{ "id": 3509024, "name": "Amy FINLEY o/b/o Herself and W.F., a Minor Child v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration", "name_abbreviation": "Finley v. Astrue", "decision_date": "2008-01-10", "docket_number": "07-627", "first_page": "103", "last_page": "112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "372 Ark. 103" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "270 S.W.3d 849" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "371 F.3d 593", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9229220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that because the children, both of whom were the result of in vitro fertilization of the mother's eggs by the decedent's sperm after his death, were the decedent's legitimate children under Arizona law, they were deemed dependent under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(d" }, { "parenthetical": "observing that \"[developing reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do not address directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/371/0593-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ark. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 210166 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/344/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "110 S.W. 1024", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Ark. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1521445 ], "year": 1908, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/86/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.W. 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ark. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1371618 ], "year": 1926, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/170/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "435 Mass. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 993853 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/435/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 F. Supp. 2d 1257", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8937038 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/386/1257-01" ] }, { "cite": "930 A.2d 1180", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a child conceived after her father's death via artificial insemination was not a \"surviving issue\" under New Hampshire intestacy law and, thus, was not eligible to receive a portion of her father's estate" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "369 Ark. 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 4017700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/369/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ark. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 4017572 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/369/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-210", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-203", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-507", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.355", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.354", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 416", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(h)(2)(A)" }, { "page": "(h)(2)(A)" }, { "page": "(h)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "c" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" }, { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-85-137", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(d)" }, { "page": "(g)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "370 Ark. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5568516 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/370/0429-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 939, "char_count": 19709, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0621841414715793e-07, "percentile": 0.5573751597100834 }, "sha256": "ec85292fee9bb66a1e72afab6647585bed490641b3ef7cb4a279f8622c0a7881", "simhash": "1:331bf98262af558b", "word_count": 3185 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:33:19.424661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Amy FINLEY o/b/o Herself and W.F., a Minor Child v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Paul Danielson, Justice.\nThis case involves a question of law certified to this court by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas in accordance with Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-8 and accepted by this court on June 28, 2007. See Finley v. Astrue, 370 Ark. 429, 260 S.W.3d 717 (2007) (per curiam). The question certified is the following:\nDoes a child, who was created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during his parents\u2019 marriage, but implanted into his mother\u2019s womb after the death of his father, inherit from the father under Arkansas intestacy law as a surviving child?\nWe conclude that the answer to this question is no.\nAccording to the District Court\u2019s order, the certified question arises from an appeal by Amy Finley, from the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, Michael Astrue (the Commissioner), which denied her claim for \u201cchild\u2019s insurance benefits\u201d under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(d). The District Court\u2019s order reflects the following facts. On October 6, 1990, Ms. Finley and Wade W. Finley, Jr., were married. During the course of the marriage, the Finleys pursued fertility treatments at the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS), and, ultimately, participated in UAMS\u2019s In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (IVF/ET) Program. In June of 2001, doctors produced ten embryos using Ms. Finley\u2019s eggs and Mr. Finley\u2019s sperm. Two of the embryos were implanted into Ms. Finley\u2019s uterus and four embryos were frozen for preservation. Ms. Finley later suffered a miscarriage of both of the implanted embryos.\nOn July 19, 2001, Mr. Finley died intestate while domiciled here in Arkansas. A little less than one year later, on June 26, 2002, Ms. Finley had two of the previously frozen embryos thawed and transferred into her uterus, resulting in a single pregnancy. On February 14, 2003, prior to the child\u2019s birth, the Lonoke County Circuit Court entered an order providing that upon the baby\u2019s delivery,\nthe State Registrar of the Arkansas Department of Health, Division of Vital Records, shall enter and state upon the certificate of birth that Wade W. Finley, Jr., now deceased, is the father of [W.F.]; [a]nd that, thereafter, all State and Federal Agencies, of the United States of America, shall uphold the findings of this Court\u2019s conclusion of paternity \u2014 in [Plaintiff] the mother and Wade W. Finley, Jr. the father \u2014 for any and all lawful purposes; and, that [W.F.] is the legitimate child of [Plaintiff] and Wade W. Finley, Jr. for any and all lawful purposes.\nThe child was bom on March 4, 2003, and on April 11, 2003, Ms. Finley filed a claim for mother\u2019s insurance benefits and the child\u2019s claim for child\u2019s insurance benefits, based on the earnings record of Mr. Finley. The claims were denied at the initial and reconsideration levels; however, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on June 16, 2006, awarding both mother\u2019s and child\u2019s insurance benefits.\nOn December 14, 2006, the Appeals Council reversed the ALJ\u2019s decision, finding that Ms. Finley\u2019s claims were without merit. Ms. Finley then filed her complaint with the District Court on October 13, 2006, appealing the final decision of the Commissioner. The parties filed a joint motion to certify the instant question of law to this court and to stay briefing before the District Court. The District Court granted the motion, certified the instant question to this court, and we accepted certification, as already stated.\nIn the briefs before us, Ms. Finley argues that her child was \u201cconceived\u201d at the time her egg was fertilized by the father\u2019s sperm. She contends that there is no statutory prohibition in Arkansas preventing a natural child who was conceived by in vitro fertilization from inheriting from his father. She avers that the General Assembly was aware of in vitro fertilization procedures in light of the fact that it mandated all accident and health insurance companies include in vitro fertilization as a covered expense in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 23-85-137(a) (Repl. 2004) and was aware of assisted reproductive technologies by its reference to artificial insemination in Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209 (c) (Repl. 2004). She urges that based upon the medical definitions of \u201cconception,\u201d the child born of the Finleys\u2019 union was not posthumously conceived and that as a matter of public policy, all children\u2019s rights should be protected, including their rights to property and inheritance.\nThe Commissioner responds that Arkansas intestacy law does not provide inheritance rights from a biological father to a child who was created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during his parents\u2019 marriage, but implanted into his mother\u2019s womb after the death of the father. He argues that the Finleys\u2019 child was neither born nor conceived during the Finleys\u2019 marriage, which ended upon Mr. Finley\u2019s death. The Commissioner maintains that the logical interpretation of the term \u201cconception\u201d or \u201cconceived,\u201d as used in Arkansas\u2019s intestacy provisions, is to mean the onset of pregnancy, or the successful implantation of an embryo in the womb. He asserts that the General Assembly has not amended the intestate succession statutes to expand the definition of conception to include the creation of embryos during the in vitro fertilization process and that absent a statutory amendment to encompass an IVF-created embryo, this court should conclude that the General Assembly did not intend for such embryos to be considered \u201cconceived\u201d within the terms of the intestacy statutes. He further points out that the General Assembly, and not the courts, determines public policy. Finally, the Commissioner submits, given the fact that inheritance laws require finality, it is unlikely that the legislature defined the term \u201cconception\u201d to include a medical procedure that could result in a biological birth many years after the father\u2019s death. Ms. Finley replies that the General Assembly has been well aware of assisted reproduction for a number of years and, had it chosen to do so, it could have enacted legislation to prevent such an inheritance.\nA review of the benefits being sought and the orders leading to the certification of the instant question was set forth in the District Court\u2019s certification order. It provides that\n[u]nder the Social Security Act, a child is entitled to child\u2019s insurance benefits if he is the child of an individual who dies while insured, if the child was dependent upon the insured at the time of the insured\u2019s death. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(d). \u201cChild\u201d means \u201cthe child or legally adopted child of an individualf.]\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 416(c). In determining whether a claimant is the \u201cchild\u201d of a deceased insured, the Commissioner is instructed to \u201capply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property ... by the courts of the State in which [the insured] was domiciled at the time of his deathf.]\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 416(h)(2)(A). Social Security regulations provide further guidance on determining \u201cchild\u201d status, including that a claimant be the insured\u2019s \u201cnatural child,\u201d meaning that the claimant \u201ccould inherit the insured\u2019s personal property as his or her natural child under State inheritance law[s].\u201d See 20 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 404.354 and 404.355(a)(1). In deciding whether the claimant has \u201cinheritance rights as the natural child of the insured[,]\u201d the Commissioner uses \u201cthe law on inheritance rights that the State courts would use to decide whether you could inherit a child\u2019s share of the insured\u2019s personal property if the insured were to die without leaving a will.\u201d See 20 C.F.R. \u00a7 404.355(b)(1).\nDuring the administrative proceedings in this case, Plaintiff claimed that there were no Arkansas statutes specifically addressing the inheritance rights of a child conceived through in vitro fertilization, but that, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209(c), W.F. was \u201cconceived\u201d as a \u201czygote\u201d prior to his father\u2019s death, while his parents were married. Thus, she argued that W.F. had inheritance rights under that statute. The Commissioner acknowledged the lack of a\u201cclear definition\u201d of \u201cconception\u201d under Arkansas state law, but looked to \u201cthe generally accepted definition of the term in the medical community\u201d and concluded that \u201cconception\u201d occurred when \u201cthe embryo was implanted in [Plaintiffs] uterus after the wage earner died.\u201d The Commissioner also rejected Plaintiff\u2019s reliance on both Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 11-9-507, a worker\u2019s compensation statute which does not \u201cgovern inheritance issues,\u201d and the Lonoke Circuit Court Order, which was \u201cnot consistent with the law as enunciated by the highest court in the State of Arkansas.\u201d\nAccording to the Commissioner\u2019s findings: (1) W.F. was the biological child of Wade W Finley, Jr. who was not married to Plaintiff at the time that W.F. was conceived or born; and (2) W.F. did not have \u201cinheritance rights in [Wade W. Finley, Jr.\u2019s] estate\u201d and thus did \u201cnot have status as the child of the wage earner pursuant to [42 U.S.C. \u00a7 416(h)(2)(A)].\u201d Because Plaintiffs claim for \u201cmother\u2019s insurance benefits\u201d was contingent on having \u201can entitled child of the wage earner in her care,\u201d the Commissioner found that this claim also lacked merit.\n(Internal footnotes and citations to transcript omitted.)\nHaving been presented with the instant question, we turn to our statutes on intestate succession. Title 28, Chapter 9 of the Arkansas Code Annotated sets forth Arkansas\u2019s law on intestate succession, entitled the \u201cArkansas Inheritance Code of 1969.\u201d Arkansas Code Annotated \u00a7 28-9-203(a) (Repl. 2004) provides that \u201c[a]ny part of the estate of a decedent not effectively disposed of by his or her will shall pass to his or her heirs as prescribed in the following sections.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-203(a) (Repl. 2004).\nThe instant certified question presents a posthumous child. In order to inherit as a posthumous heir under Arkansas law, the child must not only have been born after the decedent\u2019s death, but must also have been conceived before the decedent\u2019s death:\n(a) Posthumous descendants of the intestate conceived before his or her death but born thereafter shall inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime of the intestate.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-210(a) (Repl. 2004) (emphasis added). In order to answer the question certified to this court, we must, then, determine whether a child, created as an embryo through in vitro fertilization during the child\u2019s parents\u2019 marriage, but implanted into the child\u2019s mother\u2019s womb after the death of the child\u2019s father, was \u201cconceived before\u201d the decedent\u2019s death. This requires us to construe section 28-9-210(a).\nThe basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. See id. Furthermore, we are very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has circumvented legislative intent. See Arkansas Beverage Retailers Ass\u2019n v. Moore, 369 Ark. 498, 256 S.W.3d 488 (2007).\nIt is clear from the statute that in order to inherit through intestate succession as a posthumous descendant, the child must have been conceived before the decedent\u2019s death. Flowever, the statutory scheme fails to define the term \u201cconceived.\u201d While we could define that term, we find there is no need to do so, as we can definitively say that the General Assembly, in enacting Act 303 of 1969, \u00a7 12, now codified at Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-210, did not intend for the statute to permit a child, created through in vitro fertilization and implanted after the father\u2019s death, to inherit under intestate succession. Not only does the instant statute fail to specifically address such a scenario, but it was enacted in 1969, which was well before the technology of in vitro fertilization was developed. See Janet L. Dolgin, Surrounding Embryos: Biology, Ideology, & Politics, 16 Health Matrix: J.L. & Med. 27 (2006) (observing that the first birth resulting from in vitro fertilization was in 1978). See also Dena S. Davis, The Puzzle ofIVF, 6 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol\u2019y 275 (2006) (observing that the first successful birth of a child from a cryopreserved embryo was in 1984).\nBoth of the interested parties in this case cite to several decisions by both federal and state courts involving at least similar issues. See Khabbaz v. Commissioner, 930 A.2d 1180 (N.H. 2007) (holding that a child conceived after her father\u2019s death via artificial insemination was not a \u201csurviving issue\u201d under New Hampshire intestacy law and, thus, was not eligible to receive a portion of her father\u2019s estate); Stephen v. Commissioner of Social Security, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that the Commissioner properly determined that the child was not entitled to child\u2019s survivor benefits, where under Florida law, a child conceived from the sperm of a person who died before the transfer of sperm to a woman\u2019s body was not eligible for a claim against the decedent\u2019s estate unless the child was provided for by the decedent\u2019s will); Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that because the children, both of whom were the result of in vitro fertilization of the mother\u2019s eggs by the decedent\u2019s sperm after his death, were the decedent\u2019s legitimate children under Arizona law, they were deemed dependent under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(d) and did not need to demonstrate actual dependency nor deemed dependency under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 416(h)); Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 435 Mass. 536, 760 N.E.2d 257 (2002) (holding that where the surviving parent or the child\u2019s other legal representative demonstrates a genetic relationship between the posthumously reproduced child and the decedent, and where the survivor or representative establishes both that the decedent affirmatively consented to posthumous conception and to the support of any resulting child, the child may enjoy the inheritance rights of \u201cissue\u201d under Massachusetts\u2019s intestacy law, so long as time limitations do not preclude the commencement of succession rights on behalf of the child). While those opinions appear thoughtful and well-reasoned under each state\u2019s respective code provisions or lack thereof, they are of no assistance in interpreting our specific Arkansas statute. In addition, both parties discuss Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209(c) (Repl. 2004), which provides:\n(c) Any child conceived following artificial insemination of a married woman with the consent of her husband shall be treated as their child for all purposes of intestate succession. Consent of the husband is presumed unless the contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence.\nArk. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-9-209(c). That statute is inapposite for two reasons. First and foremost, the statute goes to the legitimacy of a child, and, second, it specifically references artificial insemination, not in vitro fertilization, which, as already noted in the footnote above, are two completely different procedures.\nWhile the parties would have us define the term \u201cconceive,\u201d we decline to do so in the instant case. Our role is not to create the law, but to interpret the law and to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. See, e.g., Miller v. Tatum, 170 Ark. 152, 279 S.W. 1002 (1926); Williams v. Buchanan, 86 Ark. 259, 110 S.W. 1024 (1908). In vitro fertilization and other methods of assisted reproduction are new technologies that have created new legal issues not addressed by already-existing law. See, e.g., Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, supra (observing that \u201c[developing reproductive technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which currently do not address directly the legal issues created by posthumous conception\u201d); Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, supra (observing that \u201cwith the act of procreation now separated from coitus, posthumous reproduction can occur under a variety of conditions that may conflict with the purposes of the intestacy law and implicate other firmly established State and individual interests\u201d). Were we to define the term \u201cconceive,\u201d we would be making a determination that would implicate many public policy concerns, including, but certainly not limited to, the finality of estates. That is not our role. The determination of public policy lies almost exclusively with the legislature, and we will not interfere with that determination in the absence of palpable errors. See Jordan v. Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co., 344 Ark. 81, 40 S.W.3d 254 (2001). With this is mind, we strongly encourage the General Assembly to revisit the intestacy succession statutes to address the issues involved in the instant case and those that have not but will likely evolve.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative.\nThe Commissioner\u2019s order also denied Ms. Finley\u2019s claim for \u201cmother\u2019s insurance benefits\u201d under 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 402(g).\nIn vitro fertilization is described as follows:\nAfter the woman has taken injectable ovulation-inducing medications..., multiple oocytes are retrieved from the woman\u2019s ovaries by a minor surgical procedure. The oocytes are placed in a petri dish with her male partner\u2019s sperm (in vitro) and placed in an incubator for fertilization to occur. The embryos are allowed to grow for a period of three to five days before they are placed back into the woman\u2019s uterus.\n17-289 Attorneys\u2019 Textbook ofMedicineV.2H9.65 (3ded,2007). It differs entirely from artificial insemination:\nIntrauterine insemination, also known as artificial insemination, refers to the placement of sperm into the uterine cavity. Intrauterine insemination may be performed at the time of ovulation in the woman\u2019s normal menstrual cycle, or with the use of medications that induce ovulation. In most cases, the female partner takes fertility medications in advance of the procedure. The man must produce sperm at the time the woman is ovulating; the sperm (after undergoing certain \u201cwashing\u201d procedures) are then inserted into the woman\u2019s uterine cavity through a long, thin catheter.\n17-289 Attorney\u2019s Textbook of Medicine P.289.81 (3d ed. 2007).\nThe District Court\u2019s order further observes that in participating in the IVF/ET program at UAMS, the Finleys executed a consent form. That form is not before us; however, we note that the Worker\u2019s Compensation Commission awarded benefits to the child based, at least in part, on the consent form\u2019s language. See Finley v. Farm Cat, Inc., WCC No. F108515 (Dec. 27, 2006).\nThe District Court\u2019s order notes that the remaining four embryos were not preserved.\nWhile our statutory code does not define this term, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines the term \u201cposthumous child\u201d as: \u201cA child born after a parent\u2019s death.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 255 (8th ed. 2004).", "type": "majority", "author": "Paul Danielson, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Kenneth E. Buckner, for appellant.", "Jane Duke, Acting U.S. Att\u2019y, by: Stacey E. McCord, Ass\u2019t U.S. Att\u2019y, Tina M. Waddell, Regional Chief Counsel, SSA, and Julia Denegre, Special Ass\u2019t U.S. Att\u2019y, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Amy FINLEY o/b/o Herself and W.F., a Minor Child v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration\n07-627\n270 S.W.3d 849\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered January 10, 2008\nKenneth E. Buckner, for appellant.\nJane Duke, Acting U.S. Att\u2019y, by: Stacey E. McCord, Ass\u2019t U.S. Att\u2019y, Tina M. Waddell, Regional Chief Counsel, SSA, and Julia Denegre, Special Ass\u2019t U.S. Att\u2019y, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0103-01", "first_page_order": 127, "last_page_order": 136 }