{ "id": 3508783, "name": "James R. WRIGHT, Administrator of the Estate of Conlisha L. Wright, Deceased v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., d/b/a Centerpoint Energy Arkansas; Rheem Manufacturing Co.; and Anna Sue White, d/b/a White Rentals", "name_abbreviation": "Wright v. Centerpoint Energy Resources Corp.", "decision_date": "2008-02-14", "docket_number": "07-255", "first_page": "330", "last_page": "334", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "372 Ark. 330" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "276 S.W.3d 253" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "155 S.W.3d 2", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 6141193, 5367829 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark-app/85/0382-01", "/ark/356/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ark. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5367829 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/356/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(l)", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-60-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ark. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1753676 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/275/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 914", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257716 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0914-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ark. 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3800178 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/368/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 U.S. 88", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3412726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1870, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/78/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 S.W. 649", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "170 Ark 10", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1371677 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/170/0010-01" ] }, { "cite": "320 Ark. 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1451260 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "it is this court's fundamental duty to give effect to the legislative purpose set by the venue statutes" }, { "parenthetical": "it is this court's fundamental duty to give effect to the legislative purpose set by the venue statutes" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "542", "parenthetical": "noting that, where the venue statute provides that an action for fraud could be brought in the county \"where any one plaintiff resides,\" the use of the present tense \"indicates residency at the time the suit is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/320/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ark. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 4017572 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly" }, { "parenthetical": "the basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/369/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-102", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-55-213", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 578, "char_count": 10706, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.142028882733962e-08, "percentile": 0.42835257962915985 }, "sha256": "3e7c97a8a4b771d16588dfdfd08701544f2e575c458b13bc4406db4d97c5e90f", "simhash": "1:3e5edfc8744e5e39", "word_count": 1760 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:33:19.424661+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "James R. WRIGHT, Administrator of the Estate of Conlisha L. Wright, Deceased v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., d/b/a Centerpoint Energy Arkansas; Rheem Manufacturing Co.; and Anna Sue White, d/b/a White Rentals" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nThe primary issue in this appeal involves the interpretation of two venue statutes, Ark Code Ann. \u00a7 16-60-112(a) (Repl. 2005) and Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-55-213 (Repl. 2005), and whether they are in conflict.\nSection 16-60-112(a) was first enacted in 1939 and fixed venue in a wrongful-death action (1) in the county where an accident occurred that caused the injury or death, or (2) in the county where the person injured or killed resided at the time of the injury. In \u00a7 16-55-213(a), a part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, the General Assembly provided that, except for six specified venue statutes, \u201call civil actions\u201d must be brought in any of the following counties:\n(1) the county in which a substantial part of the events or omission giving rise to the claim occurred;\n(2) (A) the county in which an individual defendant resided;\n(3) (A) the county in which the plaintiff resided. []\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis litigation arose after Conlisha Wright was found dead in her Jonesboro apartment on January 22, 2004; emergency personnel determined that she had died as the result of carbon monoxide poisoning. Conlisha\u2019s two children were also found unconscious but alive. Conlisha\u2019s estate was subsequently opened pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 28-40-102 (Repl. 2004) in Craig-head County, where she had resided prior to her death. Appellant James Wright, Conlisha\u2019s ex-husband, was appointed personal representative of the estate.\nJames then filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against defendants Anna Sue White, d/b/a White Rentals, Rheem Manufacturing Company, and Centerpoint Energy Arkansas (hereafter, collectively \u201cCenterpoint\u201d). James filed his complaint in Crittenden County under \u00a7 16-55-213(a)(3)(A), claiming that, as personal representative of Conlisha\u2019s estate, he was a plaintiff who resided in Crittenden County at the time of Conlisha\u2019s injury. Centerpoint disagreed and argued that \u00a7 16-60-112(a) controlled and required James to file his wrongful-death suit in Craighead County. The trial judge ruled in Centerpoint\u2019s favor and dismissed James\u2019s suit without prejudice.\nAs James correctly points out, this appeal turns on the question of whether venue is controlled by \u00a7 16-55-213 or \u00a7 16-60-112. In making this decision, we consider basic rules of statutory construction to determine which statute gives full effect to the General Assembly\u2019s intent when it enacted \u00a7 16-55-213 in 2003. See McMickle v. Griffin, 369 Ark. 318, 254 S.W.3d 729 (2007) (the basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly); Quinney v. Pittman, 320 Ark. 177, 895 S.W.2d 538 (1995) (it is this court\u2019s fundamental duty to give effect to the legislative purpose set by the venue statutes).\nJames argues that the two statutes are in conflict, but he primarily contends that \u00a7 16-55-213, being the later enactment, impliedly repealed \u00a7 16-60-112, the earlier venue statute. James further submits that \u00a7 16-55-213 is a comprehensive law that established venue in \u201call civil actions\u201d other than the six venue statutes that were expressly excepted, and \u00a7 16-60-112 is not specifically excepted. Citing Babb v. City of El Dorado, 170 Ark 10, 278 S.W. 649 (1926), James acknowledges the universal principle that the repeal of a law merely by implication is not favored and will not be allowed unless the implication is clear and irresistible. However, James points to other language in the Babb case, wherein this court quoted the United States Supreme Court for the statement that, \u201ceven where two acts are not in express terms repugnant, yet if the latter act covers the whole subject of the first, and embraces new provisions plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute toward the first act, it will operate as a repeal of that act.\u201d Babb, 170 Ark. at 14, 278 S.W. at 650 (quoting United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. 88, 11 Wall. 88 (1870)). See also McMickle v. Griffin, supra.\nFrom the foregoing, James asks us to accept his interpretation of \u00a7 16-55-213 that the 2003 venue statute takes up anew and covers the entire ground of venue in civil actions. He concludes that this is evident when the plain language of the more recent statute is read and given its ordinary meaning. To further support his argument, Wright argues that, where \u00a7 16-55-213(a) provides wording such as \u201call civil actions,\u201d the legislature clearly intended the statute to fix venue in a wrongful-death action, as the wrongful-death venue statute is not excepted by the \u00a7 16-55-213(a).\nIn addition, Wright further submits that, even if the rules of statutory construction are used in this case, the result would be the same, because the clear language of \u00a7 16-55-213 provides no suggestion that it does not govern wrongful-death actions arising out of deaths occurring after its enactment. He concludes that \u201cnot one word, punctuation mark, or nuance in or from the statutory language . . . even hints otherwise.\u201d\nHowever, our reading and analysis of \u00a7 16-55-213 convinces us that its language is not as clear as Wright would have it. As previously stated, repeal by implication is not favored and is never allowed except when there is such an invincible repugnancy between the provisions that both cannot stand. See McMickle v. Griffin, supra. Thus, for Wright to succeed in this matter, and for this court to conclude that \u00a7 16-55-213 impliedly repealed \u00a7 16-60-112, the repugnancy between the statutes must be abundantly clear, for even seemingly conflicting statutes should be read in a harmonious manner where possible. See Great Lakes Chem. Corp. v. Bruner, 368 Ark. 74, 243 S.W.3d 285 (2006). In addition, this court will not give statutes a literal interpretation if it leads to absurd consequences that are contrary to legislative intent. See Burford Distrib., Inc. v. Starr, 341 Ark. 914, 20 S.W.3d 363 (2000).\nAs noted above, James filed this wrongful-death action in Crittenden County, claiming that he could bring this lawsuit in the county in which he, as the plaintiff, resides under \u00a7 16-55-213(a)(3)(A). We find this to be a rather strained interpretation of the plain language of the statute, which clearly employs the word \u201cresided\u201d in a past-tense reference. In reviewing the statute as a whole, there are only three counties where a wrongful-death action can be brought: (1) where a substantial part of the events or omission giving rise to the claim occurred, (2) where an individual defendant resided, and (3) where the plaintiff resided. See \u00a7 16-55-213(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), & (a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). Given the past-tense language in subsection (a)(1) referring to the county \u201cin which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred,\u201d we similarly construe the General Assembly\u2019s use of the past tense in subsections (a)(2)(A) and (a)(3)(A) to mean that venue is fixed where the plaintiff or defendant resided at the time of the events giving rise to the cause of action. Compare Quinney v. Pittman, 320 Ark. at 185, 895 S.W.2d at 542 (noting that, where the venue statute provides that an action for fraud could be brought in the county \u201cwhere any one plaintiff resides,\u201d the use of the present tense \u201cindicates residency at the time the suit is filed\u201d) (emphasis added).\nAt the time Conlisha died, she resided in Craighead County, and James resided in Crittenden County. Thus, at the time of the events giving rise to the cause of action, the only person who resided in Craighead County was Conlisha. Her estate was not opened until after she died and James was appointed personal representative of her estate, and even those events took place in Craighead County. Thus, in this context, we conclude that venue was where Conlisha resided at the time the events giving rise to the claim occurred \u2014 Craighead County.\nThe \u201cprimary purpose of venue statutes is to provide a convenient, logical, and orderly forum for the resolution of disputes.\u201d 92A C.J.S. Venue \u00a7 6 (2000); see, e.g., Atkins Pickle Co. v. Burrough-Uerling-Brasuell Consulting Eng\u2019rs, Inc., 275 Ark. 135, 628 S.W.2d 9 (1982). Our construction of \u00a7 16-55-213 and \u00a7 16-60-112 not only harmonizes both statutes, as we must do if at all possible, see Great Lakes Chemical Corp., supra, but it avoids the disfavored result of repeal by implication and also provides a logical forum for the resolution of this particular dispute.\nAffirmed.\nThe six statutes are Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7\u00a7 16-60-101 to -103,16-60-107,16-60-114, and 16-60-115, and subsection (e) of \u00a7 16-55-213. Notably, \u00a7 16-60-112(a) is not one of the six excepted statutes.\nSubsection (2)(B) and (3)(B) are omitted because they pertain to actions involving \u201can entity other than an individual\u201d; these provisions are not at issue in this matter.\nWhite Rentals rented Conlisha an apartment equipped with a gas heater manufactured by Rheem Manufacturing, and Centerpoint Energy provided the natural gas utility.\nWe note that, in certain instances, Wright argues that there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction, yet at other times, he refers to fundamental statutory rules of construction in an attempt to fortify his position.\nWe also point out that the wrongful-death statute affords a cause of action \u201c[w]hen-ever the death of a person ... shall be caused by a wrongful act,... and the act... is such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof if death had not ensued[.\\\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(a)(l) (Repl. 2005) (emphasis added).\nWe note that the parties argue about whether James was a real party in interest. Our wrongful-death statute, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 16-62-102(b) (Repl. 2005) provides that such actions \u201cshall be brought by and in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person.\u201d See also Rhuland v. Fahr, 356 Ark. 382, 155 S.W.3d 2 (2004); Ark. R. Civ. P. 17(a). James is clearly the administrator of Conlisha\u2019s estate. However, because we have determined that venue is fixed at the time of the events giving rise to the cause of action, James\u2019s subsequent appointment as administrator is immaterial.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Blair & Stroud, by: H. David Blair, for appellant.", "Womack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, P.A., by: Jeffrey W. Puryear and Chuck Gschwend; Snellgrove, Langley, Culpepper, Williams &Mullally, by: Michael Mullally; and McNabb, Bragorgos & Burgess, by: Richard E. Sorin, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "James R. WRIGHT, Administrator of the Estate of Conlisha L. Wright, Deceased v. CENTERPOINT ENERGY RESOURCES CORP., d/b/a Centerpoint Energy Arkansas; Rheem Manufacturing Co.; and Anna Sue White, d/b/a White Rentals\n07-255\n276 S.W.3d 253\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered February 14, 2008\nBlair & Stroud, by: H. David Blair, for appellant.\nWomack, Landis, Phelps, McNeill & McDaniel, P.A., by: Jeffrey W. Puryear and Chuck Gschwend; Snellgrove, Langley, Culpepper, Williams &Mullally, by: Michael Mullally; and McNabb, Bragorgos & Burgess, by: Richard E. Sorin, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0330-01", "first_page_order": 354, "last_page_order": 358 }