philrite Dev., Inc., 30 Ark. App. 88, 782 S.W.2d 595 (1996)).\nIn response to the Board\u2019s motion to dismiss for failure to timely file the notice of appeal, the Sloans attached an affidavit to their motion before this court, explaining how they were diligent in checking the circuit court\u2019s docket. However, this affidavit was not presented to the circuit court. In fact, it was not signed until after the record was closed, and it is well settled that evidence outside of the record cannot be considered on appeal. See Pirtle v. Southern Lumber Co., 98 Ark. 266, 135 S.W. 908 (1911); Hudson v. Kyle, 365 Ark. 341,229 S.W.3d 890 (2006). Even if this court could consider these affidavits.it raises the question of why, if the two affiants were closely monitoring the progress of this case and its appeal, did the Sloans fail to discover when it was filed and wait almost three months to request an extension for their appeal?\nThe clerk\u2019s office was obligated to lodge the instant appeal because the Sloans received an extension for filing their notice of appeal under Rule 4(b)(3),but, as was explained earlier, that extension was erroneous.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Hardin, Jesson & Terry, PLC, by: Elizabeth Andreoli; Kutak Rock, LLP, by: Kathleen Reynolds, for appellants.", "Elizabeth Thomas Smith, Associate General Counsel, University of Arkansas for Medical Science, for appellee the Arkansas Rural Medical Practice Loan and Scholarship Board.", "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Scott P. Richardson, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., and Jeremy C. Lasiter, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Anthony SLOAN, M.D., and Valerie Sloan, M.D. v. ARKANSAS RURAL MEDICAL PRACTICE LOAN and SCHOLARSHIP BOARD; and Alan Sugg, in His Official Capacity as President of the University of Arkansas\n06-1477\n255 S.W.3d 834\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 26, 2007\nHardin, Jesson & Terry, PLC, by: Elizabeth Andreoli; Kutak Rock, LLP, by: Kathleen Reynolds, for appellants.\nElizabeth Thomas Smith, Associate General Counsel, University of Arkansas for Medical Science, for appellee the Arkansas Rural Medical Practice Loan and Scholarship Board.\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Scott P. Richardson, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., and Jeremy C. Lasiter, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0442-01", "first_page_order": 472, "last_page_order": 476 }