{
  "id": 5568240,
  "name": "STATE of Arkansas v. Quincy GRISBY",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Grisby",
  "decision_date": "2007-05-17",
  "docket_number": "CR 06-1269",
  "first_page": "66",
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      "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501",
      "category": "laws:leg_statute",
      "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE of Arkansas v. Quincy GRISBY"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThis appeal concerns a circuit court\u2019s authority to modify the sentencing portion of a negotiated plea agreement after the court had accepted the plea but before the court entered the judgment and commitment order. We affirm the circuit court because the sole issue argued by the State was not properly preserved for appeal.\nAppellant State of Arkansas and Appellee Quincy Grisby entered into a negotiated plea agreement that disposed of Grisby\u2019s offenses pending in three separate criminal cases filed in Jefferson County Circuit Court. Grisby agreed to accept the State\u2019s offer, which proposed that he plead guilty to aggravated robbery and attempted capital murder and serve concurrent twenty and twenty-five year sentences for those respective crimes. At a hearing held on August 7, 2006, the circuit court accepted the terms of the plea and pronounced sentences at the sentencing hearing. However, prior to entering its judgment and conviction order, the circuit court sua sponte informed the parties that it would not accept the sentencing portion of the negotiated plea, and it scheduled another sentencing hearing. In response to the circuit court\u2019s decision to conduct another hearing, the State filed a motion for recusal on August 14, 2006. In that motion, the State alleged that the circuit court judge was prejudiced by her interaction with Grisby while she was a prosecutor. At the resentencing hearing on August 15, 2006, the issues on the table were two-fold: (1) should the circuit court judge recuse from the case (2) and, if not, did the circuit court have the authority, under the rules of criminal procedure, to reduce Grisby\u2019s sentence prior to entry of the judgment?\nThe circuit court judge did not recuse and counsel for the State argued that, pursuant to the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure, the circuit court was prohibited from departing from the terms of the negotiated plea. The circuit court subsequently reduced Grisby\u2019s concurrent twenty and twenty-five year sentences to fifteen-year sentences for aggravated-robbery and attempted capital murder, which is within the sentencing range for those crimes. See Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-501 (Repl. 2006). On August 24, 2006, in response to the State\u2019s request for specific findings, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain the resentencing decision. A judgment and commitment order was entered the same day, August 24. From that order, the State filed a notice and amended notice of appeal. On appeal, the State argues that the circuit court\u2019s modification of the sentencing portion of the negotiated plea violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.\nAs this court has often held, the State\u2019s ability to appeal is not a matter of right; rather, it is limited to those cases described under Ark. R. App. P. - Crim. 3. Thomas v. State, 349 Ark. 447, 79 S.W.3d 347 (2002). Under Rule 3, we accept appeals by the State when our holding would establish important precedent or would be important to correct and have a uniform administration of the criminal law. Id. In this appeal, the issue raised by the State concerns the circuit court\u2019s authority to modify the sentencing portion of a negotiated plea agreement after the court had accepted the plea but before the court entered the judgment and commitment order. Because our holding in this case would be important to correct and have uniform administration of the criminal law, we accept jurisdiction of this appeal.\nThe State\u2019s sole point on appeal is that the circuit court violated the separation-of-powers doctrine by modifying the sentencing portion of the negotiated plea. Unfortunately, this issue is not preserved for appeal. A careful review of the record reveals that the State never argued the separation-of-powers doctrine to the circuit court. At the resentencing hearing, the State inquired from the circuit court what authority or citation it was relying on to reduce Grisby\u2019s sentence. The circuit court responded, indicating that it was relying on Ark. R. Crim. P. - 25.3. At that time, the State asked the court for a brief recess to prepare its argument. When the parties returned on record, the State began as follows:\nMr. Kizar: Your Honor, it is the State\u2019s position that the threshold question in this matter if the court decides pursuant to Rule 25.3 to reject the plea negotiation as the court previously accepted, and just for purposes of argument, we\u2019ll say the court has the authority to do that, fine, the court rej ects that plea offer. Then because the procedure that would allow the court to sentence pursuant to Rule 25.3 was not followed, the threshold question becomes Rule 31.1, and you have to read them in conjunction with one another.\nAs the above-quoted section reflects, the State limited its argument to the circuit court\u2019s lack of authority to resentence Grisby under our rules of criminal procedure. Nowhere in the record did the State argue that the circuit court was violating the separation-of-powers doctrine. In response to Grisby\u2019s argument that the issue is not preserved, the State, in its reply brief, argues:\n[Grisby\u2019s] preservation bar is simply mistaken. There is nothing talismanic about the phrase \u201cseparation-of-powers doctrine\u201d that had to be intoned below, as [Grisby] implies, to preserve the State\u2019s argument that what the circuit court did effectively violated that doctrine. The State\u2019s argument was (and is) that the circuit court\u2019s reduction of sentences for which the State had bargained unfairly bound only the State to the negotiated agreement.\nIn sum, the State is saying that the nature of the State\u2019s argument below was a separation-of-powers argument irrespective of the fact that the name \u201cseparation of powers\u201d was never mentioned in the record below. This argument is unconvincing. The nature of the State\u2019s argument below was purely a procedural argument \u2014 that the circuit court did not comply with the rules of criminal procedure in modifying Grisby\u2019s sentences. In criminal cases, issues raised, including constitutional issues, must be presented to the circuit court in order to be preserved for appeal. Standridge v. State, 357 Ark. 105, 161 S.W.3d 815 (2004). We will not address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal. Id. The State did not raise this separation-of-powers argument below; thus, it is not preserved for appellate review. Moreover, we cannot address the issues argued below relating to the criminal procedural rules, because the State chose not to make that specific argument on appeal. In other words, that argument made below but not in this appeal is considered abandoned. See Jordan v. State, 356 Ark. 248, 147 S.W.3d 691 (2004); Rankin v. State, 365 Ark. 255, 227 S.W.3d 924 (2006). Accordingly, we must affirm the circuit court without reaching the underlying merits presented on appeal.\nAffirmed.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.",
      "Sandra Trotter Phillips and Odette Woods, Office of the Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Dist.-West, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE of Arkansas v. Quincy GRISBY\nCR 06-1269\n257 S.W.3d 104\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered May 17, 2007\n[Rehearing denied June 21,2007.]\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: David R. Raupp, Sr. Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellant.\nSandra Trotter Phillips and Odette Woods, Office of the Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Dist.-West, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0066-01",
  "first_page_order": 90,
  "last_page_order": 93
}