{ "id": 3664681, "name": "Eric FLOWERS v. STATE of Arkansas", "name_abbreviation": "Flowers v. State", "decision_date": "2008-04-10", "docket_number": "CR 07-319", "first_page": "127", "last_page": "133", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ark. 127" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "282 S.W.3d 767" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-604", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "370 Ark. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5569853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/370/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ark. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3558928 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" }, { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/362/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159703 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11132917 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 U.S. 579", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 355769 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/509/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 Ark. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 3712413 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/359/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 Ark. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1155533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383" }, { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/353/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ark. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1740849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/282/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ark. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1604743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/331/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ark. 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1111351 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/346/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ark. 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1158877 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/351/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 43", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5403926 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0043-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 Ark. 63", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 5404341 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/357/0063-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)(1)" }, { "page": "(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 728, "char_count": 13027, "ocr_confidence": 0.77, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.0976338652220277e-07, "percentile": 0.7612671626801408 }, "sha256": "aaa9572d2ac1b0171fb0e3abd8e49bf68cf46ad399d75aa0b3113f5bc40a4ecb", "simhash": "1:cf7bf4aef66c6a5b", "word_count": 2161 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:36.449526+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Eric FLOWERS v. STATE of Arkansas" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "TOM GLAZE, Justice.\nOn September 26, 2006, a Miller County jury found Flowers guilty of capital murder by committing or attempting to commit the felony of robbery, and that in the course of and in furtherance of robbery he caused the death of Obie Watson under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. On appeal, Flowers argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict and by allowing the testimony on the part of three State witnesses: Jason Green, Detective Marc Sillivan, and Detective Shawna Yonts. Flowers\u2019s conviction for capital murder under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101(a)(1) was supported by substantial evidence, and the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. Accordingly, we affirm Flowers\u2019s conviction.\nThe record reveals the following. On August 25, 2004, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Jason Green was riding his motorcycle on a street in Texarkana, when he observed a pickup truck in a ditch. Green stopped to render aid and called out, asking if the occupants were injured. A voice responded from the dark and told Green \u201cwe are fine\u201d and asked him not to call the police \u201cbecause we\u2019ve been drinking.\u201d Green asked once again if anyone was hurt and needed help, and the person again responded, saying everything was fine. Nevertheless, based on the nature of the responses, Green called 911 and reported the apparent accident. Green went home, got his own truck and returned to the scene of the accident. Green then used his headlights to illuminate the pickup in the ditch and called out to the occupants. There was no response so he approached and climbed into the bed of the wrecked truck and saw a man, later identified as Obie Watson, lying face down in the floorboard, with blood covering the passenger compartment. Officers from the Texarkana Police Department, responding to Green\u2019s earlier 911 call, arrived at the scene, and found Watson\u2019s body in the pickup truck.\nAfter Watson was pronounced dead at the scene, the initial investigation revealed the back glass of his truck had been shattered. Officers found no skid marks, sliding marks, or any other indication of a cause of the accident. Evidence collected from Watson\u2019s truck included a brick found in the floorboard of the truck, shattered glass, and DNA samples. A gun and shell casings were later found near Watson\u2019s truck and fibers found in the hammer of the gun were determined to match fibers from nylon sacks containing wood that were in the bed of Watson\u2019s truck. Forensic tests of a bullet recovered from Watson\u2019s chest indicated that it was fired from the recovered gun. Lottery tickets were found inside Watson\u2019s truck and scattered along the ditch where Watson\u2019s truck stopped.\nFor his first point for reversal, Flowers argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. An appeal from a denial of a motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Woolbright v. State, 357 Ark. 63, 160 S.W.3d 315 (2004). Reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this court determines whether the verdict was supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that is forceful evidence enough to compel a conclusion one way or the other beyond speculation or conjecture. Benson v. State, 357 Ark. 43, 160 S.W.3d 341 (2004). The reviewing court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and considers only evidence that supports the verdict. Clem v. State, 351 Ark. 112, 117, 90 S.W.3d 428, 430 (2002).\nCircumstantial evidence may constitute substantial evidence to support a conviction. Ross v. State, 346 Ark. 225, 57 S.W.3d 152 (2001). The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that, to be substantial, the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused. Id. The question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide, id. Upon review, this court must determine whether the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id.\nA person commits capital murder if acting alone or with one or more other persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit robbery \u201cand in the course of and in furtherance of\u201d robbery \u201cor in immediate flight therefrom, he or she or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.\u201d Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-10-101(a)(1) (Repl. 2006).\nFlowers specifically argues that the jury\u2019s verdict was based on speculation because there was no testimony that Watson had a wallet or anything else in his pocket when he was killed, nor was there evidence that the lottery tickets, found scattered some distance from Watson\u2019s truck, belonged to Watson. There was testimony that Watson regularly purchased lottery tickets with very particular numbers, and lottery tickets that matched these numbers were found along the ditch where Watson\u2019s truck was located and inside the truck itself. Watson\u2019s pant\u2019s pocket was turned inside out and investigators found neither a wallet nor any other identification on Watson\u2019s person. The store clerk who sold the lottery tickets testified that Watson had purchased the tickets the night he was killed. The clerk further averred that Flowers had told the clerk that Flowers would pay back money the clerk loaned Flowers as soon as he was able to perform a robbery. DNA profiles taken from inside Watson\u2019s truck matched Flowers\u2019s DNA profile, and on the night Watson was murdered Flowers was picked up by another witness who testified that Flowers told her that he shot and killed Watson because Watson had seen Flowers\u2019s face. Finally, a witness testified that Flowers had possession of a gun at the time of Watson\u2019s murder that was later established as the murder weapon, and told the owner of the gun where it could be found after Watson\u2019s murder. Based on the direct and circumstantial evidence presented at trial, the jury\u2019s verdict was supported by substantial evidence without the need to resort to speculation and conjecture.\nFor his second point for reversal, Flowers argues that the trial court erred by allowing Jason Green to testify regarding a person\u2019s voice and the person was unknown, unseen, and unidentified at the scene of the crime. The Arkansas Rules of Evidence define hearsay as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Ark. R. Evid. 801(c) (2007). This court has held that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay under Rule 801(c), where the statement is offered to show the basis for the witness\u2019s actions. See Sanford v. State, 331 Ark. 334, 962 S.W.2d 335 (1998); Bliss v. State, 282 Ark. 315, 668 S.W.2d 936 (1984).\nFiere, Jason Green\u2019s testimony \u2014 that a voice responded \u201cYes, we are fine. We are not hurt. We will be coming right up. Please do not call the police as we have been drinking\u201d \u2014 explained why Green left the scene to get his truck so he could offer help and also why he called 911 for assistance. Because Green\u2019s testimony was provided in order to show his basis of action, the trial court did not err in overruling Flowers\u2019s hearsay objection.\nFor his third point for reversal, Flowers argues that the trial court erred in allowing Officer Sillivan\u2019s opinion testimony that the rear glass window of Watson\u2019s truck appeared to be broken from the outside. Flowers contends that \u201c[a]t trial, there were no facts articulated by [ ] Sillivan that would permit him to give his opinion as to the direction from which the glass had been broken.\u201d\nUnder Ark. R. Evid. 701, a witness not testifying as an expert may provide testimony in the form of opinions and'inferences if those opinions and inferences are rationally based on the perception of that witness and are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness\u2019s testimony or a determination of a fact in issue. This court reviews a trial court\u2019s decision to allow lay opinion testimony under Rule 701 for abuse of discretion. Bridges v. State, 327 Ark. 392, 398, 938 S.W.2d 561, 564 (1997).\nOur court held in Robinson v. State, 353 Ark. 372, 383, 108 S.W.3d 622, 628 (2003), that a trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed lay opinion testimony by an investigator regarding a victim\u2019s blood loss from a gunshot wound based on his experience as a homicide investigator. Similarly, in the case before us now, the trial court overruled Flowers\u2019s objection and allowed Sillivan to testify and give his lay opinion based on his work experience and observations. Sillivan testified that his opinion was that the truck\u2019s back glass window had been broken from the outside. He based his opinion on the shattered glass found inside Watson\u2019s truck and a brick found inside the truck. The circuit court ruled this testimony was rationally based on Sillivan\u2019s prior law enforcement experience, forensic training, and personal observation; we believe the circuit court was correct in doing so under Rule 701. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nFor his final point, Flowers argues the trial court erred when it allowed Officer Shawna Yonts to provide expert testimony on the direction of blood spatters found inside Watson\u2019s truck. Whether a witness qualifies as an expert in a particular field is a matter within the trial court\u2019s discretion, and this court will not reverse such a decision absent an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 359 Ark. 297, 302, 197 S.W.3d 468, 472 (2004). Ark. R. Evid. 702 provides the following:\nIf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.\nIn Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Foote, 341 Ark. 105, 14 S.W.3d 512 (2000), this court adopted the rule from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), and held that trial courts must first determine whether an expert is proposing to testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Such a determination will require an assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology the testimony is based on is scientifically valid and whether it is applicable to the facts in issue. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., supra. This court has also adopted the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), which determined that Rule 702 applies equally to all types of expert testimony and not simply to scientific expert testimony, and that they must be shown to be both reliable and relevant. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Gill, 352 Ark. 240, 100 S.W.3d 715 (2003).\nHere, the trial court concluded that Yonts\u2019s specialized training in \u201cblood-spatter analysis\u201d provided sufficient basis to qualify her to give expert testimony. Further, the trial court stated that it was uncontradicted that Yonts\u2019s training provided her with \u201cknowledge in this field that a person would receive that would enable them to qualify to testify and give their opinion in this field of expertise.\u201d\nThis court has held that \u201cif some reasonable basis exists demonstrating that the witness has knowledge of the subject beyond that of ordinary knowledge, the evidence is admissible as expert testimony\u201d under Rule 702. Flowers v. State, 362 Ark. 193, 210, 208 S.W.3d 113, 127 (2005). Because Yonts had received specialized training that would have provided her with more than \u201cordinary knowledge\u201d in blood-spatter analysis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Y onts\u2019s testimony as that of an expert witness.\nThe record has been reviewed for all objections, motions, and requests adversely decided against Flowers as required under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h). See, e.g., White v. State, 370 Ark. 284, 259 S.W.3d 410 (2007). We find no prejudicial error.\nFlowers also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because there was no testimony that he killed Watson with premeditation or for pecuniary gain. However, the jury convicted Flowers for causing Watson\u2019s death in the furtherance of a robbery, not for a premeditated, deliberate killing. Pecuniary gain is an aggravating circumstance that a jury may use for consideration of whether to impose the death penalty under Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 5-4-604 (Repl. 2006) \u2014 which was not imposed. Accordingly, the court does not address these arguments.", "type": "majority", "author": "TOM GLAZE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert L. Depper, Jr., for appellant.", "Dustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Leaann J. Irvin, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Eric FLOWERS v. STATE of Arkansas\nCR 07-319\n282 S.W.3d 767\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 10, 2008\nRobert L. Depper, Jr., for appellant.\nDustin McDaniel, Att\u2019y Gen., by: Leaann J. Irvin, Ass\u2019t Att\u2019y Gen., for appellee." }, "file_name": "0127-01", "first_page_order": 153, "last_page_order": 159 }