{ "id": 3665763, "name": "Diana McSPARRIN v. DIRECT INSURANCE", "name_abbreviation": "McSparrin v. Direct Insurance", "decision_date": "2008-04-24", "docket_number": "07-934", "first_page": "270", "last_page": "275", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ark. 270" }, { "type": "parallel", "cite": "283 S.W.3d 572" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ark.", "id": 8808, "name": "Arkansas Supreme Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 34, "name_long": "Arkansas", "name": "Ark." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "620 S.W.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ark. 269", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 8718782 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/273/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-22-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Ark. Code Ann.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "a" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "606 S.W.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 Ark. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1709309 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/270/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 F. Supp. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 382119 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "985" }, { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/242/0983-01" ] }, { "cite": "831 S.W.2d 133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 1906040 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0283-02" ] }, { "cite": "309 Ark. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1906040, 1906037 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/309/0283-02", "/ark/309/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ark. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 922697 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/327/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ark. 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1257768 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/341/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.W.3d 221", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 Ark. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ark.", "case_ids": [ 1159709 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ark/352/0315-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 603, "char_count": 10198, "ocr_confidence": 0.76, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.489411136230868e-07, "percentile": 0.6627430788435928 }, "sha256": "bc493114deee3324e4024d6c6ba054ff3bbc897ddcc951b0813a090a8074e857", "simhash": "1:eb2b96c329386753", "word_count": 1629 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:24:36.449526+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "Diana McSPARRIN v. DIRECT INSURANCE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Tom Glaze, Justice.\nOn July 19, 2006, at approximately 3:00 a.m., appellant Diana McSparrin repeatedly rammed her car five or six times into Joshua Dark\u2019s 1991 GMC Jimmy, which was parked outside Dark\u2019s home and unoccupied at the time. McSparrin\u2019s successive impacts moved Dark\u2019s vehicle a distance of almost fifty feet, until it stopped against a car belonging to McSparrin\u2019s ex-boyfriend, Thomas Dennis. Dennis lived next door to the Dark family, and McSparrin testified that she might have been upset with Dennis before she began drinking at Dennis\u2019s house, but said that she could not recall ramming into Dark\u2019s vehicle because she was intoxicated at the time.\nAfter hearing McSparrin\u2019s first impact into Dark\u2019s vehicle, Dark\u2019s father called 911. Officers from the Fayetteville Police Department arrived at the scene and arrested McSparrin for Driving While Intoxicated after she failed a sobriety test. McSparrin\u2019s insurer, Direct Insurance Company (Direct), later filed an action for a declaratory judgment and alleged that because McSparrin had intentionally driven her vehicle into Joshua Dark\u2019s vehicle, Direct did not have a duty to defend or indemnify McSparrin under an exclusionary clause in her automobile pohcy which reads, \u201c[Direct] do[es] not provide Liability Coverage for any covered person who intentionally causes bodily injury or property damage.\u201d\nThe trial court held a one-day bench trial, and found that, although \u201cit is undisputed Ms. McSparrin was drunk,\u201d the facts demonstrated that McSparrin intentionally rammed Dark\u2019s vehicle. As a result, the trial court further held that the exclusionary clause applied, and that Direct did not have a duty to defend or indemnify McSparrin. McSparrin raises one point on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred because she could not have intentionally rammed Dark\u2019s vehicle due to her voluntary intoxication.\nThe standard of review on appeal from a bench trial is whether the circuit court\u2019s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See Murphy v. City of West Memphis, 352 Ark. 315, 101 S.W.3d 221 (2003). This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the appellee, resolving all inferences in favor of the appellee. See Ark. Transit Homes, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Cas., 341 Ark. 317, 16 S.W.3d 545 (2000).\nWhen construing insurance policies, this court adheres to the rule that, where terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the policy language controls, and absent statutory strictures to the contrary, exclusionary clauses are generally enforced according to their terms. Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 208, 937 S.W.2d 180 (1997). \u201cThe insurer has the burden of proving an exclusion.\u201d Ark. Farm Bureau Ins. Fed\u2019n v. Ryman, 309 Ark. 283, 286, 831 S.W.2d 133, 134 (1992).\nThis court has not directly addressed whether voluntary-intoxication prevents an individual from forming the intent required to trigger an exclusionary clause. Although the parties concede that there are no Arkansas cases directly on point, McSparrin relies on a case decided by the federal district court, Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Ratliff, 242 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Ark. 1965). There, an individual named Allen Holland repeatedly rammed T.J. Ratliff from behind as the vehicles traveled on an Arkansas state highway. Eventually, Ratliffs vehicle turned over, causing him personal injuries. Ratliff filed suit against Holland for damages, and Holland\u2019s insurance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment, asserting that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify Holland due to an exclusionary clause which provided that the policy did not apply to injuries \u201ccaused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured.\u201d Id. at 985. The federal district court found that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Holland \u201cintended to inflict at least some degree of injury and damage upon Ratliff and his property\u201d based on the principle that \u201ca person in the possession of his faculties intentionally does an act from which injury to another will probably and forseeably result.\u201d Id. at 992. Accordingly, \u201cRatliffs injuries were excluded from the coverage of [Holland\u2019s] policy.\u201d Id.\nMcSparrin asserts that the Ratliff decision was based on the ill will that existed between the parties, which she contrasts with the facts in her case; she contends there was no evidence of animus between herself and Joshua Dark. Additionally, McSparrin argues that the Ratliff case suggests an individual\u2019s actions are not intentional if he is not in complete control of his faculties. However, in Ratliff, there never was an issue as to whether Holland was \u201cin possession of his faculties\u201d when he rammed Ratliff. Regardless, more convincing and applicable to the present appeal, is the Ratliff court\u2019s statement that \u201cthe presence or absence of particular intent can be inferred logically and legally from the facts and circumstances leading up to, surrounding, and following the act or omission in question.\u201d Id. Just as the Ratliff court held that Holland acted intentionally because he pursued and repeatedly drove into the rear of Ratliff s car, finally causing it to overturn, the trial court in the present case similarly found that after McSparrin\u2019s initial impact with Joshua Dark\u2019s vehicle, she rammed it five additional times, backing up approximately ten feet and revving the engine before each successive impact.\nDirect responds to McSparrin\u2019s point for reversal by asserting that the \u201ckey legal principles\u201d found in a decision by the Arkansas Court of Appeals in National Investors Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Arrowood, 270 Ark. 617, 606 S.W.2d 97 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980), are applicable to this appeal. In Arrowood, James Arrowood shot his ex-wife in the leg and his insurance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment, alleging that the injuries to Sandra Arrowood were intentionally caused and therefore excluded from coverage by either James or Sandra Arrowood\u2019s homeowner\u2019s policies. James Arrowood testified that \u201che had no reason to shoot or kill Sandra,\u201d and that he had no recollection of the events surrounding the shooting of his ex-wife, other than taking \u201ca bunch of Valium.\u201d Id. at 620. The trial court held that the policies\u2019 exclusionary clauses were not applicable, and the insurance companies appealed, arguing that the trial court \u201cerred in finding that liability coverage was not excluded under the policy for bodily injury which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.\u201d Id. at 621, 606 S.W.2d at 100.\nOn review, the court of appeals first noted the general rule that coverage exists under insuring contracts and exclusion clauses for the unintended results of an intentional act, but not for damages assessed because of an injury which was intended to be inflicted. The Arrowood court then cited Ratliff, supra, to hold that determining whether an act was intentional was \u201ca matter of weighing all the facts and circumstances bearing on the incident in its entirety,\u201d and reversed the trial court, noting the long history of James Arrowood\u2019s previous acts showing a propensity to violence against his ex-wife. Id. at 624, 606 S.W.2d 101. As to James Arrowood\u2019s alleged Valium-induced memory loss, the court of appeals stated the following:\n[WJhile no firm conclusions can be founded upon it, even James\u2019 professed inability to remember any part of the incident, which we regard as credible, seems more consistent with a finding that the injury was intentional rather than accidental, as even the human mind often obliterates from its memory behavior which it wants to disavow.\nId. Further, the court of appeals noted that \u201cJames Arrowood\u2019s testimony is that he had no recollection of any part of the events of the shooting, so how can he say what his intention was at that exact moment if his memory is so lacking?\u201d Id. at 624, 602 S.W.2d at 102.\nSimilar to James Arrowood, McSparrin contends that her intoxication caused her to \u201cblackout\u201d and that she has no recollection of ramming Dark\u2019s vehicle repeatedly. Weighing against her is the fact that she rammed Dark\u2019s vehicle until it rested against that of her ex-boyfriend \u2014 whom she was upset with \u2014 that she giggled as she repeatedly backed up and rammed Dark\u2019s vehicle, and the fact that her intoxication was at least not so severe that she was cognizant of the fact that Dark\u2019s father had called the police to report her act and called him an \u201casshole\u201d for doing so before her arrest. And, while McSparrin was arrested for DWI, showing at least some level of intoxication, she later made a recorded statement for her insurance company admitting that her damage to Dark\u2019s vehicle was intentional.\nMcSparrin also contends that the trial court\u2019s decision violates public policy, arguing the General Assembly has \u201cendorsed the public policy in favor of compensating victims\u201d because it \u201chas seen fit to mandate automobile insurance coverage while home owners insurance is purely voluntary with the individual.\u201d However, Ark. Code Ann. \u00a7 27-22-101 (a) (Repl. 2008) states that the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance chapter \u201cis not intended in any way to alter or affect the validity of any policy provisions, exclusions, exceptions, or limitations contained in a motor vehicle policy required by this chapter.\u201d The trial court\u2019s decision that McSparrin\u2019s course of conduct showed that she acted intentionally in repeatedly ramming into Dark\u2019s vehicle is not clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, nor is it contrary to any public policy our General Assembly has announced. '\nAffirmed.\nMcSparrin also cites Talley v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co., 273 Ark. 269, 620 S.W.2d 160 (1981), for support. However, Talley involved the question of reconciling an intentional act \u2014 firing a shotgun blast at a car occupied by two individuals \u2014 with the unintended result of blindness.", "type": "majority", "author": "Tom Glaze, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Marshall Prettyman, Legal Aid of Arkansas, for appellant.", "Barrett & Deacon, P.A., by: Barrett Deacon and BrandonJ. Harrison for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "Diana McSPARRIN v. DIRECT INSURANCE\n07-934\n283 S.W.3d 572\nSupreme Court of Arkansas\nOpinion delivered April 24, 2008\nW. Marshall Prettyman, Legal Aid of Arkansas, for appellant.\nBarrett & Deacon, P.A., by: Barrett Deacon and BrandonJ. Harrison for appellee." }, "file_name": "0270-01", "first_page_order": 296, "last_page_order": 301 }